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To: Members of the Executive Board

From: The Secretary

**Subject: Review of the Resident Representative Program—
Selected Issues and Statistical Annex**

The attached supplementary background paper on review of the resident representative program (EBS/97/137, 7/25/97) has been prepared on the basis of additional information.

Ms. Doughty (ext. 37399) is available to answer questions relating to this paper prior to the Board discussion.

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Review of the Resident Representative Program: Selected Issues and Statistical AnnexPrepared by the Office of Internal Audit and Inspection¹

Approved by Eduard Brau

September 16, 1997

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I. HISTORY OF THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM

1. The resident representative program has its origin in Fund financial assistance to support member countries' stabilization programs and the accompanying desire by countries for on-the-spot policy and technical help from Fund staff in implementation of these programs. Since the initial assignments in the mid-1950s, growth in the number of resident representative posts has closely paralleled growth in the number of countries with Fund-supported economic programs or with which the Fund is intensively involved in other ways (Text Table 1). Three broad phases have marked the development of the resident representative program: 1956 through the mid-1970s; the mid-1970s through the 1980s; and 1990 through the present.

2. The period from the mid-1950s through the mid-1970s was characterized by organic development in the size and functions of the program. Until 1955, the Fund sent staff only on short-term technical assignments. The first long-term assignments were to Paraguay, Bolivia, and Haiti in 1956, representing the *de facto* start of the resident representative program (Text Table 2). Assignments in this early period were made both in connection with economic stabilization programs, which were often supported by stand-by arrangements with the Fund, and in some cases to meet members' requests for assistance on more specialized matters (including exchange control, central bank legislation, statistics, and monetary and fiscal policy). Staff on these long-term assignments carried various titles ("Fund Advisor", "Technical Advisor", "Resident Advisor", "Resident Expert"), and the administrative and financial arrangements with the host country were initially handled on an ad hoc basis. In 1957, however, the Executive Board adopted a proposal requesting members receiving such assistance to make a contribution to the cost of these assignments. Contributions included paying reasonable subsistence allowances in local currency and providing local transportation, office space, equipment and the like, while the Fund would meet all other costs.

3. The initial policy worked well for several years. In 1965, it was decided that a distinction should be made between long-term assignments with different core objectives, and that the existing administrative and financial arrangements would apply only to those assignments that involved straight technical assistance ("Technical Advisors"). In cases where staff members served principally as an extension of the Fund and provided a broad range of policy advice ("Resident Representatives"), the Fund would pay all costs associated with the assignment, with the exception of office space, secretarial assistance, and (where possible) local transportation. A third (intermediate) type of assignment ("Resident Advisors") would be used in situations calling for assistance of a predominantly specialized nature but that encompasses both technical and policy elements.² Like technical advisors, resident advisors would require higher country contributions than resident representatives, and both technical

²Resident advisors continued to be used within the resident representative program budget on an occasional basis through 1995 -- the most recent such assignments were to Zimbabwe and to the Baltic States (Resident Statistical Adviser) -- and they remain in use within the technical assistance budget.

Table 1. Growth of the Resident Representative Program, 1955-97 1/

Year	Number of Resident Representative Positions 2/	Number of Fund-supported Arrangements 3/	Number of Program/Intensive Countries	Number of IMF Member Countries 4/	Resident Representatives in percent of Area Department Staff
1955	--	3	...	53	...
1956	3	3	...	57	...
1960	2	12	...	66	...
1965	7	23	...	100	...
1970	17	23	...	117	6.0
1975	20	12	...	128	6.0
1980	18	29	...	141	6.0
1985	29	30	58	149	7.2
1990	32	51	73	154	7.2
1991	38	45	80	155	8.3
1992	51	53	102	157	9.3
1993	63	45	105	177	10.0
1994	69	47	108	178	10.3
1995	66	56	108	179	9.9
1996	68	57	107	181	10.3
1997	70	60	107	181	10.7

Sources: Administration Department, Treasurer's Department, Office of Budget and Planning, and IMF Annual Reports.

1/ Financial years.

2/ Data for actual staff years by Fund Advisors, Technical Advisors, and Resident Advisors (1956-1970), and for Executive Board ceiling on resident representative and resident advisor positions (1975-1997).

3/ Includes Stand-by arrangements and arrangements supported by the Extended Fund Facility, Structural Adjustment Facility, and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.

4/ Calendar year data (1955-90) and financial year data (1991-1997).

Table 2. Chronology of Principal Executive Board Developments
in the Resident Representative Program, 1956—96

-
- 1956** First long-term staff assignments were approved to Paraguay, Bolivia, and Haiti (EBM/56/12, EBD/57/112, and EBD/57/44, Supp. 1).
- 1957** Executive Directors approved a general policy relating to resident technical advisors and adopted a proposal to request recipient countries' contributions to offset part of the cost of long-term assignments (EBAP/57/37 and EBM/57/23).
- 1965** Executive Directors approved the concept of a "resident representative" who provides a broad range of policy and technical advice and serves as an extension of the Fund, drawing a distinction between resident representatives, resident advisors, and long-term technical advisors (EBAP/65/148 and EBM/65/58).
- 1969** Executive Directors approved a relaxation of the criteria for assignment of resident representatives (EBAP/69/150 and EBM/69/82).
- 1974** A review of the resident representative program in Latin America and the Caribbean undertaken by the Directors of Western Hemisphere and Administration Departments was considered by Executive Directors (EBAP/74/323).
- 1975/76** Several reviews of the program were considered by Executive Directors, leading to criteria for allocating resident representatives and to the introduction of a ceiling on total resident representative positions (EB/CAP/75/1, EB/CAP/75/11, EB/CAP/76/9, EB/CAP/76/15, EBAP/75/84, EBAP/75/176, EBAP/75/267, EBAP/76/123, EBM/76/9, and EBM/76/10).
- 1978** A review of the cost effectiveness of the program and the operation of the 1975/76 procedures was considered by Executive Directors (EB/CAP/78/2, EB/CAP/78/3, and EBAP/78/125).
- 1988** A review of the program carried out by the Administration Department in consultation with other departments was considered by Executive Directors (EBAP/88/161).
- 1994** A review of the program conducted by an *ad hoc* inter-departmental working group (the Resident Representative Review Committee) was considered by Executive Directors (EBAP/94/69).
-

Source: Executive Board documents.

and resident advisors generally operate with greater independence from headquarters than resident representatives. The use of resident representative assignments was initially restricted to countries which had stand-by arrangements with the Fund. In 1969, the Executive Board relaxed the assignment criteria and decided that resident representatives could remain after the expiry of stand-by arrangements and could be extended to countries without such arrangements. This decision supported an expansion in the resident representative program.

4. The evolution of the resident representative program from the mid-1970s through the 1980s was characterized by closer involvement of Executive Directors in the design of the program's administrative policies. As requests for resident representatives steadily grew, attention to costs led to a series of reviews in 1975 and 1976 that were discussed by the Executive Board Committee on Administrative Policies (CAP) and the Executive Board. In 1975, the Board officially adopted procedures whereby requests both for new posts and for the continuation of existing posts beyond a three year period would be appraised by the CAP and, if judged positively, would be submitted with the CAP's recommendation to the Executive Board via the relevant Executive Director. In 1976, after reviewing a range of possible approaches to limiting the number and duration of posts, the Board replaced the 1975 procedures with (i) criteria for the allocation of posts, and (ii) a ceiling on the total number of resident representative positions that would be set each year during the budget round (with the proviso that, should unforeseen circumstances arise, management could request an extension in the ceiling and that such requests would be considered on the basis of the criteria). The criteria adopted were that, in allocating resident representatives, priority would be given to countries facing serious financial difficulties, to newly independent countries in which technical expertise was relatively scarce, to cases where the actual or prospective use of Fund resources was high, and to cases with special needs such as those involving a debt rescheduling operation or an international aid consortium. Board approval was necessary (and remains necessary) to raise the budgetary ceiling on the number of positions but, within the ceiling, Fund management was authorized to open and close posts.

5. Reflecting growth in the number of member countries with Fund-supported arrangements and increasing demand from these members for resident representatives, the ceiling was raised on several occasions and the size of the program expanded by about 50 percent between 1975 and 1990. In 1978, the CAP reviewed the cost effectiveness of the program but concluded that increasing the country contributions requested in respect of these positions would be inappropriate as it could dilute the influence of resident representatives with national authorities and even compromise the objectivity of advice. The Board endorsed the CAP's recommendations that the 1976 procedures be retained and that efforts continue to be made to close posts if they ceased to be essential. In 1988, at the request of Executive Directors, the Administration Department undertook a Fund-wide review of the functions, administrative procedures, and cost effectiveness of the program. The review concluded that the benefits of the program to the Fund justified its costs; that the existing system for controlling program costs had worked well; that the ceiling on the number of positions had served as an effective control mechanism since resident representative posts had frequently

been closed in order to respect the ceiling; and that scaling down the program could lead to a deterioration in the quality of services provided by the Fund to member countries.

6. The development of the resident representative program in the period since 1990 has been dominated by the emergence of the transition countries and the accompanying rise in Fund membership. In late 1992/early 1993, in response to growth in the number of posts, many of the administrative features of the program now in effect (see Annex II of EBS/97/137), including the revised benefit package for resident representatives, the introduction of post operating budgets, and the creation of a specialized unit in Administration Department to handle the increased workload in opening new, and supporting new and existing, posts, were introduced. In April 1993, Executive Directors requested a review of several aspects of the program, including its budgetary impact, national contributions to post costs, the net benefits and general effectiveness of resident representatives, the appropriateness of the incentive package for these staff, and the administrative support arrangements for the program. An ad hoc interdepartmental working group of Fund staff was appointed by management to conduct the review and provide specific recommendations. The working group's recommendations -- which covered a range of issues including terms of reference for posts/resident representatives, continued emphasis on country contributions, resident representatives' selection, appointment, role, supervision and re-entry to headquarters -- were implemented by management in late 1993/early 1994. In October 1994, the Budget Committee reviewed the general conclusions of the working group and noted the areas in which changes had been introduced.

II. OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS' FIELD PROGRAMS

7. This section presents a brief comparison of the Fund's resident representative program with the field programs of other international organizations (Text Table 3). Since the IMF, as a monetary institution which views its field offices as transitional, differs in important respects from the development institutions surveyed, each of which view their field programs as a long-term local presence that is critical to the fulfillment of their mission in member countries, caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the results of the comparison.

8. Like the Fund, both the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have global field networks.³ The World Bank's resident missions provide policy advice, and support and monitor project implementation, across a broad range of areas from poverty eradication programs and institution-building projects to financial sector restructuring operations. The UNDP's field offices also have broad functions that range from mobilizing resources to delivering technical assistance and coordinating certain activities of other multilateral and bilateral organizations. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European

³While data for the Commission of the European Union (EU) are not shown in Text Table 3, the EU also has a global field network and at end-1996 had 131 representative offices.

Table 3. Field Office Coverage and Staffing of Comparator International Organizations 1/

	IMF 2/		WB 3/		ADB 4/		EBRD 5/		IDB 6/		UNDP 7/	
	Expat.	Local	Expat.	Local	Expat.	Local	Expat.	Local	Expat.	Local	Expat.	Local
Africa	17	87	62	479	0	0	0	0	0	0	158	1412
Asia and Pacific	12	46	44	307	30	109	0	0	1	1	75	759
Europe I	9	24	27	134	1	1	21	62	5	4	8	56
Europe II	19	69	16	151	0	0	17	81	0	0	19	174
Middle East	3	5	20	139	4	18	0	0	0	0	51	597
Western Hemisphere	10	18	34	84	1	3	0	0	173	284	52	701
Grand Totals:	70	249	203	1294	36	131	38	143	179	289	363	3699
Memorandum Items:												
Number of countries with posts:	66		72		11		23		28		130	
Expatriate staff in percent of total field staff:	22		14		22		21		38		9	
Average number of expatriates per post:	1.1		2.8		3.3		1.6		6.4		2.8	
Average total staff per post:	5		21		15		8		17		31	

Sources: IMF, World Bank (WB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

1/ "Expat." includes staff seconded directly from headquarters. "Local" includes locally-hired full-time staff at all grade levels, excludes local staff seconded and paid for by host governments, and excludes part-time staff. A zero indicates that the post is either vacant or manned by a consultant.

2/ Authorized staff years paid for by the IMF in posts open as of December 31, 1996.

3/ World Bank staffing of country offices as of December 31, 1996. Expatriate and local staff employed in the various types of bank field offices (including liaison offices, field offices, operations, units, and agricultural divisions), are included for those countries in which the bank has a resident mission.

4/ ADB staffing in resident missions and resident offices as of April 30, 1997.

5/ EBRD resident office staffing figures as of December 31, 1996.

6/ IDB country coverage as of December 31, 1996.

7/ UNDP proposed staffing including extrabudgetary staffing and emergency posts for 1996-1997.

Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have regional field networks within the respective geographical areas covered by each institution. The field offices of the IDB, ADB, and EBRD focus on monitoring and implementation of projects and loan programs, and are also active in the recruitment and support of consultants and specialized technical assistants.

9. Reflecting their field-based philosophies, and reflecting the project-specific and sectoral focus of the multilateral development institutions, these organizations:

- generally employ significantly larger numbers of local professional and support staff per post (about 18 on average by the World Bank, and between 6 and 28 by the other organizations) than the IMF (less than four local staff per post on average);
- employ higher numbers of expatriate staff per post on average (ranging from 1.6 for the EBRD to 6.4 for the IDB) than the IMF (1.1);
- have longer tours of duty for their representatives (approximately 3.5 years for the World Bank, three years for the EBRD, 3-5 years for the IDB, and 4-5 years for the UNDP) than the IMF (2.3 years average assignment length);
- have approaches to field benefits that increasingly emphasize the “localization” of benefits (benefits decline after a certain transition period to a field location) or the equalization of field benefits with those of headquarters-based staff. (In some cases, this trend reflects shifts toward terms of employment for all staff that explicitly provide for periodic field location as a general condition of employment);
- have more stable field networks over time (e.g., the World Bank has opened and closed about 45 and 7 posts, respectively, over the past 10 years) than the IMF which tends to open and close posts more frequently (60 openings and 27 closures over the same period);
- in the case of the UNDP (130 countries), has much more comprehensive geographical coverage than the IMF (66 countries); in the case of the World Bank (72 countries), have a similar country coverage to the IMF but more regional “hub” offices and a deepening philosophy of decentralization to the field; and, in the case of the EBRD (23 countries) and IDB (28 countries), though not the ADB (11 countries), have a more comprehensive field network than the IMF within their respective regions.

10. With the exception of the World Bank which owns about 5 percent of its field offices, neither the Fund nor any of the comparator organizations own the residences or offices used by their field representatives.

III. COST COMPARISONS⁴

A. Cost of IMF Resident Representative Program

11. Budgeted resident representative positions doubled from 34 in 1986 to 68 in 1996, paralleling a near doubling to 107 in the number of countries with Fund-supported programs or requiring intensive work by Fund staff (Text Table 4). In 1996, about 45 percent of the \$30 million costs to the Fund of the resident representative program were accounted for by posts located in transition countries, which rose from zero to 27 posts between 1989 and 1996 (Text Table 4). Over this period, the share of resident representative costs in total administrative expenses tripled to 6.3 percent (Text Table 4).

12. Average nominal budgetary expenditures per resident representative have remained broadly stable at some \$450,000 per annum since 1993 (Text Table 4). Salaries, benefits, and allowances absorbed approximately one half of costs in 1996, with the remainder shared between costs for residential housing and office space, and costs for travel and administrative support (Text Table 4). Average real costs per resident representative rose by more than two thirds between 1989 and 1993 but have remained broadly stable since then. Two factors account for the substantial increase in average real costs over this period (a period in which cost tracking also improved) -- the doubling in the number of resident representative positions (post openings entail high one-time costs) and the large proportion of these openings (more than 85 percent) that occurred in transition economies (the transition economies have proved to entail both higher-than-average opening and operating costs). A principal factor that has inhibited a decline in average real costs that might otherwise have been expected to accompany the tailing-off in post openings since 1993 is the enhanced field benefits package introduced in FY 1994.

13. In total, the value of office space and local services provided by national authorities is estimated to amount to about 7 percent of average costs per post or some \$30,000 per post per annum.⁵ In particular, national authorities provide office space for 80 percent of Fund posts on a rent-free basis or for a nominal contribution, while the Fund rents office premises on a commercial basis in the remaining 20 percent of cases.⁶ In addition, authorities provide Fund posts with the services of an average of one local staff member per post without charge or at minimum cost (overtime, bonuses), while the Fund employs at its own expense a further

⁴All references in this section to particular years are to financial years unless noted otherwise.

⁵FY 1996 estimate based on EBAP/94/69.

⁶FY 1997 data, International Facilities Unit, Administration Department.

Table 4. Resident Representative Program Costs (1984-96) 1/
(Financial years, in thousands of U.S. dollars unless indicated otherwise)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Total costs	3,400	4,000	4,900	5,300	5,400	5,100	5,300	7,800	11,600	20,300	25,671	27,264	29,815
of which countries in transition 2/	900	1,800	2,400	8,292	12,483	13,248	13,888
Total real costs 3/	3,400	3,800	4,500	4,600	4,600	4,200	4,200	5,800	8,400	13,800	17,000	17,820	19,211
of which countries in transition 2/	700	1,300	1,700	5,637	8,267	8,659	8,948
Total costs	3,400	4,000	4,900	5,300	5,400	5,100	5,300	7,800	11,600	20,300	25,671	27,264	29,815
of which: Regular salaries, benefits and allowances	6,847	8,647	9,482	10,783
Additional resident representative benefits and allowances	2,581	3,579	3,750	4,057
Travel (business and benefit)	427	541	828	1,317
Office and residence: lease, security furniture, and equipment	7,272	9,335	9,535	9,313
Administrative support, EDP support and other miscellaneous costs	3,174	3,570	3,669	4,344
Budgeted resident representative positions (in staff years)	25	29	34	31	30	27	32	38	51	63	69	66	68
Actual staff in the field (in effective staff years)	19	24	29	26	27	23	24	31	39	46	58	63	66
of which countries in transition 2/	4	6	7	20	23	24	27
Average cost per staff year 4/	180	167	169	189	200	222	221	252	303	441	451	430	450
Average real cost per staff year 3/	180	159	154	166	171	183	174	188	216	299	291	281	290
Program/intensive countries (number of countries)	63	58	58	60	63	67	73	80	102	105	108	108	107
Resident representative costs as a share of total administration expenses (in percent) 5/	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.8	3.5	5.2	5.7	5.9	6.3

Source: Office of Budget and Planning, and EBAP/94/69.

1/ All costs in this table represent costs to the Fund, excluding the value of country contributions to post costs.

2/ Using WEO definition of countries in transition.

3/ Adjusted for inflation using CPI-Urban Consumers for Washington, FY 1982-84 = 100.

4/ Budgetary cost basis per effective staff year as calculated by OBP.

5/ Total program costs as a percentage of the Fund's total administrative expenses net of reimbursements.

four local staff per post on average (security guards, drivers, messengers, etc).⁷ Overall, the Fund's average payment per local staff member is less than \$5,000 per annum.⁸

B. Cost of an IMF A14 Economist at Headquarters and in the Field

14. The cost of a typical Fund mid-range A14 economist in the field was \$398,000 in 1996, while the corresponding cost of that staff member at headquarters was \$251,000 (Text Table 5). The cost of an economist in the field shown in Text Table 5 differs from the average budgeted cost per resident representative shown in Text Table 4 in the treatment of capital expenses and post start-up costs (which are averaged over 3.5 years in Text Table 5 but treated on a cash basis in Text Table 4), and in removal of the unrepresentative upward bias that stems from the high costs of establishing and maintaining an office and residences in Moscow.^{9 10}

15. Both the field and headquarters cost measures shown in Text Table 5 include all reasonably identifiable overhead costs of operating, respectively, in the field and at headquarters. In particular, the cost estimate for a typical Fund resident representative includes \$80,000 per annum for residential housing (including security, furniture and equipment, maintenance, etc); \$18,000 per annum for office costs (supplies, operations, equipment, telecommunications, etc); \$37,000 per annum in administrative support (including components relating to local staff, ADM staff, BCS support, and area department administrative staff); and \$23,000 in other costs. The cost estimate for an equivalent headquarters-based economist includes \$17,000 per annum for office costs (supplies, operations, equipment, telecommunications, etc); \$42,000 per annum in administrative support (including components relating to ADM staff, BCS support, and area department administrative staff); and \$2,000 in other costs.

16. In 1996, it thus required \$147,000 per annum in additional remuneration and other costs to support the work of a typical A14 economist as a resident representative. This incremental cost of placing an economist in the field rather than at headquarters is key information for decision making. Over the medium-term, it is the approximate annual incremental cost to the Fund against which the value of a typical resident representative

⁷End-1996 data, Staff Benefits Division, Administration Department.

⁸FY 1996, OBP (Memorandum from Mr. Wolfe to Mr. Ouattara; September 5, 1996).

⁹See EBS/97/137, page 48, for further discussion of the differences between the two cost concepts.

¹⁰The ongoing costs of operating the Moscow office have been reduced by about 25 percent from FY 1997.

Table 5. Comparison of Field/Headquarters Cost Profiles 1/

(FY 1996, in thousands of U.S. dollars)

	Resident Representative			Headquarters		
	IMF	World Bank	ADB/IDB/UNDP (minimum-maximum)	IMF	World Bank	ADB/IDB/UNDP (minimum-maximum)
Regular salaries, benefits and allowances	162	173	150-192	162	173	150-156
Additional resident representative benefits and allowances	56	39	0-23	0	0	0
Travel	22	36 2/	18-28	28	44 2/	14-39
Office and residence: lease, security, furniture, and equipment	98	84	6-48	17	20	7-18
Administrative support, EDP support, and other miscellaneous costs	60	67 3/	12-24	44	47	10-26
Total costs	398	399	203-260 4/	251	284	201-222 5/

Sources: IMF figures compiled by OIA on the basis of Office of Budget and Planning data; World Bank Planning and Budgeting Department; Asian Development Bank Office of the Controller; Inter-American Development Bank Compensation and Benefits Division; and United Nations Development Programme Division for Audit and Management Review.

1/ Cost profile of a Fund resident representative and an equivalent Fund economist based at headquarters, together with cost profiles for equivalent staff of the World Bank, ADB, IDB, and UNDP. For the IMF, this profile is based on a mid-range A14 economist, married with two children; for the World Bank, ADB, IDB, and UNDP, the profile is based on a staff member at a broadly equivalent level.

2/ World Bank business travel costs are, on average, significantly higher than the IMF, both at headquarters and for resident representatives, due to travel to project sites outside capital cities.

3/ This includes field costs related to mission support which are transfer-charged by Bank resident offices to regional departments and are estimated by the World Bank to amount to 7 percent of resident representative support costs.

4/ The median figure for these institutions is \$254,000.

5/ The median figure for these institutions is \$210,000.

should be measured. In 1996, the incremental cost of \$147,000 for a resident representative position would have funded approximately 1.3 staff missions.¹¹

C. Resident Representative Costs of Comparator Organizations

17. The Fund and World Bank expenditures for a typical mid-range A14 staff member located in the field are virtually identical, reflecting the two organizations' parallel salary and benefit structures (Text Table 5).¹² The principal difference between Fund and Bank costs for an equivalent staff member located at headquarters are in travel expenses, due to a higher proportion of the Bank's travel being to locations outside national capitals (Text Table 5).

18. Field costs for the ADB, the IDB, and the UNDP for a typical A14 staff member are substantially below those incurred by the Fund and Bank, notwithstanding very similar regular salaries, benefits, and allowances for headquarters-based economists (Text Table 5). Setting aside intrinsic differences in travel expenses (which stem from the different orientations and locations of these organizations) and related differences in administrative and communication support costs, these organizations' lower costs for field-based economists are explained by lower field benefits and allowances, and by higher contributions by field-based staff to their housing expenses. As a condition of employment and normal part of a career, the regional development banks and the UNDP expect their staff to spend a significant proportion of their careers stationed away from headquarters. As a result, the inducements offered to staff to locate abroad are significantly lower than those offered by the Fund and the Bank. In addition, expenditures by the Fund on the security of its field staff are generally higher than those of other international organizations (with the exception of the UNDP which has certain specialized security needs), amounting to 2 percent of the average cost of a field staff member compared to less than 1 percent on average for the ADB and IDB.¹³

¹¹Based on FY 1993 mission cost data, EBAP/93/78. This estimate assumes that a typical staff mission involves one mission chief and three economists for two weeks in the field and for two weeks before and one week after the mission.

¹²The cost comparison in Text Table 5 is with a World Bank staff member who is at an equivalent grade to that of the Fund's "typical" resident representative (mid-range of grade A14). It should be noted, however, that the Bank's "typical" field representative tends in fact to be 1-3 grades higher than this level, in the same manner that staff grades in the Bank at headquarters tend on average to be somewhat higher than those in the Fund. As a result, the A14-based cost comparison shown in Text Table 5 is less "representative", involving more of a deviation from average field costs, for the Bank than for the Fund.

¹³The World Bank's security expenditures are decentralized and no consolidated statistics exist for total Bank spending on security.

19. In relation to total administrative expenditures, the costs of the Fund's resident representative program are lower than those of the Bank's network of field offices and closer to those of the EBRD and ADB, and all of these organizations including the Bank spend proportionately less on their field networks than the IDB and UNDP (Text Table 6).

IV. THE CURRENT BUDGETARY FRAMEWORK¹⁴

20. The current budgetary process for the resident representative program incorporates elements relating both to the number of resident representative positions and to the dollar costs of resident representative posts. Budget planning and formulation for the program are integrated with the annual cycles for the Medium-Term Budgetary Outlook and the Administrative and Capital Budgets. Estimates of the likely demand for resident representative positions and the likely cost of the program over the forthcoming three-year period are incorporated in the Managing Director's Statement on the Budgetary Outlook in the Medium Term, which is considered initially by the Committee on the Budget and then by the Executive Board in January of each year. Final estimates for the number of resident representative positions and the budgeted costs of the program in the coming year are included in the Administrative Budget proposed by management to the Executive Board in mid-April. The Board's approval of the Fund's Administrative Budget includes a decision that effectively establishes the total number of resident representative positions as a ceiling authorized by the Board for the forthcoming financial year.

21. In the context of the medium-term budget exercise initiated in June of each year, OBP seeks initial information from area departments on expected demand by country for resident representative positions during the next financial year and the subsequent two years. Departmental submissions are received in late summer and reviewed over the next few months. When detailed preparations for the annual budget round for the coming financial year commence in January, OBP seeks an update from area departments of the likely demand for resident representative positions. To assess the competing demands for resources, area departments are asked to provide information on (i) the need for continuing to maintain existing resident representative posts; (ii) the priority assigned by area departments to each post; (iii) the expected need for new openings and their justification; (iv) the status of current and prospective Fund-supported arrangements and/or other interaction with each member country in which a post is to be operated; and (v) the possibility of closing low priority posts and the likely impact of such closures. OBP provides management with a summary and commentary on the submissions and with a ranking of countries from highest to lowest priority for location of a post. The priority ranking is based on a number of factors including whether or not the country has a Fund program, the type of program, the country's borrowing from the Fund, and the quota size of the member. Management decides the total number and

¹⁴See EBS/97/137 for a general description of the budget framework that is proposed to form part of modified program arrangements.

Table 6. Comparison of Field Costs in Relation to Total Costs

(FY 1996)

	Field Program Costs	Total Administrative Budget Expenditures	Field Costs as a Percent of Total Administrative Budget
	(In millions of U.S. dollars)		(In percent)
International Monetary Fund	30	471	6.3
World Bank	108	1,263	8.5
Asian Development Bank	13	191	6.9
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	8	122	6.5
Inter-American Development Bank	56	291	19.4
United Nations Development Programme	142	471	30.2

Sources: IMF Office of Budget and Planning; World Bank Planning and Budgeting Department; Asian Development Bank, Office of the Controller; Inter-American Development Bank Compensation and Benefits Division; European Development Bank for Reconstruction and Development Office of the Assistant Director of Personnel; and United Nations Development Programme for Audit and Management Review.

distribution of posts across departments to be included in the proposed budget submitted to the Board for the coming year.

22. Administration Department (ADM) administers the central dollar budget that supports all expenditures related to the resident representative program with the exception of resident representatives' salaries and regular benefits.¹⁵ During the annual budget round, ADM draws up detailed consolidated estimates of the dollar requirements necessary to support the program based on (i) the proposed number and distribution of resident representative positions approved by management; (ii) budget requests from resident representatives (as reviewed and forwarded by area departments) based on the likely cost of operating each post; and (iii) ADM's experience in administering the program. Following review of ADM's estimates by area departments and OBP, management decides the final dollar figure for support of the program to be included in the Fund's budget proposal to the Board. Once the Board has approved the annual budget, notifications are issued by OBP to departments indicating both the dollar budget allocated to ADM to support the program and the number of resident representative positions assigned to each area department.

23. Since resident representative positions are effectively subject to a staff ceiling approved by the Executive Board, these positions are administered from a central pool throughout the year and are neither part of area department staff ceilings nor fungible with other area department staff resources.¹⁶ Post opening decisions and the allocation of the necessary position(s) from the central pool are at the discretion of management, while decisions on post closures may be made unilaterally by area departments. Guidelines set out by management for the program require area departments to seek agreement in principle from management to open a post before any commitments are made to national authorities, and for departments to address budgetary and other issues with ADM and OBP before forwarding proposals to management.¹⁷ Thus, if a department wishes to open a new post during the year it is necessary to seek approval and a resident representative position from the central pool in order to do so. If there are no positions available in the pool, a department has to close an existing post in order to open a new post. Equally, if a post is closed during the year, the

¹⁵ Local staff employed in resident representative offices are budgeted in dollars and fall within this central dollar budget rather than within the ceiling on resident representative positions.

¹⁶For analytical purposes, resident representative staff appear as a separate item in the area department category of budget tables that show staff resources employed by organizational unit (e.g., Tables 6 and 24 of EBAP/97/32; April 1, 1997).

¹⁷The guidelines are contained in a Memorandum from the Deputy Managing Director to Departments (March 30, 1994), as updated by a Memorandum from the Deputy Director, Administration Department to Senior Personnel Managers of Area Departments (December 18, 1995).

resident representative position(s) released by the closure revert to the central pool.¹⁸ This approach to post opening, closure and distribution decisions tends to favor the *status quo* distribution of resident representative positions since, in practice, a higher standard of "evidence" regarding the merits of an individual case is necessary for decisions either during the budget round or throughout the year that require a shift in the distribution of positions across departments than for decisions that require changes only in the country allocation of positions within a department. The system has had limited success in achieving net post closures by those departments relatively unaffected by the emergence of the transition economies, and thus has only occasionally achieved distributional changes in resident representative positions across departments without expansion in the total number of resident representative positions.

24. The program guidelines provide for proposals both to open posts and to extend posts (upon the turnover or extension of resident representative staff who are generally appointed for only one year at a time) to be forwarded to management only after (i) the national authorities have made a formal request for the opening or extension of the post; (ii) the area department and the authorities have discussed preliminary terms of reference for the proposed resident representative position; (iii) the area department has selected and obtained the authorities' agreement to a specific candidate for the post; and (iv) both ADM and OBP have reviewed and provided their comments on the proposal. Following management's authorization to open a new post or extend an existing post, the authorities are formally notified of the decision, the candidate's appointment is formally proposed by the Fund to the country, and the responsibilities of the authorities -- including in relation to the country's expected contribution to the costs of the post -- are formally agreed.

25. While most dollar costs associated with operation of the resident representative program are administered centrally by ADM, there are two general exceptions to this process.¹⁹

(i) the costs of non-benefit resident representative travel outside the country of assignment (e.g., travel back to headquarters or elsewhere for consultation with departments, for the Annual Meetings, to participate in discussions between Fund staff and the authorities of the country, for Consultative Group and Paris Club meetings) are budgeted and administered by the relevant area department; and,

¹⁸Due to temporary periods of vacancy at some posts, the number of staff years actually used from the central pool during the year will typically fall a little short of the budgetary ceiling (e.g., over FY 1993-97 the annual budgetary ceiling on the number of resident representative positions averaged 67.2, while the staff years used averaged 60 per annum).

¹⁹Post expenditures that are normally paid directly by ADM include residential rent, major renovations, furniture and furnishings, and contractual services.

(ii) a portion of the central dollar budget is devolved from ADM to each individual post to form a “post operating budget” that typically covers office expenses, residential expenses, representation, in-country travel expenses, and some local purchases of goods and services. Responsibility for budgeting, control and monitoring of post operating budgets resides in the first instance with each resident representative and in the second instance with resident representatives’ area department supervisors and ADM.

V. TARGETING OF THE PROGRAM: SELECTED ISSUES

A. Post Openings, Closures and Time Horizons

Post Openings

26. National authorities, to a greater extent than mission teams, view the need to strengthen local macroeconomic capacities as a factor that should be a key consideration in decisions on whether to open a resident representative post and on whether a post should remain open. In post opening decisions, authorities believe that the most important factors should be the need for an intensive dialogue between the Fund and the country (77 percent), the need to strengthen local macroeconomic capacity (64 percent), and the need for on-site policy advice (62 percent) (Annex Table 2). Mission teams believe that the most important factors should be the need for close monitoring of developments (83 percent), the likelihood that the post will make a material difference to policy implementation (77 percent), and the need for an intensive dialogue (77 percent) (Annex Table 2). In free-form survey responses regarding the main need for keeping the post in their country open, national authorities point to a reduced dialogue if the post were to close (37 percent), the need to monitor economic programs (30 percent), the need for on-site policy advice (21 percent) and the need to develop macroeconomic policy-making and planning capabilities (21 percent). While mission teams also point to the need for on-site policy advice (26 percent) and to a reduced dialogue if the post were to close (24 percent), they tend to emphasize the need for program monitoring (45 percent) and to rate data collection needs (22 percent) above developing macroeconomic capacity (11 percent) as key reasons for keeping the post in their country open.

Post Closures

27. Survey respondents overall view the factors that should be important in post closure decisions as whether effective monitoring of developments (85 percent of all respondents) and an effective dialogue (84 percent) can be sustained without a post, whether the post has achieved its objectives (73 percent), and whether local capacity to formulate and implement macro-economic policies is strong (72 percent) (Annex Table 2). Mission teams, however, place greatest weight (91 percent) on whether effective monitoring of developments can be sustained without a post, a characteristic that they share with a specific subgroup of national authorities’ respondents -- those from countries in which posts have been located for many years. National authorities in this “long-duration group” are much more likely (88 percent) than authorities in general (68 percent) to hold the view that, in post closure decisions, the

most important factor is whether effective monitoring of developments can be sustained without a post.²⁰ In free-form responses, all respondent groups identify the most important effects of closing the post in their countries as a reduced dialogue and a reduced knowledge of program developments, while mission teams and resident representatives also point to less effective program design. Mission teams are more likely than other respondents to identify less effective data exchange as one of the most important effects of closing the post in their country. In country interviews and visits, senior officials pointed to the loss of resident representatives' policy advice as a key issue in the event that the post was to close and also to the loss of the public relations work of resident representatives.

28. Regarding how to assess when a post is no longer necessary, the view most commonly expressed by national authorities and resident representatives (45 percent and 48 percent, respectively) in free-form responses to the question "how will you know when the post in your country is no longer necessary?" is that this point is reached when sound economic practices have been established. Mission teams are evenly divided between this view (34 percent) and the view that a post is no longer necessary at the conclusion of a program relationship with the country (30 percent). In country interviews, officials observed that there are risks associated with closure in situations where the experience and discipline of political/democratic institutions are in their infancy both because these institutions may falter and because, as political/democratic institutions develop and gain confidence, this can itself place increasing strains on the ability to run sound macroeconomic policies.

Time Horizons

29. A majority of mission team respondents tends to view their country as likely to no longer strictly require a post within a shorter time frame (zero to six years) than the majority of respondents overall (two to eight years), and only half as many mission staff (almost 10 percent) as national authorities (almost 20 percent) view their countries as likely to require a post for more than ten years (Annex Table 2).²¹ Despite the fact that posts in long-duration cases have been in operation for almost three times as long as posts overall, national authorities in the long-duration group are more than twice as likely as authorities in general

²⁰The long-duration group comprises the 11 countries covered by the survey that had (a) the longest combined post duration and post time-span (see Figure 1, Annex II, EBS/97/137 for definitions of these concepts); and (b) at least one national authorities' respondent. The 11 countries and the 17 officials who responded for these countries comprise, respectively, 20 percent of the 54 countries and 20 percent of the 84 national authorities' respondents for which responses are included in the survey results.

²¹An illustration of national authorities' longer time horizons to closure was provided during country interviews by a senior national policy-maker who suggested that the post in his country would no longer be necessary after three successive parliaments had backed the implementation of sound policies and noted that this could take 10 or more years.

(41 percent versus 19 percent) to view the time horizon within which the post in their country will no longer be strictly necessary as greater than 10 years.

30. The 2-8 year time horizon of the majority of respondents suggests that, given the average period from the (most recent) opening of each post to end-1996 was 6.5 years, an aggregate planning time horizon of some 9-15 years from the time a post is opened may be realistic in the *majority* of cases for the current generation of resident representative posts.²² So why have some current posts been open for much longer periods than 9-15 years? IMF respondents were asked about the factors they believe to be important in explaining why some posts have remained open for very long periods (e.g., 15 years and longer). The most important factor cited by both mission team and IMF respondents generally is inadequate local capacity (45 percent), followed by changing needs and circumstances of countries in which posts continued to have important roles to play (42 percent), and the high degree of effectiveness of posts in supporting IMF-member interaction (41 percent) (Annex Table 2). Executive Board and senior IMF staff respondents are more likely than other groups to point to lobbying of the Fund by member countries (52 percent), and both these respondents (47 percent) and mission teams (40 percent) point to a poor focus on exit strategies as an important factor explaining long-duration posts. IMF respondents working with the long-duration group of countries tend to place relatively greater weight on vested interests by area departments as a reason for long posts, and relatively less weight on changing country circumstances, than IMF respondents in general.

31. Also important in this context are respondents' views regarding time horizons as they apply to the actual work of posts. Almost two thirds of respondents believe that the main players (national authorities, IMF HQ-based staff, and resident representatives) work with short time horizons, focussing mostly on posts' short-term priorities rather than on functions with medium-term benefits (Annex Table 1). Moreover, almost 90 percent of resident representatives report that the time horizon of most work assignments delegated to them by area departments is less than one week, and more than 50 percent of representatives report that most work delegated by area departments is for completion within a day or two (Annex Table 10).

²²While this 9-15 years period is one "indicator" that emerged from the survey against which it may be valid to assess the average duration of posts in aggregate, *it would not be valid to apply this indicator to individual countries*. The current generation of posts encompasses a spectrum of individual country situations including recent transition cases, countries with long-lived and persistent deficits in local capacity, post-conflict cases, and countries which have been repeat hosts to resident offices for short intervals over the years. Each of these groups has differing characteristics (and, indeed, individual countries within these groups have differing characteristics) with likely implications for the relevant post horizon. In many cases, the relevant post horizon may well be shorter than 9-15 years.

B. The Linkage Between the Role of Posts and Post Duration

32. The appropriate time horizon over which resident representative posts should remain open is closely related to the role of posts and to how one assesses when a post has fulfilled its role and is no longer necessary. Overall, the results discussed above regarding post openings, closures, and time horizons point to *a disconnect -- particularly on the part of mission staff but also on the part of some national authorities -- between, on the one hand, general recognition that weak local macroeconomic capacity underlies unwillingness to close posts and, on the other hand, lack of emphasis in specific cases on the related need for posts to play a role in strengthening local macroeconomic capacity.* The horizon of mission staff is driven to a greater extent than other players by short-term program and data requirements, and this group is more likely to view a post as redundant outside a program-driven environment. National authorities, in turn, may be influenced by short-term political cycles, and resident representatives by the horizon of their main clients -- national authorities and mission teams. While all groups realize that weak local capacity is a key factor inhibiting post closure in many cases, each group faces incentives to focus on short-term priorities in their work with posts rather than on efforts -- likely to pay off over the medium-term -- to overcome capacity weaknesses. This time-inconsistency problem is likely to extenuate the horizon over which posts are needed.

33. The disconnect between medium-term prerequisites for post closure and short-term work practices relating to posts is at odds with respondents' clear majority view that (1) posts should be transitional in nature and have, as one of their major goals, the function of building up local institutions and mechanisms so that relations can ultimately be managed effectively without a resident representative office (52 percent of all respondents); and (2) that posts should thus place approximately equal emphasis on supporting programs and supporting local capacity-building efforts (56 percent of all respondents) (Annex Table 1). The close linkage in this area of posts' role and their duration is clearly underlined by the views of national authorities from the long-duration group of countries. National authorities in this group basically see posts as having a permanent monitoring role. These authorities do not share to the same extent as national authorities in general the view that posts should be transitional (35 percent of long-duration national respondents versus 46 percent of all national respondents) or that posts should place broadly equal emphasis on supporting programs and capacity-building (41 percent versus 51 percent). These authorities are more likely to believe that posts should be viewed as long-term (41 percent versus 33 percent) and that their primary emphasis should be on program support (47 percent versus 31 percent). While this group places just as much emphasis as national authorities generally on strong local capacity as a prerequisite for closure (64 percent versus 62 percent), they are much less likely to strongly agree that the role of resident representatives should move toward greater emphasis on macroeconomic capacity-building (35 percent versus 59 percent).

34. The consensus view of respondents in general -- that the appropriate role for posts is broadly equal support for capacity-building and policies/programs, and that the appropriate

time horizon is the transition period to local institutions/capacities that are sufficiently strong to formulate and implement effective macroeconomic policies -- is supported by other survey results related to objectives (Annex Table 1), comparative advantage (Annex Table 1), the relative contributions of resident representatives and staff missions to various result areas (Annex Table 3), and by the views expressed by senior officials in country interviews and visits regarding the role of posts (see Text Table 9 in section V.C below). In particular, it is supported by views on the directions important to improve the effectiveness of the resident representative program over the medium-term. A majority of all respondent groups strongly agree that the role of resident representatives should move toward greater emphasis on on-site macroeconomic policy advice (69 percent), program monitoring (69 percent), local capacity-building in areas of macroeconomic policy formulation and implementation (56 percent), and public relations (55 percent) (Annex Table 1). Overall, the results in these areas suggest that posts should have three principal or "core" roles -- (1) on-site policy advice, (2) program support, and (3) support for local capacity-building -- together with several "derived" or secondary roles, the fulfillment of which would in most cases essentially spring from effective performance of the core roles (Text Table 7). Each of the core and derived roles listed in Text Table 7 is a role viewed by a majority of survey respondents both as being an area in which posts have a comparative advantage relative to staff missions (Annex Table 1) and as an area that *should* be an objective of posts (Annex Table 1).

Table 7. Core and Derived Roles of Posts

1. Core Roles

- * On-site policy advice, including early warning
- * Program monitoring and assisting with implementation
- * Capacity/institution/transparency building

2. Derived Roles

- * Strengthening the dialogue
- * Local public relations, briefings, liaison with other organizations
- * Information exchange: to HQ on local economic and other developments, and from HQ on periodic information requests by the authorities
- * Local coordination of Fund-provided TA and training activities

35. At present, resident representatives on average spend about 6 percent of their time on activities they view as directly contributing to strengthening local macroeconomic capacities

or institutions (Annex Table 1). While some of the functions currently carried out by posts contribute *indirectly* to capacity-building (e.g., coordinating IMF-provided technical assistance and training), *direct* emphasis by posts on efforts to strengthen local capacities is an area of significant untapped potential in the resident representative program and one that is in the interests of both the Fund and the authorities. For posts to be genuinely transitional, it is essential that they contribute to a strengthening of local institutions to the point where a post is no longer necessary for Fund-member interaction. A natural consequence of preoccupation with short-term results is likely to be less attention to medium-term exit conditions and low “investment” in bringing these conditions about. Activities that strengthen local macro-economic capacities may be repeatedly placed on a “back-burner”, while short-term priorities are met. A view expressed by some mission respondents is that the best contribution that can be made by Fund staff to members’ macroeconomic capacities is by staff working to secure the success of programs. Short-term program success does not directly correspond, however, to solid local institutions/capacities that enable such success to be sustained over the medium-term. In practice, a degree of tension can exist between the two ends.²³ While staff missions contribute to strengthening local capacities, as do technical assistance missions, resident representatives are best placed -- by virtue of their ongoing residence in countries -- to assist with capacity/institution-building efforts that involve continuity of input and development over a period of time (see Text Table 8).

36. Greater balance in the relative priority accorded to each of the three core roles of posts identified in Text Table 7 above would likely make an important contribution to reducing the average duration of individual posts and to boosting posts’ tangible contribution to the Fund’s efforts to assist members in meeting their macroeconomic development agendas. Given the incentives facing posts’ principal clients (national authorities and mission teams) however, ensuring that capacity-building objectives are met and that posts are genuinely transitional in nature will be critically dependent on strong leadership on this issue by the senior staff of area departments’ immediate offices. The establishment of specific terms of reference for posts that set out in concrete terms what the Fund and the authorities intend to achieve together over the horizon that the post is expected to be necessary should go a long way toward ensuring that greater priority on capacity-building efforts is translated into concrete results. While maximizing operational effectiveness should be the primary determinant in departments’ decisions regarding whether a post is and/or remains warranted in individual cases, improvements in local capacity should *ceteris paribus* result in average

²³The extent of the tensions between these two ends, and the degree of frustration on the part of some national authorities, should not be underestimated. There are cases where, after a number of years of arrangements with the Fund, the data transformations necessary to monitor program variables are calculated in Washington, and are unable to be effectively monitored locally by either national authorities or resident representatives because the precise technical specification of program variables has not been presented to the authorities or explained to the relevant technical officials. While such cases may represent an extreme form of ongoing “short-termism”, milder versions of the problem are relatively pervasive.

Table 8. Posts and Local Capacity-Building

- * In one half of the 20 country cases in which posts' past contribution to local capacity-building was discussed during interviews and visits, officials said that resident representatives had played a role in this area at some stage during the life of the post, albeit informally and subject to the proclivities of individual resident representative staff in this direction.
- * For example, one senior official noted that: *"Most of the current policy-making team (including me) learnt everything they know about short-term macroeconomic policy management from Fund resident representatives in the early days. In particular, more was learnt from resident representatives than from missions about how a financial program is put together. In this area of financial programming concepts, IMF courses are no substitute for resident representatives working with officials over a sustained period."*
- * In those cases (21 countries) where officials were asked during interviews and visits whether resident representatives *should* play a role during their tenure in supporting capacity/institution/transparency building in one macroeconomic area identified together by staff and the authorities, national authorities were strongly in favor of such a role in over 75 percent of cases. In about 15 percent of cases, officials expressed views along the lines of "maybe" or "depending on the situation" and, in 10 percent of cases, authorities would not favor resident representatives having a capacity-building role.
- * A number of advantages of a more formal role for resident representatives in supporting local efforts to strengthen macroeconomic capacity were noted by officials, including that such a role *"could seriously help to build program ownership"*; that *"capacity-building in the area of the Fund's financial programming framework would enable programs to be monitored locally and eventually even developed locally. At present, if the Governor (of the Central Bank) asks about progress relative to the program, the resident representative cannot give a definite response until he hears from Washington where the data is sent for monitoring"*; and that *"with a more effective transfer of skills, the Memorandum of Economic Policies could become a "home-made document that the IMF rubber stamps, instead of an IMF-made document that the Government rubber stamps"*.

planned time horizons for the majority of posts being reduced from the current horizon of some 9-15 years from the time a post is opened. Without both clear specification of the mechanisms by which posts will reach the closure horizon, and effective monitoring of progress by departments, the risk is distinct that posts will tend to remain several years' away from the point at which mission staff and authorities feel ready to close the post. In such

circumstances, the relative weight accorded to capacity-building support should be increased and efforts to reach a satisfactory closure window should be reinvigorated.

C. Program and Post-Program Contexts

37. The survey data do not lend themselves to definitive empirical conclusions regarding the use of posts in program contexts relative to post-program contexts since the sample of post-program cases with a resident representative post is small.²⁴ Certain survey and other results contain some limited information, however, about the extent to which the appropriate role of posts may vary between program and post-program situations and/or between ESAF-supported cases relative to SBA/EFF-supported cases.

38. IMF survey respondents were asked to comment on a diagram showing a “continuum model” of Fund interaction with member countries that very broadly depicts a spectrum from pre-program through post-program country situations (Figure 1). Respondents were asked to indicate which of the characterizations of country situation, IMF objectives, and post objectives in the diagram best corresponds to that of the country to which they are assigned. A majority (54 percent) of those who responded (almost 80 percent of those asked) indicated that country situation three (“moderate or sector-specific macroeconomic imbalances”) best characterizes the country to which they are assigned, while 25 percent selected situation two (“large or economy-wide macroeconomic imbalances”), 11 percent situation one (“systemic upheaval or post-conflict”), and 10 percent situation four (“relative macroeconomic stability but continuing structural weaknesses”). Pattern and correlation analysis of responses indicates that the specific configurations of country situations, IMF objectives, and post objectives associated with each other in the diagram are viewed as broadly appropriate.²⁵ Thus, at the broadest of levels, a majority of respondents view information gathering as a role of posts that should decrease in relative importance, on-site policy advice as a role that will tend to decline in relative intensity, and capacity-building as a role of posts that should increase in relative importance, as countries approach stable macroeconomic conditions and the focus of Fund-member interaction shifts to sustaining and safeguarding macroeconomic stability in post-program environments.


39. The survey results reveal that views on the core aspects of the role of resident representatives are largely shared between those working with posts in countries with ESAF-

²⁴While a number of countries were “between” programs at the time the survey was carried out, only four countries could be classified as non-program or post-program situations.


²⁵The characterizations of both IMF and post objectives are positively correlated (coefficients of 0.7 and 0.6, respectively, each statistically significant at the five percent level) with that of indicative country situations, and the characterization of post objectives is positively correlated with that of IMF objectives (coefficient of 0.6, statistically significant at the 5 percent level).

Figure 1. Three-Dimensional "Continuum Model" of IMF Interaction with Member Countries


A: Indicative country situation



B: Main "objectives" or focus of IMF's involvement with country



C: Main "objectives" or focus of an IMF resident representative post ^{1/}



^{1/}In addition to the primary objectives identified in each phase, all resident representative posts are assumed to fulfil a number of common functions: strengthening the dialogue between the IMF and national authorities, local coordination of IMF-provided technical assistance, and public relations.

supported arrangements, those working with posts in countries with stand-by and EFF-supported arrangements, and those working with posts in “other” situations.²⁶ Respondents in all three groups rate on-site policy advice and program monitoring among the three most important directions in which the role of resident representatives should move in order to improve the effectiveness of posts. For all three groups, capacity/institution/transparency-building also features as one of the three key directions for greater emphasis by resident representatives -- in its simplest “*capacity-building*” form in the case of both the ESAF and “other” groups, and in its alternative “*transparency-building*” form (via public relations/information) in the case of the SBA/EFF group. This shift toward greater emphasis on public information activities by the SBA/EFF group tends to support the view (see EBS/97/137, page 18) that, as countries’ economic performance strengthens and they move toward a post-program relationship with the Fund, the simpler capacity/institution-building role of posts should evolve into a role in promoting macroeconomic transparency. In order to bolster the likelihood that sustainable policies will be maintained in a post-program environment, the private sector should take on a greater role in policy “monitoring” and, in order for the private sector to be able to fulfill this role, public information and policy transparency take on growing importance.

40. The views expressed by many officials during country interviews and visits about the weight that they currently place and/or would place in the future in program and post-program contexts on various aspects of the role of resident representatives (summarized in Text Table 9) were consistent with the broad themes that emerge in this area from the survey results. In particular, many of the national authorities interviewed held strongly to the view that resident representatives should not be withdrawn immediately following the conclusion of program relationships, arguing that such withdrawal effectively removes all “safety nets”, magnifying the impact of the reduced frequency of staff missions and isolating policy-makers from Fund advice at a time when it is often most needed. Irrespective of the fact that the Fund and the member no longer have a program-based relationship, officials noted that the IMF’s advice and public statements exert considerable informal pressure on authorities to maintain prudent policies, and that the Fund’s influence in this respect is generally greater than that of domestic advisers or commentators. In many post-program cases, the authorities continue to take their cues to an important extent from the Fund. A number of officials noted that, in cases where reforms are apt to slide during the implementation phase, a specific role often remains for close monitoring of changes in the sequencing and/or pace of reforms from that “advertised”. Resident representatives can reinforce the impact of Special Data Dissemination Standard

²⁶The views of IMF mission team respondents were analyzed according to which of three groups the country to which they are assigned falls into: (1) those with a stand-by or an EFF-supported arrangement (hereafter the SBA/EFF group); (2) those with an ESAF-supported arrangement (hereafter the ESAF group); and (3) “other” (hereafter the “other” group) which comprises countries with no Fund-supported arrangement (mostly those countries between programs at the time of the survey, plus a few post-program and non-program cases). The almost 190 mission team respondents fell virtually equally into each of these three groups.

Table 9. Program and Post-Program Contexts: National Authorities' Views

Role of Posts in Program Cases

- * A stewardship role: explaining the rationale for missions' policy recommendations, promoting greater understanding of the need for certain policy measures among different branches of government, and assisting the authorities to implement policies.
- * An early warning and policy advice role.
- * A capacity-building role (see Text Table 8).
- * A public advocacy role for economic adjustment/reforms: helping to build public (and parliamentary) understanding of the need for certain policy measures.
- * The role of a "bridge" to the Fund: smoothing over or preventing periodic small misunderstandings, "translating" local developments or the authorities' rationale for certain policy measures into terms that can be easily interpreted by HQ-based staff.

Role of Posts in Post-Program Cases

- * An informal "intellectual stimulus" role: sustaining an ongoing dialogue with, and often providing a valued source of relatively scarce analytical "feedback" for, key technocrats.
- * A precautionary "complacency deterrence" role: by signaling the Fund's continued close monitoring of policies, a resident representative's presence acts as an inhibiting influence on temptations to alter or reverse policy direction.
- * The role of an independent, objective "best practice promoter": the Fund's wealth of cross-country experience and strong technical reputation can be extremely helpful tools in the domestic dialogue between technocrats and politicians. In the words of one official, a Fund resident representative "represents an opinion that cannot be bought" and can be an important independent source of information for the domestic business community.
- * A form of "analytical insurance": helping to ensure that the Fund's surveillance is robust in terms of the local institutional framework and sufficiently well-informed that the staff does not 'get it wrong'.
- * A form of "image insurance": many expressed the view that there is an important signaling problem if the Fund closes its local operation before the reform process is complete.

(SDDS) type initiatives in these cases by providing definitive on-the-spot assessments of how policy announcements have been translated into reality. The consensus view to emerge from country interviews was that there should be considerable advance warning of posts' closure so that a transitional period could take place where posts are gradually phased out.

D. Other Organizations: Alternative Models and Views

41. Survey respondents were asked for free-form comments regarding what the Fund can learn from the way in which other organizations (e.g., the IBRD, EBRD, EU, UNDP, etc) operate their field offices. Independent content analysis of the 230 responses indicates that the majority of those who commented in all respondent groups agree that there is little or nothing that the Fund can learn from the operations of other organizations. The areas most frequently noted by minorities of respondents across all groups were greater delegation of authority, more use of local professional staff, and better public relations.

42. Survey respondents' lack of advocacy for either radical changes by the Fund in the current structure of posts or for adoption by the Fund of a broad-based strategy of decentralization to the field such as that embraced by the World Bank, is consistent with the feedback obtained from approximately 20 local representatives of the most important bilateral and other multilateral organizations who participated in confidential interviews for this review during country visits. Virtually all of those interviewed gave similar (unsolicited and independent) feedback on the issue of the size of Fund posts, observing that the Fund's one-person operations (in terms of the number of expatriate staff) have significant operational advantages (in that this structure necessitates a very focussed approach by the Fund's resident representatives and does not risk taxing local interaction capacity in the way that some larger multilateral and bilateral field offices do) and are extremely effective in terms of what individual Fund representatives are able to achieve.

43. National authorities in a number of cases also offered (unsolicited) views during country interviews regarding the Fund's representatives relative to those of other organizations. These views included that *"IMF resident representatives are in a different business to those of other organizations and have an image and credibility that are distinct from the representatives of other organizations"*; that *"the Fund representative is a key economic adviser to senior policy-makers; your representative has a lot of credibility with these officials who simply do not have the same relationship with representatives of other organizations"*; and that *"the Fund resident representative is more useful than those of other organizations."*

44. Bilateral and multilateral representatives provided strongly positive views (summarized in Text Table 10) regarding both the importance to the Fund of being represented locally in member countries, and the advantages obtained by bilateral and other multilateral organizations from the presence of Fund resident representatives. Those interviewed almost uniformly indicated both that their organizations obtain significant direct value from their

Table 10. Benefits of IMF Posts: Bilateral and Other Multilateral Perspectives

Benefits of a Local Presence to the Fund

- * “The fact of the resident office means that the IMF is represented at the table with the other players when decisions are made on the ground regarding the development process.”
- * “The power of the IMF’s views would be diminished if you were not here. An in-country presence is necessary for credibility: pronouncements from Washington generate a kind of "them" and "us", "what do they know" mentality.”
- * “The IMF is very effective at cutting through the front the authorities put up to make the picture look good, but it is only on the spot that you are able to consistently and effectively point out the "tinting" that is going on. The presence of your office exerts subtle pressures on the authorities even when the influence of your resident representative is behind-the-scenes and informal. If the IMF was not here, the reformers in the Government would be much more isolated.”
- * “The Fund resident representative is able to act as a kind of “local ringmaster” with respect to the bilaterals on some issues, e.g., Paris Club debt. Without the representative, much more of this coordination effort would essentially shift back to Washington.”

Benefits of Local IMF Presence to Bilaterals and Other Multilaterals

- * “The Fund represents the starting point of the reform program. The bilaterals link their work to the Fund and the Fund thus wields immense influence on donors and the Government. There would be serious concerns if the Fund just "flew in, laid down the law, and flew out".”
- * “No-one else has the same access as the Fund. Your resident representative is informative and accessible and we utilize your person extensively to brief visiting senior officials. This plays a big part in keeping everyone on the same wavelength.”
- * “The resident representative is an important channel for bilaterals to feed back concerns they have on various micro implementation issues to the Fund in Washington. Without this, there would be a lot more Fund-bilateral misunderstandings both on the ground and in capitals around the world.”
- * “It is much more effective when the Government is asked the right questions by the Fund representative than by any individual bilateral: the IMF can get more out of the Government than any one country acting alone, even the largest of the bilaterals.”

interaction with Fund representatives and that they observe significant indirect benefits flowing from the existence of Fund posts. In virtually all cases, bilateral representatives noted that the effectiveness of the Fund's resident office compares favorably with those of other multilateral organizations. In the words of a leading bilateral counterpart in an important but less-than-intensive case: "(the Fund post) is money well spent".

E. Number, Size, Staffing, and Coverage of Posts

Number and Size of Posts

45. A clear majority (57 percent) of respondents believe that the Fund has fewer posts than optimal, and about the same proportion of respondents believe that the existing allocation of posts across countries and regions is presently less than optimal (although not extremely so) (Annex Table 2). Consistent with the view that the Fund has too few posts, almost 75 percent of respondents in total believe that the Fund should locate more economists in the field and most respondents would employ these economists at new posts since a majority believes that increasing the number of Fund economists at existing posts would have little impact on posts' effectiveness (Annex Table 2).

Staffing of Posts

46. In free-form survey comments, a surprising number of respondents across all groups point to a lack of local professional resources at posts to assist resident representatives as one of the biggest inadequacies of posts and/or as a key change area that would improve effectiveness. This view was echoed by a number of officials in country interviews. On average, about one half of posts employs a local economist or research assistant,²⁷ and a majority of respondents (with the exception of mission teams) believes that increasing the number of cases in which local professional staff are employed would increase effectiveness (Annex Table 2). This view is supported by other survey results which indicate that gathering economic information and data is the area on which resident representatives currently spend the largest single proportion of their time -- almost 20 percent on average, or one day per week (Annex Table 1). In view of the need to increase the priority given by resident representatives to capacity-building activities, data/information gathering is both a key area in which time savings need to be made and an area in which savings are likely to be feasible without unduly risking quality -- via the hiring in more cases of local economic/ research assistant staff. In contrast, about 1.3 administrative assistants/secretaries/interpreters are currently employed per post,²⁷ and 75 percent of respondents believe that there would be little gain in increasing the number of these local administrative support staff (Annex Table 2).

47. Resident representatives and IMF non-mission respondents believe that posts staffed solely with local personnel ("liaison" type posts) would be capable of carrying out a limited

²⁷Office of Budget and Planning data for the second half of FY 1996.

range of functions (e.g., providing administrative and logistical support for missions, and gathering economic information and data), while a majority of mission staff is not persuaded that liaison posts could effectively perform any functions (Annex Table 2). Overall, two thirds of IMF respondents believe that the use of "liaison" posts -- even if the alternative was outright closure of existing posts -- would be highly undesirable, while national authorities are divided on the merits of liaison posts (Annex Table 2). An analysis of free-form survey comments on liaison posts indicated that IMF respondents could see few benefits (since local staff could not undertake key functions such as policy advice and early warning), clear risks (conflict of interest), and thus low cost effectiveness (a number of respondents pointed out that liaison offices would amount to little more than costly mail boxes).

Coverage of Posts

48. Survey respondents overall are evenly divided between those that see a lot of potential for use of posts with regional responsibilities and those that see little potential for such arrangements (Annex Table 2). In free-form comments, however, a majority of those commenting could see both operational and efficiency advantages in regional coverage arrangements provided that the country circumstances (good relations, ease of travel, etc) were amenable to such arrangements. While four posts currently have formal responsibility for covering more than one country (see paragraph 101 of EBS/97/137), certain other posts participate periodically in regional fora or are involved to a limited extent in informal coverage of regional issues. The effectiveness of formal regional coverage arrangements has yet to be fully tested by, for example, a series of adverse developments or a crisis in a country covered on a secondary basis by a neighboring resident representative. In country interviews, officials noted the potential drawback that a resident representative who covers more than one country may be less able and less likely to intervene early, with an associated weakening of their key role in early warning and killing bad ideas before they gain momentum. National authorities could see value in regional coverage by a resident representative in situations where a post is being phased out, but were less convinced that one staff member could effectively cover two intensive cases on an ongoing basis.

F. Posts Relative to Staff Missions

49. A majority of IMF respondents agree that, in principle, posts have a comparative advantage over staff missions in strengthening the policy dialogue, on-site policy advice, monitoring programs, early warning, macroeconomic capacity-building, gathering economic information and data, assessing the political and social context, local coordination of IMF-provided technical assistance, local coordination of donors, and in local public relations/information (Annex Table 1). Respondents are evenly split regarding whether posts have an equal advantage or a comparative disadvantage relative to staff missions in policy diagnosis and design of country policy strategy, but are in broad agreement that staff missions have a comparative advantage in substantive economic analysis and/or research and in substantive report-drafting (Annex Table 1).

50. More than two thirds of national authorities' respondents believe that the contribution of resident representatives is about the same or higher than that of staff missions in every result area these respondents were asked about: improving local understanding of the IMF, improving IMF understanding of local policy-makers' views, providing early warning of potential policy/program slippages, improving implementation of TA recommendations, constraining slippages and improving progress in structural reforms, promoting well-informed domestic economic debate, improving overall policy/program implementation, supporting local macroeconomic capacity-building, influencing domestic expectations regarding economic reforms, strengthening the policy dialogue, improving day-to-day monetary and credit control, reducing the extent of off-budget activities and improving budget transparency, resolving statistical problems, and improving government expenditure management (Annex Table 3). In relation to specific result areas that only IMF survey respondents were asked about, a majority of these respondents believe that the contribution of resident representatives is about the same or higher than that of staff missions in every area: adapting policies to meet local conditions, identifying and overcoming local obstacles, maintaining domestic policy-makers' momentum and resolve, timely compliance with prior actions, timely compliance with performance criteria, timely achievement of structural benchmarks, and reducing the frequency of program interruptions or suspensions (Annex Table 3).

51. In country interviews, national authorities and local representatives of bilateral and other multilateral organizations consistently noted that staff missions are not a substitute for resident representatives and that the two are instead complementary in the sense that resident representatives help to maximize the value-added by missions and vice versa. In particular, officials noted that missions cannot fulfil a timely early warning role due to their relative infrequency. Quarterly missions cannot substitute for the daily presence of a resident representative during periods of intensive economic adjustment or reform, and, even in less intensive situations, occasional missions are not as effective in fulfilling an ongoing complacency deterrence role. Relatedly, missions do not fulfil the same role in shaping local interpretation of the economic situation since the staff's "snapshot" assessment of the economy is available only infrequently whereas resident representatives' assessment of the economic situation is available to policy-makers on a continuous basis. From the authorities' perspective, missions are often necessarily highly focussed on coming up to date: an activity that can both (a) involve significant effort on the authorities' part, and (b) result in missions taking on, in the words of officials in two separate cases, a "mechanical quality". Moreover, missions are perceived to some degree as "auditors" from Washington and "outsiders who come to the country a couple of times a year and believe they know what is best for us". Resident representatives are able to promote best practices in a non-threatening way to a greater extent than staff missions who, in the view of officials in two separate cases, *"can be perceived as representing use of force rather than persuasion"*.

52. Survey respondents have mixed views on whether or not the existence of a post reduces the resources devoted to missions and staff visits (Annex Table 2). While resident representatives and mission team members believe that posts have not led to fewer missions and staff visits, two thirds of senior staff -- who may be a more reliable source of institutional

memory in this area -- tend to believe that posts have in fact lowered the number of missions (Annex Table 2). A majority of resident representatives and senior staff believe that posts have tended to reduce the duration of staff missions, but this view is not shared by mission team members (Annex Table 2). A majority of all respondent groups agree that posts have not tended to reduce the size of staff missions (Annex Table 2).

VI. POST EFFECTIVENESS: SELECTED ISSUES

53. National authorities in general rate the effectiveness and contribution of posts at a higher *level* than do mission team respondents. This relation between the views of these two groups holds across a range of areas with, for example, authorities and mission staff rating their satisfaction with post effectiveness at mean levels of 4.8 and 4.3, respectively, on a scale of 1-6. Despite differences in view regarding the level of effectiveness, however, there is a high degree of overlap in the *pattern of response* of national authorities and mission staff across various contribution and effectiveness measures. The views of these two groups on areas of greater relative effectiveness and/or contribution of posts are highly correlated.²⁸ In particular, the four areas in which the contribution of posts is rated highest (as measured by the mean scores for each group) are the same for the two respondent groups: (1) improving the IMF's understanding of domestic policy-makers' views, constraints, reasons and plans; (2) providing early warning of potential slippages and/or minimizing program "surprises"; (3) strengthening the policy dialogue between the IMF and national authorities; and (4) improving local understanding of the IMF, its objectives, policies, and procedures.

54. Views on the effectiveness of posts among survey respondents from different geographical regions, and among respondents working with posts in the context of differing Fund-member relations, are discussed below in sections VI.A and VI.B, respectively. In addition, certain common characteristics of posts which are rated as relatively less effective are suggested by the survey results and these are outlined in broad terms in section VI.C. Finally, a number of qualitative views related to the effectiveness of posts that were prominent in national authorities' free-form survey responses and in country interviews are summarized briefly in section VI.D.

A. Regional Comparisons

55. Satisfaction with the effectiveness of resident representative posts varies across different regions (Annex Table 6.A).²⁹ The highest proportions of those who are highly or

²⁸A coefficient of 0.9, statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

²⁹The comparative results discussed in this section and presented in Annex Tables 6.A through 6.C do not separately identify the views of respondents working with Middle Eastern posts, both in order to preserve the confidentiality of this relatively small respondent sub-group and
(continued...)

“very” satisfied with the effectiveness of the posts in their countries occur in the case of respondents working with European I and Western Hemisphere posts (74 percent and 65 percent, respectively, of respondents), while the lowest proportions of those highly or “very” satisfied with post effectiveness occur in the case of those working with Asian and African posts (59 and 58 percent, respectively, of respondents).

56. Views on both the type of obstacles and the overall level of obstacles to maximizing the potential value-added of resident representatives vary across regions (Annex Table 6.A). Larger proportions of respondents working with African posts view poor cooperation with resident representatives by national authorities (79 percent of respondents), poor relations between area department missions and national authorities (60 percent), and insufficient delegation of authority to resident representatives (51 percent) as significant or “major” obstacles than respondents working with posts in other regions. Larger proportions of respondents working with both Western Hemisphere and African posts (58 percent of respondents in each case) than respondents working with posts in other regions rate lack of attention paid by IMF staff in Washington to resident representatives’ policy recommendations as a significant or “major” obstacle to maximizing the potential value-added of resident representatives. A larger proportion of respondents working with Western Hemisphere posts (37 percent) also view emphasis by IMF staff in Washington on short-term priorities as a significant or “major” obstacle than respondents working with posts in other regions.

57. Views on the direction in which the role of resident representatives should move in order to improve the medium-term effectiveness of posts vary little across departments with one notable exception (Annex Table 6.C). Clear majorities of respondents across all regions believe that the role of resident representatives should move toward greater emphasis on policy advice, program monitoring, macroeconomic capacity-building and public relations -- except that Western Hemisphere respondents generally are significantly less likely than those from other regions to favor greater emphasis on a public relations role for resident representatives.

58. This feature of Western Hemisphere respondents’ attitudes also surfaced in country interviews, with officials from two of the four countries interviewed from the region emphasizing that they see resident representatives as private advisors to government rather than as public commentators. These officials argued that the Fund’s public role in the region can be sensitive and a high profile by resident representatives could at times reduce the authorities’ scope to adopt Fund policy recommendations despite the fact that the authorities may agree with them. In two other countries interviewed from the region, however, officials

²⁹(...continued)

because small sample size makes these results relatively less robust. The aggregate results for respondent groups presented in Annex Tables 6.A through 6.C do, however, incorporate the views of respondents working with Middle Eastern posts.

expressed a similar appreciation of resident representatives' public relations activities as officials in other regions. Moreover, even in those cases that de-emphasized a public role for resident representatives, officials did not have similar reservations regarding periodic EXR missions nor regarding periodic public statements by Fund management about policy issues related to their countries, suggesting that the problem in respect of resident representatives may owe more to historical views regarding respective roles, and/or to status considerations, than to substantive national attitudes.

B. Type of Fund Relations

59. Satisfaction with the effectiveness of posts and with overall staff quality varies little between mission team respondents working with posts in countries with ESAF-supported arrangements and those working with posts in countries with stand-by or EFF-supported arrangements. A majority of mission respondents in the ESAF and SBA/EFF groups has been highly or "very" satisfied both with overall post effectiveness and with the overall quality of resident representative staff that have been assigned to their countries.³⁰ The "other" group (mostly countries which were "between" programs at the time of the survey) is less satisfied with both post effectiveness and overall staff quality, perhaps reflecting the state of hiatus in Fund-member relations in many of these cases at the time of the survey. Given the relatively higher weight placed on program-based interaction by mission team respondents relative to other groups, situations in which program relationships have paused may well present fewer opportunities for resident representatives to make contributions valued by these respondents. Respondents in the SBA/EFF group are somewhat less likely (17 percent) to view the average quality of resident representative staff as high or very high than respondents in the ESAF (23 percent) or "other" (25 percent) groups. A majority of respondents in all three groups believe that the quality of staff assigned to resident representative positions should generally be higher on average.

C. Weak Posts

60. One of the conclusions of this review is that there is a high rate of variability in the effectiveness of posts, with about one third having problems of one kind or another that reduce their effectiveness (EBS/97/137, paragraph 12, page 10). This assessment is supported both by the results of the 21 country interviews with senior officials and by the survey results. In particular, almost 30 percent of national authorities' respondents and almost 50 percent of mission team respondents -- or a total of almost 43 percent of respondents across these groups jointly -- are only "satisfied" or worse with the overall effectiveness of the post with which they work (Annex Table 3). In comparison, 56 percent of these respondents jointly are highly or very satisfied with their post's effectiveness. Adjusting these results for the effect of varying numbers of respondents per post reveals that the performance of about two thirds of

³⁰See section V.C above for a definition of the ESAF, SBA/EFF, and "other" groups.

posts is strong (hereafter the “effective posts”), while the performance of about one third of posts bears room for improvement (hereafter the “weak posts”).

61. What information about the characteristics of weak posts can be ascertained from the survey results? National authorities were asked two questions about staff quality in the survey: (1) “In your experience, how high or low is the average quality of resident representative staff?”, and (2) “How satisfied have you been overall with the quality of resident representative staff?”. These questions were asked in a separate section of the questionnaire (Part 6A) to that in which authorities were asked about their overall satisfaction with post effectiveness (Part 3). Text Table 11 shows national authorities’ views on the level of staff quality and national authorities’ overall satisfaction with staff quality, grouped according to whether national authorities view post performance as effective or weak. As can be seen from Text Table 11, a key characteristic of posts with weaker ratings for effectiveness by national authorities is that both the level of staff quality and satisfaction with staff quality are viewed by national authorities much more negatively than is the case for posts with stronger ratings for effectiveness. While staff quality is by no means the only ingredient that influences posts’ effectiveness overall, it is a primary factor in post effectiveness and the two are closely linked in authorities’ eyes. Similar analysis of national authorities’ views in other areas reveals that weak posts are likely to be associated with perceptions that resident representatives have been given insufficient authority to perform the job effectively, and with perceptions that resident representatives initiate contact with the authorities only infrequently to provide policy advice and views.

**Table 11. National Authorities’ Views on Post Effectiveness and Staff Quality
(In percent)**

	<u>Staff Quality</u>			
	<u>Perceived Quality Level</u>		<u>Satisfaction with Quality</u>	
	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
Effective Posts ^{1/}	77	23	82	18
Weak Posts ^{2/}	35	65	35	65

1/ Views of the 56 respondents who are highly or “very satisfied” overall with the effectiveness of posts.

2/ Views of the 23 respondents who are only satisfied or less-than-satisfied overall with the effectiveness of posts.

D. National Authorities' Perspectives³¹

62. In free-form survey responses regarding the biggest achievement of the post in their country, almost half of those who commented (more than 80 percent of national respondents) pointed to strengthened policy dialogue, improved Fund image, and greater policy acceptance. Other prominent themes in this area were improved program design and implementation, the resident representative's contribution to confidence-building, and his/her contribution to strengthened local macroeconomic capacity (each of which were noted by 15 percent of those who commented). In country interviews and visits, two areas were most frequently pointed to by officials as providing the single most valuable benefit of having a resident representative: (1) the resident representative's contribution as a provider of neutral "third-party" policy advice (an *"informal sounding-board whose discretion can be trusted and who does not have any particular domestic political agenda"* in the words of one official); and (2) the resident representative's "safeguarding" contribution in providing independent, authoritative early warning that certain developments or policies pose risks; in this context, authorities in several cases pointed to resident representatives' contributions to stalling unsound initiatives before they gathered momentum.

63. In free-form responses regarding the main way in which posts affect the quality of the Fund's country work, national authorities who commented (two thirds of national respondents) most frequently cite posts' contribution to the policy dialogue and to confidence-building (30 percent), and the insight provided by posts into local conditions and developments (almost 20 percent). In country interviews, many authorities noted the high average level of competency and professionalism of the staff who had served as resident representatives in their countries. Similarly, in survey results more than 80 percent of national authorities identify the high technical skill level and high motivation of resident representatives as key contributing factors to the value-added by posts (Annex Table 3).

64. In free-form survey responses regarding the greatest inadequacy of posts, about 20 percent of those who commented (60 percent of national respondents) pointed to poor performance or under-qualification/lack of experience of those assigned as resident representatives, while inadequate job descriptions, inadequate delegation of authority, and unhelpful personal qualities of resident representative staff were each pointed to by a further 15 percent of respondents respectively. Relatedly, the key change area that national authorities most frequently identified as likely to have the greatest leverage on the effectiveness of the resident representative program is that of clearer delegation of authority and clearer terms of reference/job descriptions for resident representatives (30 percent of all national respondents). This key change area was closely linked in national authorities' free-form comments with the

³¹This section summarizes views related to post effectiveness that were provided by national authorities in free-form survey comments or in interviews and that are not discussed elsewhere in this report or in EBS/97/137.

need for personnel quality and policy competence of a level at which resident representatives are able to both influence and interpret the Fund's policy positions vis-a-vis their country.

65. In survey responses, only 20 percent of national authorities' respondents believe that resident representatives have enough authority to carry out their jobs effectively, and authorities are almost evenly divided over whether resident representatives are able, without prior reference to IMF staff in Washington, to give policy advice when the authorities request it (Annex Table 5). In cases in which the authority of resident representatives was discussed during country interviews and visits (17 out of 21), national authorities expressed the view in almost 90 percent of cases that resident representatives lack authority and should have greater authority. As one official noted "*it is clear that the resident representative is 'less equal' than the mission staff*". Authorities made a direct connection between resident representatives not having the confidence of senior staff in Washington or of the mission chief, and his/her views carrying little weight with national authorities. Officials expressed strong views on the uselessness of sending "bellboys" or "ambassadors" and, in several instances, referred to resident representative posts as "mailboxes" or "post offices". One official noted that: "*It is apparent that the mandate of the resident representative is very limited and that genuine responsibility resides only with the mission chief. If the resident representative had a mandate and genuine influence in Washington, then we would have to draw him into domestic policy decisions to a greater degree because policy surprises would become less acceptable. It is because the resident representative has no real influence that the role is limited to essentially one of a post office.*"

VII. PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS WITH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

A. Country Receptiveness and Cooperation

66. A majority of both mission team and resident representative respondents believe that the national authorities with whom they work are highly receptive toward having the resident representative post in their countries and that this receptiveness has a very favorable influence on the ability of these posts to be effective (Annex Table 9). Executive Board and senior IMF staff respondents place even stronger emphasis than others on the importance of national receptiveness to the effectiveness of posts (Annex Table 9). Moreover, survey results (Annex Table 3) and free-form comments on obstacles to posts' effectiveness both point to non-cooperation or unwillingness to engage on the part of the authorities as factors that, when present, have important adverse impacts on the ability of posts to maximize their effectiveness.

67. National receptiveness to posts varies inversely with post duration and time-span, i.e., the longer a post has been operating, the less receptive the authorities are perceived as being to its continued existence. For example, resident representatives in Western Hemisphere posts -- the region with the longest average post duration and time span (see EBS/97/137, Annex II, Figure 1) -- rate national authorities' receptiveness at a level that is 40 percent lower on average than the level at which resident representatives working in European I and II posts -- the regions with the shortest average post duration and time span -- rate national

receptiveness.³² Long post duration and attendant lower national receptiveness are closely linked to poorer cooperation by national authorities with resident representatives. In the case of respondents working with Western Hemisphere posts, for example, a considerable “perception gap” (80 percentage points) exists between, on the one hand, mission team respondents (89 percent) who rate weak cooperation by national authorities with resident representatives as a major obstacle to maximizing post effectiveness and, on the other, national authorities (9 percent), few of whom see any significant obstacle in this area (Annex Table 6.A).³³

B. Consultation and Cooperation

68. Overall, the survey results point to a range of practices across and within departments regarding consultation with authorities on post objectives, and also to a degree of confusion among respondents regarding when and whether consultation actually takes place and what the results are of such consultation. Two thirds of national authorities’ respondents believe that a high degree of common understanding exists between their authorities and IMF staff regarding the main objectives of posts (Annex Table 1), but 30 percent say that they have not been consulted on the role and/or objectives of the post in their country (Annex Table 9) and almost 60 percent believe that no reassessment of post objectives takes place prior to the assignment of a new resident representative (Annex Table 1). Mission teams and resident representatives tend to agree with national authorities both that a high degree of common understanding exists on post objectives and that post objectives are not reassessed prior to the assignment of a new resident representative (Annex Table 1), but they are less likely to agree that the authorities were consulted on the objectives of the post (Annex Table 9). Executive Board and senior staff respondents do not share other respondents’ view that a high degree of common understanding exists regarding the main objectives of posts (Annex Table 1), but are more likely to believe both that post objectives are reassessed on the turnover of resident representatives (Annex Table 1) and that authorities are consulted on the objectives of posts (Annex Table 9).

69. Consultation is linked to both (1) the extent to which national authorities believe that their interests as well as the interests of the Fund are met by posts, and (2) the extent to which national authorities cooperate with resident representatives. Overall, only 20 percent of resident representatives rate instances of less-than-full cooperation with them by national authorities on important matters as being moderately to very frequent (Annex Table 9), but this proportion falls to about 10 percent in those cases where authorities have been consulted

³²Based on mean scores for the receptiveness of Western Hemisphere and European national authorities (3.7 and 5.3, respectively, on a scale of 1-6).

³³The “perception gap” between mission staff and national authorities in other regions on poor cooperation by national authorities as a major obstacle to post effectiveness is 38 percentage points on average (Annex Table 6.A).

on the role and/or objectives of the post, and climbs to almost 30 percent in those cases where authorities have not.

C. Access and Interaction

70. The majority of resident representatives (58 percent) spend between 30 minutes and 90 minutes per day in communication and/or interaction of one form or another with national authorities at all levels, while 40 percent of resident representatives spend more than 90 minutes per day (Annex Table 9). There are, however, significant regional variations in the time spent by resident representatives in interacting with national authorities, with a majority of resident representatives in European posts spending more than 90 minutes on average per day, while resident representatives in Asian and Western Hemisphere posts are more likely to spend 30-60 minutes per day.

71. Most Ministers and Deputy Ministers report that their contacts with resident representatives occur between one and three times per week (52 percent), while a little more than 40 percent report that their contacts with resident representatives occur less frequently than this (Annex Table 9). Significant regional variations also exist in this area, with Asian authorities' contacts with resident representatives much more likely to occur at this level on a fortnightly or monthly basis (72 percent), while European II authorities' contacts at this level are more likely to occur one to five times per week (62 percent). The majority of resident representatives (62 percent) report that they have daily contacts with officials at technical levels (Annex Table 9). Both ministerial and technical contacts tend generally to take the form of bilateral meetings with resident representatives (Annex Table 9).

72. One third of national authorities indicate that they initiate contact with resident representatives frequently or "very" frequently to ask questions and/or seek policy views (Annex Table 9), with authorities working with European II and Western Hemisphere posts more likely than those working with Asian or European I posts to initiate contact frequently. Forty-four percent of national authorities indicate that resident representatives initiate contact with them frequently or "very" frequently to provide policy views (Annex Table 9), with authorities working with Western Hemisphere and European II posts more likely than those working with Asian posts to indicate that resident representatives initiate contact frequently.

73. Overall, only one third of respondents say that specific mechanisms or arrangements (e.g., regular meetings, committees, working groups, etc) exist to facilitate interaction between resident representatives and national authorities (Annex Table 9). These mechanisms are most common in the European II and African regions (50 percent and 44 percent of cases, respectively), and are rare in the Western Hemisphere, Asian and European I regions (11 percent, 21 percent, and 22 percent of cases, respectively).

74. Resident representatives are evenly divided between those who are frequently asked by the authorities to provide comments on drafts of relevant policy documents, laws or regulations, and those who are only infrequently provided with an opportunity to comment

(Annex Table 9). The former are more likely to work in European II posts (60 percent), while the latter are more likely to work in Asian posts (72 percent). National authorities are evenly divided between those who indicate that resident representatives have written technical reports or analyses for them on particular policy issues and those who indicate that resident representatives have not (Annex Table 9). Again, the experience in this area tends to vary by region, with national authorities in the Asian and European regions more likely to indicate that resident representatives have written reports for them than those in the African and Western Hemisphere regions.

75. A majority (52 percent) of national authorities characterize the role played by resident representatives in the intra-governmental policy dialogue as moderate (Annex Table 9), with resident representatives in the European II region more likely than those in Asia to be viewed as having a prominent role in this area. Two out of three respondents believe that resident representatives have enough or close-to-enough access to key national decision-makers for resident representatives to be effective (Annex Table 9), but only about one third of respondents believe that resident representatives' views on policy issues have significant or "great" influence with key members of the government (Annex Table 5). The degree of influence that resident representatives' policy views have with key government members tends to vary by region, with resident representatives in the African and European II regions more likely to be viewed as having significant influence than those in the Asian or Western Hemisphere regions. Both the degree of influence that representatives' views have with key members of the government, and the extent of the role played by resident representatives in the intra-governmental policy dialogue, are closely linked to national authorities' perceptions regarding the level of staff quality (see Text Table 12 below).

76. Many of the factors discussed above (e.g., how influential resident representatives' policy views are with key members of the government, the frequency with which national authorities initiate contact to seek resident representatives' views, and the extent of resident representatives' role in the policy dialogue in this section) are individually correlated with measures of post effectiveness.³⁴ Moreover, an index of factors measuring *national receptiveness to resident representative posts and the degree to which authorities draw resident representatives into domestic policy-making processes is highly linked to posts'*

³⁴Coefficients of 0.5 in each case, all statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

**Table 12. National Authorities' Views on Staff Quality and Influence
(In percent)**

	<u>Resident Representatives' Influence on:</u>			
	<u>Intra-Govt. Dialogue</u> ^{1/}		<u>Key Govt. Members</u> ^{2/}	
	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
High Staff Quality ^{3/}	26	74	38	62
Lower Staff Quality ^{4/}	3	97	14	86

1/ The prominence of resident representatives' role in the intra-governmental policy dialogue.

2/ How influential resident representatives' policy views are with key members of the government.

3/ Views of the 50 respondents who rated the level of resident representative staff quality as high or "very high".

4/ Views of the 28 respondents who rated the level of resident representative staff quality as only adequate or worse.

effectiveness.³⁵ The only correlates of post effectiveness found among the survey data that are more important than countries' acceptance and inclusion of resident representatives are a group of resident representatives' behavioral and skill characteristics (see section IX.A below).

³⁵National authorities' "acceptance and inclusion" of resident representatives is a composite index comprising: (1) resident representatives' access to key decision-makers; (2) the frequency with which authorities' initiate contact to seek representatives' views; (3) the frequency with which authorities ask representatives to comment on drafts of relevant policy documents and/or laws/regulations; (4) the prominence of representatives' role in the intra-governmental policy dialogue; (5) the degree of authorities' receptiveness to posts; and (6) the (in)frequency of less-than-full cooperation with resident representatives by authorities on important matters. This index of resident representatives "acceptance and inclusion" is both correlated with an index of "overall post effectiveness" comprising factors related to posts' contributions and effectiveness across a range of general result areas (coefficient of 0.7, statistically significant at the 5 percent level) and correlated with an index of "post economic effectiveness" comprising factors related to posts' contributions across a range of specific economic result areas (coefficient of 0.4, statistically significant at the 5 percent level). These correlations are based on country-grouped data (i.e., average measures for each country that are based on data aggregated across a number of individual respondents who work with the post in that particular country -- a process which increases the reliability of the results).

77. A majority of all respondents (52 percent) are highly or “very” satisfied with the overall quality of interaction between resident representatives and their national counterparts (Annex Table 9). However, 22 percent of respondents are not satisfied and the level of satisfaction varies across respondent groups, with mission teams being rather less satisfied overall than other respondents (Annex Table 9).

D. Country Contributions to Post Operations

78. A majority of all respondent groups (70 percent) agree that understandings exist between the Fund and national authorities regarding the physical, financial, and/or resource contributions to be made by national authorities to the effective functioning of the post in their country (Annex Table 9). In the majority of cases, respondents indicate that these arrangements take the form of formal written understandings contained in an exchange of letters (or similar) between the Fund and the authorities (Annex Table 9). A majority of all respondents indicate that the agreed contribution of authorities covers office space, while 40-45 percent of respondents believes that authorities’ contributions are understood to extend to providing resident representatives with ready access to relevant national officials and with cooperation in the performance of their role (Annex Table 9). About 30 percent of respondents indicate that the authorities’ contribution also extends to providing the resident representative with a car and/or driver, and with secretarial support staff. (Annex Table 9). Respondents agree that national authorities are (where relevant) fully meeting their understandings regarding office space, a car/driver, secretarial support, and -- in most cases -- regarding access and cooperation with resident representatives (Annex Table 9).

79. A majority (52 percent) of resident representatives and mission staff indicates that national authorities almost always fulfil their undertakings to provide resident representatives and/or IMF staff in Washington with economic data of a reasonable quality in a timely manner, while 44 percent of respondents indicate that authorities usually or sometimes fulfil undertakings in this regard (Annex Table 9). Perceptions regarding *how* national authorities fulfil their undertakings in this area, however, diverge widely across respondent groups (Annex Table 9). Three out of four national respondents acknowledge that their authorities rely substantially or “heavily” on resident representatives to ensure that authorities’ data undertakings to the Fund are met (50 percent of resident representatives agree with this assessment), whereas only 22 percent of mission staff recognize authorities’ heavy reliance on resident representatives in the area of data provision (Annex Table 9).

80. Almost 50 percent of all Fund posts are located within central bank premises and more than three quarters are located within government premises of all kinds (including ministries of finance, cabinet offices, prime ministers’ offices, etc) (Annex Table 9). A majority of respondents agree that the current “inside” location of most posts has a positive impact on the quality of interaction between Fund resident representatives and national authorities (Annex Table 9). The majority of respondents generally, and more than 60 percent of resident representatives, believe that little potential exists to share offices and local staff with the World Bank (Annex Table 9). In free-form comments on the reasons for their views on this

issue, over half of those who commented noted three factors: (1) the risk of blurring the Fund's image/credibility and fostering local confusion between the two institutions; (2) the fact that the Fund and Bank field offices are completely different in nature and in operation; and (3) the fact that coordinating locations is difficult in practice and has not worked effectively in cases where it has been attempted. Several of those participating in the review noted potential risks (closely related to the first of these factors) of the appearance to national audiences of "unholy collaboration" between the two international institutions, and of a joint physical operation being perceived as a kind of "headquarters of an alternative government".

VIII. AREA DEPARTMENTS AND RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES

A. Interaction and Integration

81. Over 70 percent of resident representatives spend between 30 minutes and 90 minutes per day in communication in all forms (i.e., orally, in writing, via electronic mail, etc) with area department staff in Washington (Annex Table 10). Resident representatives in the European I region are more likely to spend 60-90 minutes per day communicating with area department staff (Annex Table 10).

82. Mission chiefs are also formally resident representatives' supervisors in about one half of cases, with an area department division chief who is not the mission chief for the country filling the role of formal supervisor for about 30 percent of resident representatives and a department director or deputy director filling this role for about 15 percent of representatives (Annex Table 10).³⁶ The terms of reference for almost three out of four resident representatives do not tend to specify their supervisors' responsibilities, and supervision and monitoring practices have tended in most cases to evolve informally and orally between individual supervisors and resident representatives (Annex Table 10).

83. In the majority of cases, resident representatives' reports to mission chiefs tend about equally to consist of written and oral reports, while about one third of resident representatives usually report to mission chiefs in writing (Annex Table 10). More than 85 percent of resident representatives indicate that they report between two and five times per week to mission chiefs, and almost 50 percent indicate that they report daily (Annex Table 10). The frequency of reporting tends to vary by region, with Western Hemisphere resident representatives more likely to report daily and resident representatives working in African posts more likely to report two to three times per week (Annex Table 10). Practices regarding resident representatives reporting to area department directors/deputy directors vary widely (Annex Table 10). One third of resident representatives indicate that they report to area department (deputy) directors only in exceptional circumstances, one third report either monthly or more

³⁶For ease of exposition only, mission chiefs will be assumed throughout the remainder of this chapter to be also resident representatives' formal supervisors and division chiefs unless the context requires a distinction to be made between the three roles.

frequently, and about 15 percent report quarterly (Annex Table 10). In the majority of cases, such reports are in writing (Annex Table 10). While three out of four resident representatives believe that adequate channels exist for them to express their views to area department immediate office staff, over 20 percent do not and views in this area tend to vary by region, with European II resident representatives less likely to believe that adequate channels exist and Western Hemisphere resident representatives more likely to believe that adequate channels exist (Annex Table 10). Concerns in this area were also noted in a number of free-form survey responses.

84. Priority-setting practices have tended to evolve informally and orally between individual mission chiefs and resident representatives, and 85 percent of resident representatives do not have a formal rolling work program that is agreed regularly with their supervisors (Annex Table 10). A majority of resident representatives find anyway that their terms of reference and/or work program tend to be of little relevance, in practice, both to short-term priority-setting and more generally to the job (Annex Table 10). Mission chiefs play the principal role in establishing resident representatives' work priorities, followed by daily/weekly exigencies, national authorities, and resident representatives themselves (Annex Table 10). Most resident representatives and mission respondents (85 percent and 83 percent, respectively) characterize the nature of work assignments delegated to resident representatives by area department staff as including tasks that are moderately to very sensitive and/or complex (Annex Table 10). Similarly, most resident representatives and mission respondents (87 percent and 74 percent, respectively) characterize the time horizon of work assignments delegated as being for completion within a week, with a majority of resident representatives characterizing the typical time horizon as being within a day or two (Annex Table 10).

85. In practice, resident representatives on average spend most time gathering economic information and data (about 20 percent of their time); monitoring programs including providing early warning (about 15 percent); facilitating the policy dialogue, providing on-site policy advice, and assessing the political and social context (each about 10 percent) (Annex Table 1). Mission teams believe that, *ideally*, resident representatives should give highest priority to facilitating the policy dialogue and program monitoring/early warning over data gathering (Annex Table 10), whereas resident representatives' believe that, *in practice*, area departments' place highest priority on data gathering, followed by facilitating the policy dialogue and program monitoring/early warning (Annex Table 10).

86. The area department country documents on which resident representatives are most likely to "always" or nearly always be asked to comment are staff reports (50 percent of respondents), followed by policy framework papers (45 percent), "other" papers (42 percent), briefing papers (39 percent), and country strategy papers (38 percent) (Annex Table 10). Practices diverge widely in this area, however, with an *equal* proportion of respondents indicating that resident representatives are rarely asked to comment on briefing papers (Annex Table 10). Resident representatives working with European II posts are less likely to indicate that they are frequently asked to comment on briefs (25 percent), while those working with Asian posts are more likely to indicate that resident representatives are frequently asked to

comment (71 percent). Almost 40 percent of respondents overall rate resident representatives as having little or no influence on the policy content of briefing papers, and one third indicate that representatives have little or no influence on the policy content of staff reports (Annex Table 5). Concerns regarding weak interaction with resident representatives over, in particular, briefing papers were noted frequently in free-form survey responses.

87. Overall, roughly one half of respondents rates resident representatives' level of influence over both the area department's policy stance vis-a-vis their country and key strategic shifts in the area department's policy stance as moderate (Annex Table 5). Like resident representatives' influence with national authorities, the extent of their influence on the policy positions taken by area departments vis-a-vis their country is closely linked to area departments' perceptions regarding the level of staff quality (see Text Table 13 below).

88. About three quarters of respondents agree that resident representatives play a key role in assessing the authorities' preparedness for missions, while over 60 percent view resident representatives as playing a key role in determining the timing of missions (Annex Table 10). Over 40 percent of respondents rates resident representatives as playing a significant role in the policy dialogue between missions and the authorities during area department staff missions to the country, although lower proportions of mission teams and senior staff share this view (Annex Table 10). National authorities in the African and Western Hemisphere regions are less likely than authorities in other regions to view resident representatives as playing a significant role in the policy dialogue between missions and authorities. About 40 percent of respondents view resident representatives as playing a significant role in the in-country work carried out by area department staff missions (Annex Table 10). A large majority of resident representatives (85 percent) indicate that high-level policy discussions rarely take place within the country without them being present, while a majority of resident representatives note that high-level discussions take place frequently outside the country (e.g., Paris Club, Consultative Group meetings, other occasions) without them being present (Annex Table 10). About 60 percent of resident representatives indicate that they have been (or expect to be) brought back to Washington by their area department once per year for the purpose of consultation with their colleagues (Annex Table 10).

89. Only seven percent of resident representatives rate the support provided to them by area departments in the area of research assistance services (e.g., timely access to relevant country and policy documents, timely provision of cross-country or other economic data requested by resident representatives) as "effective" (Annex Table 10). A majority of resident representatives indicate that mission chiefs keep them informed of relevant issues related to the resident representative's country "most of the time", while 60 percent of resident representatives indicate that they are kept informed of relevant Fund-wide policy developments only "some of the time" by their mission chiefs or supervisors (Annex Table 10). Resident representatives are evenly divided between those who indicate that relevant information is circulated to them mostly automatically and those who indicate that relevant information is circulated to them mostly in response to their specific requests (Annex Table

**Table 13. Mission Teams' Views on Staff Quality and Influence
(In percent)**

	<u>Resident Representatives' Influence on:</u>			
	<u>Dept.'s Policy Stance</u> ^{1/}		<u>Key Shifts in Policy Stance</u> ^{2/}	
	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
High Staff Quality ^{3/}	45	55	45	55
Lower Staff Quality ^{4/}	12	88	12	88

1/ Resident representatives' influence over the area department's policy stance vis-a-vis the country.

2/ Resident representatives' influence over key shifts in the department's policy stance vis-a-vis the country.

3/ Views of the 39 respondents who rated the level of resident representative staff quality as high or "very high".

4/ Views of the 135 respondents who rated the level of resident representative staff quality as only adequate or worse.

10). Serious shortcomings in these areas of the extent to which resident representatives' data and other requests of area department staff, and the extent to which resident representatives are kept informed of relevant developments, featured prominently in respondents' free-form survey comments.

90. Inadequacies in other aspects of the interaction between resident representatives and area department staff missions exist in some cases and adversely impact the ability of resident representatives to perform their role effectively. Several areas featured in free-form survey comments (both by resident representatives and mission team respondents) and were noted in some cases by officials in country interviews: exclusion of resident representatives from mission work and mission discussions, failure to back up resident representatives with national authorities, failure to establish and maintain effective communication lines between mission chiefs and resident representatives, inadequate recognition on the part of mission staff in some cases of the realities of local policy and other conditions, routine bypassing of resident representatives in interaction with the authorities on substantive matters in some cases, and allowing tensions or frictions between Fund mission staff and resident representatives to play out in ways clearly observable to national authorities.

91. Overall, a majority of all respondents (51 percent) are highly or "very" satisfied with the quality of interaction between resident representatives and area department staff (Annex Table 10). However, the level of satisfaction varies across regions, with respondents in the

European I region (71 percent) more likely than others to be highly satisfied, and respondents in the European II region (41 percent) less likely than others to be highly satisfied with the quality of interaction.

92. A number of the factors discussed above (e.g., resident representatives' influence on the area department's policy stance vis-a-vis their countries, on key strategic changes in the department's policy stance, the extent of their role in the policy dialogue between missions and authorities, and the weight placed by area departments on resident representatives' policy recommendations) are individually correlated (based on survey-wide as opposed to country-grouped data) with measures of post effectiveness.³⁷ Moreover, an index of factors measuring *the extent of resident representatives' integration and influence in the country work of area departments is closely linked to posts' effectiveness* when calculated on the basis of country-grouped data.³⁸

B. Delegated Authority

93. A majority of respondents view resident representatives as having high or "great" discretion in (1) gathering economic information and data; (2) program monitoring and early warning; (3) local public relations and explaining the role of the Fund; (4) conducting the on-site dialogue with authorities (although Executive Board and senior staff respondents view resident representatives as having less discretion in this area than other respondent groups); and (5) fostering local coordination among donors and other agencies (Annex Table 5). Only one in four respondents believes that resident representatives are given enough authority to perform the job effectively, with Executive Board and senior staff respondents less likely to

³⁷Coefficients of 0.5 in the case of both influence on the department's policy stance and influence on key shifts in the policy stance, a coefficient of 0.5 in the case of role in the policy dialogue between missions and authorities, and a coefficient of 0.3 in the case of the weight placed on resident representatives' policy recommendations, each statistically significant at the 5 percent level. See section VII.C, paragraph 76 above for a description of country-grouped data.

³⁸A composite index comprising: resident representatives' influence over the policy content of (1) briefing papers, (2) staff reports, (3) back-to-office reports, (4) the area department's policy stance, (5) key strategic shifts in the department's policy stance; and, the prominence of resident representatives' role in (6) the in-country dialogue between missions and national authorities, and (7) the in-country work carried out by missions. This index of representatives' "integration and influence" in area departments' country work is both correlated with an index of "overall post effectiveness" comprising factors related to posts' contributions and effectiveness across a range of general result areas (coefficient of 0.5, statistically significant at the 5 percent level) and correlated with an index of "post economic effectiveness" comprising factors related to posts' contributions across a range of specific economic result areas (coefficient of 0.3, statistically significant at the 5 percent level).

believe representatives are given enough authority (12 percent) than other groups (Annex Table 5). Views on whether or not resident representatives are given enough authority vary by region with respondents working with European I posts more likely than other respondents to believe that resident representatives are given sufficient authority (41 percent), and respondents working with Western Hemisphere posts less likely to believe that resident representatives are given sufficient authority to be effective (17 percent). Like mission staff's views on the influence of resident representatives with area department staff, their views on how much discretion resident representatives currently have to give on-site policy advice to national authorities, and on whether or not resident representatives are given enough authority to carry out their role effectively, are closely linked to mission staff's perceptions regarding the level of staff quality (see Text Table 14 below).

**Table 14. Mission Teams' Views on Staff Quality and Authority
(In percent)**

	<u>Resident Representatives' Authority:</u>			
	<u>Discretion for Policy Advice? ^{1/}</u>		<u>Enough Authority to be effective? ^{2/}</u>	
	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
High Staff Quality ^{3/}	42	58	40	60
Lower Staff Quality ^{4/}	26	74	28	72

1/ How much discretion do resident representatives have to give on-site policy advice?

2/ Do resident representatives have enough authority to be effective?

3/ Views of the 39 respondents who rated the level of resident representative staff quality as high or "very high".

4/ Views of the 135 respondents who rated the level of resident representative staff quality as only adequate or worse.

94. Respondents are divided regarding whether or not resident representatives have the authority to give *ad referendum* policy advice to national authorities within the broad parameters of existing agreed policy positions without prior reference to IMF staff in Washington (Annex Table 5). Overall, a majority (56 percent) believes that resident representatives have this authority, but Executive Board and senior staff respondents are less persuaded on this issue than other groups (Annex Table 5). Each respondent group's view on whether or not resident representatives *should* have greater discretion to give policy advice tends to be a close reverse image of their view on whether or not *ad referendum* authority

currently exists, with one exception: 83 percent of mission staff are opposed to greater discretion but only 57 percent of mission team respondents believe that *ad referendum* authority currently exists (Annex Table 5).

95. A number of resident representative “discretion” factors (e.g., resident representatives’ discretion to give on-site policy advice, their discretion in program monitoring and providing early warning, and their discretion to undertake macroeconomic capacity-building activities) are individually correlated (based on survey-wide as opposed to country-grouped data) with measures of post effectiveness.³⁹ Moreover, an index of factors measuring *the overall extent of resident representatives’ discretion across a range of areas is linked to posts’ effectiveness* when calculated on the basis of country-grouped data.⁴⁰

96. Regarding the occasional delegation to resident representatives of the leadership role for non-sensitive review/other missions or advance teams, in almost 90 percent of 17 country interview cases, national authorities had no qualms about resident representatives who are suitably qualified and experienced undertaking such roles where sensitive negotiating issues are not at stake. A majority of the officials interviewed noted that occasional mission leadership responsibility would increase the influence of resident representatives with national authorities. Most national authorities believed that it would be more problematic for a resident representative to switch smoothly between the two roles in the case of sensitive negotiations. In just over 10 percent of cases, authorities said they would not favor resident representatives having a mission leadership role in any circumstances. A majority of resident representatives (52 percent) have had prior experience of leading a Fund mission or staff visit during their careers, but few have been asked to lead an advance team (11 percent), staff visit (5 percent), or mission (1 percent) from the field (Annex Table 7).

IX. PERSONNEL ISSUES

A. Staff Quality

97. One of the conclusions of this review is that the IMF should assign only high-quality staff with the appropriate skills and judgement to resident representative positions (EBS/97/137, page 30, paragraph 65). While the majority of posts are very effective (Annex Table 3), one third of posts are only weakly effective or worse and the main characteristic shared by these posts is incumbency by staff not suited to the assignment (Text Table 11

³⁹Coefficients of 0.4, 0.4, and 0.3, respectively, for discretion regarding on-site policy advice, macroeconomic capacity-building activities, and program monitoring/early warning, each statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

⁴⁰The composite “discretion” index is correlated with an index of “overall post effectiveness” comprising factors related to posts’ contributions and effectiveness across a range of general result areas (correlation coefficient of 0.3, statistically significant at the 5 percent level).

above). Why is high staff quality so important to the effectiveness of posts? It is the essential common ingredient in three factors that are highly correlated with post effectiveness (sections VII and VIII above): (1) resident representatives' access to, and influence with, national authorities (Text Table 12 above); (2) resident representatives' influence with IMF headquarters-based staff (Text Table 13 above); and (3) the level of authority that can be delegated to resident representatives (Text Table 14 above). The ability to operate as an effective extension of the Fund lies at the heart of the role of resident representatives and is dependent on access, influence and authority, elements of the role that cannot be fully realized when staff quality is weak.

98. The quality of staff assigned to resident representative positions appears to have improved over the course of the 1990s, as measured by the award of outstanding ratings for field performance in annual performance assessments. Outstanding ratings awarded for field-based work increased from an average of as little as 2 percent of all field-based performance ratings as recently as 1992-93 to an average of approximately 10 percent over 1994-96 (EBS/97/137, Annex II, Figure 7). These aggregate statistics, however, obscure major divergences across geographical regions (Text Table 15). Moreover, and assuming no bias in the rate at which outstanding ratings are awarded for field performance, the fact that the ratings for field-based staff continue to fall below the 15 percent ceiling on outstanding ratings for staff Fund-wide suggests that even the current higher average level of field staff quality remains lower than average staff quality at headquarters.

Table 15. Outstanding Field Performance, 1992-96
(Outstanding ratings in percent of all field performance ratings)

	AFR	APD	EUI	EUII	WHD	Average ^{1/}
Outstanding ratings:						
1994-96	--	8	18	12	12	10
1992-93	--	--	--	10	--	2

^{1/} Including MED.

99. Satisfaction with overall staff quality also varies across regions (Annex Table 6.B). The highest proportions of those who have been highly or "very" satisfied overall with the quality of resident representative staff assigned to the post in their countries occur in the case of those working with Western Hemisphere and European I posts (72 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of all respondent groups), while the lowest proportions of those highly or "very" satisfied overall with the quality of resident representative staff occur in the case of those

working with Asian and African posts (52 and 48 percent, respectively, of all respondent groups).

100. The fact that staff quality remains a problem in the resident representative program is an area of broad agreement among IMF participants in the review. More than 40 percent of mission team respondents have been only satisfied or less (as opposed to highly/very satisfied) with the overall quality of staff assigned as resident representatives to their country, and more than 20 percent opt for less-than-satisfied (Annex Table 4). Fully three quarters of Executive Board, senior IMF staff, and mission team respondents believe that the *level* of staff quality is only adequate or lower (as opposed to high/very high), and more than one quarter opts for less-than-adequate (Annex Table 4). More than three quarters of Executive Board, senior IMF staff, and mission team respondents believe that staff quality in the resident representative program continues to be variable (Annex Table 4). ***Almost three quarters of Executive Board and senior staff respondents, and a clear majority of mission team respondents, believe that the average quality of staff assigned as resident representatives should be higher (Annex Table 4).*** In free-form survey responses to the question “what is the most important obstacle to the effectiveness of the post in your country?”, 42 percent of mission staff who commented (75 percent of all mission team respondents) point to the assignment of resident representative staff who lack technical or other skills necessary to perform the job. In free-form survey responses to the question “what has been the greatest inadequacy of the post in your country?”, 44 percent of mission staff who commented (60 percent of all mission team respondents) point to the assignment of resident representative staff who are poorly qualified to fulfil the role.

101. While IMF respondents have strong views regarding continuing staff quality problems, a sizable minority of national authorities are also less than enthusiastic about staff quality in the resident representative program. Almost 40 percent of national authorities’ respondents have been only satisfied or less (as opposed to highly/very satisfied) with the overall quality of staff assigned as resident representatives to their country (Annex Table 4). One third of national respondents rate the *level* of staff quality overall as only adequate or lower (as opposed to high/very high) (Annex Table 4). ***Almost one half of all national respondents believes that staff quality should be higher (Annex Table 4).*** In two thirds of the 21 country cases for which interviews with senior officials were conducted, those interviewed made observations about staff quality that ranged from relatively mild concerns that staff quality should on average be somewhat higher to full-blown dissatisfaction with staff quality.

B. Skills and Background

102. There is a substantial measure of agreement among resident representatives, national authorities and mission teams on what it takes to be an effective resident representative, with

views on the most important skills highly correlated across each of these respondent groups.⁴¹ The five skills, qualities, or abilities needed by resident representatives on which the largest proportion of all respondent groups agree are economic policy skills (71 percent of all respondents), interpersonal effectiveness (65 percent), interpreting economic data (48 percent), knowledge of IMF policies (45 percent), and willingness to take initiative (37 percent) (Annex Table 7). In country interviews and visits, confidence and initiative-taking/outreaching skills were mentioned repeatedly. Among a range of resident representative behavioral and skill characteristics, the frequency with which resident representatives initiate contact with national authorities to provide policy views is the single characteristic most highly correlated with both national authorities' and mission teams' views on post effectiveness.⁴²

103. In general, mission respondents tend to place relatively higher weight on a range of "people" skills (interpersonal effectiveness, persuasiveness, oral communication, etc) than do national authorities' respondents who tend to place relatively higher weight on a range of technical factors (financial programming skills, economic theory skills, influence at headquarters) than mission staff (Annex Table 7). Notably, in free-form responses to the question "what is the strongest predictor of resident representative effectiveness in your experience?", IMF respondents point about equally to diplomatic and to technical skills, while national authorities view technical skills as very much more important when a choice is to be made. Similarly, in free-form responses to the question "in cases of high quality staff, what are typically the skills or abilities that stand out?", national authorities overwhelmingly point to technical skills.

104. Analysis of the survey results on skills in relation to those on the contributions made by resident representatives across various result areas suggests that technical and interpersonal skills may influence effectiveness in distinct ways. An emphasis by mission team respondents on technical skills (economic theory, economic policy, interpreting economic data, financial programming, etc) is correlated with higher ratings by mission staff for resident representatives' contributions across a range of specific economic result areas (contributions to improving monetary and credit control, government expenditure management, etc).⁴³ An emphasis by mission team respondents on personal traits/characteristics (interpersonal effectiveness, willingness to take initiative, persuasiveness, cultural adaptability, etc) is

⁴¹Coefficients of 0.96 between resident representatives and mission team respondents, 0.8 between resident representatives and national authorities, and 0.8 between national authorities and mission staff, each statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

⁴²Coefficients of 0.5 for both national authorities and mission staff, each statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

⁴³Indices comprising a range of technical skills and a range of economic result areas have a correlation coefficient of 0.4, statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

correlated with higher ratings by mission staff for resident representatives' contributions across a range of general result areas (contributions to strengthening the policy dialogue, improving mutual understanding of Fund-local policy views, etc).⁴⁴

105. Probably reflecting the higher weight that national authorities place on resident representatives' influence at headquarters, authorities are more likely to rate "seniority" as an important predictor of resident representatives' effectiveness (mean score of four on a scale of 1-6) than mission respondents or resident representatives (mean scores of 2.8 and 3.1, respectively) (Annex Table 7). The ability to communicate effectively in the business language of the country is viewed as a factor important to resident representatives' effectiveness by a majority of all respondent groups (Annex Table 7).

106. More than 75 percent of IMF respondents rate experience as a Fund economist working on program cases as the most useful area of previous experience for a resident representative assignment (Annex Table 7). The second most useful area of previous experience according to almost one half of respondents is experience as a Fund economist working in an IMF area department, Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD), Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department (MAE), or Policy Development and Review Department (PDR) (Annex Table 7). Almost 75 percent of respondents believe that a period of three or more years' experience either working on program cases or in one of these departments at the Fund is likely to be important to an individual's ability to be effective as a resident representative, and more than one quarter of respondents believes that more than four years' experience is desirable (Annex Table 7).

C. Selection and Appointment

107. Survey results relating to the current selection process for resident representative positions support the conclusion that quality tradeoffs are made in order to fill posts, and point to wide recognition among Fund staff that such tradeoffs are made. IMF survey respondents overwhelmingly believe that the consideration that tends to dominate the current selection process for resident representative positions is that of finding a reasonably suitable individual who is interested in the post (more than 80 percent of all respondents) (Annex Table 8). This factor rates ahead of obtaining a close match between a candidate's skills and the specific requirements of the position (just over 40 percent of all respondents) which, in turn, rates a little ahead of finding a candidate willing to relocate quickly to the post (35 percent) (Annex Table 8). The most common method by which discussions were initiated regarding their current assignment -- according to resident representatives -- was via a direct approach to them by their departments (27 percent), followed by the resident representative hearing about the vacancy via casual contacts (21 percent), and via a direct approach to the resident representative by a department other than his/her own (16 percent) (Annex Table 8).

⁴⁴Indices comprising a range of personal traits and a range of general result areas have a correlation coefficient of 0.3, statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

More than 80 percent of all respondents believe that there should be a requirement for all resident representative vacancies to be formally advertised (Annex Table 8).

108. About one half of all IMF respondent groups provided free-form comments on the question of how the current selection process could be improved and the overwhelming majority of these argued for greater transparency in the selection criteria and the selection process. Respondents' comments in this area frequently referred to factors other than the competence and suitability of the individual entering current selection decisions in many cases. In free-form comments regarding the key change areas likely to have greatest leverage on effectiveness in the resident representative program, an improved selection process that places greater emphasis on the necessary skills for these positions was the second most frequently noted issue (identified by around one half of the approximately 180 IMF respondents who commented), following that of better defining the role, authority and area department integration of resident representatives (identified by over 90 percent of those who commented).

109. A majority of national authorities' respondents (58 percent) are satisfied with the degree of consultation by the Fund that currently takes place prior to the posting of a new resident representative (Annex Table 8). IMF respondents are closely divided regarding what, if any, role national authorities should have in the selection of resident representatives for assignments in their country. The largest proportion of all three IMF respondent groups narrowly favor a veto right for national authorities based on candidates' *curriculum vitae* information (45 percent of all respondents), but large minorities in each group believe that authorities should have no role in vetting candidates (34 percent of all respondents) (Annex Table 8). A majority of IMF respondents (54 percent) are aware of cases where national authorities have influenced the selection of the resident representative for the authorities' country (and the overwhelming reason reported in free-form comments by IMF respondents for national authorities exerting such influence is that of resident representative candidates' nationality), but most believe that this happens relatively infrequently (Annex Table 8).

110. More than 50 percent of resident representatives indicate that they were formally appointed only one to two months (or less) prior to taking up their assignments, with 20 percent appointed less than one month in advance of their start date (Annex Table 8). Most senior staff who responded indicated that they normally start looking seriously for a resident representative's successor about six months in advance of the expiry of the incumbent's term in the role (Annex Table 8). On the appropriate length of resident representative assignments, IMF respondents are evenly divided between two and three years, while national authorities strongly favor three year assignments (Annex Table 8). One third of resident representatives spent less than one week in the area department of their assignment prior to taking up the resident representative position, while another 44 percent spent more than one month in the area department (Annex Table 8). On the turnover of resident representatives, a majority of national authorities' respondents (69 percent) rate a period of overlap between incoming and outgoing resident representatives as important, but only 42 percent of resident representatives indicate that they had such a period of overlap with their predecessors (Annex Table 8).

D. Training

111. A majority of current resident representatives believe that the training and orientation they received prior to taking up their assignments was not fully adequate (Annex Table 8), and free-form responses in this area across all respondent groups point to three general areas in which greater training and orientation should be provided: (1) language, media and communication skills, (2) "best practice" briefings on how to tackle effectively various aspects of the role, and (3) country-specific briefings on policies and priorities. A majority of all respondent groups agree that resident representatives are currently provided with inadequate opportunities to maintain their human capital while in the field (Annex Table 8). One half of the 150 respondents who provided free-form comments on this issue noted that resident representatives should be provided with opportunities to attend local, regional and Washington-based training courses, conferences, professional seminars/workshops etc., and that video tapes of professional material including tapes of internal Fund economics training courses should be provided to resident representatives. A number of respondents noted the need for training of local staff in field offices in order to reduce the administrative burden on resident representatives (see section X below).

E. Career Issues

112. Resident representatives and mission staff agree on the most important factors attracting candidates in general to resident representative assignments (Annex Table 8). Greater day-to-day job autonomy, greater responsibility, the financial benefits, the opportunity to work with practical economic problems for an extended period, and the opportunity to experience life in another country, are each rated as factors of great importance by large majorities of these respondents. Resident representative respondents tend, however, to place greater weight on the job-related attractions to prospective candidates, while mission staff tend to believe that the financial benefits serve as the principal inducement. Neither group rates expectations that such assignments will have a beneficial career impact as an important factor attracting candidates. A majority of resident representatives indicate that, in retrospect, the factors which most attracted them were the opportunity to work with practical economic policy problems for an extended period (62 percent), greater day-to-day job autonomy (56 percent), greater responsibility (56 percent), and the financial benefits (52 percent) (Annex Table 8).

113. There is also a large degree of agreement between resident representatives and mission staff on the most important factors reducing the attractiveness of resident representative assignments to candidates in general (Annex Table 8). In particular, large majorities of both groups rate difficult living conditions in many post countries, reluctance to disrupt children's education, difficulties in replicating spouse employment opportunities in field locations, concerns about poor quality medical facilities in many countries, concerns that resident representative experience is not rated as highly as other types of experience in promotion decisions, and concerns that the opportunity cost career-wise of being absent from

headquarters is high, as the most important detractions. In retrospect, resident representatives rate the detractions that applied most strongly to them as the perception that there is a high opportunity cost career-wise of being absent from headquarters (38 percent), the perception that resident representative experience is not rated as highly as other forms of experience for promotion purposes (36 percent), difficult living conditions in many posts (36 percent) and concerns about poor quality medical facilities in many post countries (32 percent) (Annex Table 8).

114. Most resident representatives (63 percent) indicate that they have not experienced promotion difficulties related to infrequency of performance assessment while in the field, but one quarter indicates that they have experienced difficulties related to this factor (Annex Table 8). Two thirds of resident representatives do not expect to be promoted during their current assignments, while one quarter does expect promotion over this horizon (Annex Table 8). Twelve percent of resident representatives indicate that they have been promoted during their current assignment, and almost 30 percent indicate that they expect to be promoted on the completion of their current assignment (Annex Table 8). A majority of respondents perceive resident representative experience as having a neutral impact on promotion decisions and on career advancement more generally (Annex Table 8). A majority of respondents believe that resident representatives are generally treated more-or-less fairly from the perspective of career issues when they return to headquarters (Annex Table 8).

115. In free-form comments on career issues related to the resident representative program, the prominent theme across all respondent groups is that resident representative positions do not form part of the defined career path at the Fund and that they need to in order to effect meaningful improvement in the program. In comments on how the career treatment of resident representatives could be improved, over 60 percent of the 135 respondents who commented pointed to issues related to the need for resident representative positions to form a part of the mainstream career path at the Fund. In comments on what changes respondents believe would be most likely to increase the proportion of high-quality A14+ staff who would be interested in resident representative assignments, over 60 percent of the 200 respondents who commented pointed to the same issue. Similarly, in free-form comments regarding the key change areas likely to have greatest leverage on effectiveness in the resident representative program, the need to better define resident representative positions in the Fund's career path was the third most frequently noted issue (identified by almost one half of the approximately 180 IMF respondents who commented) following those of better defining the role, authority, and area department integration of resident representatives, and improving resident representative selection and skills.

116. Career-related issues greatly outweigh financial issues as the key concern regarding resident representative positions, with survey results pointing to the Fund's field benefits package comparing moderately well with those other organizations (Annex Table 8). However, in free-form responses regarding areas in which the field benefits package results in inequities and/or could be improved, key issues raised across respondent groups were the desirability of more flexible travel provisions -- both regarding travel by resident

representatives to headquarters and regarding family-related travel, loss of spouse income, concerns regarding abrupt changes in benefits' packages during tenure, the need for generous and well-targeted hardship allowances, the need for flexibility in housing arrangements and, among resident representatives specifically, dissatisfaction with the current provisions for cost of living adjustments.

117. Almost 50 percent of resident representatives indicate that the area departments that appointed them have, in all or nearly all respects, lived up to any understandings reached with resident representatives regarding their current assignments, while almost as many (46 percent) indicate that there have been shortcomings in the extent to which area departments have lived up to any understandings (Annex Table 8). In free-form comments on this issue, most of those who commented (about one third of resident representatives) pointed to either promotion-related issues or integration-related issues (including information-sharing and resistance to an annual visit to Washington by resident representatives for consultations). Overall, two thirds of resident representatives are highly or very satisfied with their experience in their current assignment, while one third are only satisfied or less (Annex Table 8). If they were making the decision today, 82 percent of resident representatives indicate that they would accept their current assignments while 15 percent would not (Annex Table 8).

F. Family and Security Issues

118. The key family-related issues affecting the resident representative program are: difficult living conditions in many post countries, reluctance to disrupt children's education, spouse employment difficulties, and concerns about poor quality medical facilities. Three of these issues (living conditions, children's education and spouse employment) outweigh perceived career-related disadvantages of resident representative assignments in the degree to which they are viewed as major factors that reduce the attractiveness of these positions to mission team respondents (who represent a significant part of the pool of potential resident representative candidates) (Annex Table 8).

119. Among the family-related factors that reduce the attractiveness of resident representative assignments, however, spouse employment difficulties is an area that is likely to skew the pool of staff interested in these assignments, reducing the extent to which women economists apply for these positions. Analysis of the survey results reveals that 92 percent of female mission team respondents view spouse employment difficulties as a major factor reducing the attractiveness of resident representative assignments, while this proportion falls to 70 percent in the case of male mission team respondents.

120. The survey results suggest that the staff currently accepting resident representative positions are those relatively less affected by spouse employment and children's education issues: the gap between the proportion of current resident representatives who rated spouse employment and children's education difficulties as major detractions that applied to them when they were considering their current assignment (21 percent for each of these issues), and the proportion of mission team respondents who rate spouse employment and children's

education difficulties as major detractions (72 percent and 83 percent, respectively) is 50-60 percentage points (Annex Table 8). Moreover, the absence and/or amelioration of spouse employment difficulties was the family-related issue that was most commonly identified in free-form comments by 140 mission team respondents on the question of the single most important factor that could lead them to take a resident representative assignment at some time in the future.

121. A majority of respondents believe that the most important obstacles to spouse employment in field locations are low numbers of equivalent jobs in post countries (61 percent), the career impact of absence from the U.S. employment market (52 percent), and low salary levels of equivalent jobs in post countries (Annex Table 8). Current resident representatives have encountered difficulties in finding spouse employment opportunities in field locations and these difficulties affect their satisfaction with resident representative assignments (Annex Table 8). A large majority of resident representatives (84 percent) say that they did not receive any assistance from the Fund in addressing spouse employment issues related to their field assignment and, of the 50 percent of resident representatives who responded, one third rate the Fund's approach to spouse employment difficulties as highly or completely inadequate (Annex Table 8). In free-form comments regarding measures the Fund could take to overcome spouse employment problems related to resident representative assignments, one half of those who commented (125 respondents) pointed to a range of ways in which the Fund could provide intensive employment assistance to resident representatives' spouses and one quarter pointed to a need to provide compensation for lost family income.

122. Almost one half of resident representatives (48 percent) are concerned about personal security in post countries, and nearly 20 percent have very great concerns about their personal security and that of their households (Annex Table 8). The same proportion of resident representatives (48 percent) believe that the Fund should be doing more to ensure their personal security, while about one third believe that no further steps regarding security are needed in their cases on the part of the Fund (Annex Table 8). In free-form responses (made by about 90 respondents), the most frequent comments regarding how the Fund could be more useful in the area of resident representatives' security related to obtaining diplomatic status or equivalent agreements with authorities, greater provision of security devices and equipment, more extensive use of security guards, and greater responsiveness by the Fund to resident representatives' views regarding security issues, with each of these comments noted by 10-15 percent of those who commented.

X. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ACCOUNTING SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

123. Resident representatives are closely divided in their views on the administrative support (i.e., assistance in the areas of budgeting, payments, accounting, administrative arrangements) that is provided to them by the Administration Department (ADM) and the Treasurer's Department (TRE).

124. A majority of resident representatives (53 percent) believe that the extent of the administrative support they receive from ADM is less than fully adequate, while 44 percent of resident representatives believe that the extent of the support received from ADM is fully adequate or close to fully adequate (Annex Table 11.A). A majority of resident representatives (51 percent) rate the effectiveness of ADM in the administrative support it provides to them as only satisfactory or worse, while 45 percent rate ADM as highly effective in the support it provides to resident representatives (Annex Table 11.A).

125. Similarly, a majority of resident representatives (53 percent) believe that the extent of the payments/accounting support they receive from TRE is less than fully adequate, while 44 percent of resident representatives believe that the extent of the support provided by TRE is fully adequate or close to fully adequate (Annex Table 11.A). A majority of resident representatives (54 percent) rate the effectiveness of TRE in the payments/accounting support it provides to them as only satisfactory or worse, while 41 percent rate TRE as highly effective in the support it provides to resident representatives (Annex Table 11.A).

126. In free-form comments on the issue of what ADM could do to be more useful to resident representatives, almost one half of resident representatives who commented (56 percent of resident representatives) point to organization-related issues, while about 40 percent of those who commented point to service-related issues. Organization-related issues include the need for “flexible”, “sensible”, and “less bureaucratic” application of policies and rules; the need for simplification and streamlining of procedures; the need to reduce the budgeting burden on resident representatives; and the need for greater coordination by ADM staff across different ADM areas in relation to individual post or individual resident representative issues. Service-related issues include the need for more prompt response by ADM staff to resident representatives’ requests and questions, and the need for greater feedback to resident representatives on decisions taken.

127. In free-form comments on the issue of what TRE could do to be more useful to resident representatives, one half of resident representatives who commented (45 percent of resident representatives) point to service-related issues, while about 40 percent of those who commented pointed to organization-related issues. Service-related issues include the need to be more responsive generally to resident representatives’ questions/requests together with the need to respond more rapidly. Organization-related issues included the need for clearer information from TRE, and the need for greater coordination with ADM.

128. In several other contexts throughout the survey, free-form comments by IMF respondents across all respondent groups point at a broader level to both the high opportunity cost (in terms of substantive work) of the current administrative load borne by resident representatives and the need to find effective means to reduce it. Overall, the need to reduce the administrative demands on resident representatives and/or increase the support resources available to resident representatives was the fourth most frequently noted issue (identified by more than one third of approximately 180 IMF respondents) in free-form comments regarding

the key change areas likely to have greatest leverage on effectiveness in the resident representative program.

129. These more generalized comments by survey respondents on administrative-related matters touch upon a wide range of issues including the need for improved ADM support for resident representatives, for more effective research assistance to resident representatives by area departments, for greater administrative and research assistance support locally at posts for resident representatives, and for increased integration of resident representatives in headquarters-based electronic communications and information systems (see section XI.F below), but there are three broad themes underlying the concerns articulated by respondents: (1) the administrative demands on resident representatives related to any individual issue may not appear unreasonable, but the cumulative magnitude of these demands across all areas is often large; (2) resident representative offices are expected to deal with extra-ordinary administrative issues which even the strongest-performing administrative staff at headquarters would find challenging and are expected to do this with the assistance of local staff who are normally less experienced (and substantially less familiar with Fund procedures) than administrative staff at headquarters; and (3) fragmentation of the headquarters-based administrative support arrangements for resident representatives, both within and across various departments, compounds the difficulties for resident representatives. Overall, the level at which matters related to administrative support (broadly defined) are identified as a problem by survey respondents generally implies that the current administrative support strategy at headquarters for resident representatives needs to be reassessed across all relevant areas and potentially re-engineered.

XI. POSTS AND OTHER IMF AND NON-IMF COUNTERPARTS

A. Representatives of Other Organizations

130. In general, resident representatives' contacts with local representatives of bilateral or other multilateral agencies occur most frequently with local representatives of the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Commission of the European Union (EU) (Annex Table 11.B). Among these organizations, the coordination between Fund and Bank representatives is rated as relatively the most effective (a mean score across all respondent groups of 4.6 on a scale of 1-6) (Annex Table 11.B).

131. Resident representatives rate contacts with local members of the diplomatic community (a mean score of 5.5 on a scale of 1-6), the financial sector (mean score of 5.4), the donor community (mean score of 5.3), and the business sector (mean score of 4.7) as occurring more frequently than contacts with local exporters, academics, parliamentary groups, social sector groups, representatives of the political opposition, or local labor union representatives (Annex Table 11.B).

132. National authorities believe that Fund resident representatives, in providing briefings for various third-party groups, should place highest emphasis on the local diplomatic community (a mean score of 4.2 on a scale of 1-6), local and international media representatives (mean score of 4.1), foreign donor groups (mean score of 4.0), and local business groups (mean score of 4.0), and relatively lower emphasis on local parliamentarians, foreign business groups, local donor groups, foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local labor unions, local NGOs, and foreign parliamentarians (Annex Table 11.B).

B. External Relations

133. A majority of national authorities are highly or “very” receptive to resident representatives’ involvement in external relations activities, while about one third are moderately receptive and less than 10 percent are unreceptive to resident representatives’ involvement in this area (Annex Table 11.C). Almost 40 percent of resident representatives rate their involvement in external relations activities as high or heavy, while about one quarter rate their involvement as low (Annex Table 11.C).

134. About one half of resident representatives is involved in one or more external relations activities during any two-week period, while roughly 40 percent of resident representatives undertake an activity in this area approximately once per month (Annex Table 11.C). A majority (55 percent) of resident representatives rate press interviews as their most common form of external relations activity, with the next most frequent form being participation in seminars (Annex Table 11.C). Resident representatives indicate that the most frequent “catalyst” for their external relations activities is a media organization (40 percent of resident representatives), with resident representatives’ themselves (27 percent) the next most frequent instigators (Annex Table 11.C).

135. A majority (58 percent) of all IMF respondents agree that resident representatives are not expected to clear media statements in advance with national authorities, a similar majority (59 percent) agree that resident representatives *are* expected to clear media statements in advance with their area department, and most agree that resident representatives are not expected to clear media statements in advance with External Relations Department (EXR) (Annex Table 11.C). Most IMF respondents believe that area departments and resident representatives (68 percent and 65 percent, respectively) should play the key role in judgements regarding resident representatives’ external relations activities (Annex Table 11.C).

136. More than 60 percent of resident representatives indicate that EXR has been only moderately useful or not useful to them in relation to their external relations activities, while 36 percent indicate that EXR has been highly or very useful to them (Annex Table 11.C). In free-form comments regarding what EXR could do to be more useful to them, most resident representatives who commented (about one half of all resident representatives) noted that more regular and more substantive external relations materials would be helpful.

137. A majority (51 percent) of resident representatives characterizes the quality of their experiences overall in the external relations area as having been highly or “very” satisfactory, while a majority (54 percent) of national authorities also has been highly or “very” satisfied with external relations activities undertaken by resident representatives (Annex Table 11.C). Only about 10 percent of Executive Directors and senior staff believe that difficulties arise frequently regarding resident representatives’ external relations activities, while more than 70 percent of both national authorities and mission team respondents indicate that difficulties have not arisen in the case of their country regarding resident representatives’ external relations activities (Annex Table 11.C). Almost one half of resident representatives believe that senior headquarters-based staff would support them “all the way” or close to all the way if resident representatives found themselves in an awkward external relations situation (Annex Table 11.C).

C. Executive Directors’ Offices

138. A majority (57 percent) of IMF respondents rates resident representatives’ contacts with the IMF Executive Director’s office for their countries as infrequent or rare, with resident representatives more likely (71 percent) than other respondent groups to characterize the frequency of contact at this level (Annex Table 11.D). Most respondents (43 percent) rate the overall effectiveness of interaction between Executive Directors’ offices and resident representatives as “adequate” as opposed to either “effective” (9 percent) or “inadequate” (19 percent) (Annex Table 11.D). Most respondents (46 percent) tend to believe that a somewhat higher frequency of interaction between resident representatives and Executive Directors’ offices would be useful, with national authorities in particular (76 percent) and resident representatives (61 percent) sharing this view to a greater extent than mission staff or other IMF respondents (Annex Table 11.D).

D. IMF-provided Technical Assistance

139. Forty-five percent of resident representatives characterize the extent of the ongoing technical assistance (TA) program in their country as “moderate”, while 38 percent characterize it as “extensive” (Annex Table 11.E). A majority (56 percent) of resident representatives indicates that there are long-term resident experts working in their countries (Annex Table 11.E). Fifty percent of these long-term experts were working in the monetary area, 30 percent in the fiscal area, and 20 percent in the statistical area. A majority (55 percent) of all survey respondents rates the coordination between resident representatives and resident advisors as effective overall (Annex Table 11.E).

140. More than one third of all respondents rate resident representatives as being highly involved with TA, while just under 20 percent of respondents rate resident representatives as having “a lot of” (as opposed to “some” or “a little”) influence on the focus of the TA provided by FAD and MAE missions (Annex Table 11.E). Only about 12 percent of respondents rate resident representatives as having a lot of influence on the focus of TA provided by STA missions (Annex Table 11.E). Most Executive Board and senior IMF staff

respondents (45 percent) believe that resident representatives should have a high degree of influence on the focus of IMF-provided TA to post countries (Annex Table 11.E). A majority of resident representatives rate the TA provided by FAD missions as “effective”, while 30 percent rate effectiveness as adequate; forty-four percent of resident representatives rate the TA provided by MAE missions as “effective”, while 38 percent rate effectiveness as adequate; and 27 percent of resident representatives rate the TA provided by STA missions as “effective”, while 42 percent rate effectiveness as adequate (Annex Table 11.E). The overall effectiveness of the coordination between resident representatives and FAD, MAE, and STA missions is rated as adequate by about one third of all respondents on average (36 percent, 33 percent, and 39 percent, respectively) and as effective by about one quarter of all respondents on average (28 percent, 27 percent, and 20 percent, respectively) (Annex Table 11.E).

E. IMF-provided Training

141. A majority (53 percent) of resident representatives rate the level of IMF Institute and Joint Vienna Institute (INS/JVI) activities related to post countries as “extensive”, while 38 percent rate the level as “moderate” (Annex Table 11.F). Almost two thirds of resident representatives indicate that the extent of their involvement with INS/JVI activities relating to their countries is high (Annex Table 11.F). A similar proportion of resident representatives indicate that they are frequently or very frequently involved in interviewing candidates for courses, while only 27 percent indicate that the frequency of their involvement in administrative arrangements related to candidates’ attendance at courses is high (Annex Table 11.F). Forty percent of resident representatives indicate that their involvement in INS/JVI related activities requires less than one hour per week, and less than 20 percent indicate that the level of interference with time on economic work is high (Annex Table 11.F).

142. Most resident representatives believe that there is little potential to reduce the time that they spend on these activities via greater use of local staff at posts, but around 30 percent of resident representatives believe that the time they spend on these activities could be reduced via increased time spent by INS/JVI staff (Annex Table 11.F). A majority of resident representatives (55 percent) indicate that INS/JVI very often or almost always take up their candidate recommendations (Annex Table 11.F). A majority (54 percent) rate INS/JVI as highly or very effective in their interaction with resident representatives, while 38 percent of resident representatives rate the effectiveness of interaction with INS/JVI as only satisfactory or less (Annex Table 11.F). In free-form responses regarding what INS/JVI could do to increase the effectiveness of their interaction with resident representatives, resident representatives who commented (about 40 percent of resident representatives) made various suggestions for improving selection and interview procedures.

F. Information and Communications Technology Support Function

143. A majority of resident representatives (55 percent) rate the overall quality of the information and communication technology with which they have been provided as only satisfactory or worse, while 42 percent rate the overall quality of technology as high or very

high (Annex Table 11.G). Most resident representatives (50 percent) have experienced few or no problems with IMF-provided hardware, but 48 percent have experienced some degree of hardware problems (Annex Table 11.G). Resident representatives are evenly divided between those who have experienced few or no problems with IMF-provided software (49 percent), and those who have experienced some level of software problems (49 percent) (Annex Table 11.G). Almost two thirds of resident representatives have experienced few or no problems with incompatible hardware and software (Annex Table 11.G). A majority of resident representatives (56 percent) have experienced some degree of problems with local hardwiring services in post countries, while 31 percent have experienced few or no problems in this area (Annex Table 11.G). Over 60 percent of resident representatives have experienced some degree of problems with a lack of adequate information/training provided in the technology area, while 34 percent have experienced few or no problems in this area (Annex Table 11.G). Over 60 percent of resident representatives have experienced some degree of problems with a lack of timely support services provided in the technology area, while 35 percent have experienced few or no problems in this area (Annex Table 11.G). A majority (53 percent) of resident representatives rate the overall quality of the technological support services provided to resident representatives by BCS and by BCS contractors such as MCI as only satisfactory or worse, while 42 percent rate the overall quality of support services provided as high or very high (Annex Table 11.G). Twenty percent of resident representatives believe that the technology provided to resident representatives by the Fund compares well or very well with the field technology provided by other comparable organizations to their field staffs, while two thirds of resident representatives believe that the technology provided by the Fund compares only moderately well or compares badly with the field technology provided by other organizations (Annex Table 11.G).

144. Two thirds of resident representatives provided free-form comments in the area of technology services, and these comments noted a range of concerns in areas including the electronic mail capability provided to posts, Internet access, lack of access to the Fund's internal web site, inability of support staff to solve problems raised by resident representatives, poor quality of communications equipment, and lack of signal encryption technology. A small number of mission respondents (15 percent) provided comments in the area of technology services provided to posts, and 65 percent of these comments related to the difficulties and/or unreliability of communications links with resident representative posts.

STATISTICAL ANNEX

List of Abbreviations

AD	Area department
ADM	Administration Department
AFR	African Department
APD	Asia and Pacific Department
CV	Curriculum vitae
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ED	Executive Director
EU	Commission of the European Union
EU1	European I Department
EU2	European II Department
EXR	External Relations Department
FAD	Fiscal Affairs Department
HQ	IMF Headquarters
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INS	IMF Institute
JVI	Joint Vienna Institute
MAE	Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department
n.a.	Not applicable
NA	National authorities
NGO	Non-governmental organization
Other HQ	Other headquarters-based survey respondents
PDR	Policy Development and Review Department
RR	Resident representative
TA	Technical assistance
TRE	Treasurer's Department
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WEO	World Economic Outlook
WHD	Western Hemisphere Department

Note: survey respondents were instructed to skip questions that were not applicable to them or that they lacked sufficient information to answer. Thus, the proportion of respondents who did not answer (reported in the Statistical Annex as “not answered”) is higher for questions requiring very specific knowledge than for topics of wide familiarity to respondents.

Table 1. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: In principle, should RR posts be viewed mostly as long-term or as transitional instruments?					
Primary emphasis on long-term	25	26	33	24	17
Approximately equal emphasis	22	26	20	22	19
Primary emphasis on transitional	52	48	46	52	60
Not answered	1	0	0	1	3
Q: In principle, should RR posts mainly support programs or local capacity-building?					
Primary emphasis on supporting programs	32	34	31	33	30
Approximately equal emphasis	56	51	52	59	57
Primary emphasis on supporting local capacity-building	11	15	15	8	11
Not answered	1	0	1	1	2
Q: In principle, in which activities should posts have a comparative advantage over staff missions?					
a. Strengthening dialogue between IMF and member country					
Comparative advantage	55	68	n.a.	56	44
Equal advantage	37	27	n.a.	37	46
Comparative disadvantage	6	4	n.a.	5	8
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	2
b. Policy diagnosis and design of country policy strategy					
Comparative advantage	6	10	n.a.	4	10
Equal advantage	48	53	n.a.	46	48
Comparative disadvantage	44	36	n.a.	49	40
Not answered	2	1	n.a.	2	2
c. On-site policy advice					
Comparative advantage	57	59	n.a.	58	53
Equal advantage	32	34	n.a.	30	34
Comparative disadvantage	9	7	n.a.	10	11
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	2	2
d. Monitoring IMF-supported economic programs					
Comparative advantage	65	71	n.a.	63	65
Equal advantage	26	23	n.a.	27	27
Comparative disadvantage	7	5	n.a.	8	6
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	2
e. Early warning of program slippages					
Comparative advantage	88	92	n.a.	89	84
Equal advantage	7	3	n.a.	8	10
Comparative disadvantage	3	5	n.a.	2	4
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	1	2
f. Gathering economic information and data					
Comparative advantage	68	62	n.a.	74	61
Equal advantage	24	30	n.a.	21	25
Comparative disadvantage	6	8	n.a.	4	10
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	1	4

Table 1. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
g. Assessing the political and social context					
Comparative advantage	83	90	n.a.	83	78
Equal advantage	12	4	n.a.	13	15
Comparative disadvantage	3	5	n.a.	2	4
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	2	2
h. Local coordination of IMF-provided TA					
Comparative advantage	76	48	n.a.	86	80
Equal advantage	17	42	n.a.	9	12
Comparative disadvantage	6	10	n.a.	4	6
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	2
i. Macroeconomic capacity-building activities					
Comparative advantage	49	49	n.a.	48	52
Equal advantage	41	47	n.a.	40	38
Comparative disadvantage	8	4	n.a.	10	9
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	3	2
j. Fostering local coordination of donors and other agencies					
Comparative advantage	81	77	n.a.	86	76
Equal advantage	13	16	n.a.	10	15
Comparative disadvantage	4	5	n.a.	2	6
Not answered	2	1	n.a.	2	2
k. Local public relations and information about IMF					
Comparative advantage	88	84	n.a.	91	84
Equal advantage	8	11	n.a.	6	10
Comparative disadvantage	3	5	n.a.	2	4
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	2
l. Substantive economic analysis and/or research					
Comparative advantage	3	4	n.a.	3	3
Equal advantage	24	29	n.a.	25	17
Comparative disadvantage	70	64	n.a.	69	77
Not answered	2	3	n.a.	2	2
m. Substantive report-drafting					
Comparative advantage	4	5	n.a.	2	5
Equal advantage	10	18	n.a.	8	9
Comparative disadvantage	84	77	n.a.	87	84
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	2	2

Table 1. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What should be the main objectives of RR posts?					
a. On-site policy advice, including early warning	87	90	81	86	89
b. Strengthening dialogue between IMF and member country	73	75	82	67	77
c. Monitoring IMF-supported economic programs	70	73	64	66	84
d. Gathering economic information and data	61	49	40	79	54
e. Assessing political and social context	47	56	37	48	47
f. Macroeconomic capacity-building	41	30	36	45	48
g. Local public relations and information on IMF	35	36	36	37	31
h. Local coordination of IMF-provided technical assistance	26	18	38	26	19
i. Policy diagnosis and design of country policy strategy	25	44	31	19	17
j. Fostering local coordination of donors, etc.	16	22	18	12	20
k. Substantive economic analysis/research	7	1	23	4	4
l. Substantive report drafting	1	0	4	0	1
Q: Do all parties understand post objectives and are objectives reassessed?					
a. Is there any reassessment of objectives when new RRs are assigned?					
Yes	35	27	29	35	45
No	48	60	57	43	39
Not answered	18	12	14	22	16
b. How much consensus is there on RRs' objectives?					
Great common understanding	18	27	15	22	3
5	34	32	52	33	22
4	22	21	24	15	37
3	11	8	6	13	14
2	8	7	1	6	20
Little common understanding	3	3	1	4	0
Not answered	4	3	0	7	4
Q: For medium-term effectiveness, in what broad direction should the role of RRs tend to move?					
a. Local macroeconomic capacity-building					
Strongly agree	27	27	39	23	26
5	29	30	20	34	28
4	22	29	13	23	23
3	11	7	6	12	16
2	6	4	8	7	5
Strongly disagree	3	1	12	1	1
Not answered	1	1	1	1	1
b. Economic information and data gathering					
Strongly agree	18	10	20	24	12
5	23	21	27	24	18
4	27	40	13	26	31
3	20	16	25	16	25
2	7	5	7	6	9
Strongly disagree	4	5	7	2	2
Not answered	2	3	0	1	3

Table 1. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
c. Policy diagnosis and design of country policy strategy					
Strongly agree	13	27	21	5	12
5	28	36	32	23	26
4	23	21	20	25	22
3	17	11	15	16	27
2	13	3	2	23	9
Strongly disagree	5	0	7	7	4
Not answered	1	3	1	1	1
d. On-site policy advice					
Strongly agree	32	53	39	23	26
5	37	29	30	41	42
4	20	12	15	24	19
3	7	3	8	7	8
2	3	1	1	4	3
Strongly disagree	1	0	5	1	1
Not answered	1	1	1	1	1
e. Monitoring IMF-supported economic programs					
Strongly agree	41	45	37	39	43
5	28	23	31	29	26
4	21	22	18	23	18
3	6	5	6	6	9
2	3	1	4	3	3
Strongly disagree	1	1	2	1	0
Not answered	1	1	2	1	1
f. Public relations and explaining role of Fund					
Strongly agree	27	32	32	25	24
5	28	25	30	29	26
4	24	25	15	25	30
3	11	11	12	11	10
2	7	5	5	8	8
Strongly disagree	2	0	6	2	2
Not answered	1	3	0	2	1
g. Local coordination among donors and agencies					
Strongly agree	13	25	12	8	13
5	19	14	30	17	18
4	28	27	18	30	32
3	22	12	18	24	27
2	11	14	10	14	4
Strongly disagree	6	7	10	6	2
Not answered	2	1	4	1	3

Table 1. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What time horizon do the main players work with?					
a. Do RRs focus on the short or medium terms?					
Short Term	65	58	n.a.	67	68
Medium Term	21	32	n.a.	19	19
Not answered	14	11	n.a.	15	13
b. Do HQ staff focus on the short or medium terms?					
Short Term	63	68	n.a.	59	68
Medium Term	22	18	n.a.	25	19
Not answered	14	14	n.a.	15	15
c. Do NAs focus on the short or medium terms?					
Short Term	65	71	n.a.	62	66
Medium Term	20	16	n.a.	22	19
Not answered	15	12	n.a.	15	15

Resident Representatives - All Departments

	Average	Standard Deviation
(Total Number of Respondents)	(64)	
Q: In practice, how is RRs' time allocated?		
Allocation of Time (in percent):		
a. Gathering economic information and data	18	10
b. Program monitoring and early warning	14	7
c. Facilitating dialogue between NAs and IMF	12	6
d. Providing on-site policy advice	11	7
e. Assessing political and social context	11	7
f. Administration of the post	7	4
g. Local PR and information about IMF	6	4
h. Local coordination among donors	6	3
i. Macroeconomic capacity-building	6	5
j. Coordinating IMF TA and training	6	4
k. Other	1	1
	100	

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What should be important in deciding whether to open RR posts?					
a. Need to strengthen local macroeconomic capacity					
Extremely important	30	33	35	28	28
5	30	33	29	27	37
4	19	15	14	22	18
3	9	10	6	10	11
2	8	5	10	11	4
Unimportant	2	3	7	1	0
Not answered	1	1	0	2	2
b. Need for intensive dialogue between NAs and IMF					
Extremely important	46	64	44	43	39
5	31	19	33	34	30
4	15	12	20	13	17
3	5	0	0	6	10
2	2	3	1	3	2
Unimportant	0	0	1	0	1
Not answered	1	1	0	1	1
c. Need for close monitoring of economic and political developments					
Extremely important	42	53	29	45	40
5	37	40	32	38	37
4	14	5	24	11	17
3	4	0	7	4	4
2	1	0	4	1	1
Unimportant	1	0	5	0	0
Not answered	1	1	0	1	1
d. Need for on-site policy advice from the IMF					
Extremely important	41	45	32	42	42
5	32	34	30	29	38
4	16	12	21	17	14
3	7	5	7	9	3
2	2	0	6	2	1
Unimportant	1	0	2	1	1
Not answered	1	3	1	1	1
e. High degree of cooperation by NAs including the willingness to work closely with RR					
Extremely important	26	33	30	23	24
5	31	33	30	28	37
4	27	21	30	30	23
3	10	7	6	11	12
2	4	3	1	5	3
Unimportant	2	3	2	1	1
Not answered	2	1	1	2	1

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. Post will make a material difference to policy implementation					
Extremely important	35	45	15	40	35
5	34	32	24	37	41
4	19	15	31	16	16
3	6	5	12	3	5
2	3	0	10	2	0
Unimportant	2	1	5	1	1
Not answered	2	1	4	2	1
g. Program/near program cases and cases where IMF exposure remains high					
Extremely important	33	40	17	38	31
5	33	29	32	32	37
4	19	18	24	16	20
3	9	8	11	8	8
2	3	3	7	3	1
Unimportant	1	1	4	1	1
Not answered	2	1	6	1	2
h. Regional importance or large economic size of country					
Extremely important	7	5	8	11	1
5	12	16	11	11	13
4	23	22	24	23	23
3	18	18	12	15	27
2	19	18	15	22	19
Unimportant	19	18	25	18	16
Not answered	2	3	5	1	1
Q: What should be important in deciding whether to close RR posts?					
a. Strong local macroeconomic policy capacity					
Extremely important	33	37	30	34	31
5	39	44	32	39	41
4	11	7	14	9	16
3	7	8	8	8	4
2	5	1	8	6	3
Unimportant	2	3	7	1	1
Not answered	2	0	0	4	3
b. Effective dialogue between IMF and NAs					
Extremely important	46	53	40	43	49
5	38	38	33	43	32
4	9	7	17	7	10
3	3	1	4	3	1
2	2	0	5	2	2
Unimportant	0	0	1	0	1
Not answered	2	0	0	2	4

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
c. Effective monitoring of economic and political developments without post					
Extremely important	47	51	42	49	44
5	38	37	26	44	37
4	8	10	19	3	9
3	3	1	7	2	4
2	1	0	2	1	2
Unimportant	1	1	4	0	1
Not answered	1	0	0	2	3
d. Post's effectiveness impaired by exogenous factors					
Extremely important	36	34	26	41	37
5	28	25	33	25	33
4	16	16	11	17	16
3	9	11	8	10	9
2	6	8	12	5	1
Unimportant	2	4	7	0	1
Not answered	2	1	2	2	3
e. Poor track record of cooperation with IMF					
Extremely important	20	14	18	19	30
5	26	32	26	22	30
4	21	19	18	23	18
3	16	15	20	19	9
2	11	12	12	12	6
Unimportant	4	8	4	4	3
Not answered	2	0	2	2	3
f. Post not likely to make material difference to policy implementation					
Extremely important	34	41	19	33	45
5	28	32	30	25	29
4	18	11	25	23	10
3	11	8	15	12	6
2	3	3	2	3	4
Unimportant	2	3	5	2	1
Not answered	3	3	4	3	4
g. Low program prospects, low on-site surveillance need, low exposure					
Extremely important	33	32	27	34	37
5	31	37	24	30	34
4	19	16	30	16	16
3	8	5	10	9	6
2	4	3	5	5	1
Unimportant	2	3	2	2	1
Not answered	4	4	2	4	4

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
h. Post has achieved its' objectives					
Extremely important	46	51	42	41	57
5	27	30	32	26	23
4	11	5	11	13	12
3	5	5	8	7	0
2	3	3	4	4	3
Unimportant	2	1	2	3	0
Not answered	5	4	1	6	5
i. Resource priorities (need for post or staff elsewhere)					
Extremely important	19	21	11	21	19
5	22	26	19	23	22
4	20	19	14	22	20
3	15	16	17	14	16
2	13	7	20	12	15
Unimportant	6	10	13	4	2
Not answered	4	1	6	4	5
Q: Why have some posts been open for very long periods?					
a. Poor focus on exit strategies					
Extremely important	14	10	n.a.	16	14
5	26	19	n.a.	24	33
4	18	22	n.a.	17	17
3	11	10	n.a.	12	9
2	13	16	n.a.	12	13
Unimportant	8	8	n.a.	8	6
Not answered	11	15	n.a.	11	8
b. Lobbying of IMF by countries					
Extremely important	12	14	n.a.	11	14
5	29	22	n.a.	28	38
4	21	18	n.a.	20	26
3	13	16	n.a.	16	4
2	8	7	n.a.	9	9
Unimportant	3	3	n.a.	3	3
Not answered	13	21	n.a.	13	6
c. Vested interests by ADs in retaining posts					
Extremely important	13	12	n.a.	14	10
5	24	22	n.a.	24	24
4	22	22	n.a.	24	16
3	14	14	n.a.	12	17
2	8	4	n.a.	7	14
Unimportant	7	7	n.a.	6	11
Not answered	12	19	n.a.	12	9
d. Institutional inertia within the Fund					
Extremely important	10	10	n.a.	13	5
5	24	23	n.a.	22	27
4	23	23	n.a.	24	20
3	14	10	n.a.	15	15
2	12	11	n.a.	11	13
Unimportant	7	10	n.a.	5	10
Not answered	11	14	n.a.	11	10

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
e. Exogenous factors delaying countries' adjustment progress					
Extremely important	7	5	n.a.	9	5
5	25	18	n.a.	28	23
4	23	33	n.a.	16	29
3	17	14	n.a.	19	15
2	13	8	n.a.	13	15
Unimportant	4	4	n.a.	3	4
Not answered	12	18	n.a.	12	9
f. Inadequate local macroeconomic capacity					
Extremely important	17	18	n.a.	16	17
5	28	29	n.a.	29	24
4	20	22	n.a.	17	25
3	15	10	n.a.	16	16
2	10	8	n.a.	10	11
Unimportant	1	1	n.a.	1	1
Not answered	10	12	n.a.	10	6
g. Posts highly effective in supporting IMF-member interaction					
Extremely important	14	19	n.a.	12	13
5	27	26	n.a.	25	30
4	25	21	n.a.	28	23
3	12	10	n.a.	13	14
2	10	10	n.a.	11	10
Unimportant	2	3	n.a.	1	2
Not answered	11	12	n.a.	11	9
h. Changing needs/circumstances resulting in continuing role for posts					
Extremely important	14	16	n.a.	13	14
5	28	23	n.a.	26	33
4	23	26	n.a.	22	23
3	13	14	n.a.	13	12
2	9	5	n.a.	12	6
Unimportant	2	1	n.a.	1	3
Not answered	12	14	n.a.	12	9
i. Unwillingness to risk signaling wider withdrawal of support					
Extremely important	9	15	n.a.	7	6
5	19	18	n.a.	19	20
4	30	23	n.a.	28	39
3	14	12	n.a.	15	12
2	14	14	n.a.	16	10
Unimportant	4	5	n.a.	3	5
Not answered	11	12	n.a.	12	8
Q: Within what time horizon will posts no longer be strictly needed?					
Greater than 10 years	12	12	19	9	n.a.
8-10 years	16	19	13	16	n.a.
6-8 years	18	16	19	18	n.a.
4-6 years	25	25	18	29	n.a.
2-4 years	18	21	15	18	n.a.
Less than 2 years	7	5	6	7	n.a.
Not answered	4	1	10	3	n.a.

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How optimal is the current number of posts?					
Far too many posts	3	n.a.	n.a.	3	3
5	5	n.a.	n.a.	4	8
4	27	n.a.	n.a.	28	24
3	34	n.a.	n.a.	32	37
2	18	n.a.	n.a.	20	15
Far too few posts	5	n.a.	n.a.	4	8
Not answered	9	n.a.	n.a.	10	6
Q: What is your assessment of the current allocation of posts across countries/regions?					
Optimal	2	n.a.	n.a.	2	1
5	21	n.a.	n.a.	22	20
4	33	n.a.	n.a.	33	32
3	23	n.a.	n.a.	23	24
2	7	n.a.	n.a.	5	10
Extremely sub-optimal	2	n.a.	n.a.	2	2
Not answered	13	n.a.	n.a.	14	11
Q: How much potential is there for posts with regional responsibilities?					
A lot of potential	15	22	n.a.	11	18
5	22	25	n.a.	22	19
4	14	16	n.a.	15	11
3	17	12	n.a.	19	16
2	21	10	n.a.	22	27
Very little potential	10	11	n.a.	10	8
Not answered	2	4	n.a.	2	1
Q: Should the IMF locate more or fewer economists in the field?					
More economists	16	32	n.a.	11	15
5	28	27	n.a.	28	29
4	30	26	n.a.	32	29
3	16	5	n.a.	18	19
2	5	3	n.a.	6	5
Fewer economists	2	1	n.a.	3	0
Not answered	3	5	n.a.	3	2
Q: How much impact on RR posts' effectiveness would each of the following have?					
a. increasing the number of IMF economist staff assigned to posts?					
Major impact	12	8	17	13	10
5	20	29	23	14	25
4	10	7	8	7	18
3	11	11	14	10	13
2	17	16	13	17	20
Little impact	27	27	24	37	10
Not answered	3	1	1	3	4

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
b. increasing the number of local professional staff employed by posts?					
Major impact	13	14	19	10	13
5	21	32	25	15	20
4	15	11	15	15	19
3	15	16	13	16	15
2	15	11	11	16	22
Little impact	18	15	17	25	6
Not answered	2	1	0	3	4
c. increasing number of local support staff employed by posts?					
Major impact	2	1	5	0	3
5	8	12	11	4	10
4	13	14	15	10	16
3	16	21	15	14	15
2	26	23	17	28	31
Little impact	33	27	32	42	19
Not answered	3	1	5	3	5
Q: Have posts reduced the resources devoted to staff missions?					
a.i. Have posts decreased the number of missions?					
Yes	41	27	n.a.	33	66
No	54	62	n.a.	61	33
Not answered	5	11	n.a.	6	1
a.ii. How many missions or staff visits per year reduced?					
More than 3	1	0	n.a.	1	n.a.
2 to 3	3	3	n.a.	3	n.a.
1 to 2	15	0	n.a.	21	n.a.
Less than 1	6	3	n.a.	7	n.a.
Not answered	69	73	n.a.	67	n.a.
b.i. Have posts decreased the duration of missions?					
Yes	49	48	n.a.	43	63
No	45	41	n.a.	51	35
Not answered	5	11	n.a.	6	1
b.ii. How many days per mission or staff visit reduced?					
More than 3	11	14	n.a.	10	n.a.
2 to 3	23	27	n.a.	21	n.a.
1 to 2	12	14	n.a.	11	n.a.
Less than 1	8	27	n.a.	1	n.a.
Not answered	55	51	n.a.	57	n.a.
c.i. Have posts decreased the size of missions?					
Yes	41	48	n.a.	34	47
No	54	45	n.a.	58	52
Not answered	5	7	n.a.	8	1
c.ii. How many economists per mission or staff visit reduced?					
More than 2	1	0	n.a.	1	n.a.
1 to 2	17	26	n.a.	13	n.a.
Less than 1	16	12	n.a.	17	n.a.
Not answered	67	62	n.a.	69	n.a.

Table 2. Country Targeting of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
c.iii. How many support staff per mission or staff visit reduced?					
More than 2	1	0	n.a.	1	n.a.
1 to 2	17	22	n.a.	15	n.a.
Less than 1	18	21	n.a.	17	n.a.
Not answered	64	58	n.a.	66	n.a.
Q: What activities could "liaison" posts (local staff only) carry out?					
a. Administration and logistical support for IMF missions	44	93	n.a.	3	89
b. Gathering economic information/data	37	78	n.a.	3	74
c. Reporting on the political and social context	27	42	n.a.	13	44
d. Liaison with local organizations	21	42	n.a.	1	46
e. Facilitating communication between NAs & IMF	23	36	n.a.	15	29
f. Reviewing candidates for IMF provided training courses	20	32	n.a.	5	41
g. Program monitoring and early warning	13	16	n.a.	8	19
Q: If alternative is closure, would liaison posts (local staff only) be useful?					
Very desirable	9	10	14	7	5
5	12	15	18	12	5
4	10	7	20	9	4
3	8	5	8	8	9
2	23	18	18	22	35
Very undesirable	36	45	18	39	39
Not answered	2	0	4	3	2

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How satisfied are you overall with RR posts' effectiveness?					
Very satisfied	18	21	26	19	6
5	38	51	44	31	40
4	25	15	18	25	39
3	9	8	5	10	10
2	6	3	5	10	2
Very dissatisfied	2	0	1	4	0
Not answered	2	3	1	2	3
Q: In general, how close does the RR program come to maximizing its potential value-added?					
Maximum value added	1	n.a.	n.a.	1	1
5	33	n.a.	n.a.	35	28
4	43	n.a.	n.a.	38	52
3	14	n.a.	n.a.	14	15
2	4	n.a.	n.a.	6	1
Zero value added	0	n.a.	n.a.	0	0
Not answered	4	n.a.	n.a.	5	3
Q: How much impact do RR posts have on the quality of country work?					
Major impact	25	45	24	23	13
5	36	38	37	31	44
4	22	8	26	24	26
3	6	3	4	7	10
2	5	0	6	8	3
Little impact	2	0	1	4	1
Not answered	3	5	2	2	3
Q: Is the contribution of RR posts to effective country outcomes recognized?					
a. Is contribution of posts recognized by HQ staff?					
Yes	70	62	n.a.	75	66
No	20	32	n.a.	13	24
Not answered	11	7	n.a.	12	11
b. Is contribution of posts reported in country documents?					
Yes	12	19	n.a.	13	2
No	80	73	n.a.	78	90
Not answered	8	8	n.a.	9	8
Q: Contribution of RR post to strengthening the policy dialogue between IMF and NAs?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	26	44	33	20	20
5	35	36	35	34	37
4	20	15	19	20	26
3	10	4	7	13	12
2	5	0	4	8	2
No contribution	2	0	2	4	0
Not answered	2	1	0	2	3

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	25	37	33	14	29
About the same	41	51	40	43	32
Lower contribution	29	11	23	38	31
Not answered	5	1	4	5	8
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving the IMF's understanding of domestic policy-makers' views, constraints, reasons, and plans?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	32	63	29	26	24
5	32	25	36	31	39
4	19	11	18	20	24
3	8	0	7	12	9
2	5	0	7	8	2
No contribution	1	0	1	2	0
Not answered	2	1	2	2	3
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	53	78	49	45	54
About the same	30	18	35	31	33
Lower contribution	13	1	13	21	9
Not answered	4	3	4	4	4
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving local understanding of the IMF, its objectives, policies and procedures?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	24	49	25	16	18
5	29	29	32	26	33
4	25	12	19	30	29
3	12	4	13	14	11
2	6	3	7	7	3
No contribution	2	1	2	2	1
Not answered	3	1	1	3	4
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	56	77	50	48	63
About the same	33	21	38	38	28
Lower contribution	6	1	8	10	2
Not answered	4	1	4	5	6
Q: Contribution of RR post to the IMF's ability to adapt policies to meet local conditions?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	8	22	n.a.	3	8
5	28	45	n.a.	22	27
4	30	23	n.a.	32	33
3	17	7	n.a.	22	14
2	12	1	n.a.	15	14
No contribution	3	0	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	2	1	n.a.	2	3

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	26	45	n.a.	15	33
About the same	50	44	n.a.	54	47
Lower contribution	20	10	n.a.	27	15
Not answered	3	1	n.a.	4	4
Q: Contribution of RR post to identifying and overcoming local obstacles?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	21	44	n.a.	14	15
5	37	44	n.a.	33	42
4	20	7	n.a.	22	28
3	10	1	n.a.	14	9
2	6	0	n.a.	11	3
No contribution	3	0	n.a.	5	0
Not answered	3	4	n.a.	2	3
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	55	82	n.a.	42	61
About the same	30	15	n.a.	35	29
Lower contribution	11	0	n.a.	19	4
Not answered	4	3	n.a.	4	5
Q: Contribution of RR post to maintaining local policy-makers' momentum and resolve?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	15	26	n.a.	13	10
5	29	40	n.a.	23	32
4	24	19	n.a.	24	28
3	13	5	n.a.	13	19
2	11	7	n.a.	14	8
No contribution	6	1	n.a.	10	0
Not answered	3	1	n.a.	3	3
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	24	40	n.a.	17	25
About the same	48	55	n.a.	45	49
Lower contribution	25	4	n.a.	34	22
Not answered	3	1	n.a.	4	4
Q: Contribution of RR post to promoting well-informed domestic economic debate?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	7	15	12	2	5
5	23	27	23	21	23
4	27	37	31	22	28
3	17	5	15	20	24
2	15	10	10	20	16
No contribution	7	3	8	12	0
Not answered	3	3	1	4	4
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	35	47	37	29	39
About the same	44	51	42	43	42
Lower contribution	16	0	18	23	13
Not answered	5	3	4	5	6

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Contribution of RR post to influencing domestic expectations regarding feasibility, sustainability and benefits of economic reforms?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	7	14	10	3	6
5	20	32	25	12	22
4	30	33	26	30	33
3	21	12	20	24	19
2	14	7	12	19	14
No contribution	6	1	6	9	2
Not answered	3	1	1	4	3
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	23	37	27	15	26
About the same	52	59	49	50	53
Lower contribution	21	3	21	31	16
Not answered	4	1	2	5	5
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving daily monetary and credit control?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	12	19	12	9	12
5	20	18	25	14	30
4	22	32	13	20	27
3	14	10	17	14	15
2	14	15	11	19	8
No contribution	13	4	19	21	0
Not answered	5	3	4	4	9
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	35	40	33	28	49
About the same	35	44	40	31	32
Lower contribution	24	14	20	37	9
Not answered	6	3	6	5	10
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving government expenditure management?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	7	15	8	3	6
5	14	14	24	10	15
4	25	26	19	24	30
3	21	23	21	20	23
2	16	16	12	20	12
No contribution	14	4	12	22	6
Not answered	3	1	4	2	8
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	18	18	24	11	28
About the same	44	62	44	40	37
Lower contribution	33	19	26	46	26
Not answered	5	1	6	3	10

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Contribution of RR posts to reducing off-budget activities and improving budgetary transparency?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	5	14	7	1	4
5	16	16	24	12	15
4	21	32	18	17	24
3	23	22	18	23	30
2	18	12	14	23	14
No contribution	13	3	14	21	5
Not answered	4	1	5	3	8
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	16	22	23	10	19
About the same	45	62	48	38	45
Lower contribution	33	15	23	48	26
Not answered	6	1	7	5	10
Q: Contribution of RR post to resolving statistical problems and/or improving the quality of economic statistics?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	9	12	7	6	13
5	22	25	29	19	19
4	23	25	14	23	28
3	22	23	20	20	25
2	14	12	17	17	5
No contribution	8	1	10	12	1
Not answered	4	1	4	2	9
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	28	34	24	24	37
About the same	37	44	46	33	30
Lower contribution	30	21	25	39	23
Not answered	5	1	5	4	11
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving progress and/or constraining slippages on structural reforms?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	9	26	6	4	6
5	21	19	26	20	20
4	31	36	37	24	37
3	19	12	17	22	20
2	12	5	4	18	11
No contribution	5	0	10	8	1
Not answered	3	1	1	5	4
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	22	42	25	14	19
About the same	48	51	54	44	51
Lower contribution	25	5	19	36	22
Not answered	5	1	2	6	9

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving the extent of implementation of technical assistance recommendations?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	11	15	19	6	10
5	23	23	32	18	25
4	27	41	21	26	23
3	19	11	13	24	23
2	12	8	7	16	11
No contribution	5	0	5	7	3
Not answered	3	1	2	3	6
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	36	47	43	27	40
About the same	41	45	38	45	30
Lower contribution	19	7	15	24	22
Not answered	5	1	4	4	9
Q: Contribution of RR post to timely compliance with prior actions for Fund-supported programs?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	22	44	n.a.	13	22
5	31	26	n.a.	31	37
4	18	12	n.a.	19	23
3	9	3	n.a.	12	8
2	3	0	n.a.	5	2
No contribution	2	1	n.a.	4	0
Not answered	15	14	n.a.	17	10
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	46	53	n.a.	39	55
About the same	30	32	n.a.	30	28
Lower contribution	9	1	n.a.	13	8
Not answered	15	14	n.a.	18	10
Q: Contribution of RR post to timely compliance with performance criteria for Fund-supported programs?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	21	40	n.a.	12	24
5	27	23	n.a.	25	32
4	22	18	n.a.	22	25
3	9	3	n.a.	13	6
2	5	1	n.a.	7	3
No contribution	3	1	n.a.	4	2
Not answered	13	14	n.a.	16	8
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	39	51	n.a.	29	49
About the same	37	36	n.a.	39	33
Lower contribution	10	0	n.a.	16	8
Not answered	14	14	n.a.	16	10

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Contribution of RR post to timely achievement of structural benchmarks under Fund-supported programs?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	13	34	n.a.	5	11
5	23	26	n.a.	24	20
4	26	14	n.a.	26	35
3	12	4	n.a.	14	14
2	7	3	n.a.	7	9
No contribution	3	1	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	17	18	n.a.	20	10
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	32	48	n.a.	25	34
About the same	40	34	n.a.	42	41
Lower contribution	10	0	n.a.	13	13
Not answered	18	18	n.a.	21	12
Q: Contribution of RR post to providing early warning of potential policy slippages and/or to minimizing program surprises?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	31	56	24	22	33
5	34	26	33	34	40
4	13	5	21	11	13
3	7	0	7	10	5
2	6	0	8	8	4
No contribution	2	1	4	3	0
Not answered	8	11	2	12	4
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	64	74	55	56	80
About the same	18	14	29	17	13
Lower contribution	9	1	13	14	2
Not answered	9	11	4	13	5
Q: Contribution of RR post to reducing the frequency of formal or informal program interruptions?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	10	26	n.a.	5	8
5	17	18	n.a.	15	22
4	20	16	n.a.	16	29
3	15	7	n.a.	17	15
2	9	4	n.a.	11	10
No contribution	6	3	n.a.	10	3
Not answered	23	26	n.a.	25	14
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	22	36	n.a.	13	30
About the same	41	38	n.a.	40	47
Lower contribution	13	0	n.a.	21	8
Not answered	23	26	n.a.	26	15

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving program implementation overall?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	16	33	12	12	13
5	33	32	33	30	39
4	23	16	29	20	31
3	10	5	10	13	9
2	5	0	10	7	2
No contribution	4	1	7	5	0
Not answered	9	12	0	13	6
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	32	49	31	24	35
About the same	41	37	46	42	38
Lower contribution	14	1	20	18	12
Not answered	12	12	2	15	15
Q: Contribution of RR post in the area of macroeconomic capacity-building?					
i. RR post?					
Major contribution	7	16	10	2	9
5	17	21	20	14	17
4	28	32	18	27	37
3	18	19	15	19	19
2	14	8	12	20	10
No contribution	11	3	24	14	1
Not answered	4	1	1	5	8
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?					
Higher contribution	31	44	21	21	52
About the same	42	48	55	42	27
Lower contribution	21	7	20	31	11
Not answered	6	1	4	6	11
Q: How important are the following factors in contributing to the value-added of RRs?					
a. High technical skill level of RRs?					
Very important	39	45	58	31	31
5	38	36	29	41	40
4	16	15	7	18	23
3	5	4	4	7	2
2	1	0	1	1	3
Not important	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	1	0	1	1	1
b. High motivation level of RRs?					
Very important	62	74	58	63	51
5	33	23	30	32	43
4	4	3	8	3	3
3	1	0	2	1	2
2	0	0	0	0	0
Not important	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	1	0	1	1	1

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
^a (Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
c. Effective interaction between RRs and HQ staff?					
Very important	51	64	50	49	45
5	38	25	38	41	42
4	10	10	10	9	11
3	1	1	1	1	1
2	0	0	0	0	0
Not important	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	1	0	1	1	1
d. Effective interaction between RRs and NAs?					
Very important	79	88	63	84	80
5	18	12	31	15	19
4	1	0	5	1	0
3	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0
Not important	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	1	0	1	1	1
e. Good relations between AD missions and NAs?					
Very important	22	15	42	17	19
5	37	47	29	38	34
4	30	27	20	35	29
3	8	8	7	6	11
2	3	0	1	3	5
Not important	1	3	0	1	0
Not answered	1	0	1	1	1
f. Effective priority-setting by RRs					
Very important	29	40	n.a.	29	23
5	43	38	n.a.	43	46
4	21	18	n.a.	20	24
3	4	1	n.a.	4	4
2	1	0	n.a.	2	0
Not important	1	0	n.a.	0	2
Not answered	2	3	n.a.	3	1
g. Heavy use of RRs by NAs?					
Very important	36	47	27	33	41
5	31	32	20	33	38
4	21	16	32	22	13
3	8	3	12	8	6
2	2	0	5	2	0
Not important	0	0	1	0	0
Not answered	2	3	2	2	2
h. High level of delegation to RRs?					
Very important	21	49	25	10	16
5	27	25	33	23	32
4	32	18	19	41	38
3	11	5	15	14	8
2	6	1	4	10	5
Not important	1	1	1	2	0
Not answered	1	0	2	2	1

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
i. High weight placed on RRs' policy recommendations by HQ staff?					
Very important	22	42	29	12	20
5	35	32	32	36	37
4	26	19	23	30	24
3	11	5	12	11	17
2	4	0	1	9	1
Not important	1	1	0	1	0
Not answered	2	0	4	2	1
Q: To what extent are the following factors obstacles to RRs maximizing their potential value-added?					
a. Lack of sufficient skills and/or experience on part of RRs					
Major obstacle	38	49	31	35	43
5	33	34	13	38	42
4	10	5	11	13	9
3	7	8	6	7	4
2	3	1	7	4	1
Not an obstacle	6	0	29	2	0
Not answered	2	1	4	1	1
b. Insufficient delegation of authority to RRs					
Major obstacle	15	38	15	8	12
5	26	33	24	23	29
4	28	12	27	31	33
3	15	15	7	17	17
2	8	0	10	13	5
Not an obstacle	5	0	11	5	2
Not answered	3	1	6	3	1
c. Lack of attention paid by HQ to RRs' policy recommendations					
Major obstacle	21	41	18	14	25
5	30	36	24	31	27
4	23	11	14	29	27
3	13	10	15	12	18
2	6	0	6	10	2
Not an obstacle	5	1	15	3	0
Not answered	3	1	7	2	1
d. Overburdening of RRs with administrative duties					
Major obstacle	23	36	11	25	18
5	29	34	18	32	28
4	21	11	17	22	33
3	10	7	6	13	11
2	8	3	14	6	9
Not an obstacle	7	5	29	1	0
Not answered	3	4	6	2	1
e. Emphasis by HQ staff on short-term priorities					
Major obstacle	9	12	13	5	10
5	21	27	19	22	16
4	28	25	25	29	30
3	17	5	12	21	23
2	15	18	11	16	14
Not an obstacle	7	7	13	5	5
Not answered	4	5	7	2	2

Table 3. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. Poor cooperation with RRs by NAs					
Major obstacle	54	62	31	59	57
5	24	18	13	26	34
4	6	11	2	7	5
3	4	5	7	4	0
2	3	0	8	3	0
Not an obstacle	7	3	32	1	0
Not answered	3	1	6	1	3
g. Poor relations between AD missions and NAs					
Major obstacle	18	22	21	15	18
5	28	30	14	31	33
4	24	19	10	29	31
3	15	19	5	19	12
2	7	4	17	5	2
Not an obstacle	6	4	26	1	1
Not answered	3	1	7	1	2
h. Poor priority-setting by RRs					
Major obstacle	23	37	n.a.	22	15
5	29	23	n.a.	30	33
4	27	22	n.a.	25	34
3	12	10	n.a.	14	11
2	5	3	n.a.	6	4
Not an obstacle	0	0	n.a.	1	0
Not answered	3	5	n.a.	3	2
i. Poor communication/diplomatic skills on part of RRs					
Major obstacle	52	63	20	60	57
5	27	26	19	26	35
4	7	4	8	8	4
3	2	1	5	2	1
2	3	3	8	2	0
Not an obstacle	7	0	35	1	1
Not answered	2	3	5	2	1

Table 4. Quality of Resident Representative Staff
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(366)	(n.a.)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: In your experience, how high or low is the average quality of RR staff?					
Very high quality	6	n.a.	23	2	0
5	23	n.a.	38	20	16
4	42	n.a.	27	46	47
3	19	n.a.	7	21	27
2	3	n.a.	0	5	1
Very low quality	0	n.a.	0	0	0
Not answered	7	n.a.	5	7	9
Q: In your experience, how variable is the quality of staff assigned as RRs?					
Highly consistent	3	n.a.	11	0	1
5	11	n.a.	31	6	5
4	10	n.a.	17	7	9
3	17	n.a.	14	19	16
2	26	n.a.	6	30	37
Highly variable	23	n.a.	6	31	23
Not answered	10	n.a.	15	8	10
Q: In general, should the average quality of staff assigned as RRs be higher or lower?					
Higher quality	59	n.a.	48	57	74
About the same	34	n.a.	50	36	17
Lower quality	0	n.a.	0	0	0
Not answered	6	n.a.	2	7	9
Q: How satisfied or dissatisfied have you been overall with the quality of RR staff assigned to your country?					
Very satisfied	24	n.a.	27	23	n.a.
5	30	n.a.	36	28	n.a.
4	24	n.a.	25	23	n.a.
3	8	n.a.	4	10	n.a.
2	5	n.a.	2	7	n.a.
Very dissatisfied	3	n.a.	0	4	n.a.
Not answered	5	n.a.	6	5	n.a.

Table 5. Influence and Authority of Resident Representatives (continued)
(In percent)

	All Departments				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How influential are RRs' policy views with key government members?					
Great influence	8	15	8	4	n.a.
5	23	32	19	22	n.a.
4	32	33	36	29	n.a.
3	15	8	15	17	n.a.
2	10	8	7	13	n.a.
Little influence	6	0	5	10	n.a.
Not answered	6	4	10	6	n.a.
Q: How much influence do RRs have on the policy content of AD documents?					
a. Briefing papers?					
Great influence	3	5	n.a.	2	1
5	12	22	n.a.	13	3
4	21	30	n.a.	20	17
3	19	8	n.a.	20	25
2	23	15	n.a.	22	30
No influence	14	16	n.a.	15	12
Not answered	8	3	n.a.	8	12
b. Staff reports?					
Great influence	3	7	n.a.	3	1
5	12	22	n.a.	12	4
4	23	23	n.a.	25	17
3	22	11	n.a.	22	30
2	20	18	n.a.	15	30
No influence	12	14	n.a.	13	6
Not answered	8	5	n.a.	8	11
c. Back to office reports?					
Great influence	1	1	n.a.	1	n.a.
5	9	11	n.a.	8	n.a.
4	16	16	n.a.	16	n.a.
3	16	14	n.a.	17	n.a.
2	16	19	n.a.	15	n.a.
No influence	32	32	n.a.	32	n.a.
Not answered	10	7	n.a.	11	n.a.
d. Country strategy papers?					
Great influence	3	4	n.a.	3	1
5	12	18	n.a.	13	6
4	18	15	n.a.	20	17
3	15	11	n.a.	11	28
2	12	7	n.a.	9	23
No influence	9	10	n.a.	11	4
Not answered	30	36	n.a.	33	20
e. Policy framework papers?					
Great influence	4	8	n.a.	4	1
5	16	19	n.a.	17	11
4	20	14	n.a.	20	26
3	13	8	n.a.	10	25
2	11	7	n.a.	8	18
No influence	6	7	n.a.	7	2
Not answered	30	37	n.a.	34	17

Table 5. Influence and Authority of Resident Representatives (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. Other key policy papers?					
Great influence	3	4	n.a.	4	1
5	11	18	n.a.	13	3
4	17	15	n.a.	19	13
3	14	8	n.a.	10	25
2	14	7	n.a.	10	30
No influence	11	16	n.a.	12	5
Not answered	30	32	n.a.	33	23
Q: How much influence do RRs have on:					
a. ADs' policy stance vis-a-vis RRs' country?					
Great influence	4	10	10	1	1
5	18	25	26	16	8
4	32	41	30	32	26
3	20	11	20	22	24
2	19	11	8	21	29
No influence	4	1	4	5	4
Not answered	4	1	2	3	9
b. Key strategic shifts in AD's policy stance vis-a-vis RR's country?					
Great influence	3	7	8	1	1
5	17	21	26	16	9
4	26	40	27	25	17
3	21	16	21	21	27
2	20	8	10	23	31
No influence	6	1	5	8	5
Not answered	6	7	2	6	10
Q: How much discretion do RRs have in carrying out different activities?					
a. Conducting on-site policy dialogue with authorities?					
Great discretion	21	42	29	16	9
5	32	32	33	33	27
4	23	12	18	25	29
3	10	8	4	11	16
2	9	4	12	9	11
No discretion	1	0	1	2	1
Not answered	4	1	4	3	8
b. Providing on-site policy advice to decision-makers?					
Great discretion	12	25	18	8	5
5	27	40	36	21	20
4	28	18	23	35	28
3	16	11	10	19	23
2	10	5	8	9	15
No discretion	3	0	2	5	1
Not answered	4	1	4	3	8

Table 5. Influence and Authority of Resident Representatives (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
c. Gathering economic information/data?					
Great discretion	47	59	33	56	32
5	31	32	31	26	39
4	11	5	14	11	15
3	4	1	11	2	3
2	2	1	4	2	2
No discretion	1	0	1	1	1
Not answered	4	1	6	3	8
d. Program monitoring and early warning of slippages?					
Great discretion	41	52	37	43	30
5	29	25	33	23	41
4	15	8	18	16	14
3	5	4	2	6	8
2	2	0	2	3	0
No discretion	1	0	2	1	0
Not answered	8	11	5	9	8
e. Coordinating IMF technical assistance and training?					
Great discretion	23	23	31	25	14
5	24	23	29	20	30
4	24	29	18	26	20
3	15	14	11	16	17
2	6	5	6	6	6
No discretion	2	3	1	2	1
Not answered	6	3	5	6	11
f. Macroeconomic capacity-building activities?					
Great discretion	21	32	14	23	14
5	27	30	24	26	29
4	22	18	27	19	29
3	15	10	11	20	16
2	6	3	12	6	2
No discretion	2	1	7	1	1
Not answered	7	7	5	6	9
g. Fostering local coordination among donors and other agencies?					
Great discretion	27	49	15	30	15
5	25	25	20	23	34
4	20	12	21	21	24
3	10	3	14	11	9
2	7	5	11	7	6
No discretion	2	0	8	1	1
Not answered	8	5	10	7	11
h. Local public relations and explaining IMF role?					
Great discretion	27	40	25	30	14
5	33	34	32	32	32
4	19	10	18	19	28
3	10	11	10	11	11
2	5	1	7	4	6
No discretion	2	3	4	1	1
Not answered	4	1	5	3	8

Table 5. Influence and Authority of Resident Representatives (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Are RRs given enough authority to perform the job effectively?					
Enough authority	26	33	21	31	12
5	34	34	32	40	23
4	16	10	19	12	27
3	12	8	11	8	22
2	8	11	12	5	9
Much too little authority	2	3	2	1	2
Not answered	3	1	2	2	6
Q: Do RRs have authority to give ad referendum policy advice?					
Yes	56	71	51	57	47
No	36	25	44	35	42
Not answered	7	4	5	8	11
Q: Should RRs have greater discretion to give policy advice?					
Yes	29	26	56	11	44
No	64	71	36	83	47
Not answered	6	3	8	6	9

Table 6. Regional Results
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents (Incl.MED)	All Respondents 1/				
		AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(72)	(51)	(42)	(82)	(38)
Q: How satisfied are you overall with RR posts' effectiveness?						
Very satisfied	18	22	20	24	20	26
5	38	36	39	50	41	39
4	25	24	24	2	18	18
3	9	11	6	12	7	8
2	6	4	6	7	10	5
Very dissatisfied	2	1	0	5	2	0
Not answered	2	1	6	0	1	3
Q: How much impact do RR posts have on the quality of country work?						
Major impact	25	31	18	40	35	26
5	36	29	49	24	32	45
4	22	24	18	21	18	13
3	6	7	4	2	6	8
2	5	3	2	7	5	5
Little impact	2	3	4	2	1	0
Not answered	3	4	6	2	2	3
Q: Contribution of RR post to strengthening the policy dialogue between IMF and NAs?						
i. RR post?						
Major contribution	26	26	20	29	35	32
5	35	38	37	43	27	37
4	20	15	35	17	13	18
3	10	14	2	0	16	8
2	5	6	4	5	5	3
No contribution	2	0	0	7	2	0
Not answered	2	1	2	0	1	3
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?						
Higher contribution	25	25	20	17	26	29
About the same	41	44	49	52	38	53
Lower contribution	29	26	29	29	33	16
Not answered	5	4	2	2	4	3
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving program implementation overall?						
i. RR post?						
Major contribution	16	25	10	12	20	18
5	33	31	25	36	40	39
4	23	17	18	21	17	26
3	10	14	8	10	7	8
2	5	8	4	5	9	3
No contribution	4	0	4	10	2	3
Not answered	9	6	31	7	5	3

1/ The results shown for each area department include only resident representatives, national authorities, and area department mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents (Incl.MED)	All Respondents 1/				
	AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD	
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(72)	(51)	(42)	(82)	(38)
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?						
Higher contribution	32	35	29	26	30	42
About the same	41	44	27	50	50	37
Lower contribution	14	13	12	17	15	16
Not answered	12	8	31	7	5	5
Q: To what extent are the following factors obstacles to RRs maximizing their value-added?						
a. Lack of sufficient skills and/or experience on part of RRs						
Major obstacle	38	44	35	33	34	45
5	33	31	39	29	23	21
4	10	8	8	17	16	5
3	7	4	6	7	9	5
2	3	3	4	7	6	3
Not an obstacle	6	6	6	5	11	21
Not answered	2	4	2	2	1	0
b. Insufficient delegation of authority to RRs						
Major obstacle	15	26	12	17	15	13
5	26	25	14	24	32	29
4	28	24	27	21	23	32
3	15	15	20	12	12	16
2	8	3	14	19	5	8
Not an obstacle	5	3	10	2	10	0
Not answered	3	4	4	5	4	3
c. Lack of attention paid by HQ to RRs' policy recommendations						
Major obstacle	21	29	16	19	18	24
5	30	29	22	33	32	34
4	23	26	18	14	17	21
3	13	6	18	17	16	11
2	6	0	12	7	6	8
Not an obstacle	5	3	12	7	9	3
Not answered	3	7	4	2	2	0
d. Burdening RRs with administrative duties						
Major obstacle	23	25	22	19	21	29
5	29	29	27	33	32	24
4	21	18	18	17	17	8
3	10	6	12	12	10	8
2	8	10	6	5	7	18
Not an obstacle	7	7	14	10	10	11
Not answered	3	6	2	5	4	3

1/ The results shown for each area department include only resident representatives, national authorities and area department mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total	All Respondents 1/				
	All Respondents (Incl.MED)	AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(72)	(51)	(42)	(82)	(38)
e. Emphasis by HQ staff on short-term priorities						
Major obstacle	9	13	6	7	11	8
5	21	19	27	17	18	29
4	28	33	25	21	24	21
3	17	14	8	19	13	18
2	15	11	18	24	16	18
Not an obstacle	7	4	8	7	13	5
Not answered	4	6	8	5	4	0
f. Poor cooperation with RRs by NAs						
Major obstacle	54	64	41	36	52	47
5	24	15	25	31	22	16
4	6	3	6	12	6	8
3	4	4	8	10	5	3
2	3	3	4	7	1	3
Not an obstacle	7	8	14	2	9	24
Not answered	3	3	2	2	5	0
g. Poor relations between AD missions and NAs						
Major obstacle	18	22	12	12	23	11
5	28	38	27	26	20	21
4	24	19	18	26	23	24
3	15	8	20	21	12	13
2	7	3	12	2	10	13
Not an obstacle	6	6	10	10	7	18
Not answered	3	4	2	2	5	0
h. Poor communication/diplomatic skills on part of RRs						
Major obstacle	52	63	39	57	45	39
5	27	13	35	21	27	21
4	7	10	6	7	7	5
3	2	3	6	0	2	0
2	3	1	2	7	5	8
Not an obstacle	7	8	8	5	10	24
Not answered	2	3	4	2	4	3

1/ The results shown for each area department include only resident representatives, national authorities and area department mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents	Total National Authorities (Incl.MED)	<u>National Authorities</u>				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(84)	(21)	(14)	(14)	(21)	(11)
Q: How satisfied are you overall with RR posts' effectiveness?							
Very satisfied	18	26	24	29	21	24	36
5	38	44	33	43	64	38	45
4	25	18	29	14	0	24	18
3	9	5	10	0	7	5	0
2	6	5	5	7	7	5	0
Very dissatisfied	2	1	0	0	0	5	0
Not answered	2	1	0	7	0	0	0
Q: How much impact do RR posts have on the quality of country work?							
Major impact	25	24	19	14	21	38	27
5	36	37	33	43	36	38	45
4	22	26	29	29	29	14	18
3	6	4	10	0	0	0	9
2	5	6	10	0	7	10	0
Little impact	2	1	0	7	0	0	0
Not answered	3	2	0	7	7	0	0
Q: Contribution of RR post to strengthening the policy dialogue between IMF and NAs?							
i. RR post?							
Major contribution	26	33	29	29	36	29	45
5	35	35	38	36	43	29	27
4	20	19	14	36	14	19	18
3	10	7	10	0	0	14	9
2	5	4	10	0	0	5	0
No contribution	2	2	0	0	7	5	0
Not answered	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?							
Higher contribution	25	33	38	36	21	29	36
About the same	41	40	38	43	57	38	36
Lower contribution	29	23	24	21	14	29	27
Not answered	5	4	0	0	7	5	0
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving program implementation overall?							
i. RR post?							
Major contribution	16	12	14	7	7	14	18
5	33	33	29	29	43	38	36
4	23	29	29	36	36	14	36
3	10	10	14	7	7	10	9
2	5	10	14	14	0	14	0
No contribution	4	7	0	7	7	10	0
Not answered	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?							
Higher contribution	32	31	29	43	29	19	45
About the same	41	46	57	29	50	57	27
Lower contribution	14	20	10	29	21	24	27
Not answered	12	2	5	0	0	0	0

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents	Total National Authorities (Incl.MED)	National Authorities				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(84)	(21)	(14)	(14)	(21)	(11)
Q: To what extent are the following factors obstacles to RRs maximizing their value-added?							
a. Lack of sufficient skills and/or experience on part of RRs							
Major obstacle	38	31	38	36	36	24	9
5	33	13	24	14	0	10	9
4	10	11	5	14	21	10	9
3	7	6	5	7	7	10	0
2	3	7	5	7	14	10	0
Not an obstacle	6	29	19	21	14	33	73
Not answered	2	4	5	0	7	5	0
b. Insufficient delegation of authority to RRs							
Major obstacle	15	15	24	7	21	10	0
5	26	24	33	14	14	19	45
4	28	27	24	21	21	29	55
3	15	7	5	7	14	10	0
2	8	10	5	29	14	5	0
Not an obstacle	5	11	5	21	0	19	0
Not answered	3	6	5	0	14	10	0
c. Lack of attention paid by HQ to RRs' policy recommendations							
Major obstacle	21	18	19	14	36	14	0
5	30	24	33	21	14	10	36
4	23	14	24	7	0	14	27
3	13	15	0	14	21	29	18
2	6	6	0	14	7	5	9
Not an obstacle	5	15	10	29	14	19	9
Not answered	3	7	14	0	7	10	0
d. Burdening RRs with administrative duties							
Major obstacle	23	11	10	7	14	14	9
5	29	18	14	29	29	10	9
4	21	17	24	7	21	14	9
3	10	6	5	7	0	10	9
2	8	14	19	7	7	10	36
Not an obstacle	7	29	19	43	21	33	27
Not answered	3	6	10	0	7	10	0
e. Emphasis by HQ staff on short-term priorities							
Major obstacle	9	13	19	7	7	14	18
5	21	19	14	29	14	24	9
4	28	25	38	14	21	19	27
3	17	12	14	7	7	10	27
2	15	11	10	0	21	14	9
Not an obstacle	7	13	0	29	14	14	9
Not answered	4	7	5	14	14	5	0

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents	Total National Authorities (Incl.MED)	National Authorities				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(84)	(21)	(14)	(14)	(21)	(11)
f. Poor relations between AD missions and NAs							
Major obstacle	18	21	29	21	14	33	0
5	28	14	19	14	21	5	9
4	24	10	14	14	14	0	0
3	15	5	5	0	14	5	0
2	7	17	10	21	7	14	36
Not an obstacle	6	26	19	29	21	24	55
Not answered	3	7	5	0	7	19	0
g. Poor cooperation with RRs by NAs							
Major obstacle	54	31	38	21	29	33	9
5	24	13	14	21	21	10	0
4	6	2	0	0	7	5	0
3	4	7	10	14	7	5	0
2	3	8	10	7	21	0	9
Not an obstacle	7	32	29	36	7	29	82
Not answered	3	6	0	0	7	19	0
h. Poor communication/diplomatic skills on part of RRs							
Major obstacle	52	20	29	29	36	5	0
5	27	19	14	21	21	24	0
4	7	8	14	0	7	10	9
3	2	5	10	14	0	0	0
2	3	8	5	7	14	10	9
Not an obstacle	7	35	29	29	14	38	82
Not answered	2	5	0	0	7	14	0

Table 6. Regional Results
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents	Total Mission Teams (Incl.MED) 1/	Country Mission Teams 1/				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(189)	(33)	(23)	(19)	(41)	(18)
Q: How satisfied are you overall with RR posts' effectiveness?							
Very satisfied	18	19	18	17	32	17	22
5	38	31	24	35	32	41	39
4	25	25	27	30	5	17	11
3	9	10	18	4	11	10	11
2	6	10	6	9	11	12	11
Very dissatisfied	2	4	3	0	11	2	0
Not answered	2	2	3	4	0	0	6
Q: How much impact do RR posts have on the quality of country work?							
Major impact	25	23	24	17	47	27	17
5	36	31	24	39	11	32	56
4	22	24	30	22	26	22	6
3	6	7	9	9	0	12	6
2	5	8	0	4	11	5	11
Little impact	2	4	6	4	5	2	0
Not answered	3	2	6	4	0	0	6
Q: Contribution of RR post to strengthening the policy dialogue between IMF and NAs?							
i. RR post?							
Major contribution	26	20	18	4	26	22	22
5	35	34	27	43	32	37	44
4	20	20	21	35	21	12	17
3	10	13	24	4	0	20	6
2	5	8	6	9	11	7	6
No contribution	2	4	0	0	11	2	0
Not answered	2	2	3	4	0	0	6
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?							
Higher contribution	25	14	9	9	16	12	17
About the same	41	43	45	48	37	39	61
Lower contribution	29	38	36	39	47	46	17
Not answered	5	5	9	4	0	2	6
Q: Contribution of RR post to improving program implementation overall?							
i. RR post?							
Major contribution	16	12	15	4	16	15	11
5	33	30	30	26	21	44	56
4	23	20	12	4	21	20	17
3	10	13	21	13	11	7	0
2	5	7	9	0	11	10	6
No contribution	4	5	0	4	11	0	6
Not answered	9	13	12	48	11	5	6

1/ The results shown for each area department include only area department mission members, while the results shown for "Total Mission Teams" include PDR/FAD mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents	Total Mission Teams (Incl.MED) 1/	Country Mission Teams 1/				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(189)	(33)	(23)	(19)	(41)	(18)
ii. RR post relative to staff missions?							
Higher contribution	32	24	27	13	26	24	28
About the same	41	42	36	30	42	54	50
Lower contribution	14	18	21	9	21	17	11
Not answered	12	15	15	48	11	5	11
Q: To what extent are the following factors obstacles to RRs maximizing their value-added?							
a. Lack of sufficient skills and/or experience on part of RRs							
Major obstacle	38	35	42	35	21	37	50
5	33	38	33	52	42	24	33
4	10	13	12	9	21	20	6
3	7	7	3	4	11	7	6
2	3	4	3	0	5	7	6
Not an obstacle	6	2	0	0	0	5	0
Not answered	2	1	6	0	0	0	0
b. Insufficient delegation of authority to RRs							
Major obstacle	15	8	15	9	0	5	6
5	26	23	15	9	26	37	22
4	28	31	27	35	26	27	33
3	15	17	30	22	11	12	17
2	8	13	3	13	32	7	17
Not an obstacle	5	5	3	9	5	10	0
Not answered	3	3	6	4	0	2	6
c. Lack of attention paid by HQ to RRs' policy recommendations							
Major obstacle	21	14	18	13	5	10	22
5	30	31	21	26	37	37	44
4	23	29	42	17	21	27	17
3	13	12	12	17	21	10	6
2	6	10	0	17	11	10	11
Not an obstacle	5	3	0	4	5	7	0
Not answered	3	2	6	4	0	0	0
d. Burdening RRs with administrative duties							
Major obstacle	23	25	30	22	26	15	33
5	29	32	36	22	26	44	28
4	21	22	15	35	16	22	6
3	10	13	6	17	26	7	11
2	8	6	6	4	5	10	17
Not an obstacle	7	1	0	0	0	2	0
Not answered	3	2	6	0	0	0	6

1/ The results shown for each area department include only area department mission members, while the results shown for "Total Mission Teams" include PDR/FAD mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
A. Effectiveness and Results of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents	Total Mission Teams (Incl.MED) 1/	Country Mission Teams 1/				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(189)	(33)	(23)	(19)	(41)	(18)
e. Emphasis by HQ staff on short-term priorities							
Major obstacle	9	5	3	0	11	7	6
5	21	22	21	30	11	20	22
4	28	29	30	39	26	22	17
3	17	21	18	13	32	20	22
2	15	16	12	17	21	17	33
Not an obstacle	7	5	6	0	0	15	0
Not answered	4	2	9	0	0	0	0
f. Poor cooperation with RRs by NAs							
Major obstacle	54	59	70	48	42	59	67
5	24	26	18	39	32	29	22
4	6	7	3	4	16	5	6
3	4	4	3	4	11	2	6
2	3	3	0	4	0	2	0
Not an obstacle	7	1	0	0	0	2	0
Not answered	3	1	6	0	0	0	0
g. Poor relations between AD missions and NAs							
Major obstacle	18	15	12	9	11	20	11
5	28	31	42	35	26	27	33
4	24	29	30	17	37	37	28
3	15	19	9	30	21	10	22
2	7	5	0	9	0	7	6
Not an obstacle	6	1	0	0	5	0	0
Not answered	3	1	6	0	0	0	0
h. Poor communication/diplomatic skills on part of RRs							
Major obstacle	52	60	73	48	68	59	50
5	27	26	9	43	16	27	39
4	7	8	12	4	11	10	0
3	2	2	0	4	0	2	0
2	3	2	0	0	5	2	6
Not an obstacle	7	1	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	2	2	6	0	0	0	6

1/ The results shown for each area department include only area department mission members, while the results shown for "Total Mission Teams" include PDR/FAD mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
 B. Quality of Resident Representative Staff
 (In percent)

	Total All Respondents (Incl.MED) 1/	AFR	All Respondents 1/			
			APD	EUI	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(366)	(54)	(37)	(33)	(62)	(29)
Q: In your experience, how high or low is the average quality of RR staff?						
Very high quality	6	5	5	12	14	3
5	23	18	24	30	27	48
	42	40	43	27	39	27
3	19	17	21	18	15	7
2	3	0	2	3	5	4
Very low quality	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	7	18	2	9	0	10
Q: In your experience, how variable is the quality of staff assigned as RRs?						
Highly consistent	3	4	0	15	2	0
5	11	15	16	15	13	7
4	10	13	5	3	10	24
3	17	9	25	12	21	17
2	26	22	21	12	19	14
Highly variable	23	18	27	24	32	17
Not answered	10	19	5	19	3	20
Q: In general, should the average quality of staff assigned as RRs be higher or lower?						
Higher quality	59	54	51	55	60	34
About the same	34	28	46	43	39	59
Lower quality	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	6	18	2	3	1	7
Q: How satisfied or dissatisfied have you been overall with the quality of RR staff assigned to your country?						
Very satisfied	24	15	19	39	27	28
5	30	33	33	21	32	44
4	24	31	27	12	20	10
3	8	8	6	6	10	7
2	5	6	2	9	7	0
Very dissatisfied	3	0	2	3	3	4
Not answered	5	7	11	9	1	7

1/ The results shown for each area department include only national authorities and area department mission members, while the results for "Total All Respondents" exclude only resident representatives who were not asked these questions. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results
 B. Quality of Resident Representative Staff
 (In percent)

	Total All Respondents	Total National Authorities (Incl.MED)	National Authorities				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(366)	(84)	(21)	(14)	(14)	(21)	(11)
Q: In your experience, how high or low is the average quality of RR staff?							
Very high quality	6	23	14	14	29	38	9
5	23	38	38	36	36	38	45
4	42	27	33	43	21	10	36
3	19	7	10	7	0	14	0
2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very low quality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	7	5	5	0	14	0	9
Q: In your experience, how variable is the quality of staff assigned as RRs?							
Highly consistent	3	11	10	0	36	5	0
5	11	31	33	36	29	33	18
4	10	17	29	7	0	19	27
3	17	14	10	29	7	19	9
2	26	6	5	7	0	10	9
Highly variable	23	6	5	14	0	5	0
Not answered	10	15	10	7	29	10	36
Q: In general, should the average quality of staff assigned as RRs be higher or lower?							
Higher quality	59	48	52	57	43	48	27
About the same	34	50	43	43	50	52	73
Lower quality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	6	2	5	0	7	0	0
Q: How satisfied or dissatisfied have you been overall with the quality of RR staff assigned to your country?							
Very satisfied	24	27	10	29	36	33	27
5	30	36	48	29	21	38	45
4	24	25	29	36	14	19	27
3	8	4	10	0	7	0	0
2	5	2	0	0	0	10	0
Very dissatisfied	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	5	6	5	7	21	0	0

Table 6. Regional Results
B. Quality of Resident Representative Staff
(In percent)

	Total All 1/	Total Mission Teams (Incl.MED) 1/	Country Mission Teams 1/				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(366)	(189)	(33)	(23)	(19)	(41)	(18)
Q: In your experience, how high or low is the average quality of RR staff?							
Very high quality	6	2	0	0	0	2	0
5	23	20	6	17	26	22	50
4	42	46	45	43	32	54	22
3	19	21	21	30	32	15	11
2	3	5	0	4	5	7	6
Very low quality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	7	7	27	4	5	0	11
Q: In your experience, how variable is the quality of staff assigned as RRs?							
Highly consistent	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	11	6	3	4	5	2	0
4	10	7	3	4	5	5	22
3	17	19	9	22	16	22	22
2	26	30	33	30	21	24	17
Highly variable	23	31	27	35	42	46	28
Not answered	10	8	24	4	11	0	11
Q: In general, should the average quality of staff assigned as RRs be higher or lower?							
Higher quality	59	57	55	48	63	66	39
About the same	34	36	18	48	37	32	50
Lower quality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	6	7	27	4	0	2	11
Q: How satisfied or dissatisfied have you been overall with the quality of RR staff assigned to your country?							
Very satisfied	24	23	18	13	42	24	28
5	30	28	24	35	21	29	44
4	24	23	33	22	11	20	0
3	8	10	6	9	5	15	11
2	5	7	9	4	16	5	0
Very dissatisfied	3	4	0	4	5	5	6
Not answered	5	5	9	13	0	2	11

1/ The results shown for each area department include only area department mission members, while the results for "Total Mission Teams" include PDR/FAD mission members and the results for "Total All Respondents" include all respondents except resident representatives who were not asked these questions. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results
C. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total All Respondents (incl. MED)	AFR	APD	All Respondents 1/		
				EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(72)	(51)	(42)	(82)	(38)
Q: For medium-term effectiveness, in what direction should the role of RRs tend to move?						
a. Local macroeconomic capacity-building						
Strongly agree	27	32	27	36	33	21
5	29	28	27	21	30	37
4	22	19	25	21	22	18
3	11	11	10	12	5	5
2	6	7	4	2	7	8
Strongly disagree	3	3	6	5	1	11
Not answered	1	0	0	2	1	0
b. Economic information and data gathering						
Strongly agree	18	25	12	19	21	16
5	23	25	33	19	17	24
4	27	22	29	40	27	21
3	20	17	18	7	22	26
2	7	8	2	5	5	11
Strongly disagree	4	3	4	5	7	3
Not answered	2	0	2	5	1	0
c. Policy diagnosis and design of country policy strategy						
Strongly agree	13	13	12	7	18	18
5	28	28	27	33	30	34
4	23	18	25	29	23	18
3	17	18	20	14	11	13
2	13	11	12	10	12	13
Strongly disagree	5	11	4	2	4	3
Not answered	1	1	0	5	1	0
d. On-site policy advice						
Strongly agree	32	33	27	26	38	50
5	37	36	29	38	35	29
4	20	21	22	26	18	13
3	7	3	10	7	6	3
2	3	6	6	0	1	0
Strongly disagree	1	1	4	0	0	5
Not answered	1	0	2	2	1	0
e. Monitoring IMF-supported economic programs						
Strongly agree	41	49	35	26	41	42
5	28	28	31	33	28	26
4	21	15	25	21	20	26
3	6	3	6	10	5	5
2	3	4	0	2	2	0
Strongly disagree	1	1	0	2	2	0
Not answered	1	0	2	5	1	0

1/ The results shown for each area department include only resident representatives, national authorities, and area department mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
 C. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts
 (In percent)

	Total All Respondents (incl. MED)	All Respondents 1/				
		AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(72)	(51)	(42)	(82)	(38)
f. Public relations and explaining role of Fund						
Strongly agree	27	42	27	29	23	16
5	28	25	25	26	35	24
4	24	19	27	19	23	24
3	11	6	10	14	12	18
2	7	4	6	5	4	13
Strongly disagree	2	3	2	2	1	5
Not answered	1	1	2	5	1	0
g. Local coordination among donors and agencies						
Strongly agree	13	19	20	10	13	5
5	19	25	20	19	21	13
4	28	19	24	26	29	24
3	22	24	16	17	18	24
2	11	10	14	10	11	21
Strongly disagree	6	3	8	10	6	13
Not answered	2	0	0	10	1	0

1/ The results shown for each area department include only resident representatives, national authorities, and area department mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results
C. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	Total Respondents	National Authorities					
		Total National Authorities (Incl.MED)	AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(84)	(21)	(14)	(14)	(21)	(11)
Q: For medium-term effectiveness, in what direction should the role of RRs tend to move?							
a. Local macroeconomic capacity-building							
Strongly agree	27	39	29	50	50	57	9
5	29	20	19	21	14	19	27
4	22	13	19	7	14	10	18
3	11	6	10	7	7	0	0
2	6	8	19	0	0	10	9
Strongly disagree	3	12	5	14	14	5	36
Not answered	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
b. Economic information and data gathering							
Strongly agree	18	20	19	7	0	29	45
5	23	27	19	36	50	29	0
4	27	13	19	21	21	5	0
3	20	25	24	29	14	19	45
2	7	7	14	0	0	10	9
Strongly disagree	4	7	5	7	14	10	0
Not answered	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
c. Policy diagnosis and design of country policy strategy							
Strongly agree	13	21	10	21	7	38	18
5	28	32	43	21	57	29	9
4	23	20	14	29	14	24	27
3	17	15	19	7	14	10	36
2	13	2	0	14	0	0	0
Strongly disagree	5	7	14	7	0	0	9
Not answered	1	1	0	0	7	0	0
d. On-site policy advice							
Strongly agree	32	39	48	29	36	48	27
5	37	30	29	29	36	24	36
4	20	15	14	7	21	19	18
3	7	8	5	14	7	10	0
2	3	1	0	7	0	0	0
Strongly disagree	1	5	5	7	0	0	18
Not answered	1	1	0	7	0	0	0
e. Monitoring IMF-supported economic programs							
Strongly agree	41	37	33	36	14	52	45
5	28	31	38	29	36	29	27
4	21	18	10	29	14	14	18
3	6	6	5	0	14	5	9
2	3	4	10	0	7	0	0
Strongly disagree	1	2	5	0	7	0	0
Not answered	1	2	0	7	7	0	0

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
 C. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts
 (In percent)

	Total Respondents	Total National Authorities (Incl.MED)	<u>National Authorities</u>				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(84)	(21)	(14)	(14)	(21)	(11)
f. Public relations and explaining role of Fund							
Strongly agree	27	32	29	36	50	38	0
5	28	30	33	14	29	33	27
4	24	15	24	29	14	5	9
3	11	12	0	14	7	19	27
2	7	5	10	0	0	0	18
Strongly disagree	2	6	5	7	0	5	18
Not answered	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
g. Local coordination among donors and agencies							
Strongly agree	13	12	10	14	0	29	0
5	19	30	29	29	36	38	9
4	28	18	19	29	29	5	18
3	22	18	29	7	7	19	27
2	11	10	10	7	7	5	27
Strongly disagree	6	10	5	14	7	5	18
Not answered	2	4	0	0	14	0	0

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
C. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts
(In percent)

	All Respondents	Total Mission Teams (Incl.MED) 1/	Country Mission Teams 1/				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(189)	(33)	(23)	(19)	(41)	(18)
Q: For medium-term effectiveness, in what direction should the role of RRs tend to move?							
a. Local macroeconomic capacity-building							
Strongly agree	27	23	30	26	26	22	22
5	29	34	27	30	26	39	44
4	22	23	18	30	26	24	17
3	11	12	18	9	16	5	11
2	6	7	3	4	5	7	6
Strongly disagree	3	1	3	0	0	0	0
Not answered	1	1	0	0	0	2	0
b. Economic information and data gathering							
Strongly agree	18	24	24	22	42	24	6
5	23	24	30	30	5	12	39
4	27	26	24	30	32	32	28
3	20	16	18	17	5	20	11
2	7	6	3	0	11	2	17
Strongly disagree	4	2	0	0	0	7	0
Not answered	2	1	0	0	5	2	0
c. Policy diagnosis and design of country policy strategy							
Strongly agree	13	5	3	0	0	10	0
5	28	23	18	26	21	22	56
4	23	25	24	22	37	22	17
3	17	16	18	30	16	12	6
2	13	23	21	17	21	24	22
Strongly disagree	5	7	15	4	5	7	0
Not answered	1	1	0	0	0	2	0
d. On-site policy advice							
Strongly agree	32	23	15	9	16	24	50
5	37	41	48	35	42	41	28
4	20	24	24	35	32	24	17
3	7	7	3	9	11	5	6
2	3	4	9	9	0	2	0
Strongly disagree	1	1	0	4	0	0	0
Not answered	1	1	0	0	0	2	0
e. Monitoring IMF-supported economic programs							
Strongly agree	41	39	52	30	26	39	33
5	28	29	27	35	42	27	33
4	21	23	18	30	26	20	28
3	6	6	3	4	5	5	6
2	3	3	0	0	0	5	0
Strongly disagree	1	1	0	0	0	2	0
Not answered	1	1	0	0	0	2	0

1/ The results shown for each area department include only area department mission members, while the results shown for "Total Mission Teams" include PDR/FAD mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 6. Regional Results (continued)
 C. Objectives of Resident Representative Posts
 (In percent)

	All Respondents	Total Mission Teams (Incl.MED) 1/	<u>Country Mission Teams 1/</u>				
			AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(189)	(33)	(23)	(19)	(41)	(18)
f. Public relations and explaining role of Fund							
Strongly agree	27	25	33	26	21	17	28
5	28	29	24	35	26	37	22
4	24	25	24	22	11	32	28
3	11	11	9	4	21	10	11
2	7	8	3	13	11	2	11
Strongly disagree	2	2	3	0	5	0	0
Not answered	1	2	3	0	5	2	0
g. Local coordination among donors and agencies							
Strongly agree	13	8	6	22	16	10	0
5	19	17	27	17	11	12	22
4	28	30	18	22	21	44	22
3	22	24	33	22	16	22	22
2	11	14	12	13	16	10	17
Strongly disagree	6	6	3	4	16	0	17
Not answered	2	1	0	0	5	2	0

1/ The results shown for each area department include only area department mission members, while the results shown for "Total Mission Teams" include PDR/FAD mission members. For unavoidable technical reasons, the area department results shown exclude PDR/FAD mission members and senior area department immediate office staff.

Table 7. Resident Representative Skills and Background (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What are the five most critical skills, qualities, or abilities needed by RRs? Skills, qualities or abilities in the following areas:					
a. economic policy?	71	77	71	68	72
b. interpersonal effectiveness?	65	77	46	70	65
c. interpreting economic data?	48	34	50	50	52
d. knowledge of IMF policies?	45	47	43	43	51
e. willingness to take initiative?	37	36	27	41	38
f. diplomacy?	37	32	31	42	34
g. oral communication?	32	34	18	38	30
h. persuasiveness?	31	37	18	34	32
i. financial programming?	24	19	36	19	28
j. cultural adaptability?	20	23	19	21	14
k. identifying priorities?	18	21	26	17	12
l. economic theory?	15	16	32	10	8
m. enthusiasm?	15	18	5	21	12
n. influence at headquarters?	14	15	38	5	10
o. diagnosing obstacles?	10	3	20	10	8
p. quantitative data analysis?	9	1	14	11	5
q. written communication?	7	5	6	9	4
r. humility?	7	10	10	7	4
Q: Is it important to RRs' effectiveness that they be able to communicate in the business language of the country?					
Very important	35	44	35	32	33
5	28	15	35	29	33
4	15	12	10	17	20
3	7	7	10	6	5
2	7	8	6	7	5
Not important	5	12	5	6	0
Not answered	2	1	1	3	2
Q: Is an individual's grade a strong predictor of RR effectiveness? 1/					
Yes, very strong predictor	5	8	14	1	4
5	15	14	27	10	15
4	20	19	25	17	22
3	19	14	14	23	22
2	23	22	14	25	25
No, very weak predictor	12	18	4	16	5
Not answered	6	5	1	7	8
Q: What are the three most useful areas of previous experience for an RR assignment? Previous experience as:					
a. economist working on program cases at the IMF	76	75	n.a.	80	67
b. economist in an AD or in FAD, MAE, or PDR of IMF	49	37	n.a.	48	60
c. economist at IMF	43	40	n.a.	50	32
d. economist in an AD of the IMF	35	45	n.a.	33	31
e. economist in central bank or ministry of finance	32	23	n.a.	35	31
f. IMF mission chief	23	26	n.a.	15	37
g. economist at IMF or WB	10	8	n.a.	10	10
h. economist at multilateral international financial institution	6	3	n.a.	4	12

1/ Note that, for national authorities, this question was phrased in terms of seniority rather than grade.

Table 7. Resident Representative Skills and Background (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Is there a minimum period of experience that is likely to be important to effectiveness as an RR?					
a. Yes; more than 4 years' experience	26	36	n.a.	19	35
b. Yes; at least 4 years' experience	19	15	n.a.	24	12
c. Yes; at least 3 years' experience	28	27	n.a.	29	28
d. Yes; at least 2 years' experience	17	10	n.a.	20	15
e. Yes; at least 1 years' experience	4	4	n.a.	5	2
f. No; other factors are likely to be more important	4	8	n.a.	2	5
g. Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	2
Q: During your Fund career, have you led a mission/staff visit for the IMF?					
Yes	52	52	n.a.	40	75
No	46	48	n.a.	57	20
Not answered	3	0	n.a.	3	4
Q: Have RRs been asked by ADs to lead:					
a. advance teams?					
Yes	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	86	86	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. staff visits?					
Yes	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	89	89	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. missions?					
Yes	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	95	95	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What are the three considerations that tend, in practice, to dominate the selection process for RRs?					
a. Finding a reasonably suitable individual who is interested in post	82	78	n.a.	83	84
b. Obtaining a close match between candidate's skills and specific post requirements	43	52	n.a.	42	37
c. Finding a candidate willing to relocate quickly to post	35	36	n.a.	33	38
d. Desire to give someone a learning and growth opportunity	30	30	n.a.	28	37
e. Desire to give strong performers opportunity to show different skills	21	22	n.a.	20	20
f. Desire to re-assign someone who is ill-suited to his/her current position	18	8	n.a.	17	27
g. Desire to accommodate preferences of authorities	15	25	n.a.	16	4
h. Need to rapidly find a suitable alternative as leading candidate withdrew for family reasons	7	7	n.a.	7	6
i. Need to rapidly find a suitable alternative as leading candidate withdrew for career reasons	3	3	n.a.	3	3
Q: How were discussions initiated between RRs and ADs regarding RRs' selection?					
a. AD obtained RR's name from ADM list of interested staff	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. RR applied in response to formal vacancy in "Career Opportunities"	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. RR's own AD approached RR	27	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
d. RR heard about vacancy via casual contacts	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
e. RR was directly approached by AD other than own	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
f. RR approached AD in response to prospective vacancy in "Career Opportunities"	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
g. Other	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: What are the two most useful methods for locating suitable candidates?					
a. Formally advertised vacancies	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	16
b. Casual network of contacts	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	15
c. Internal department candidates	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	15
d. Directly approaching individuals	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12
e. Directly approached by individuals	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	10
f. Informally spreading the message	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3
g. List maintained by ADM of interested staff	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3
Q: Should there be a requirement for all RR vacancies to be formally advertised?					
Yes	82	78	n.a.	84	82
No	11	18	n.a.	9	11
Not answered	7	4	n.a.	7	8
Q: Are NAs satisfied with the degree of consultation regarding selection of RRs?					
Yes	58	n.a.	58	n.a.	n.a.
No	23	n.a.	23	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	19	n.a.	19	n.a.	n.a.
Q: What role should NAs have in RR selection for their country?					
a. no role	34	25	n.a.	36	37
b. veto right based on candidate's CV	45	58	n.a.	42	41
c. veto right based on candidate's personal attributes	14	25	n.a.	10	14
d. other	12	15	n.a.	11	12

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Are you aware of cases when NAs have influenced RRs' selection and appointment?					
Yes	54	48	n.a.	55	58
No	40	49	n.a.	39	34
Not answered	6	3	n.a.	6	8
Q: How often do NAs exert influence over RR appointments?					
Frequently	2	3	n.a.	2	1
5	6	7	n.a.	7	4
4	10	7	n.a.	11	12
3	13	18	n.a.	12	13
2	26	18	n.a.	24	35
Seldom	13	23	n.a.	10	12
Not answered	30	25	n.a.	35	23
Q: How far in advance of start dates are RRs formally assigned?					
Less than one month	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1-2 months	32	32	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2-3 months	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3-4 months	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
More than 4 months	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: How far in advance do ADs start looking seriously for RRs' successors?					
3 months or less	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1
About 4 months	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1
About 5 months	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
About 6 months	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	23
About 7 months	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3
8 months or more	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
Not answered	63	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	63
Q: What is the appropriate length of time for an RR be assigned to a post in one country?					
1 year	0	0	0	1	0
2 years	39	32	17	50	43
3 years	50	58	71	41	43
Other	9	11	11	6	12
Not answered	2	0	1	3	2
Q: How long do RRs spend in ADs prior to assignment?					
Less than 1 week	33	33	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1 to 2 weeks	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2 to 3 weeks	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3 to 4 weeks	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
More than 4 weeks	44	44	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How important is it that there be a period of overlap between RRs?					
Very important	25	n.a.	25	n.a.	n.a.
5	29	n.a.	29	n.a.	n.a.
4	15	n.a.	15	n.a.	n.a.
3	7	n.a.	7	n.a.	n.a.
2	7	n.a.	7	n.a.	n.a.
Not important	6	n.a.	6	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	11	n.a.	11	n.a.	n.a.
Q: Do RRs:					
a. have a period of overlap with outgoing RRs?					
Yes	42	42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	51	51	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. receive written briefs from predecessors?					
Yes	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	73	73	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. develop their TORs together with their supervisors?					
Yes	58	58	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	41	41	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
d. develop concrete work programs together with their supervisors?					
Yes	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	89	89	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
e. draw up "individual development plans" with their supervisors?					
Yes	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	95	95	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: Do RRs receive sufficient training and orientation prior to assignment?					
Yes, adequate training	5	10	n.a.	4	1
5	15	14	n.a.	14	17
4	24	25	n.a.	21	28
3	18	23	n.a.	17	14
2	17	19	n.a.	16	17
No, inadequate training	5	7	n.a.	3	6
Not answered	17	3	n.a.	24	16
Q: Do RRs in field receive sufficient opportunities to maintain their human capital?					
Yes, adequate opportunities	3	5	n.a.	1	3
5	12	8	n.a.	11	17
4	21	19	n.a.	24	17
3	22	19	n.a.	21	25
2	23	32	n.a.	23	14
No, inadequate opportunities	11	11	n.a.	10	15
Not answered	9	5	n.a.	10	9

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

		<u>All Departments</u>				
		Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)		(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q	In general, how important are the following factors in attracting RR candidates?					
	a. Financial benefits					
	Great importance	39	34	n.a.	42	34
	5	37	22	n.a.	40	43
	4	15	33	n.a.	10	13
	3	5	8	n.a.	5	3
	2	1	1	n.a.	1	3
	Little importance	0	1	n.a.	0	0
	Not answered	2	0	n.a.	2	3
	b. Greater day-to-day job autonomy					
	Great importance	23	32	n.a.	24	14
	5	51	52	n.a.	49	53
	4	18	12	n.a.	19	19
	3	5	3	n.a.	3	9
	2	2	0	n.a.	2	2
	Little importance	0	0	n.a.	0	0
	Not answered	2	1	n.a.	2	3
	c. Opportunity to experience life in another country					
	Great importance	14	21	n.a.	12	15
	5	34	34	n.a.	34	34
	4	26	26	n.a.	26	26
	3	15	11	n.a.	15	18
	2	6	3	n.a.	10	3
	Little importance	2	4	n.a.	2	0
	Not answered	2	1	n.a.	2	3
	d. Greater responsibility					
	Great importance	21	34	n.a.	19	17
	5	45	48	n.a.	46	40
	4	21	12	n.a.	21	27
	3	8	5	n.a.	8	10
	2	3	0	n.a.	3	3
	Little importance	1	0	n.a.	1	0
	Not answered	2	0	n.a.	2	3
	e. Opportunity to get out of Washington					
	Great importance	7	10	n.a.	6	6
	5	19	15	n.a.	21	19
	4	23	12	n.a.	29	20
	3	26	36	n.a.	21	27
	2	15	8	n.a.	16	17
	Little importance	7	16	n.a.	4	5
	Not answered	4	3	n.a.	4	4

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. Opportunity to work with practical economic policy problems for an extended period					
Great importance	19	36	n.a.	15	13
5	37	40	n.a.	36	38
4	25	19	n.a.	25	29
3	11	4	n.a.	13	13
2	5	0	n.a.	7	3
Little importance	1	1	n.a.	1	0
Not answered	3	0	n.a.	3	4
g. Mobility requirements					
Great importance	5	5	n.a.	6	4
5	17	15	n.a.	17	20
4	28	29	n.a.	29	26
3	23	27	n.a.	19	29
2	15	4	n.a.	23	10
Little importance	6	12	n.a.	4	6
Not answered	4	7	n.a.	3	4
h. Expectation of enhanced short-term promotion prospects					
Great importance	3	4	n.a.	4	1
5	10	5	n.a.	12	11
4	19	14	n.a.	21	18
3	24	23	n.a.	23	28
2	23	21	n.a.	24	22
Little importance	16	25	n.a.	14	15
Not answered	5	8	n.a.	3	5
i. Expectation of beneficial medium term career impact					
Great importance	8	7	n.a.	8	8
5	18	18	n.a.	19	17
4	25	25	n.a.	26	25
3	21	16	n.a.	19	28
2	15	12	n.a.	17	13
Little importance	9	16	n.a.	8	5
Not answered	4	5	n.a.	3	4
Q: In retrospect, which three attractions applied most strongly to RRs?					
a. opportunity to work with practical economic policy problems for extended period?	62	62	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. greater day to day job autonomy?	56	56	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. greater responsibility?	56	56	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
d. the financial benefits?	52	52	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
e. the opportunity to experience life in another country?	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
f. the opportunity to get out of Washington?	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
g. expectation of beneficial medium term career impact?	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
h. mobility requirements?	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
i. expectation of enhanced short term promotion prospects?	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: In general, how important are the following factors in reducing the attractiveness of RR positions?					
a. Inadequate financial incentives					
Great importance	23	26	n.a.	24	19
5	21	19	n.a.	20	25
4	10	15	n.a.	8	11
3	14	14	n.a.	14	16
2	18	16	n.a.	20	15
Little importance	9	7	n.a.	11	8
Not answered	4	3	n.a.	3	6
b. Difficult living conditions in many posts					
Great importance	37	29	n.a.	43	32
5	41	44	n.a.	40	40
4	12	10	n.a.	10	17
3	6	11	n.a.	3	6
2	1	4	n.a.	1	0
Little importance	0	0	n.a.	0	0
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	2	4
c. Perception of high opportunity cost career-wise of absence from HQ					
Great importance	28	32	n.a.	28	25
5	36	23	n.a.	42	35
4	22	30	n.a.	17	25
3	7	7	n.a.	6	9
2	3	0	n.a.	5	2
Little importance	1	3	n.a.	0	0
Not answered	3	5	n.a.	2	4
d. Perception that RR experience is not rated as high for promotions					
Great importance	28	34	n.a.	27	24
5	38	34	n.a.	37	42
4	18	15	n.a.	17	22
3	9	10	n.a.	10	6
2	4	0	n.a.	6	2
Little importance	1	1	n.a.	1	0
Not answered	4	5	n.a.	3	4
e. Perception that RR positions involve too much administrative work and too little policy responsibility					
Great importance	11	18	n.a.	8	10
5	18	10	n.a.	21	19
4	27	33	n.a.	26	24
3	23	19	n.a.	21	30
2	14	11	n.a.	17	11
Little importance	3	4	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	4	5	n.a.	3	5

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. Perception that RR assignments embody too many "risky" factors					
Great importance	4	8	n.a.	3	4
5	15	15	n.a.	17	12
4	28	33	n.a.	30	23
3	22	16	n.a.	22	28
2	22	19	n.a.	21	26
Little importance	3	4	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	5	4	n.a.	4	6
g. Difficulties in replicating spouse employment opportunities					
Great importance	34	32	n.a.	39	25
5	35	37	n.a.	33	37
4	16	15	n.a.	15	20
3	7	5	n.a.	6	10
2	3	1	n.a.	3	3
Little importance	1	3	n.a.	1	1
Not answered	5	7	n.a.	4	4
h. Reluctance to disrupt children's education					
Great importance	43	47	n.a.	42	40
5	38	33	n.a.	40	39
4	10	8	n.a.	10	12
3	4	3	n.a.	4	4
2	2	3	n.a.	2	1
Little importance	1	1	n.a.	1	0
Not answered	3	5	n.a.	2	4
i. Concerns about poor quality medical facilities in many countries					
Great importance	29	37	n.a.	31	19
5	35	36	n.a.	35	37
4	21	10	n.a.	20	33
3	8	10	n.a.	9	4
2	2	3	n.a.	2	2
Little importance	1	3	n.a.	1	0
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	3	4
j. Concerns about more limited social and leisure opportunities					
Great importance	4	5	n.a.	3	4
5	12	10	n.a.	12	13
4	21	30	n.a.	24	9
3	28	19	n.a.	30	33
2	21	16	n.a.	22	24
Little importance	9	11	n.a.	6	12
Not answered	5	8	n.a.	3	5

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: In retrospect, which three detractions applied most strongly to RRs?					
a. perception of high opportunity costs career-wise of absence from HQ	38	38	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. perception that RR experience not rated as high for promotions?	36	36	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. difficult living conditions in many posts?	36	36	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
d. concerns about poor quality medical facilities in many countries?	32	32	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
e. difficulties in replicating spouse employment opportunities?	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
f. reluctance to disrupt children's education?	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
g. perception that RR positions involve too much admin, too little policy	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
h. perception that RR assignments embody too many "risky" factors?	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
i. inadequate financial incentives?	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
j. concerns about more limited social and leisure opportunities:	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: Have RRs experienced promotion difficulties related to (in) frequency of performance assessments?					
Yes	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	63	63	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: During RRs' current assignments:					
a. do RRs expect to be promoted?					
Yes	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	66	66	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. have RRs been promoted?					
Yes	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	79	79	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: On completion of RRs' assignments, do RRs expect to be promoted?					
Yes	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	62	62	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: What are perceptions of the impact that RR experience tends to have on:					
a. promotion decisions?					
Favorable	1	3	n.a.	2	0
5	10	7	n.a.	11	10
4	36	32	n.a.	38	37
3	29	26	n.a.	26	37
2	12	12	n.a.	15	5
Unfavorable	5	12	n.a.	3	3
Not answered	7	8	n.a.	5	9
b. career advancement more generally?					
Favorable	2	3	n.a.	2	0
5	13	10	n.a.	15	10
4	38	34	n.a.	38	43
3	26	23	n.a.	25	31
2	10	11	n.a.	12	6
Unfavorable	5	11	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	6	8	n.a.	5	9

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: In general, how fairly do you believe returning RRs are treated regarding career issues?					
Very fairly	4	7	n.a.	3	3
5	11	8	n.a.	13	11
4	34	26	n.a.	35	37
3	27	26	n.a.	24	32
2	10	10	n.a.	11	9
Very unfairly	3	8	n.a.	2	0
Not answered	12	15	n.a.	13	9
Q: How well does the IMF's benefits package for RRs compare with other organizations?					
Compares favorably	7	16	n.a.	4	6
5	19	8	n.a.	21	23
4	24	29	n.a.	25	18
3	21	26	n.a.	21	15
2	4	4	n.a.	4	4
Compares poorly	3	4	n.a.	1	5
Not answered	23	12	n.a.	24	28
Q: How well have the ADs that appointed RRs lived up to any understandings reached with RRs regarding the resident representative assignment?					
In all respects	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not at all	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: How satisfied have RRs been overall with their experience in their current RR assignments?					
Very satisfied	32	32	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	34	34	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	27	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Very dissatisfied	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: If RRs were making their decisions today, would they accept their current assignments?					
Yes	82	82	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What are the obstacles to replicating spouses' US work opportunities in post countries?					
a. Language barriers					
Major obstacle	13	23	8	14	8
5	26	21	13	33	30
4	17	15	10	20	20
3	14	8	19	14	15
2	8	8	12	7	4
Not an obstacle	9	11	31	1	3
Not answered	13	14	7	11	19
b. Insufficient number of equivalent jobs in post countries					
Major obstacle	30	40	7	40	23
5	31	23	19	37	37
4	12	7	15	10	16
3	8	11	20	3	5
2	4	3	12	1	3
Not an obstacle	4	3	20	0	0
Not answered	11	14	6	10	16
c. Low salary levels in equivalent jobs in post countries					
Major obstacle	24	30	32	21	17
5	26	18	24	28	28
4	15	10	17	20	8
3	12	5	12	13	15
2	8	18	2	5	11
Not an obstacle	3	5	6	1	1
Not answered	14	14	7	14	20
d. Local rules restricting work opportunities for foreign nationals					
Major obstacle	18	18	7	22	19
5	21	19	6	26	24
4	13	15	5	14	17
3	11	7	11	12	14
2	10	8	21	7	5
Not an obstacle	12	15	44	2	1
Not answered	15	18	6	17	19
e. Career impact of absence from US employment market					
Major obstacle	24	21	n.a.	28	20
5	28	22	n.a.	32	26
4	15	7	n.a.	17	19
3	10	12	n.a.	8	11
2	3	4	n.a.	2	3
Not an obstacle	3	14	n.a.	0	1
Not answered	16	21	n.a.	13	19

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. Difficult re-entry to US employment market for spouse on return					
Major obstacle	18	16	n.a.	22	12
5	28	16	n.a.	31	29
4	19	22	n.a.	16	25
3	10	7	n.a.	11	9
2	5	5	n.a.	5	5
Not an obstacle	3	11	n.a.	1	1
Not answered	17	22	n.a.	14	19
g. Detrimental impact on family financial position due to low salary					
Major obstacle	12	16	n.a.	12	10
5	21	14	n.a.	22	24
4	14	8	n.a.	17	13
3	18	21	n.a.	19	16
2	12	8	n.a.	12	16
Not an obstacle	5	14	n.a.	3	2
Not answered	17	19	n.a.	15	19
h. Inability to leave practice/company without financial damage					
Major obstacle	14	12	n.a.	17	10
5	19	11	n.a.	21	23
4	19	16	n.a.	17	27
3	12	7	n.a.	13	12
2	6	7	n.a.	6	4
Not an obstacle	4	14	n.a.	1	2
Not answered	26	33	n.a.	24	23
Q: Do you have a spouse?					
a. Yes	90	90	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. Has your spouse accompanied you to the post?					
Yes	84	84	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. Was spouse employment the main reason spouse did not accompany?					
Yes	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	52	52	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	42	42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
d. Was spouse employment significant for acceptance/decline of post?					
Very significant	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not significant	36	36	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
e. Did you receive assistance in addressing spouse employment issues?					
Yes	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	84	84	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
f. How adequate was any assistance in this area from the IMF?					
Completely adequate	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Completely inadequate	26	26	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	51	51	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
g. If your spouse was seeking employment, was he/she successful?					
Yes	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	42	42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
h. Did difficulty finding employment lead spouse not to work?					
Yes	26	26	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	38	38	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	36	36	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
i. Are experiences with spouse employment issues affecting satisfaction with RR assignment?					
Yes, significantly increased satisfaction	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	22	22	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Yes, significantly reduced satisfaction	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	38	38	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
j. Are experiences with spouse employment issues increasing/decreasing assignment duration?					
Increasing duration	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No effect	58	58	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Decreasing duration	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
k. Are experiences with spouse employment issues increasing/decreasing interest in future RR posts?					
Increasing interest	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No effect	45	45	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Decreasing interest	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 8. Personnel Selection, Career Issues, and Other Issues (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Regarding the personal security of RRs and their households:					
a. How much of a concern is the level of security in post countries?					
Not a concern	8	16	n.a.	8	0
5	25	19	n.a.	29	22
4	13	15	n.a.	12	15
3	17	21	n.a.	17	12
2	13	8	n.a.	14	16
Very great concern	14	19	n.a.	12	14
Not answered	10	1	n.a.	8	22
b. How much more should the IMF be doing to ensure RRs' personal security?					
A lot more	6	5	n.a.	6	6
5	21	29	n.a.	17	20
4	14	14	n.a.	14	13
3	17	8	n.a.	23	12
2	12	8	n.a.	11	19
Nothing more	14	33	n.a.	12	3
Not answered	16	3	n.a.	16	26

Table 9. Interaction with National Authorities (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How receptive are NAs to having RR posts in their countries?					
Very receptive	43	49	n.a.	41	n.a.
5	29	25	n.a.	31	n.a.
4	11	10	n.a.	12	n.a.
3	6	7	n.a.	5	n.a.
2	3	5	n.a.	2	n.a.
Not at all receptive	1	1	n.a.	1	n.a.
Not answered	7	3	n.a.	8	n.a.
Q: How does NAs' receptivity influence RRs' effectiveness?					
Favorable impact	39	44	n.a.	37	n.a.
5	29	30	n.a.	29	n.a.
4	14	10	n.a.	15	n.a.
3	4	4	n.a.	4	n.a.
2	5	5	n.a.	5	n.a.
Unfavorable impact	3	4	n.a.	2	n.a.
Not answered	7	3	n.a.	8	n.a.
Q: How important to RRs' effectiveness is NAs' receptivity to post?					
Very important	53	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	53
5	31	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	31
4	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12
3	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0
2	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0
Not so important	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0
Not answered	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4
Q: Are NAs consulted on the role and/or objectives of RR posts?					
Yes	43	36	52	38	49
No	41	55	31	40	41
Not answered	16	10	17	22	10
Q: Whose interests are met by RR posts?					
a. Are countries' interests met by posts?					
Met in all respects	13	27	12	14	2
5	43	44	40	46	40
4	25	18	24	19	43
3	11	3	19	11	12
2	5	4	4	7	1
Not met at all	1	0	0	2	0
Not answered	2	4	1	2	2
b. Are the IMF's interests met by posts?					
Met in all respects	21	33	37	15	6
5	42	51	37	40	45
4	20	11	10	19	38
3	7	1	2	12	6
2	5	0	1	10	2
Not met at all	1	0	0	2	0
Not answered	5	4	13	2	2

Table 9. Interaction with National Authorities (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How frequent is less than full cooperation with RRs by NAs?					
a. On small matters?					
Very rare	19	34	n.a.	18	9
5	24	27	n.a.	24	22
4	18	15	n.a.	20	17
3	13	8	n.a.	13	18
2	11	5	n.a.	10	18
Very frequent	3	4	n.a.	3	1
Not answered	12	5	n.a.	13	15
b. On important matters?					
Very rare	18	38	n.a.	16	6
5	24	26	n.a.	24	23
4	17	11	n.a.	19	18
3	14	10	n.a.	12	20
2	10	7	n.a.	10	14
Very frequent	5	3	n.a.	6	3
Not answered	12	5	n.a.	13	15
c. Overall?					
Very rare	17	36	n.a.	15	5
5	24	26	n.a.	24	24
4	21	18	n.a.	23	22
3	14	7	n.a.	13	24
2	8	5	n.a.	9	10
Very frequent	2	3	n.a.	3	1
Not answered	13	5	n.a.	14	15
Q: How much time is spent daily on interaction between RRs and NAs?					
More than 120 minutes per day	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
90 to 120 minutes per day	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
60 to 90 minutes per day	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
30 to 60 minutes per day	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Less than 30 minutes per day	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: How frequent are RRs' contacts with Ministers and Deputy Ministers?					
Daily	11	19	4	n.a.	n.a.
2 to 3 times per week	30	35	27	n.a.	n.a.
Weekly	22	19	25	n.a.	n.a.
Fortnightly	13	12	14	n.a.	n.a.
Monthly	10	8	12	n.a.	n.a.
Other	12	8	15	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	2	1	2	n.a.	n.a.
Q: How frequent are RRs' contacts with officials at technical levels?					
Daily	62	62	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2 to 3 times per week	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Weekly	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Other	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 9. Interaction with National Authorities (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What form do RRs' contacts with Ministers and Deputy Ministers take?					
Usually bilateral meetings	72	77	68	n.a.	n.a.
Usually telephone conversations	14	8	17	n.a.	n.a.
Usually written letters or notes	5	4	8	n.a.	n.a.
Other	7	10	6	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	1	n.a.	n.a.
Q: What form do RRs' contacts with NAs at technical levels take?					
Usually bilateral meetings	68	68	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Usually telephone conversations	22	22	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Usually written letter or notes	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Other	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: How frequently do NAs initiate contact with RRs to ask questions and/or seek views on policy issues?					
Very frequently	16	21	13	15	n.a.
5	20	16	19	22	n.a.
4	28	32	37	22	n.a.
3	16	14	23	14	n.a.
2	11	11	5	13	n.a.
Very rarely	4	4	2	4	n.a.
Not answered	5	3	1	8	n.a.
Q: How frequently do RRs initiate contact with NAs to provide policy views?					
Very frequently	23	38	17	20	n.a.
5	34	37	27	35	n.a.
4	25	18	38	23	n.a.
3	8	4	11	9	n.a.
2	3	0	2	5	n.a.
Very rarely	2	0	2	3	n.a.
Not answered	4	3	2	6	n.a.
Q: Do specific mechanisms exist to facilitate interaction between RRs and NAs?					
Yes	35	33	35	35	n.a.
No	58	60	56	57	n.a.
Not answered	8	7	10	7	n.a.
Q: Do NAs ask RRs to comment on drafts of relevant policy documents, laws or regulations?					
Almost always	5	10	7	3	n.a.
5	16	12	19	16	n.a.
4	18	25	19	15	n.a.
3	21	14	20	24	n.a.
2	22	22	21	23	n.a.
Almost never	12	14	8	13	n.a.
Not answered	6	4	5	7	n.a.
Q: Do RRs write technical reports or analyses for national authorities?					
a. on their own initiative?					
Yes	41	64	37	34	n.a.
No	45	29	43	52	n.a.
Not answered	14	7	20	14	n.a.

Table 9. Interaction with National Authorities (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
b. at the request of mission chiefs?					
Yes	40	38	45	38	n.a.
No	44	42	33	49	n.a.
Not answered	16	19	21	13	n.a.
c. at the request of authorities?					
Yes	40	64	32	34	n.a.
No	41	27	30	52	n.a.
Not answered	19	8	38	14	n.a.
Q: What role do RRs have in the intra-governmental policy dialogue?					
Very prominent role	7	15	4	5	n.a.
5	15	25	13	12	n.a.
4	26	21	31	26	n.a.
3	17	12	21	17	n.a.
2	18	16	12	21	n.a.
No role	11	4	12	13	n.a.
Not answered	7	7	7	6	n.a.
Q: Do RRs have sufficient access to key decision makers?					
Sufficient access	42	42	43	42	n.a.
5	27	33	32	22	n.a.
4	13	8	14	15	n.a.
3	5	7	2	5	n.a.
2	7	4	2	11	n.a.
Insufficient access	3	3	4	2	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	2	3	n.a.
Q: How satisfied have you been generally with the quality of interaction between the RR and national authorities?					
Very satisfied	20	22	26	16	n.a.
5	32	38	33	29	n.a.
4	21	14	27	21	n.a.
3	12	10	7	15	n.a.
2	7	0	6	11	n.a.
Very dissatisfied	3	1	0	4	n.a.
Not answered	6	15	0	5	n.a.
Q: Do understandings exist regarding NAs' contributions to RR posts?					
Yes	69	82	61	67	n.a.
No	18	14	25	16	n.a.
Not answered	14	4	14	17	n.a.
Q: What form do understandings regarding NAs' contributions take?					
a. formal written understandings contained in:					
ai. terms of reference?	8	5	8	10	n.a.
aii. exchanges of letters?	28	34	27	25	n.a.
aiii. cables or telexes?	14	26	10	12	n.a.
b. informal oral understandings?	25	32	17	25	n.a.
c. other?	1	0	2	1	n.a.

Table 9. Interaction with National Authorities (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What do understandings regarding NAs' contributions cover?					
a. office space	63	73	58	61	n.a.
b. ready access by the RR to relevant national officials	45	45	42	47	n.a.
c. cooperation with the RR in the performance of his/her role	43	40	39	47	n.a.
d. car/driver	33	34	30	33	n.a.
e. secretarial support staff	31	36	32	29	n.a.
f. economist or research assistance staff	13	15	17	11	n.a.
g. other local staff	6	11	7	4	n.a.
h. interpreter	3	3	4	2	n.a.
Q: To what extent are NAs meeting understandings regarding:					
a. car/driver?					
Fully meeting	30	30	31	30	n.a.
5	2	1	2	2	n.a.
4	1	3	0	1	n.a.
3	0	0	0	0	n.a.
2	0	1	0	0	n.a.
Not meeting	2	5	1	1	n.a.
Not answered	65	59	65	67	n.a.
b. office space?					
Fully meeting	51	58	50	50	n.a.
5	6	5	5	6	n.a.
4	2	4	0	2	n.a.
3	1	3	0	2	n.a.
2	0	1	0	0	n.a.
Not meeting	1	1	2	0	n.a.
Not answered	38	27	43	40	n.a.
c. secretarial support?					
Fully meeting	27	30	31	24	n.a.
5	3	3	4	2	n.a.
4	1	3	1	1	n.a.
3	0	0	0	1	n.a.
2	0	0	0	0	n.a.
Not meeting	1	4	1	1	n.a.
Not answered	67	60	63	71	n.a.
d. economist/research support?					
Fully meeting	10	12	13	7	n.a.
5	1	0	2	1	n.a.
4	1	3	2	1	n.a.
3	1	0	0	2	n.a.
2	0	0	0	1	n.a.
Not meeting	1	4	1	1	n.a.
Not answered	85	81	81	88	n.a.

Table 9. Interaction with National Authorities (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
e. interpreter?					
Fully meeting	3	3	6	3	n.a.
5	1	1	4	0	n.a.
4	0	0	0	1	n.a.
3	1	0	0	1	n.a.
2	0	0	1	0	n.a.
Not meeting	1	3	2	0	n.a.
Not answered	93	93	87	96	n.a.
f. other local staff?					
Fully meeting	8	14	12	3	n.a.
5	0	0	1	0	n.a.
4	1	0	1	1	n.a.
3	0	0	0	1	n.a.
2	0	0	0	1	n.a.
Not meeting	1	3	1	0	n.a.
Not answered	90	84	85	95	n.a.
g. RR's access to officials?					
Fully meeting	27	36	33	21	n.a.
5	12	5	11	16	n.a.
4	5	7	1	7	n.a.
3	1	1	0	2	n.a.
2	1	0	0	2	n.a.
Not meeting	0	1	0	0	n.a.
Not answered	53	49	55	53	n.a.
h. cooperation with RRs?					
Fully meeting	25	29	38	17	n.a.
5	13	8	8	17	n.a.
4	5	3	0	9	n.a.
3	3	3	0	4	n.a.
2	1	3	0	1	n.a.
Not meeting	0	0	0	1	n.a.
Not answered	53	55	54	52	n.a.
Q: Do NAs meet undertakings to provide good quality and timely data?					
Undertakings always met	13	21	n.a.	10	n.a.
5	39	40	n.a.	39	n.a.
4	23	26	n.a.	22	n.a.
3	14	5	n.a.	18	n.a.
2	6	4	n.a.	7	n.a.
Undertakings hardly ever met	1	1	n.a.	1	n.a.
Not answered	4	3	n.a.	4	n.a.
Q: How much do NAs rely on RRs to ensure data undertakings are met?					
Heavy reliance	18	18	51	7	11
5	23	29	24	15	33
4	21	16	8	28	22
3	12	10	7	17	9
2	13	14	5	16	11
No reliance	6	7	1	10	2
Not answered	7	7	4	6	13

Table 9. Interaction with National Authorities (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Where are RRs' offices physically located?					
Central Bank	46	47	n.a.	46	n.a.
Ministry of Finance	16	16	n.a.	16	n.a.
Other 1/	35	37	n.a.	34	n.a.
Not answered	3	0	n.a.	4	n.a.
Q: Does office location affect the quality of interaction between RRs and NAs?					
Yes, positive impact	51	56	n.a.	49	n.a.
Little or no impact	36	34	n.a.	37	n.a.
Yes, adverse impact	11	10	n.a.	11	n.a.
Not answered	3	0	n.a.	4	n.a.
Q: How much potential is there to share offices & local staff with the World Bank?					
A lot of potential	10	10	n.a.	8	13
5	15	16	n.a.	15	14
4	11	5	n.a.	13	12
3	13	7	n.a.	14	14
2	23	22	n.a.	24	23
Very little potential	26	40	n.a.	23	20
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	2	4

1/ Of the "Other" responses, 37% specified other government locations and 63% specified commercial premises.

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	Total Resident Representatives (Incl.MED)	Resident Representatives				
		AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(73)	(18)	(14)	(9)	(20)	(9)
Q: How much time is spent daily on communication between RRs and ADs?						
More than 120 minutes per day	1	0	0	11	0	0
90 to 120 minutes per day	16	17	36	11	10	11
60 to 90 minutes per day	33	28	21	56	30	44
30 to 60 minutes per day	38	44	43	22	40	33
Less than 30 minutes per day	8	11	0	0	10	11
Not answered	3	0	0	0	10	0
Q: Who are formally RRs' immediate superiors or supervisors?						
Mission chief	48	33	50	67	50	56
Division chief	30	50	14	11	30	33
AD director or a deputy director	16	17	29	22	5	11
Other	3	0	7	0	5	0
Not answered	3	0	0	0	10	0
Q: Do RRs' terms of reference specify supervisors' responsibilities?						
Yes, in some detail	4	0	7	0	5	11
5	5	6	0	11	5	11
4	8	22	7	0	5	0
3	16	28	14	11	20	0
2	19	6	29	22	20	22
No, not at all	38	33	36	33	40	56
Not answered	8	6	7	22	5	0
Q: How are supervision practices between RRs and ADs determined?						
1) Mostly by formal written arrangements	8	11	14	0	5	11
2) Responses 1) and 3) equally	21	33	21	11	10	22
3) Mostly by informal oral evolution	68	56	64	89	75	67
Not answered	3	0	0	0	10	0
Q: What form do RRs' reports to mission/division chiefs take?						
1) Usually formal written reports	29	28	43	22	35	11
2) Responses 1) and 3) equally	52	72	43	67	30	56
3) Usually informal oral reports	15	0	14	11	20	33
Not answered	4	0	0	0	15	0
Q: How frequent are RRs' reports to mission/division chiefs?						
Daily	48	33	43	44	50	78
2 to 3 times per week	38	56	36	33	35	22
Weekly	4	11	7	0	0	0
Fortnightly	1	0	7	0	0	0
Other	7	0	7	22	10	0
Not answered	1	0	0	0	5	0

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>Resident Representatives</u>					
	Total Resident Representatives (Incl.MED)	AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(73)	(18)	(14)	(9)	(20)	(9)
Q: How frequent are RRs' reports to AD directors/deputies?						
Daily	5	6	7	0	5	11
2 to 3 times per week	5	6	7	0	0	11
Weekly	3	0	7	0	0	0
Fortnightly	3	6	7	0	0	0
Monthly	21	50	14	22	5	11
Quarterly	16	6	7	0	50	0
Only in exceptional circumstances	34	28	43	56	20	56
Other	10	0	7	22	15	0
Not answered	3	0	0	0	5	11
Q: What form do RRs' reports to AD directors/deputies take?						
1) Usually formal written reports	60	61	64	22	90	33
2) Responses 1) and 3) equally	19	39	21	11	0	22
3) Usually informal oral reports	8	0	7	22	5	11
Not answered	12	0	7	44	5	33
Q: Do adequate channels exist for RRs to express their views to ADs' front offices?						
Yes	75	78	86	78	60	89
No	21	22	7	22	30	11
Not answered	4	0	7	0	10	0
Q: How is priority-setting between RRs and ADs determined?						
1) Mostly by formal written arrangements	5	6	14	0	5	0
2) Responses 1) and 3) equally	23	56	21	11	5	22
3) Mostly by informal oral evolution	68	39	64	89	80	78
Not answered	3	0	0	0	10	0
Q: Do RRs have formal rolling work programs agreed with supervisors?						
Yes	12	17	0	11	15	22
No	85	83	93	89	80	78
Not answered	3	0	7	0	5	0
Q: In practice, how relevant to the job are:						
a. RRs' formal terms of reference?						
Highly relevant	10	11	0	0	15	22
5	11	11	21	22	5	0
4	19	28	7	22	15	22
3	19	28	21	33	10	11
2	15	6	36	0	20	11
Scarcely relevant	21	11	7	22	30	33
Not answered	5	6	7	0	5	0
b. RRs' formal work programs?						
Highly relevant	5	6	7	0	5	11
5	3	11	0	0	0	0
4	16	44	14	11	0	11
3	16	17	14	0	30	11
2	16	6	21	22	25	11
Scarcely relevant	23	6	7	44	25	44
Not answered	19	11	36	22	15	11

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	Total Resident Representatives (Incl.MED)	Resident Representatives				
		AFR	APD	EU1	EU2	WHD
(Total Number of Respondents)	(73)	(18)	(14)	(9)	(20)	(9)
Q: What influences RRs' work priorities?						
a. Terms of reference/work program						
Great influence	16	28	0	11	15	33
5	25	39	29	33	10	11
4	22	22	14	22	20	33
3	10	6	7	11	15	0
2	15	6	36	22	10	11
Little influence	8	0	0	0	25	11
Not answered	4	0	14	0	5	0
b. Mission chiefs' priorities						
Great influence	48	78	36	44	50	22
5	34	6	43	33	40	67
4	8	11	7	11	0	11
3	5	6	7	11	0	0
2	1	0	0	0	5	0
Little influence	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not answered	3	0	7	0	5	0
c. National authorities' priorities						
Great influence	29	56	21	11	30	11
5	36	33	14	56	35	67
4	25	6	43	22	25	11
3	4	6	7	0	0	11
2	3	0	7	0	5	0
Little influence	1	0	0	11	0	0
Not answered	3	0	7	0	5	0
d. Daily or weekly exigencies						
Great influence	25	33	29	11	25	0
5	41	28	50	44	55	33
4	21	22	7	33	15	33
3	4	17	0	0	0	0
2	3	0	0	0	0	22
Little influence	1	0	0	11	0	0
Not answered	5	0	14	0	5	11
e. Own concerns						
Great influence	14	11	14	22	15	11
5	32	22	36	44	20	44
4	32	28	29	33	40	33
3	7	11	14	0	5	0
2	8	11	0	0	15	0
Little influence	5	17	0	0	0	11
Not answered	3	0	7	0	5	0

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
Total Number of Respondents	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How simple or complex are the work assignments delegated to RRs?					
Generally simple and/or non-sensitive	11	7	n.a.	12	n.a.
Moderately complex and/or sensitive	37	26	n.a.	41	n.a.
Very complex and/or sensitive	47	59	n.a.	42	n.a.
Other	3	7	n.a.	1	n.a.
Not answered	4	1	n.a.	5	n.a.
Q: What is the time horizon of the work assignments delegated to RRs?					
Within a day or two	34	51	n.a.	28	n.a.
Within a week	43	36	n.a.	46	n.a.
Within a fortnight	11	8	n.a.	12	n.a.
Within a month	3	1	n.a.	4	n.a.
Beyond a month	2	3	n.a.	2	n.a.
Not answered	6	1	n.a.	8	n.a.
Q: Ideally, what priority should RRs' place on different activities?					
a. Facilitating dialogue between NAs and IMF					
High priority	62	67	n.a.	61	58
5	26	27	n.a.	26	27
4	7	3	n.a.	8	9
3	3	3	n.a.	2	3
2	1	0	n.a.	1	1
Low priority	1	0	n.a.	1	1
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	1
b. On-site policy advice					
High priority	43	63	n.a.	33	47
5	31	26	n.a.	32	32
4	16	8	n.a.	21	14
3	6	3	n.a.	7	4
2	2	0	n.a.	4	1
Low priority	1	0	n.a.	2	0
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	1
c. Gathering economic data and information					
High priority	38	27	n.a.	44	33
5	29	34	n.a.	31	19
4	20	23	n.a.	12	32
3	7	8	n.a.	5	9
2	4	4	n.a.	4	3
Low priority	1	3	n.a.	1	1
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	2
d. Program monitoring/early warning					
High priority	61	62	n.a.	59	65
5	24	25	n.a.	23	26
4	8	8	n.a.	9	8
3	1	1	n.a.	2	1
2	1	0	n.a.	2	0
Low priority	0	1	n.a.	0	0
Not answered	4	3	n.a.	5	1

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
Total Number of Respondents	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
e. Coordinating IMF-provided technical assistance					
High priority	11	8	n.a.	11	13
5	24	23	n.a.	17	37
4	30	33	n.a.	30	29
3	19	23	n.a.	21	14
2	10	10	n.a.	13	5
Low priority	4	3	n.a.	6	0
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	2	2
f. Macroeconomic capacity-building					
High priority	22	18	n.a.	22	24
5	26	25	n.a.	24	30
4	28	34	n.a.	26	28
3	15	14	n.a.	15	15
2	7	8	n.a.	8	2
Low priority	1	1	n.a.	2	0
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	1
g. Local public relations and information on role of IMF					
High priority	17	21	n.a.	18	14
5	26	29	n.a.	23	28
4	26	25	n.a.	25	30
3	18	15	n.a.	20	16
2	9	8	n.a.	9	10
Low priority	3	3	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	1	0	n.a.	2	1
h. Local coordination among donors and other agencies					
High priority	8	15	n.a.	8	4
5	16	21	n.a.	13	19
4	23	23	n.a.	19	32
3	23	19	n.a.	22	29
2	21	15	n.a.	27	12
Low priority	6	7	n.a.	8	2
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	3	1
i. Administration of post (budget, staff, etc.)					
High priority	6	4	n.a.	5	9
5	6	8	n.a.	4	8
4	20	25	n.a.	15	27
3	24	22	n.a.	25	25
2	28	29	n.a.	32	22
Low priority	14	11	n.a.	17	10
Not answered	2	1	n.a.	2	1
j. Assessing the political and social context					
High priority	25	34	n.a.	23	22
5	32	30	n.a.	33	31
4	25	26	n.a.	22	28
3	10	8	n.a.	10	10
2	6	0	n.a.	7	8
Low priority	1	1	n.a.	2	1
Not answered	2	0	n.a.	3	1

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
Total Number of Respondents	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: What are ADs' priorities for RRs in practice?					
a. Facilitating dialogue between NAs and IMF					
High priority	42	42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	36	36	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. On-site policy advice					
High priority	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. Gathering economic data and information					
High priority	62	62	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
d. Program monitoring/early warning					
High priority	56	56	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
e. Coordinating IMF-provided technical assistance					
High priority	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	33	33	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
f. Macroeconomic capacity-building					
High priority	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	All Departments				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
Total Number of Respondents	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
g. Local public relations and information on the role of the Fund					
High priority	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	29	29	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
h. Local coordination among donors and other agencies					
High priority	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	30	30	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
i. Administration of post (budget, staff, etc.)					
High priority	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	40	40	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
j. Assessing the political and social context					
High priority	22	22	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Low priority	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q: How often are RRs asked to comment on AD country documents?					
a. Briefing papers					
Almost always	29	32	n.a.	28	n.a.
5	10	11	n.a.	9	n.a.
4	6	4	n.a.	7	n.a.
3	9	8	n.a.	9	n.a.
2	16	15	n.a.	16	n.a.
Almost never	24	29	n.a.	22	n.a.
Not answered	7	1	n.a.	10	n.a.
b. Staff reports					
Almost always	36	40	n.a.	34	n.a.
5	14	10	n.a.	15	n.a.
4	8	7	n.a.	8	n.a.
3	8	4	n.a.	9	n.a.
2	11	12	n.a.	10	n.a.
Almost never	17	22	n.a.	15	n.a.
Not answered	7	5	n.a.	8	n.a.

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
Total Number of Respondents	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
c. Back-to-office reports					
Almost always	11	12	n.a.	10	n.a.
5	9	7	n.a.	10	n.a.
4	7	8	n.a.	7	n.a.
3	13	14	n.a.	13	n.a.
2	16	12	n.a.	17	n.a.
Almost never	35	44	n.a.	32	n.a.
Not answered	9	3	n.a.	11	n.a.
d. Country strategy papers					
Almost always	26	25	n.a.	26	n.a.
5	12	10	n.a.	13	n.a.
4	5	4	n.a.	5	n.a.
3	7	7	n.a.	7	n.a.
2	5	4	n.a.	6	n.a.
Almost never	9	15	n.a.	7	n.a.
Not answered	35	36	n.a.	35	n.a.
e. Policy framework papers					
Almost always	34	33	n.a.	35	n.a.
5	11	11	n.a.	11	n.a.
4	4	3	n.a.	5	n.a.
3	5	7	n.a.	4	n.a.
2	5	5	n.a.	5	n.a.
Almost never	6	7	n.a.	5	n.a.
Not answered	35	34	n.a.	36	n.a.
f. Other key policy papers					
Almost always	27	23	n.a.	28	n.a.
5	15	21	n.a.	13	n.a.
4	6	4	n.a.	7	n.a.
3	8	4	n.a.	10	n.a.
2	7	5	n.a.	8	n.a.
Almost never	11	19	n.a.	8	n.a.
Not answered	25	23	n.a.	26	n.a.
Q: Do RRs have a key role in:					
a. assessing NAs' preparedness for missions?					
Yes	74	82	n.a.	70	74
No	22	16	n.a.	26	18
Not answered	4	1	n.a.	4	8
b. determining the timing of missions?					
Yes	63	64	68	59	65
No	33	34	32	38	27
Not answered	4	1	1	3	9

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

		<u>All Departments</u>				
		Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
Total Number of Respondents		(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q:	During AD missions to country, what role do RRs play in?					
	a. the policy dialogue between missions and NAs?					
	Prominent role	13	21	19	10	6
	5	30	44	38	25	22
	4	28	19	24	31	31
	3	16	7	13	18	23
	2	9	7	5	12	9
	No role	2	1	1	2	2
	Not answered	3	1	0	2	8
	b. the in-country work carried out by missions?					
	Prominent role	8	14	n.a.	7	8
	5	32	42	n.a.	30	29
	4	26	23	n.a.	26	29
	3	15	12	n.a.	13	19
	2	11	7	n.a.	14	6
	No role	4	0	n.a.	7	1
	Not answered	4	1	n.a.	3	8
Q:	How often do high-level policy discussions take place in RRs' absence?					
	a. in the country?					
	Frequently	3	4	n.a.	2	n.a.
	5	4	5	n.a.	4	n.a.
	4	4	0	n.a.	5	n.a.
	3	3	4	n.a.	2	n.a.
	2	17	8	n.a.	20	n.a.
	Rarely	70	77	n.a.	67	n.a.
	Not answered	2	1	n.a.	2	n.a.
	b. in Washington or other locations? (e.g., during the IMF annual meetings, meetings of the Paris Club, Consultative Group meetings, other occasions)					
	Frequently	35	52	n.a.	29	n.a.
	5	25	11	n.a.	31	n.a.
	4	13	14	n.a.	13	n.a.
	3	10	7	n.a.	11	n.a.
	2	7	10	n.a.	6	n.a.
	Rarely	6	3	n.a.	7	n.a.
	Not answered	3	4	n.a.	3	n.a.
Q:	Are ADs bringing RRs to HQ annually for consultations?					
	Yes	59	59	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	No	33	33	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Not answered	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Q:	How adequate is ADs' economic backstopping of RRs?					
	Effective economic backstopping	10	7	n.a.	14	5
	5	34	29	n.a.	39	28
	4	21	26	n.a.	20	22
	3	13	15	n.a.	10	16
	2	10	18	n.a.	10	6
	Inadequate economic backstopping	2	3	n.a.	1	4
	Not answered	9	3	n.a.	7	18

Table 10. Interaction with Area Departments (continued)
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
Total Number of Respondents	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: Do RRs' mission chiefs/supervisors keep RRs informed:					
a. of relevant country issues?					
Always	40	30	n.a.	44	n.a.
Most of the time	47	55	n.a.	44	n.a.
Sometimes	9	14	n.a.	7	n.a.
Not answered	3	1	n.a.	4	n.a.
b. of Fund-wide policy issues?					
Always	7	8	n.a.	7	n.a.
Most of the time	40	30	n.a.	44	n.a.
Sometimes	44	60	n.a.	38	n.a.
Not answered	8	1	n.a.	11	n.a.
Q: Is circulation of information to RRs automatic?					
Mostly automatic circulation	65	48	n.a.	71	n.a.
Mostly specific requests	27	49	n.a.	18	n.a.
Other	2	1	n.a.	3	n.a.
Not answered	6	1	n.a.	8	n.a.
Q: How satisfied have you been generally with the quality of interaction between RRs and area departments?					
Very Satisfied	26	16	31	28	n.a.
5	28	29	23	29	n.a.
4	23	29	24	21	n.a.
3	9	10	7	10	n.a.
2	6	4	5	7	n.a.
Very dissatisfied	2	4	2	2	n.a.
Not answered	6	8	8	4	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
A. Administrative and Accounting Support Functions
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(355)	(73)	(n.a.)	(189)	(93)
Q: Regarding administrative and accounting support:					
a. i. How adequate is the administrative support provided to RRs by ADM?					
Adequate	5	18	n.a.	3	0
5	11	26	n.a.	6	10
4	15	23	n.a.	11	17
3	11	15	n.a.	13	4
2	9	4	n.a.	8	13
Inadequate	5	11	n.a.	4	3
Not answered	44	3	n.a.	56	53
a.ii. How adequate is the accounting support provided to RRs by TRE?					
Adequate	4	15	n.a.	2	0
5	13	29	n.a.	6	13
4	14	21	n.a.	12	15
3	10	14	n.a.	10	6
2	7	10	n.a.	5	9
Inadequate	4	8	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	48	4	n.a.	61	56
b.i. How effective is ADM in the area of RR support?					
Highly effective	3	12	n.a.	1	1
5	13	33	n.a.	7	10
4	14	25	n.a.	10	13
3	10	14	n.a.	9	10
2	9	1	n.a.	12	10
Ineffective	5	11	n.a.	3	3
Not answered	47	4	n.a.	60	54
b.ii. How effective is TRE in the area of RR support?					
Highly effective	3	11	n.a.	1	1
5	12	30	n.a.	6	10
4	15	25	n.a.	11	16
3	8	15	n.a.	7	5
2	7	7	n.a.	7	9
Ineffective	3	7	n.a.	2	1
Not answered	52	5	n.a.	66	58

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 B. Representatives of Other Organizations
 (Mean Scores on a Scale of 1-6, where "6" is the highest score)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: How frequent/effective is interaction between RRs and local representatives of other organizations?					
a. World Bank:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.2
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	4.6	4.8	5.0	4.4	4.5
Not answered (in percent)	17	4	21	16	26
b. United Nations Development Programme:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	4.1	4.5	4.0	3.7	4.5
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	3.8	4.2	4.1	3.5	3.9
Not answered (in percent)	35	7	45	40	38
c. United States Agency for International Development:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.4
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	4.2	4.6	4.2	4.1	4.0
Not answered (in percent)	38	8	60	41	38
d. Commission of the European Union:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	4.0	4.3	4.3	3.7	4.1
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.8
Not answered (in percent)	48	22	62	50	54
e. International Labor Organization:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	2.8	3.1	2.1	2.6	2.6
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	3.0	3.8	2.1	2.8	2.8
Not answered (in percent)	64	36	90	63	62
f. Other official bilateral agencies:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	4.9	4.7	5.3	0.6	0.9
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	4.7	4.8	5.2	4.6	4.4
Not answered (in percent)	77	55	89	81	73
g. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.6	3.5
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	3.7	4.1	3.9	3.6	3.2
Not answered (in percent)	63	55	69	61	70
h. Other United Nations Agencies:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	4.3	4.4	3.3	5.0	4.2
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	4.3	4.3	3.1	5.7	3.2
Not answered (in percent)	86	58	92	95	38
i. Other official donors:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	4.9	4.7	4.3	5.3	4.6
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.0
Not answered (in percent)	88	64	94	94	90
j. Non-government agencies:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	3.7	3.9	2.3	4.0	3.2
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	3.4	4.0	2.0	4.0	2.4
Not answered (in percent)	88	64	95	94	89

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 B. Representatives of Other Organizations
 (Mean Scores on a Scale of 1-6, where "6" is the highest score)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
k. Asian Development Bank:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	3.7	3.5	4.0	3.4	4.3
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	3.7	4.1	3.7	3.3	3.9
Not answered (in percent)	76	70	80	79	72
l. African Development Bank:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	2.7	1.9	3.4	2.4	3.4
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	2.9	3	3.4	2.8	2.9
Not answered (in percent)	77	71	83	82	67
m. Inter-American Development Bank:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	3.6	2.7	3.3	3.7	4.3
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.8
Not answered (in percent)	82	78	86	87	72
n. Other European Union Agencies:					
i. Frequency of Contacts	4.7	5.0	3.7	4.3	4.3
ii. Effectiveness of Coordination	4.1	4.3	2.9	4.2	4.1
Not answered (in percent)	89	79	93	88	92
Q: How frequent are RRs' contacts with:					
a. Diplomatic community?	5.0	5.5	4.2	5.0	5.2
Not answered (in percent)	17	0	30	14	27
b. Financial sector?	4.8	5.4	4.5	4.7	5.1
Not answered (in percent)	17	0	21	17	28
c. Donor community?	4.7	5.3	3.9	4.7	5.1
Not answered (in percent)	19	0	32	16	29
d. Business?	4.0	4.7	3.6	3.7	4.2
Not answered (in percent)	20	0	33	17	28
e. Exporters?	3.1	3.6	2.6	3.0	3.3
Not answered (in percent)	21	0	33	18	30
f. Academics?	2.9	3.2	2.8	2.8	3.3
Not answered (in percent)	19	0	30	17	30
g. Parliamentary Groups?	3.0	3.0	2.6	3.1	3.2
Not answered (in percent)	19	0	30	17	28
h. Other social sector groups?	2.9	3.2	2.5	2.8	3.0
Not answered (in percent)	31	12	38	33	35
i. Political opposition?	2.4	2.7	2.2	2.3	2.4
Not answered (in percent)	21	0	35	20	28
j. Labor unions?	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.3	3.0
Not answered (in percent)	21	0	33	19	28

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 B. Representatives of Other Organizations
 (Mean Scores on a Scale of 1-6, where "6" is the highest score)

		<u>All Departments</u>				
		Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)		(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q:	How much emphasis should RRs place on briefings for outsiders?					
a.	Local diplomatic community	4.1	4.6	4.2	3.8	4.1
	Not answered (in percent)	2	0	6	1	3
b.	Local and international media	4.2	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.2
	Not answered (in percent)	3	0	7	2	3
c.	Foreign donor groups	4.0	4.7	4.0	3.7	4.0
	Not answered (in percent)	2	0	7	1	2
d.	Local business groups	3.9	4.3	4.0	3.6	4.1
	Not answered (in percent)	2	1	6	1	2
e.	Local parliamentarians	4.0	4.4	3.8	3.8	4.2
	Not answered (in percent)	2	0	6	1	2
f.	Foreign business groups	3.4	4.1	3.8	3.0	3.2
	Not answered (in percent)	2	0	6	2	2
g.	Local donor groups	3.8	4.2	3.6	3.6	4.1
	Not answered (in percent)	4	3	10	3	2
h.	Foreign NGOs	3.2	3.4	3.5	2.9	3.3
	Not answered (in percent)	3	0	7	2	4
i.	Local labor unions	3.8	4.2	3.5	3.6	4.2
	Not answered (in percent)	3	0	7	1	3
j.	Local NGOs	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.8
	Not answered (in percent)	5	11	8	2	3
k.	Foreign parliamentarians	2.5	3.2	2.9	2.1	2.3
	Not answered (in percent)	2	0	5	2	2

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
C. External Relations
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: In the area of external relations:					
a. In general, how receptive are authorities to RRs' involvement in external relations?					
Very receptive	14	26	18	10	10
5	25	23	30	27	17
4	22	19	24	20	25
3	12	8	12	12	14
2	8	11	4	8	12
Not receptive	4	12	4	3	2
Not answered	15	0	10	21	20
b. What is the extent of RRs' involvement in external relations activities?					
Heavy involvement	8	14	6	6	n.a.
5	22	25	21	21	n.a.
4	29	23	36	28	n.a.
3	15	12	15	15	n.a.
2	13	18	10	13	n.a.
Little involvement	5	7	5	4	n.a.
Not answered	9	1	7	13	n.a.
c. In general, how much involvement by RRs in external relations activities is desirable?					
Heavy involvement	9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9
5	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	18
4	38	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	38
3	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	18
2	9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9
Little involvement	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1
Not answered	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8
d. How frequent are RRs' external relations activities?					
About 1 per month	40	40	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
About 1 per fortnight	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
About 1 per week	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
About 1 to 2 per week	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
More than 2 per week	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Other	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
e. What is the most common external relations activity by RRs?					
Press interview	55	55	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Participation in a seminar	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Press conference	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Speech	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Press release	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Other	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
C. External Relations
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. Who/what are the main catalysts for RRs' external relations activities?					
Media organizations	40	40	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Resident Representatives	27	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
National authorities	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
IMF HQ events (e.g., annual meetings, WEO, etc.)	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
IMF missions	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Other	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
g. Are RRs expected to clear media statements in advance:					
g.i. with authorities?					
Yes	15	23	n.a.	11	18
No	58	59	n.a.	56	62
Not answered	27	18	n.a.	34	19
g.ii. with the IMF Area Department?					
Yes	59	58	n.a.	55	68
No	24	33	n.a.	23	18
Not answered	17	10	n.a.	22	14
g.iii. with the IMF External Relations Department?					
Yes	26	36	n.a.	22	26
No	44	47	n.a.	41	47
Not answered	30	18	n.a.	37	27
h. Overall, how do RRs characterize the quality of their experience(s) in the external relations area?					
Very satisfactory	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	32	32	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Very difficult	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
i. How satisfied are NAs with RRs' external relations activities?					
Very satisfied	17	n.a.	17	n.a.	n.a.
5	37	n.a.	37	n.a.	n.a.
4	27	n.a.	27	n.a.	n.a.
3	6	n.a.	6	n.a.	n.a.
2	4	n.a.	4	n.a.	n.a.
Very dissatisfied	1	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	8	n.a.	8	n.a.	n.a.
j. In practice, how useful is EXR to RRs?					
Very useful	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not useful	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
C. External Relations
(In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
k. How much role should the following have in judgements regarding RRs' external relations activities?					
k.i. Area Department					
Main role	37	27	n.a.	44	29
5	31	30	n.a.	28	36
4	13	14	n.a.	11	16
3	6	12	n.a.	3	6
2	2	6	n.a.	1	2
No role	2	5	n.a.	1	1
Not answered	10	6	n.a.	12	9
k.ii. Resident Representative					
Main role	33	59	n.a.	23	33
5	32	27	n.a.	34	29
4	17	6	n.a.	21	17
3	5	3	n.a.	6	7
2	1	0	n.a.	1	1
No role	1	0	n.a.	1	2
Not answered	12	5	n.a.	15	10
k.iii. National Authorities					
Main role	6	11	n.a.	5	3
5	14	18	n.a.	12	14
4	19	17	n.a.	16	26
3	20	18	n.a.	20	22
2	21	24	n.a.	22	16
No role	8	6	n.a.	10	6
Not answered	12	6	n.a.	15	13
k.iv. External Relations Department					
Main role	5	8	n.a.	5	3
5	12	17	n.a.	10	14
4	18	14	n.a.	17	21
3	21	29	n.a.	19	19
2	22	14	n.a.	23	26
No role	9	14	n.a.	9	7
Not answered	13	6	n.a.	17	10
l. Have difficulties arisen regarding RRs' activities in the external relations area?					
Yes	14	n.a.	17	13	n.a.
No	71	n.a.	71	71	n.a.
Not answered	15	n.a.	12	16	n.a.
m. In general, how frequently do difficulties arise regarding RRs' activities in the external relations area?					
Very frequently	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1
5	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	10
4	17	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	17
3	20	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20
2	24	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	24
Very rarely	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	10

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 C. External Relations
 (In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Not answered	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	18
n. In an awkward external relations situation, do RRs believe that senior HQ staff would support them?					
All the way	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	34	34	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	10	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not at all	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
D. Executive Directors' Offices
(In percent)

		<u>All Departments</u>				
		Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)		(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q:	Regarding interaction between RRs and IMF Executive Directors' offices:					
	a. What is the frequency of contacts between RRs and EDs' offices?					
	Frequent	1	0	n.a.	1	0
	5	4	5	n.a.	3	6
	4	5	10	n.a.	5	2
	3	12	12	n.a.	11	13
	2	25	30	n.a.	21	31
	Rare	32	41	n.a.	34	20
	Not answered	21	1	n.a.	25	27
	b. How effective overall is the interaction between RRs & EDs' offices?					
	Effective	9	15	n.a.	7	9
	Adequate	43	53	n.a.	43	34
	Poor	19	19	n.a.	16	25
	Not answered	29	12	n.a.	34	32
	c. Would more or less interaction between RRs and EDs' offices be useful?					
	More interaction	10	10	35	1	5
	5	12	19	21	7	8
	4	24	32	20	20	31
	3	22	21	11	28	23
	2	6	5	5	6	6
	Less interaction	3	4	0	6	0
	Not answered	23	10	8	32	27

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 E. IMF-provided Technical Assistance
 (In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
Q: In the area of IMF-provided technical assistance to post countries:					
a. How would you characterize the extent of the ongoing technical assistance program?					
Extensive	38	32	n.a.	40	n.a.
Moderate	45	48	n.a.	44	n.a.
Limited	13	19	n.a.	10	n.a.
Not answered	5	1	n.a.	6	n.a.
b. Are there resident IMF technical assistance advisors?					
Yes	56	56	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
No	42	42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. How effective overall is the coordination between RRs and IMF resident advisors?					
Very effective	10	14	19	8	3
5	24	27	25	26	16
4	21	12	25	22	24
3	11	7	8	12	14
2	6	3	4	4	16
Ineffective	1	1	0	2	0
Not answered	26	36	19	25	27
d. What is the extent of RRs' involvement with technical assistance activities?					
Very involved	12	10	24	8	n.a.
5	23	33	21	20	n.a.
4	29	32	25	30	n.a.
3	14	15	15	14	n.a.
2	9	5	5	13	n.a.
Not involved	2	1	0	3	n.a.
Not answered	10	4	10	13	n.a.
e. How much influence do RRs have on the focus of technical assistance provided by:					
e.i. FAD missions?					
A lot	19	21	36	12	n.a.
Some	36	40	37	35	n.a.
A little	26	26	10	34	n.a.
Not answered	18	14	18	20	n.a.
e.ii. MAE missions?					
A lot	18	21	32	12	n.a.
Some	39	41	40	38	n.a.
A little	23	26	8	28	n.a.
Not answered	20	12	19	23	n.a.
e.iii. STA missions?					
A lot	12	12	21	7	n.a.
Some	37	36	43	34	n.a.
A little	30	38	12	35	n.a.
Not answered	22	14	24	24	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 E. IMF-provided Technical Assistance
 (In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(439)	(73)	(84)	(189)	(93)
f. How much influence should RRs have on the focus of IMF-provided TA?					
A great deal	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	18
5	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	27
4	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	27
3	10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	10
2	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5
Very little	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1
Not answered	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12
g. How do RRs rate the effectiveness of technical assistance provided by:					
g.i. FAD missions?					
Effective	49	49	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Adequate	30	30	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Poor	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
g.ii. MAE missions?					
Effective	44	44	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Adequate	38	38	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Poor	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
g.iii. STA missions?					
Effective	27	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Adequate	42	42	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Poor	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
h. How effective is the coordination between RRs and:					
h.i. FAD missions?					
Effective	28	42	37	23	22
Adequate	36	33	38	41	24
Poor	8	11	4	7	13
Not answered	28	14	21	29	42
h.ii. MAE missions?					
Effective	27	32	38	23	22
Adequate	33	37	33	37	24
Poor	10	16	4	10	12
Not answered	29	15	25	30	43
h.iii. STA missions?					
Effective	20	29	24	16	15
Adequate	39	45	46	40	26
Poor	8	11	2	11	8
Not answered	33	15	27	33	52

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
F. IMF-provided Training
(In percent)

		<u>All Departments</u>				
		Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)		(355)	(73)	(n.a.)	(189)	(93)
Q:	In the area of IMF Institute-provided (INS/JVI) training activities:					
	a. What is the level of INS/JVI activity related to post countries?					
	Extensive	34	53	n.a.	27	n.a.
	Moderate	38	38	n.a.	38	n.a.
	Limited	12	4	n.a.	15	n.a.
	Not answered	16	4	n.a.	20	n.a.
	b. What is the extent of RRs' involvement in INS/JVI-related activities?					
	Very involved	12	33	n.a.	8	4
	5	21	32	n.a.	20	17
	4	19	23	n.a.	19	15
	3	10	4	n.a.	11	13
	2	9	1	n.a.	12	9
	Not involved	5	1	n.a.	6	4
	Not answered	24	5	n.a.	25	38
	c.i. What is the frequency of RRs' involvement in interviewing candidates?					
	Very frequently	27	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	5	37	37	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	4	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	3	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	2	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Rarely	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Not answered	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	c.ii. What is the frequency of RRs' involvement in administrative arrangements related to candidates' attendance at courses?					
	Very frequently	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	5	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	4	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	3	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	2	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Rarely	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Not answered	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	d. How many hours per week involvement is required by RRs?					
	Less than 1 hour	41	41	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	1 to 2 hours	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	2 to 3 hours	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	More than 3 hours	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Other	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Not answered	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	e. Does RRs' time on INS/JVI training activities interfere with RRs' time on economic work?					
	Greatly	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	5	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	4	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	3	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	2	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Not at all	33	33	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Not answered	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 F. IMF-provided Training
 (In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(355)	(73)	(n.a.)	(189)	(93)
f. How much potential is there to reduce RRs' time on INS/JVI activities:					
f.i. via greater use of local staff?					
High potential	5	8	n.a.	4	5
5	6	5	n.a.	4	9
4	8	5	n.a.	8	8
3	8	5	n.a.	9	9
2	17	16	n.a.	17	17
Limited potential	21	52	n.a.	15	8
Not answered	35	7	n.a.	42	45
f.ii. via greater use or greater efficiency of INS/JVI staff?					
High potential	5	10	n.a.	3	3
5	10	7	n.a.	8	14
4	12	14	n.a.	13	9
3	9	10	n.a.	10	8
2	14	18	n.a.	13	14
Limited potential	11	36	n.a.	6	2
Not answered	40	7	n.a.	47	51
g. How effective overall are INS/JVI in interacting with RRs?					
Very effective	5	16	n.a.	3	1
5	18	38	n.a.	11	16
4	15	19	n.a.	16	10
3	8	11	n.a.	8	6
2	7	7	n.a.	7	8
Ineffective	2	1	n.a.	3	1
Not answered	44	7	n.a.	52	58
h. Do INS/JVI take up RRs' recommendations regarding candidates for training?					
Almost always	22	22	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	33	33	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Hardly ever	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 G. Information and Communications Technology Function
 (In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(355)	(73)	(n.a.)	(189)	(93)
Q: Regarding information and communications technology:					
a. What is the overall quality of the technology provided to RRs?					
Very high	7	16	n.a.	6	2
5	24	26	n.a.	26	19
4	17	25	n.a.	16	15
3	15	14	n.a.	16	12
2	17	11	n.a.	20	15
Very poor	4	5	n.a.	4	1
Not answered	16	3	n.a.	12	35
b. How many problems are experienced by RRs with:					
b.i. IMF-provided hardware?					
No problems	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Many problems	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b.ii. IMF-provided software?					
No problems	27	27	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	22	22	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Many problems	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	1	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b.iii. incompatible hardware and software?					
No problems	45	45	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	19	19	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Many problems	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	3	3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b.iv. local hard-wiring services?					
No problems	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Many problems	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 11. Interaction with Other IMF and Non-IMF Counterparts (continued)
 G. Information and Communications Technology Function
 (In percent)

	<u>All Departments</u>				
	Total	Resident Representatives	National Authorities	Mission Teams	Other HQ
(Total Number of Respondents)	(355)	(73)	(n.a.)	(189)	(93)
b.v. lack of adequate information/training?					
No problems	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	16	16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	25	25	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	18	18	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Many problems	5	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b.vi. lack of timely support services?					
No problems	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	21	21	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	15	15	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Many problems	11	11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	4	4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
c. Overall, how would you rate the quality of the technological "backstopping" provided to RRs by BCS and by BCS contractors such as MCI?					
Very high	2	5	n.a.	2	0
5	16	37	n.a.	11	12
4	15	16	n.a.	14	17
3	15	19	n.a.	16	12
2	15	11	n.a.	19	11
Very poor	6	7	n.a.	8	2
Not answered	30	4	n.a.	31	46
d. Overall, how well does the technology provided to RRs by the IMF compare to that provided to field representatives of other organizations?					
Very well	8	8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
5	12	12	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
4	22	22	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
3	7	7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
2	23	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Very badly	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Not answered	14	14	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.