

EB/CQuota/10/6
Supplement 1

October 19, 2010

To: Members of the Committee of the Whole on Review of Quotas
From: The Secretary
Subject: **Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Possible Elements of a
Compromise—Additional Simulations**

The attached paper provides supplementary information to the paper on the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Possible Elements of a Compromise (EB/CQuota/10/6, 10/5/10), which was discussed at the EB/CQuota meeting on October 6, 2010.

It is not intended that this paper will be published on the Fund's external website.

Questions may be referred to Mr. Krueger (ext. 36854), Ms. Bassett (ext. 34621), and Ms. Prowse (ext. 38744) in FIN.

This document will shortly be posted on the extranet, a secure website for Executive Directors and member country authorities.

Att: (1)

Other Distribution:
Department Heads

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

**Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Possible Elements of a Compromise—
Additional Simulations**

Prepared by the Finance Department

Approved by Andrew Tweedie

October 19, 2010

Contents	Page
I. Introduction	2
II. Additional Simulations	2
Tables	
1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds	5
2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection	6
A1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds—By Member	7
A2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection—By Member	13

I. INTRODUCTION

1. **This supplement presents additional illustrative simulations.** While Directors' views at the Committee of the Whole meeting on October 6 were highly preliminary, some suggested possible modifications that could help garner wider support. This supplement focuses on several suggested changes that would broadly maintain the approach set out in EB/CQuota/10/6 (10/5/10). It is hoped that the additional simulations presented below could help in on-going efforts to reach a compromise on the 14th Quota Review.

II. ADDITIONAL SIMULATIONS

2. **The simulations take Simulation 5 from EB/CQuota/10/6 as a starting point.** This simulation included the following elements:

- A doubling of quotas, with 60 percent distributed to all members on a selective basis using the quota formula, and 40 percent distributed on an ad hoc basis to a sub-set of members, primarily those under-represented using the compressed GDP blend variable.
- Under-represented advanced countries that are also under-represented using the GDP blend variable were included in the ad hoc increase but received a smaller reduction in out-of-lineness (one third of the size) than eligible EMDCs.¹ Over-represented advanced countries that are under-represented under the GDP blend also participated in the ad hoc increase but were capped at their post-second round quota share.
- Part of the ad hoc increase was allocated to protect: (i) all countries that are under-represented using the formula but not under the GDP blend variable at their post selective quota share; (ii) all over-represented countries from becoming under-represented; and (iii) all PCDR-eligible members at their post-second round quota share.
- To increase the scope for providing sizable increases for other EMDCs, a maximum of 220 percent was set on the largest individual quota increase. This maximum could be considered in the context of voluntary foregoing by eligible members.

3. **The above approach is reproduced in Simulation 7 below.** The only change is the inclusion of three additional countries (Lesotho, Solomon Islands, and Zimbabwe) in the list

¹ The ad hoc increases are allocated on the basis of a uniform reduction factor so that each eligible member's out-of-lineness—in this case relative to their share in the compressed GDP blend variable—is reduced by proportionately the same amount. Under this approach, the eligible advanced countries would receive one third of the uniform reduction factor applying to eligible EMDCs.

of members that could qualify for protection based on the IDA per capita income threshold.² While there is no formal PCDR-eligibility list (unlike the PRGT-eligibility list), eligibility is limited to PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off (US\$1,135 in 2008) or below twice IDA's cut-off for countries meeting the definition of a "small country" under the PRGT eligibility criteria. A review of the countries qualifying under these criteria confirms that two countries should also have been included: Lesotho, whose 2008 per capita income was below the US\$1,135 cut-off, and Solomon Islands, whose per capita income was below the higher cut-off applying to small countries. Zimbabwe is not PRGT-eligible because of its removal from the PRGT-eligibility list by the Executive Board in connection with its arrears to the Trust. However, its estimated per capita income was below US\$1,135 in 2008 and it lacked market access. Thus, it is likely that Zimbabwe would become PRGT-eligible once it has cleared its arrears to the PRGT Trust and the associated remedial measures are lifted.³ While its treatment for the purposes of this element of protection is still to be considered by the COW, it was thought prudent to add Zimbabwe to the list in the illustrative simulations presented below. For symmetry, Zimbabwe has also been added to the list of countries receiving individual quota share protection using the longer PRGT-eligible list.

4. Taking Simulation 7 as the starting point, the following additional suggestions are illustrated in this supplement:

- *Simulation 8—Full participation of advanced countries in the ad hoc increase.* It was suggested that all eligible countries should participate fully in the ad hoc increases if they meet the criteria of being under-represented using both the formula and the GDP blend. Relative to Simulation 1, three advanced countries (Australia, Greece, and Spain) would be eligible for larger increases under this approach.
- *Simulation 9—Dual protection at the higher of calculated quota share or GDP blend share.* It was suggested that, to be consistent with the approach of giving greater weight to the GDP blend in the ad hoc increases, protection for over-represented members should be provided at the higher of their share in the GDP blend or their calculated quota share, rather than solely the latter. Relative to Simulation 1, five countries would be covered by the double backstop, including two advanced countries (Canada and France) and three EMDCs (Argentina, Morocco, and South Africa).
- *Simulation 10—Floor on the maximum decline in quota share.* It was noted that, in the previous simulations, the quota shares of a number of over-represented countries,

² With a view to clarifying the role of the IDA income threshold, the tables below refer to this criterion (rather than the PCDR) when it is used to protect the voting share of the poorest members.

³ The Board paper on PRGT eligibility noted that Zimbabwe's per capita GNI was estimated to be well below the IDA operational cutoff and the country does not have market access; see *Eligibility to Use the Fund's Facilities for Concessional Financing* (SM/09/288, Revision 1, 1/11/10).

mainly EMDCs, would decline substantially. This simulation introduces a floor of 30 percent on the maximum decline in an individual country's quota share relative to its post second round quota share. The protection would benefit 35 countries, all EMDCs. When protection for the poorest is applied to all PRGT-eligible countries (Simulations 13–18), 23 countries would benefit from the floor (again, all EMDCs).

5. **Different combinations of the above elements could be considered.** For illustrative purposes, *Simulation 11* combines all elements of Simulations 8–10. As such, it allows for full participation of eligible advanced countries in the ad hoc increase, protects countries at the higher of their calculated quota or GDP blend share, and introduces a floor for the maximum decline in quota share.

6. **The previous elements could also be combined with voluntary foregoing by all advanced countries, building on the approach in EB/CQuota/10/6.** In that paper, staff presented an illustrative simulation showing a 1 percent haircut in the quota shares of all advanced countries. Views were expressed on both sides, and it was also stressed that any such foregoing should be voluntary. Different combinations with elements of the above simulations could be considered. For illustrative purposes, Simulation 12 takes Simulation 11 as the base and combines it, compared with the previous paper, with a slightly higher level of voluntary foregoing by all advanced countries, at 1.64 percent. This would broadly cover the cost of protection for the poorest based on the above income cutoff (it would fall short of the cost of protection using the PRGT list)⁴ and leave the US quota share unchanged from its pre-Singapore level.

7. **The results of the above simulations are summarized in Table 1.** Comparable simulations based on protection for all PRGT-eligible countries are summarized in Table 2.⁵ All these simulations meet the IMFC objectives of a shift of at least 5 percent in quota shares to dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries, except for Simulation 17 (which combines all the above elements except voluntary foregoing by advanced countries, with use of the PRGT-eligible list for protection of the poorest). The shifts from over- to under-represented countries range from 5.6–6.6 percent, while the shifts to dynamic EMDCs range from 4.9–6.1 percent. The net shifts to EMDCs as a group range from 1.8–2.8 percent.

⁴ Under this simulation, the aggregate “cost” of protection for the poorest countries is about 0.91 percentage points in terms of total quota share (1.29 percentage points for the PRGT list). The voluntary foregoing would free up about 0.96 percentage points.

⁵Results for individual member countries are presented in Tables A1 and A2.

**Table 1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 7 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 8 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 9 Simulation 7 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 10 Simulation 7 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 11 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 12 Simulation 11 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	58.2	58.5	58.5	58.2	58.6	57.7
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.8	43.8	44.1	43.8	44.1	43.4
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.4
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.4	14.7	14.4	14.4	14.5	14.3
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	41.8	41.5	41.5	41.8	41.4	42.3
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	34.6	34.3	34.3	34.6	34.2	35.1
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.4
Asia 9/	12.6	17.7	17.3	16.0	15.9	15.9	15.9	15.7	16.1
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.7	6.6	6.7
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.9
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:									
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.4	30.6	30.6	30.3	30.7	30.3
LICs (PRGT-eligible) 10/	4.4	2.6	2.4	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1
LICs (IDA threshold) 1/	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)				6.5	6.6	6.2	6.2	5.9	6.5
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				5.7	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.0	5.8
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 11/				6.0	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.1	6.1
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.2	2.0	2.0	2.3	1.8	2.8
Uniform reduction factor 12/				54.1	45.4	42.3	42.3	29.6	55.8

Source: Finance Department.

1/ Eligibility is limited to PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off (US\$1,135 in 2008) or below twice IDA's cut-off for countries meeting the definition of a "small country" under the PRGT eligibility criteria. Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively.

For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Equivalent to simulation 5 in Table 1 of EB/CQuota/10/6 (10/5/10) except for the addition of Lesotho, Solomon Islands and Zimbabwe to the list of the poorest members (see text for details).

5/ Eligible advanced countries that are under-represented under both the formula and the GDP blend receive the same reduction in out-of-lineness as EMDCs.

6/ Countries that are over-represented with respect to the formula or the GDP blend share that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are protected at their calculated quota share or their GDP blend share, whichever is greater.

7/ A country's quota share cannot fall below 70 percent of its post second round quota share.

8/ All advanced countries are assumed to accept a voluntary 1.64 percent reduction in their final quota shares.

9/ Including Korea and Singapore.

10/ Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).

11/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

12/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share.

**Table 2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 13 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 14 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 15 Simulation 13 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 16 Simulation 13 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 17 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 18 Simulation 17 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	58.2	58.4	58.5	58.2	58.6	57.6
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.8	43.8	44.1	43.8	44.1	43.4
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.4
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.4	14.6	14.4	14.4	14.5	14.3
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	41.8	41.6	41.5	41.8	41.4	42.4
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	34.6	34.4	34.3	34.6	34.2	35.1
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6
Asia 9/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.9	15.9	15.8	15.8	15.5	16.0
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.6	6.5	6.7
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.8
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.3	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:									
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.3	30.5	30.6	30.3	30.7	30.2
LICs (PRGT-eligible) 1/	4.4	2.6	2.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
LICs (IDA threshold) 10/	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)				6.3	6.3	5.9	6.0	5.6	6.2
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				5.5	5.3	5.2	5.2	4.7	5.6
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 11/				5.7	5.5	5.4	5.4	4.9	5.8
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.3	2.1	2.0	2.3	1.9	2.8
Uniform reduction factor 12/				43.5	36.5	33.2	33.5	24.9	46.0

Source: Finance Department.

1/ Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Equivalent to simulation 2 in Table 1 of EB/CQuota/10/6 (10/5/10) except that Zimbabwe is added to the list of the poorest members (see text for details).

5/ Eligible advanced countries that are under-represented under both the formula and the GDP blend receive the same reduction in out-of-lineness as EMDCs.

6/ Countries that are over-represented with respect to the formula or the GDP blend share that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are protected at their calculated quota share or their GDP blend share, whichever is greater.

7/ A country's quota share cannot fall below 70 percent of its post second round quota share.

8/ All advanced countries are assumed to accept a voluntary 1.64 percent reduction in their final quota shares.

9/ Including Korea and Singapore.

10/ PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off (US\$1,135 in 2008) or below twice IDA's cut-off for countries meeting the definition of a "small country" under the PRGT eligibility criteria. Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).

11/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

12/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share.

**Table A1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds—By Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	<u>Simulation 7</u> Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	<u>Simulation 8</u> Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	<u>Simulation 9</u> Simulation 7 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	<u>Simulation 10</u> Simulation 7 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	<u>Simulation 11</u> Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	<u>Simulation 12</u> Simulation 11 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.380
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.448
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.585
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.789	3.789	4.036	3.789	4.036	3.970
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.564	4.564	4.564	4.564	4.564	4.489
China 9/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.394	6.394	6.394	6.394	6.256	6.394
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.223	3.275	3.215	3.215	3.245	3.192
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	1.866	1.866	1.866	2.051	2.051	2.051
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.345	2.306
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.707	2.699	2.697	2.697	2.686	2.708
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.752	2.700	2.681	2.681	2.605	2.762
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.827
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.363	1.363	1.363	1.363	1.363	1.341
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.318	2.254	2.231	2.231	2.139	2.330
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.989	2.134	1.968	1.968	2.050	2.017
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.870	1.831	1.816	1.816	1.758	1.878
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.207
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.801	1.780	1.773	1.773	1.743	1.805
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.402	1.447	1.395	1.395	1.421	1.398
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.703	0.703	0.703	0.781	0.781	0.781
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.926
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.623	0.623	0.669	0.623	0.669	0.669
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.822
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.975	0.961	0.955	0.955	0.934	0.978
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.719
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.798	0.798	0.798	0.798	0.798	0.785
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.578	0.578	0.640	0.578	0.640	0.640
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.762	0.762	0.762	0.762	0.762	0.762
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.511	0.511	0.511	0.515	0.515	0.515
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.859	0.849	0.846	0.846	0.832	0.861
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.749	0.731	0.725	0.725	0.699	0.752
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.977	0.977	0.977	0.977	0.956	0.977
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.674	0.674	0.674	0.674	0.674	0.674
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.817
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.384	0.384	0.384	0.406	0.406	0.406

Table A1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 7 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 8 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 9 Simulation 7 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 10 Simulation 7 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 11 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 12 Simulation 11 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.504
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.733	0.733	0.733	0.733	0.733	0.721
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.411
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.329	0.329	0.329	0.349	0.349	0.349
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.311	0.311	0.311	0.330	0.330	0.330
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.518	0.541	0.515	0.515	0.528	0.519
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.402
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.426	0.422	0.420	0.420	0.414	0.427
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.438	0.438	0.438	0.438	0.438	0.431
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.428	0.428	0.428	0.428	0.428	0.428
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.427	0.423	0.421	0.421	0.414	0.428
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.262
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.366	0.366	0.366	0.366	0.366	0.366
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.429	0.416	0.411	0.411	0.391	0.432
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.485	0.485	0.485	0.485	0.485	0.485
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.184	0.184	0.184	0.188	0.188	0.188
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.280	0.278	0.278	0.277	0.275	0.280
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.185	0.185	0.188	0.185	0.188	0.188
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.242	0.241	0.240	0.240	0.238	0.242
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.243	0.242	0.241	0.241	0.239	0.243
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.210	0.210	0.210	0.210	0.210	0.210
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.276
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.121	0.121	0.121
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.148	0.148	0.148	0.148	0.148	0.148

Table A1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 7 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 8 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 9 Simulation 7 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 10 Simulation 7 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 11 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 12 Simulation 11 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.233	0.225	0.222	0.222	0.206	0.233
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.099	0.099	0.099
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.087	0.087	0.087	0.090	0.090	0.090
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.154	0.153	0.154
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.080	0.080	0.080
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.133
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.100	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.097	0.100
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.063	0.063	0.063
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.090	0.090	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.090
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.058
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.093	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.091	0.093
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.082	0.081	0.081	0.081	0.079	0.082
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.064

Table A1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	<u>Simulation 7</u> Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	<u>Simulation 8</u> Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	<u>Simulation 9</u> Simulation 7 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	<u>Simulation 10</u> Simulation 7 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	<u>Simulation 11</u> Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	<u>Simulation 12</u> Simulation 11 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.045	0.045	0.045
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.044	0.044	0.044
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.040	0.040	0.040
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.063	0.062	0.061	0.061	0.060	0.063
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.038	0.038	0.038
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.036	0.036	0.036
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.067
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.030
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.027	0.027	0.027
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.027	0.027	0.027
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031

Table A1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	<u>Simulation 7</u> Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	<u>Simulation 8</u> Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	<u>Simulation 9</u> Simulation 7 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	<u>Simulation 10</u> Simulation 7 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	<u>Simulation 11</u> Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	<u>Simulation 12</u> Simulation 11 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.033
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.021	0.021	0.021
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.020	0.020	0.020
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.028	0.029
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004

Table A1. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, Protection of the Poorest Based on IDA Thresholds—By Member (concluded)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 7 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 8 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 9 Simulation 7 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 10 Simulation 7 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 11 Simulation 7 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 12 Simulation 11 with foregoings based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0014	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0015	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0026	0.0026	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0044	0.0043	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0043
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0018	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0012	0.0022	0.0022	0.0022	0.0024	0.0024	0.0024
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0005	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0009	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0020	0.0020	0.0020
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0008	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0011	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0001	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ Eligibility is limited to PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing operational IDA cut-off (US\$1,135 in 2008) or below twice IDA's cut-off for countries meeting the definition of a "small country" under the PRGT eligibility criteria. Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively.

For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Equivalent to simulation 5 in Table 1 of EB/CQuota/10/6 (10/5/10) except for the addition of Lesotho, Solomon Islands and Zimbabwe to the list of the poorest members (see text for details).

5/ Eligible advanced countries that are under-represented under both the formula and the GDP blend receive the same reduction in out-of-lineness as EMDCs.

6/ Countries that are over-represented with respect to the formula or the GDP blend share that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are protected at their calculated quota share or their GDP blend share, whichever is greater.

7/ A country's quota share cannot fall below 70 percent of its post second round quota share.

8/ All advanced countries are assumed to accept a voluntary 1.64 percent reduction in their final quota shares.

9/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection—By Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 13 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 14 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 15 Simulation 13 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 16 Simulation 13 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 17 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 18 Simulation 17 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.380
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.448
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.585
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.789	3.789	4.036	3.789	4.036	3.970
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.564	4.564	4.564	4.564	4.564	4.489
China 9/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.394	6.394	6.350	6.357	6.130	6.394
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.216	3.258	3.210	3.210	3.236	3.183
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	1.866	1.866	1.866	2.051	2.051	2.051
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.345	2.306
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.698	2.692	2.689	2.689	2.682	2.700
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.688	2.647	2.627	2.628	2.577	2.704
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.827
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.363	1.363	1.363	1.363	1.363	1.341
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.240	2.189	2.164	2.167	2.104	2.259
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.970	2.087	1.952	1.953	2.025	1.992
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.822	1.790	1.775	1.776	1.737	1.834
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.207
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.776	1.759	1.751	1.752	1.732	1.782
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.396	1.433	1.390	1.391	1.413	1.390
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.703	0.703	0.703	0.781	0.781	0.781
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.926
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.623	0.623	0.669	0.623	0.669	0.669
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.822
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.957	0.946	0.940	0.940	0.926	0.962
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.719
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.798	0.798	0.798	0.798	0.798	0.785
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.578	0.578	0.640	0.578	0.640	0.640
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.762	0.762	0.762	0.762	0.762	0.762
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.847	0.840	0.836	0.836	0.826	0.850
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.727	0.713	0.706	0.707	0.690	0.732
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.977	0.977	0.973	0.974	0.933	0.977
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.674	0.674	0.674	0.674	0.674	0.674
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.817	0.817
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.384	0.384	0.384	0.406	0.406	0.406

Table A2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 13 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 14 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 15 Simulation 13 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 16 Simulation 13 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 17 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 18 Simulation 17 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.504
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.733	0.733	0.733	0.733	0.733	0.721
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.411
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.329	0.329	0.329	0.349	0.349	0.349
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.311	0.311	0.311	0.330	0.330	0.330
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.515	0.534	0.513	0.513	0.524	0.516
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.402
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.421	0.417	0.416	0.416	0.412	0.422
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.438	0.438	0.438	0.438	0.438	0.431
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.428	0.428	0.428	0.428	0.428	0.428
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.422	0.418	0.416	0.416	0.412	0.423
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.262
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.366	0.366	0.366	0.366	0.366	0.366
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.413	0.402	0.397	0.397	0.384	0.417
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.485	0.485	0.485	0.485	0.485	0.485
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.184	0.184	0.184	0.188	0.188	0.188
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.278	0.276	0.276	0.276	0.274	0.278
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.185	0.185	0.188	0.185	0.188	0.188
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.137
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.240	0.239	0.239	0.239	0.238	0.241
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.241	0.240	0.240	0.240	0.239	0.242
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.210	0.210	0.210	0.210	0.210	0.210
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.276
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.121	0.121	0.121
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.148	0.148	0.148	0.148	0.148	0.148

Table A2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 13 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 14 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 15 Simulation 13 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 16 Simulation 13 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 17 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 18 Simulation 17 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.223	0.214	0.210	0.211	0.200	0.226
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.099	0.099	0.099
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.087	0.087	0.087	0.090	0.090	0.090
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.154	0.154	0.153	0.153	0.153	0.154
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.123
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.080	0.080	0.080
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.133
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.099	0.098	0.098	0.098	0.097	0.099
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.063	0.063	0.063
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.090
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.091	0.092
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.081	0.080	0.079	0.079	0.078	0.081
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.064

Table A2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 13 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 14 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 15 Simulation 13 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 16 Simulation 13 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 17 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 18 Simulation 17 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.045	0.045	0.045
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.040	0.040	0.040
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.062	0.061	0.060	0.060	0.059	0.062
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.038	0.038	0.038
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.067
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.030
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.027	0.027	0.027
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031

Table A2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection—By Member (continued)
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 13 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 14 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 15 Simulation 13 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 16 Simulation 13 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 17 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 18 Simulation 17 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.033
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.021	0.021	0.021
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.020	0.020	0.020
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.029	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.029
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004

**Table A2. Illustrative Quota Simulations—100 Percent Increase, 0/60/40 Allocation, PRGT Protection—By Member (concluded)
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Simulation 13 Full CQS protection; partial ad hoc participation for advanced countries; maximum individual increase 4/	Simulation 14 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries 5/	Simulation 15 Simulation 13 with dual (CQS and GDP blend share) protection 6/	Simulation 16 Simulation 13 with a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share 7/	Simulation 17 Simulation 13 with full ad hoc participation for advanced countries, dual protection, and a limit on the maximum decrease in quota share	Simulation 18 Simulation 17 with foregoing based on a common percentage reduction for advanced countries 8/
Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0014	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0015	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0026	0.0026	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0044	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042	0.0042
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0018	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0012	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0005	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0009	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0008	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0011	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0001	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ Zimbabwe is included (see text for details).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively.

For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Equivalent to simulation 2 in Table 1 of EB/CQuota/10/6 (10/5/10) except that Zimbabwe is added to the list of the poorest members (see text for details).

5/ Eligible advanced countries that are under-represented under both the formula and the GDP blend receive the same reduction in out-of-liness as EMDCs.

6/ Countries that are over-represented with respect to the formula or the GDP blend share that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are protected at their calculated quota share or their GDP blend share, whichever is greater.

7/ A country's quota share cannot fall below 70 percent of its post second round quota share.

8/ All advanced countries are assumed to accept a voluntary 1.64 percent reduction in their final quota shares.

7/ All advanced countries receive a 1.64 percent reduction in their final quota shares.

8/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.