

**FOR  
AGENDA**

EBS/10/168

September 3, 2010

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To: Members of the Executive Board

From: The Secretary

Subject: **World Economic Outlook—Executive Summary and Chapters 1 and 2**

Attached for consideration by Executive Directors is a paper on global and regional economic prospects and policy issues, Chapters 1 and 2 of the October 2010 World Economic Outlook, together with an Executive Summary, which is tentatively scheduled for discussion on **Monday, September 20, 2010**. Chapters 3 and 4 of the WEO have already been sent to the Board (EBS/10/163, 8/27/10).

Questions may be referred to Mr. Decressin (ext. 37140), Ms. Koeva Brooks (ext. 39809), and Ms. Duttagupta (ext. 38583) in RES.

As is the usual practice, it is intended to publish the full set of World Economic Outlook documents. It is planned that Chapters 1 and 2 will be made available to the public on the IMF website slightly in advance of the publication of the full document, which will as usual be released at the World Economic Outlook press conference on October 6, shortly before the IMFC meeting. The paper will be revised for publication in light of the Executive Board discussion. If Executive Directors have additional comments, they should notify Mr. Decressin by the **close of business on September 21, 2010**.

This document will be posted on the secure page of the extranet website for Executive Directors and member country authorities. It would be appreciated if Directors could ensure that the World Economic Outlook documents are treated as **Strictly Confidential** until they are published on October 6.

Att (1)



INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

**World Economic Outlook—Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing**

Prepared by the Staff

Approved by Olivier Blanchard

September 2, 2010

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## Executive Summary

*Thus far, economic recovery is proceeding broadly as expected, but downside risks remain elevated. Most advanced economies and a few emerging economies are still facing large adjustments. Their recoveries are proceeding at a sluggish pace, and high unemployment poses major social challenges. By contrast, many emerging and developing economies are again seeing strong growth, because they did not experience major financial excesses just prior to the Great Recession. Sustained, healthy recovery rests on two rebalancing acts: internal rebalancing, with a strengthening of private demand in advanced economies, allowing for fiscal consolidation; and external rebalancing, with an increase in net exports in deficit countries, such as the United States, and a decrease in net exports in surplus countries, notably emerging Asia. The two interact in strong ways. Increased net exports in advanced economies imply higher demand and higher growth, allowing more room for fiscal consolidation. Strengthened domestic demand helps emerging market economies maintain growth in the face of lower exports. A number of policies are required to support these rebalancing acts. In advanced economies, the repair and reform of the financial sector needs to accelerate to allow a resumption of healthy credit growth. Also, fiscal adjustment needs to start in earnest in 2011. Specific plans to cut budget deficits in the future are urgently needed now to create new room for fiscal policy maneuver. If global growth threatens to slow appreciably more than expected, countries with fiscal room could postpone some of the planned consolidation. Meanwhile, key emerging economies will need to further develop domestic sources of growth, with the support of greater exchange rate flexibility.*

Economic recovery continued to strengthen during the first half of 2010. Global activity expanded at an annual rate of about 5 percent—about  $\frac{3}{4}$  percent higher than anticipated in the April *World Economic Outlook* (WEO) or  $\frac{1}{4}$  percent higher than in the July 2010 *WEO Update*. A surge in inventory and, lately, fixed investment accounted for a dramatic rise in manufacturing and global trade. Low consumer confidence and reduced household incomes and wealth are holding consumption down in many advanced economies. Growth in these economies reached only about  $3\frac{1}{4}$  percent during the first half of 2010, a low rate considering that they are emerging from the deepest recession since World War II. Their recoveries will remain fragile for as long as improving business investment does not translate into higher employment growth. However, household spending is doing well in many emerging market economies, which expanded by about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  percent and where investment is propelling job creation. This heterogeneity in the pace of recovery across advanced and emerging economies is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

At the same time, financial stability suffered a major setback. As explained in the accompanying October 2010 *Global Financial Stability Report* (GFSR), market volatility increased and investor confidence dropped. Prices in many stock exchanges fell, led initially by financial stocks and by European markets. Heavy selling of the sovereign debt of vulnerable euro area economies rattled the banking system, triggering a systemic crisis. This added to existing worries about the sustainability of the recovery and caused a broader

decline in stocks. Risk premiums on corporate bonds widened, and corporate bond issues slowed to a trickle in May. Issuance in emerging markets also dropped sharply. Since the beginning of the summer, however, financial conditions have improved again. Tail risks have been reduced by unprecedented European policy initiatives—the European Central Bank’s Securities Markets Program and euro area governments’ European Stabilization Mechanism—and by a frontloading of fiscal adjustment. However, underlying sovereign and banking vulnerabilities remain a significant challenge amid lingering concerns about risks to the global recovery.

The global recovery remains fragile because strong policies to foster internal rebalancing of demand from public to private sources and external rebalancing from deficit to surplus economies are not yet in place. Global activity is forecast to expand by 4–4½ percent through 2011, broadly in line with earlier expectations, and downside risks continue to predominate. WEO projections are that output of emerging and developing economies will expand at rates of 6½–7 percent. In advanced economies, however, growth is projected at only 2½ percent, with some economies slowing noticeably during the second half of 2010 and the first half of 2011, followed by a reacceleration of activity. Slack will remain substantial and unemployment persistently high. Inflation is projected to stay generally low, amid continued excess capacity and high unemployment, with a few exceptions among the emerging economies. Risks to the growth forecasts are mainly to the downside. However, the probability of a sharp global slowdown, including stagnation or contraction in advanced economies, still appears low.

Policies need to become more proactive to achieve the required internal and external rebalancing. Most advanced economies and a few emerging economies still face major adjustments, including strengthening household balance sheets, stabilizing and subsequently reducing high public debt, and repairing and reforming their financial sectors. Monetary policy should stay highly supportive in most of the advanced economies and should be the first line of defense against any larger-than-projected weakening of activity as fiscal support diminishes. With policy rates already near zero in the large advanced economies, monetary policymakers may have to resort to further unconventional measures if private demand weakens unexpectedly as fiscal support wanes.

Fiscal adjustment needs to start in 2011. If global growth threatens to slow appreciably more than expected, some of the planned consolidation could be postponed. One of the most urgent challenges for advanced economies is to legislate plans that help achieve sustainable fiscal positions before the end of the decade. This task is now more pressing than it was six months ago to rebuild room for fiscal policy maneuver in the face of still volatile sovereign debt markets. Such room could be needed because monetary policy alone might not be able to provide sufficient support to counter a threat for a markedly more pronounced-than-expected weakening of activity.

Fiscal policy tightening will likely prove contractionary in most economies, although the extent is difficult to gauge. The survey of past experience in Chapter 3 suggests that fiscal consolidation in advanced economies typically detracts from short-term growth. The introduction of credible, growth-friendly, medium-term fiscal consolidation plans—presently not on offer in many advanced economies—would help limit the deflationary impact of consolidation on private demand in the short term. Such plans would have to include reforms to rapidly growing spending programs, notably entitlements, and tax reforms that favor production rather than consumption.

Better financial sector policies and practices in advanced economies are critical for strengthening the resilience of the recovery to shocks and sustaining private demand over the medium term. Progress on this front has been very slow. Apparently isolated difficulties in a few spots can have large spillover effects, via complex financial linkages and deterioration of fragile confidence. As the October 2010 GFSR explains, insufficient progress in addressing the legacy problems of the crisis has left systems in advanced economies vulnerable. Failure to rapidly resolve, restructure, or consolidate weak banks and repair wholesale markets raises the need for further fiscal backstopping and low interest rates to support recovery, which can cause other problems, including spillovers to emerging economies. More broadly, greater clarity on the details and timing of the full range of regulatory reforms is urgently needed. This would help financial markets and institutions provide more support, on a sounder basis, for consumption and investment, which is essential for strong, sustainable growth.

Structural policies that strengthen growth over the medium term would also help support the required normalization of macroeconomic policies in advanced economies. In a number of economies, labor market policies could enhance growth and job creation and reduce high unemployment over the medium term. Complementary reforms to product and services markets could strengthen the employment effects by boosting labor demand and real wages through greater competition and lower markups on prices.

Although many emerging economies are seeing high growth again, they continue to rely significantly on demand from advanced economies. Chapter 4 makes clear that demand for imports from the advanced economies will continue to be below precrisis trends, in view of the high share of consumer durables and investment goods in trade. Emerging economies that relied heavily on demand from these economies will therefore have to rebalance growth further toward domestic sources to achieve growth rates similar to those before the crisis, helping the required external rebalancing. In economies with excessive external surpluses, which are mainly in emerging Asia, fiscal tightening should therefore take a backseat to monetary tightening and exchange rate flexibility. Removing distortions that drive high household or corporate saving rates and deter investment in nontradable sectors would facilitate the rebalancing of growth to domestic sources. Such rebalancing will require further deregulation and reform of financial sectors and corporate governance, as well as stronger social safety nets in key Asian economies. In many other emerging economies, fiscal tightening can start immediately, because domestic demand recovery is already well under

way or public debt is relatively high. In various emerging economies, rising inflation or high credit growth also signal a need for further monetary tightening.

Many emerging and developing economies have successfully concluded first-generation reforms that improved macroeconomic policy frameworks, strengthening their resilience to macroeconomic shocks. However, to sustain or further raise potential growth and employment, efforts could usefully focus on simplifying product and services market regulation, raising human capital, and building critical infrastructure. Such reforms would also help absorb growing capital inflows in a productive manner, which would accelerate global income convergence and external rebalancing. As Chapter 1 and the October 2010 GFSR underscore, these flows can be expected to grow over the medium term, as the performance of emerging economies improves relative to that of the advanced economies, yields in the advanced economies remain low for some time, and institutional investors in advanced economies continue to diversify their exposures.

Strong policy responses by all are essential to limit the fallout of the Great Recession. Historical evidence suggests that, in general, countries hit by financial crises typically suffer permanent output losses relative to precrisis trends. However, the outcome after individual crises has varied widely, depending largely on the policy responses. Much progress has been made through policy coordination in alleviating liquidity strains and rebuilding confidence. The challenge ahead is for policymakers to put in place adjustments of a more fundamental nature in a coordinated manner.

## I. GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES

*Thus far, economic recovery is proceeding broadly as expected, although downside risks remain elevated. Advanced and selected emerging economies still face major adjustments, including strengthening household balance sheets, stabilizing and subsequently reducing high public debt, and repairing and reforming their financial sectors. In many of these economies, the financial sector is still vulnerable to shocks, and growth appears to be slowing as policy stimulus wanes. By contrast, in emerging and developing economies prudent policies, implemented partly in response to earlier crises, have contributed to a significantly improved medium-term growth outlook than during the aftermath of previous global recessions. However, activity in these economies remains dependent on demand in advanced economies, particularly in emerging Asia. In this setting, global activity is forecast to expand by 4–4½ percent through 2011, with a temporary slowdown during the second half of 2010 and the first half of 2011. Output of emerging and developing economies is projected to expand at rates of 6½–7 percent. In advanced economies, however, growth is projected at only 2½ percent, implying continued substantial slack. Risks to the forecast are mainly to the downside. Sustained, healthy recovery rests on two rebalancing acts: internal rebalancing, with a strengthening of private demand in advanced economies, allowing for fiscal consolidation; and external rebalancing, with an increase in net exports in deficit countries and a decrease in net exports in surplus countries, notably emerging Asia. The two interact in strong ways. Increased net exports in advanced economies imply higher demand and higher growth, allowing more room for fiscal consolidation. A number of policies are required to support these rebalancing acts. In advanced economies, the repair and reform of the financial sector needs to accelerate to allow a resumption of healthy credit growth. Also, fiscal adjustment needs to start in earnest in 2011. Specific plans to cut budget deficits in the future are urgently needed to create new room for fiscal policy maneuver. If global growth threatens to slow appreciably more than expected, countries with fiscal space could postpone some of the planned consolidation. Meanwhile, key emerging economies will need to further develop domestic sources of growth, with the support of greater exchange rate flexibility.*

### **STRONGER ACTIVITY BUT SETBACKS TO FINANCIAL STABILITY**

Economic recovery continued to strengthen during the first half of 2010, but global financial stability suffered a major setback with the turmoil in sovereign debt markets in the second quarter of 2010. The extent of economic recovery differs importantly across regions, with Asia in the lead. The United States and Japan experienced a noticeable slowdown during the second quarter of 2010, while growth accelerated in Europe and stayed strong in emerging and developing economies. Financial conditions have begun to normalize, but institutions and markets are still fragile. In general, volatility in financial, currency, and commodities markets remains elevated.

## Growing Momentum through the First Half of 2010

The world economy expanded at an annual rate of about 5 percent during the first half of 2010—about  $\frac{3}{4}$  percent higher than anticipated in the April *World Economic Outlook* (WEO) or  $\frac{1}{4}$  percent higher than in the July 2010 *WEO Update* (Table 1.1). World industrial production reached growth rates of about 15 percent, and global trade recovered at rates over 40 percent during this period (Figure 1.1). A surge in inventory and, lately, fixed investment accounts for this dramatic rise—with the latter in particular boding well for continued recovery. Manufacturing confidence indices are back to precrisis levels, and employment in advanced economies is expanding moderately. Household spending is doing well in emerging market economies, but in advanced economies low consumer confidence, high unemployment, sluggish incomes, and reduced household wealth are holding consumption down. Chapter 2 discusses regional developments in more detail.

Growth in advanced economies reached about  $3\frac{1}{4}$  percent during the first half of 2010. This is low, considering that these economies are emerging from the deepest recession since World War II. Three groups can be distinguished (Figure 1.2):

- The economies of advanced Asia, other than Japan, have enjoyed a strong rebound. Their large manufacturing sectors have benefitted from the global rebound in trade. As a result, their output is already above precrisis levels.
- The United States is close to precrisis levels of output but far below precrisis trends, and activity slowed noticeably in the second quarter of 2010. Consumption has been growing since the third quarter of 2009, but at low rates considering the depth of the retrenchment. At the same time, investment in business equipment and software has been rising strongly lately, helped by foreign demand, rebounding profits, and normalizing financial conditions. However, this has not yet triggered a sustained, solid recovery in employment.
- Japan and the euro area are still appreciably below precrisis levels of output and remain dependent on foreign demand. In Japan, fiscal stimulus and the rebound in global trade and strong demand elsewhere in Asia have boosted output growth since the fourth quarter of 2009, but activity weakened significantly in the second quarter of 2010. In the euro area, led by Germany, activity showed significant strength only in the second quarter of this year, following a bad winter. The area's dependence on bank credit is restraining demand, as banks continue to be unusually cautious in lending. However, the depreciation of the euro from previous highs is beginning to support the euro area tradable goods sector and fixed investment is staging a modest comeback.

Emerging economies expanded by about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  percent during the first half of the year. As in advanced economies, there is significant heterogeneity both across and within regions,

Table 1.1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections

(Percent change unless noted otherwise)

	Year over Year						Q4 over Q4		
	2008	2009	Projections		Difference from July 2010 WEO Projections		Estimates		
			2010	2011	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
<b>World Output 1/</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>4.4</b>
<b>Advanced Economies</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>-3.2</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>-0.2</b>	<b>-0.4</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.6</b>
United States	0.0	-2.6	2.9	2.5	-0.4	-0.4	0.2	2.7	2.7
Euro Area	0.6	-4.1	1.1	1.3	0.1	0.0	-2.1	1.3	1.5
Germany	1.2	-4.9	1.6	1.6	0.2	0.0	-2.2	1.6	1.7
France	0.1	-2.5	1.5	1.6	0.1	0.0	-0.5	1.5	1.6
Italy	-1.3	-5.0	0.9	1.0	0.0	-0.1	-2.8	1.1	1.2
Spain	0.9	-3.6	-0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	-3.1	-0.1	1.1
Japan	-1.2	-5.2	2.9	1.8	0.5	0.0	-1.4	1.7	2.8
United Kingdom	-0.1	-4.9	1.6	2.1	0.4	0.0	-2.9	2.6	1.9
Canada	0.5	-2.5	3.3	2.8	-0.3	0.0	-1.1	3.5	2.9
Other Advanced Economies	1.7	-1.1	5.0	3.6	0.4	-0.1	3.2	3.8	4.7
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies	1.8	-0.9	7.5	4.5	0.8	-0.2	6.1	4.8	6.5
<b>Emerging and Developing Economies 2/</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.9</b>
Central and Eastern Europe	3.1	-3.6	3.1	3.2	-0.1	-0.2	2.0	1.8	4.4
Commonwealth of Independent States	5.5	-6.5	4.5	4.5	0.2	0.2	-3.9	3.8	4.5
Russia	5.6	-7.9	4.3	4.3	0.0	0.2	-3.8	3.6	4.5
Excluding Russia	5.4	-3.2	5.0	5.0	0.6	0.3	...	...	...
Developing Asia	7.7	6.9	9.3	8.4	0.1	-0.1	9.5	9.1	8.6
China	9.6	9.1	10.5	9.6	0.0	0.0	11.4	9.9	9.6
India	6.4	5.7	9.4	8.4	0.0	0.0	7.3	10.3	8.0
ASEAN-5 3/	4.7	1.7	6.5	5.4	0.1	-0.1	5.1	5.2	6.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	4.3	-1.7	5.1	4.0	0.3	0.0	1.4	4.2	4.3
Brazil	5.1	-0.2	7.1	4.2	0.0	0.0	4.4	5.3	4.3
Mexico	1.5	-6.5	4.5	4.4	0.0	0.0	-2.4	3.5	4.3
Middle East and North Africa	5.0	2.1	4.1	5.1	-0.4	0.2	...	...	...
Sub-Saharan Africa	5.5	2.3	4.9	5.8	-0.1	-0.1	...	...	...
<i>Memorandum</i>									
European Union	0.8	-4.1	1.2	1.6	0.2	0.0	-2.1	1.6	1.6
World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates	1.6	-2.1	3.6	3.3	0.0	-0.1	...	...	...
<b>World Trade Volume (goods and services)</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>-11.1</b>	<b>10.2</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>0.2</b>	...	...	...
Imports									
Advanced Economies	0.6	-12.8	8.4	5.0	1.2	0.4	...	...	...
Emerging and Developing Economies	9.0	-8.3	14.0	9.4	1.5	0.1	...	...	...
Exports									
Advanced Economies	1.9	-12.5	9.5	5.2	1.3	0.2	...	...	...
Emerging and Developing Economies	4.5	-7.7	11.5	8.9	1.0	-0.1	...	...	...
<b>Commodity Prices (U.S. dollars)</b>									
Oil 4/	36.4	-36.3	24.9	3.7	3.1	0.7	...	...	...
Nonfuel (average based on world commodity export weights)	7.5	-18.7	14.3	-1.3	-1.2	0.1	...	...	...
<b>Consumer Prices</b>									
Advanced Economies	3.4	0.1	1.3	1.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.8	1.0	1.5
Emerging and Developing Economies 2/	9.2	5.2	6.2	4.9	-0.1	-0.1	4.8	6.0	4.0
<b>London Interbank Offered Rate (percent) 5/</b>									
On U.S. Dollar Deposits	3.0	1.1	0.6	0.9	0.0	0.0	...	...	...
On Euro Deposits	4.6	1.2	0.9	1.3	0.1	0.1	...	...	...
On Japanese Yen Deposits	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.1	-0.2	...	...	...

Note: Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during June 25–July 23, 2010. Country weights used to construct aggregate growth rates for groups of economies were revised. When economies are not listed alphabetically, they are ordered on the basis of economic size. The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.

1/ The quarterly estimates and projections account for 90 percent of the world purchasing-power-parity weights.

2/ The quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 79 percent of the emerging and developing economies.


3/ Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

4/ Simple average of prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil. The average price of oil in U.S. dollars a barrel was \$61.78 in 2009; the assumed price based on future markets is \$77.14 in 2010 and \$80.000 in 2011.

5/ Six-month rate for the United States and Japan. Three-month rate for the Euro Area.

**Figure 1.1. Current and Forward-Looking Indicators<sup>1</sup>**  
*(Annualized percent change of three-month moving average over previous three-month moving average unless noted otherwise)*

World trade and industrial production have continued to rebound, and employment has begun to grow again in advanced economies. Retail sales have recovered. They are buoyant in emerging economies but lagging in advanced economies, reflecting still-low consumer confidence. Recently, manufacturing confidence has receded, but it remains consistent with further expansion.



Sources: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis for CPB trade volume index; for all others, Haver Analytics and NTC Economics; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Not all economies are included in the regional aggregations. For some economies, monthly data are interpolated from quarterly series.

<sup>2</sup>In SDR terms.


<sup>3</sup>Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.

<sup>4</sup>Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, and United States.


<sup>5</sup>Japan's consumer confidence data are based on a diffusion index, where values greater than 50 indicate improving confidence.

**Figure 1.2. Global Indicators<sup>1</sup>**  
*(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)*

Private consumption has recovered impressively in emerging economies but is lagging in advanced economies. However, investment excluding construction has staged a rebound in advanced economies, suggesting medium- rather than short-term considerations are increasingly driving activity. This bodes well for employment and consumption in the future. In the meantime, output in many advanced economies is still around or below precrisis levels. Commodity prices have recovered. Recent wheat price hikes are not representative of broader developments in food prices.



**Output since Trough for Highly Synchronized Recessions**  
 (Index; quarters from trough on x-axis)



Source: IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>Shaded areas indicate IMF staff projections. Aggregates are computed on the basis of purchasing-power-parity (PPP) weights unless noted otherwise.

<sup>2</sup>PPP-weighted averages of metal products and machinery for euro area, plants and equipment for Japan, plants and machinery for the United Kingdom, and equipment and software for the United States.

<sup>3</sup>US/EU/Jp/OAAE: United States/euro area/Japan/other advanced Asian economies; EAS: emerging Asia; LA: Latin America; CEE and CIS: central and eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States; AFR and ME: Africa and Middle East.

<sup>4</sup>Simple average of spot prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil.

with Asia and Latin American economies in the lead. In both regions, fixed investment has expanded vigorously, just as inventory rebuilding has slowed and policy stimulus has waned. This is a sign that medium-term factors are overtaking short-term factors in the recovery.

- Growth in emerging Asia reached 9½ percent, as robust domestic demand spread from China, India, and Indonesia to other Asian economies. In China, major fiscal stimulus, a large expansion of credit, and a number of specific measures to boost household incomes and consumption increased domestic demand growth to close to 13 percent in 2009, contributing to a large decline in the current account surplus. The recovery is now well established, and a transition from public stimulus to private-sector-led growth is underway.
- Latin America has also recovered strongly, with real GDP growth at about 5¾ percent. The recovery is led by Brazil, where real GDP growth has been running close to 10 percent since the third quarter of 2009 and the economy is now showing signs of overheating. A number of other economies have also returned to solid growth. However, Mexico is lagging, partly because of its strong trade linkages with the United States. Growth in Mexico recently picked up on the back of strengthening exports to the United States, but the output gap remains large.
- Many developing economies were less affected by the global recession and now seem to be sharing in the pickup in world trade, and estimates for growth in 2010 are generally encouraging. Available data for African and Middle Eastern economies point to robust growth. By contrast, economies that were particularly hard hit by the crisis are struggling to return to sustained growth, including in many parts of emerging Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, where the recovery remains much more subdued. .

Unemployment in advanced economies has receded only modestly from peak rates. Estimates are that more than 200 million people across the globe are unemployed, an increase of more than 20 million since 2007. Three-fourths of the increase has occurred in the advanced economies with the remainder in emerging market economies. In the United States, the duration of unemployment is at record lengths, and recent payroll data point to a slowdown in employment growth in the second quarter. In the euro area, the labor market shows continued resiliency in Germany, considering the depth of the recession, but in Spain unemployment has risen further from already high levels, as a result of labor market rigidities and the collapse of the construction sector. In emerging economies unemployment has broadly declined in parallel with strengthening recoveries, with a few exceptions (e.g., South Africa).

## Setbacks to Financial Stability

Financial stability suffered a major setback during the first half of the year. As explained in the accompanying October 2010 *Global Financial Stability Report* (GFSR), market volatility increased and risk appetite declined when heavy selling of the sovereign debt of vulnerable euro area economies rattled banking systems and triggered a systemic crisis as funding stress spread to banks and sovereigns. This added to existing worries about the sustainability of the recovery and caused a broader decline in stocks. Prices in many stock exchanges fell by 10–15 percent (Figure 1.3). Initially, the fall was led by financial stocks and by European markets. Risk premiums on corporate bonds widened (Figure 1.4), and corporate bond issues slowed to a trickle in May. Issuance in emerging markets also dropped sharply (Figure 1.5).

The second-quarter sovereign debt turmoil posed a threat to the recovery. There were only limited propagation effects on sovereign borrowers beyond the vulnerable euro area countries, in part due to a “flight to safety” in major markets (Figure 1.6). Nonetheless, there were small and brief increases in the spreads of euro area countries whose creditworthiness is typically considered on par with that of Germany, and this underscores the uncertainty of the environment for all sovereign issuers. Correlation analysis (beyond that shown in Figure 1.6) suggests the behavior of sovereign risk premiums during May-June is significantly explained by the interaction between high external net liabilities/deficits on the one hand and high public debt/deficits on the other. Simultaneously addressing both budgetary and competitiveness problems in a deteriorating external environment is likely to take a heavy toll on growth, which may help explain why some euro area banking systems came under particular strain.


## Signs of Normalization, But Important Vulnerabilities Remain

In recent months, financial conditions have been easing again. Tail risks have been reduced by unprecedented European policy initiatives—the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Securities Markets Program (SMP) and euro area governments’ European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM)—and by a frontloading of fiscal adjustment in response to market pressures. However, underlying sovereign and banking vulnerabilities remain a significant challenge amid lingering concerns about risks to the global recovery.

- Sovereign bond auctions in the euro area have successfully rolled over substantial maturities, albeit at higher costs. But concerns about rollover failures remain elevated.
- After declining sharply in May, there was some recovery in both advanced economy nonfinancial corporate and emerging market sovereign and corporate bond issuance in June and July.

**Figure 1.3. Recent Financial Market Developments**


Equity markets have surrendered part of their large 2009 gains, and volatility spiked during the first quarter. Losses were led by financial stocks in Europe. However, as concerns about sustainability of the recovery grew, losses broadened to other regions and sectors, particularly to companies producing discretionary consumer products. Commodity prices generally retreated, but gold prices shot up, driven by rising investor risk aversion.



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Thomson Datastream; and IMF staff calculations.  
<sup>1</sup>October 2009–July 2010.  
<sup>2</sup>CDS= credit default swap spreads.  
<sup>3</sup>Simple average of spot prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai Fateh, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil.

**Figure 1.4. Developments in Mature Credit Markets**


Funding strains in advanced economy banking markets reappeared, but tensions remained much lower than one year earlier. Bond yields for Germany, Japan, and the United States declined amid investor flight to safe havens and rising concerns about the sustainability of the recovery. However, yields in vulnerable euro area countries rose because of concerns about high public and external deficits and debt. Notwithstanding the turbulence, bank lending conditions in major economies continued to normalize. Corporate spreads widened somewhat, and issuance briefly dried up.



Sources: Bank of America/Merrill Lynch; Bank of Japan; Bloomberg Financial Markets; European Central Bank; Federal Reserve Board of Governors; and IMF staff calculations.  
<sup>1</sup>Three-month London interbank offered rate minus three-month government bill rate.  
<sup>2</sup>Ten-year government bonds.  
<sup>3</sup>Percent of respondents describing lending standards as tightening "considerably" or "somewhat" minus those indicating standards as easing "considerably" or "somewhat" over the previous three months. Survey of changes to credit standards for loans or lines of credit to enterprises for the euro area; average of surveys on changes in credit standards for commercial/industrial and commercial real estate lending for the United States; diffusion index of "accommodative" minus "severe," Tankan survey of lending attitude of financial institutions for Japan.

Figure 1.5. Emerging Market Conditions

Equity markets in emerging economies also surrendered a small part of earlier gains during the turbulent months of May and June. Spreads widened moderately and issuance fell. However, local bank credit markets continue to recover, with emerging Europe lagging. China has slowed very high credit growth rates to address growing macroprudential concerns.



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Capital Data; IMF, *International Financial Statistics*; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>JPMorgan EMBI Global Index spread.


<sup>2</sup>JPMorgan CBMBI Broad Index spread.

<sup>3</sup>Total of equity, syndicated loans, and international bond issues.

<sup>4</sup>Annualized percent change of three-month moving average over previous three-month moving average.

Figure 1.6. Public Sector Financing<sup>1</sup>

Public sector financing needs are very large in many economies. However, demand for sovereign debt has remained strong because of high risk aversion. Accordingly, long-term government bond rates of most advanced economies have declined since March 2010 as concerns about the recovery rose. Also, even during the most turbulent times in June, only a few governments experienced a major widening of spreads. In the euro area, widening spreads correlate negatively with strong current account or fiscal balances.



Source: IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>AUS Australia; AUT Austria; BEL Belgium; CAN Canada; CZE Czech Republic; DNK Denmark; FIN Finland; FRA France; DEU Germany; GRC Greece; HKG Hong Kong SAR; ISL Iceland; IRL Ireland; ISR Israel; ITA Italy; JPN Japan; KOR Korea; NLD Netherlands; NZL New Zealand; NOR Norway; PRT Portugal; SGP Singapore; SVK Slovak Republic; SVN Slovenia; ESP Spain; SWE Sweden; TWN Taiwan Province of China; GBR United Kingdom; USA United States.

<sup>2</sup>Gross financing need is the sum of maturing government debt and fiscal deficit.

The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) stress test exercise was generally welcomed by markets for improving disclosure. Following the tests, credit default swap (CDS) spreads on euro area bank bonds declined; bank stocks recovered; and several banks successfully tapped bond markets. However, significant tiering in interbank markets and still-heavy reliance by many banks on ECB financing suggest that major policy challenges remain to be addressed.

The recovery has helped improve the health of the banking system. According to the October 2010 GFSR, total bank writedowns and loan provisions between 2007 and 2010 are \$2.2 trillion, down from the April 2010 estimate of \$2.3 trillion, mainly because of an 11 percent drop in securities losses. Banks have made further progress in realizing these writedowns, with more than three quarters already reported, leaving a residual amount of approximately \$550 billion. Also, the average Tier 1 capital ratio in the global banking system rose to more than 10 percent at end-2009, although this largely reflects government recapitalization, given that less than half the capital raised was from market sources.

Overall, however, heightened economic uncertainty, continued deleveraging, and sovereign spillovers imply that core banking systems remain vulnerable to confidence shocks and are heavily reliant on government or central bank support. As discussed further below, banks face major refinancing requirements in wholesale markets that are still in disrepair. This poses particular challenges for euro area banks because of their high reliance on wholesale funding markets.<sup>1</sup> As noted in the October 2010 GFSR, the financial system remains vulnerable to downside risks because capital and liquidity buffers are insufficient to support market confidence under renewed stress.

### **Volatile Currencies and Commodity Prices**

Financial turbulence led to sharp currency movements in the first half of 2010 (Figure 1.7). The euro depreciated by about 15 percent in real effective terms, although it has partially recovered and is currently trading at a level broadly in line with medium-term fundamentals, according to IMF staff estimates. The U.S. dollar appreciated in real effective terms as risk aversion rose during May-June, but it has since returned to levels seen earlier in the year, on the strong side of medium-run fundamentals. The yen weakened briefly in April but has been appreciating since and now stands more than 25 percent above 2007 levels, broadly in line with medium-term fundamentals. With a few exceptions, emerging Asian currencies, including the Chinese renminbi, appreciated modestly in real effective terms. However, many remain undervalued relative to medium-term fundamentals.

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 1 of the October 2010 GFSR for further discussion.

Commodity prices surrendered some of the strong gains realized during the initial phase of the recovery (Figures 1.2 and 1.3). These early gains reflected a combination of strong demand in emerging economies and, considering the phase of the cycle, low inventories for some commodities (Appendix 1.1). Precious metals, however, continued to soar during the turbulence, amid heavy buying by risk-averse investors. Furthermore, the weather-related downgrades in harvest expectations for some major exporters have recently pushed up wheat prices. Although the market for wheat remains appreciably less tight than during the price spikes of 2007–08 and other food and agricultural input prices (e.g., fertilizer) have not risen much, policymakers may have to take action to protect the poor against sharp price increases in major food staples such as wheat.


### QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PACE OF RECOVERY

Thus far, economic recovery is proceeding more or less as expected. Sustained, healthy recovery rests on two rebalancing acts: internal rebalancing, with a strengthening of private demand in advanced economies, allowing for fiscal consolidation; and external rebalancing, with an increase in net exports in deficit economies, such as the United States, and a decrease in net exports in surplus economies, notably emerging Asia. The two interact in strong ways. Increases in net exports in advanced economies imply higher demand and higher growth, creating more room for fiscal consolidation. In the short term, high uncertainty in financial markets; weak real estate markets, household balance sheets, and incomes; and slowing

**Figure 1.7. External Developments**

(Index, 2000=100; three-month moving average unless noted otherwise)

The euro exchange rate depreciated significantly during May–June 2010, while those of the currencies of China, Japan, and the United States appreciated. More generally, the currencies of many emerging economies appreciated noticeably from troughs recorded during the crisis. Many emerging economies, notably in Asia, are building up international reserves. This slows the rebalancing of global demand.



Sources: IMF, *International Financial Statistics*; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Republic of Yemen.

<sup>2</sup>Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

<sup>3</sup>Asia excluding China.

<sup>4</sup>Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Turkey.

<sup>5</sup>Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

inventory rebuilding will restrain the transition from publicly to privately led recovery in advanced economies. Domestic demand in most emerging economies is expected to be robust in comparison with the recoveries following past global recessions, as a result of improved fundamentals. Over the medium term, however, domestic demand is unlikely to be strong enough to offset weaker demand in advanced economies, and therefore global demand rebalancing is projected to stall. At the same time, unless financial and structural policies are significantly strengthened, potential output in advanced economies is likely to remain appreciably below precrisis trends. Together, these developments portend a slow and sluggish recovery broadly in line with earlier WEO projections, that is vulnerable to downside risks.

### **Questions about Near-Term Prospects**

The momentum of the global recovery appears to be slowing in the third quarter in both advanced and emerging economies. The IMF staff's momentum tracker does, however, indicate that growth remains above potential in many places (Figure 1.8 and Appendix 1.2). This reflects exceptionally strong growth in manufacturing and trade during the past year. A key question is how the recovery will evolve during the remainder of 2010 and 2011. On the downside, the inventory rebound can be expected to slow, fiscal policy stimulus is being withdrawn, and there are ongoing uncertainties in financial markets. Taken together with the positive factors that are also in the pipeline, the recovery is likely to slow in the near term, to reaccelerate during 2011, but in advanced economies, to stay sluggish by past standards. Moreover, the recovery remains vulnerable to shocks, and downside risks predominate.


### ***Forces driving the near-term recovery***

Robust growth in many emerging market economies will pull the recovery along over the near term. In most, the recovery seems to have entered a self-sustaining phase, beyond restocking and on to consumption and fixed investment, which are strong as large increases in industrial production have eroded excess capacity (Figures 1.2 and 1.9). Emerging market economies have coped much better with the global downturn by virtue of strong trend growth and avoidance of financial excess (Box 1.1). Many developing economies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, were less affected by the global downturn and are experiencing solid domestic demand growth. High import growth is projected to lower the overall current account surpluses of the emerging and developing economies from almost 3¾ percent of GDP in 2008 to about 1½ percent of GDP in 2011. As explained in the October 2010 GFSR, relatively stronger growth prospects, a shift in global asset allocation, and expectations for low interest rates in mature markets continue to boost emerging market capital flows.

In advanced economies, both manufacturing and investment in machinery and equipment should continue to recover. Industrial production remains considerably below precrisis levels, reflecting the adverse impact of uncertainty and financial conditions on purchases of “postponable” items—consumer durables and investment goods (Figure 1.9).

Figure 1.8. Prospects for Near-Term Activity


Lead economic and sentiment indicators point to diminishing growth momentum in many parts of the world. However, momentum is expected to remain above WEO trend growth rates. Activity is forecast to slow during the second half of 2010 and then to re-accelerate, reflecting diminishing policy stimulus but growing private sector demand. This change in momentum is most apparent in advanced economies. Unemployment is expected to stay high for some time in many advanced economies.



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimates.  
<sup>1</sup>Within regions, countries are listed by economic size.

Figure 1.9. Recovery Dynamics

During the crisis, industrial production fell much more sharply than suggested by the trend relationship between output and GDP. This reflects a sharp drop in purchases of "postponable" items. Industrial production will continue to catch up with GDP, but at a diminishing rate. The inventory-driven rebound is largely over; as capacity utilization rates climb, investment should expand further, making a growing contribution to output growth.



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimates.  
<sup>1</sup>Trend estimated using a cointegrating relationship with global GDP.  
<sup>2</sup>Annualized percent change over previous half year for the United States and Euro area, and percent change for China.  
<sup>3</sup>Data standardized using averages and standard deviations taken from the 10 years before the crisis.

Although part of the output loss may be permanent, the remainder is likely to disappear gradually with improved financial conditions and decreased uncertainty. Investment in machinery and equipment is already showing strength in a number of advanced economies. Also, deleveraging by nonfinancial firms is already further along than that by households


(Figure 1.10), which reflects a smaller buildup of debt during the previous decade and the strong recovery of profitability and cash flow. This is especially true in the United States, where companies slashed investment and payrolls early in the recession. Strong activity through June and July will likely continue to propel investment, while inventory building decelerates.

The latest turbulence has interrupted, but not derailed, the upturn in the credit cycle. Credit growth is rising again in many emerging economies, with the exception of crisis-hit countries in eastern Europe (Figure 1.5). In advanced economies, surveys suggest that bank lending has ceased to tighten (Figure 1.3). Setbacks in the euro area have turned out to be smaller than feared during the market turmoil of the spring, and U.S. banks loosened lending standards during the second quarter. Regulatory changes designed to strengthen capital bases and discourage excessive risk-taking are not expected to have major negative effects on lending in the near term.

Commodity prices have stabilized after an initial rally. Fluctuating around \$75, crude oil prices are higher than usual at this stage of a recovery. The same holds for other commodities, notably metals. This is a lingering effect of tight markets before the crisis. However, there is currently plenty of spare capacity in the extractive industries, likely enough to meet demands through 2011 (Appendix 1.1). Consistent with this view, forward markets see broadly unchanged prices for oil and many other commodities over the near term.

**Figure 1.10. Balance Sheets and Saving Rates (Percent)**

Household debt ceased to grow during 2009 in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the euro area, debt continued to grow through 2009, mainly outside Germany. In some vulnerable economies a sharp cut in borrowing is now under way. Deleveraging by nonfinancial firms is already further along than deleveraging by households, except in some vulnerable economies.



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimates.

### *Forces holding back a near-term recovery*

Although financial market confidence has been returning, the October 2010 GFSR underscores that high volatility and, notably, concerns about sovereign risk remain cause for concern. Additional forces weighing on the recovery include weakness in real estate markets, diminishing fiscal stimulus, and high unemployment.

#### *High uncertainty in financial markets*

Absent strong, credible medium-term fiscal consolidation plans, sovereign debt markets continue to pose risks to the recovery. Sovereign debt maturing in vulnerable euro area countries during the second half of this year and 2011 exceeds \$400 billion (Figure 1.6). In refinancing this debt, these countries will face stiff competition given the rollover needs of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other euro area countries, which total about \$7½ trillion over this period as well as these countries' need to fund high deficits. Any renewed turbulence in sovereign debt markets could trigger an adverse feedback loop between sovereign debt markets and the financial sector, inflicting major damage to the recovery.

Banks also face a “wall” of maturing debt, which presents important risks for the normalization of credit conditions. There has been little progress in lengthening the maturity of their funding, and as a result, over \$4 trillion of debt is due to be refinanced in the next 24 months. Funding problems could easily arise for specific institutions, prompted by renewed stress in sovereign debt markets, further weakness in real estate markets, or downside surprises to economic activity. Because of complex linkages within and across borders, these problems could quickly become more widespread.

Continued regulatory uncertainty or ill-conceived regulatory action regarding the financial sector could undercut the nascent recovery of credit. Many prudential policy challenges remain to be addressed, and taxation of financial activity is expected to increase—measures that might make the financial system safer and less costly for taxpayers over the long term, but which could weigh down output more than markets expect during the short term.

#### *No upside from real estate*

Real estate market quagmires could further undercut households' and banks' balance sheets. The drop in residential investment has been exceptionally steep compared with past recessions. Nonetheless, in many parts of the world real estate prices are still high compared with standard valuation indicators (Box 1.2). In the United States, there remains a large

overhang of unsold properties with “underwater” mortgages.<sup>2</sup> Depressed transactions keep inventories high, putting further downward pressure on prices. In many parts of the world, real estate will remain a drag on growth over the near term, as well as a continued risk to the stability of lending institutions.

### *Deleveraging by households*

Households continue to save more than before the crisis as they repair their balance sheets, although saving rates are on course to moderate soon (Figure 1.10). Household debt ceased to grow during 2009 in the United States and the United Kingdom. While this has brought about a noticeable decline in ratios of debt to income and debt to financial assets, these ratios remain well above the levels of a decade ago. In the euro area, where the precrisis expansion had been rapid in some economies, debt continued to grow throughout 2009, except in Germany. However, a sharp cut in household borrowing is now underway, and judging from debt ratios, corrections may have some way to go, especially, but not exclusively, in the vulnerable euro area countries. Even so, deleveraging may not require significant additional hikes in household savings rates—WEO projections for the United States, for example, foresee no further increases following sharp upward revisions to recent data.

### *Slowing inventory accumulation*

In the United States and many advanced Asian economies, inventory rebuilding has been in high gear and is not expected to accelerate further. In the euro area and Japan, inventory drawdowns were more limited during the downturn, possibly reflecting labor hoarding that kept production up. In these economies, too, inventory rebuilding is unlikely to accelerate. Therefore, inventories will turn from being a supportive to a neutral factor in the recovery.

### *Shifting policy support*

While monetary policy will remain accommodative, with increasing effectiveness as financial markets heal, fiscal policy will soon become less stimulative. At the same time, the mix of macroeconomic policies across countries will provide only limited support to global demand rebalancing.

### *Easy monetary conditions*

Monetary policy remains appropriately supportive in most economies, and markets are expecting a very gradual return to more normal interest rates (Figure 1.11).


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<sup>2</sup>“Underwater” mortgages are loans that exceed the market value of the property. See Box 1.5 of the October 2010 GFSR for a discussion of downside risks to U.S. real estate markets.

### Figure 1.11. Measures of Monetary Policy and Liquidity in Selected Advanced Economies

(Percent unless noted otherwise)

Monetary policy remains appropriately supportive. Amid rising uncertainty about future prospects, expectations for further rate hikes have been pushed further into the future, mainly in advanced economies.



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Eurostat; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Three-month treasury bill.

<sup>2</sup>Relative to core inflation.

<sup>3</sup>Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

<sup>4</sup>Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

<sup>5</sup>Expectations are based on the federal funds rate for the United States, the sterling overnight interbank average rate for the United Kingdom, and the euro interbank offered forward rates for Europe; updated September 1, 2010.

<sup>6</sup>Updated September 1, 2010. Dashed lines are as of April 12, 2010.

<sup>7</sup>Average ask/bid spread of the Turkish lira reference interest rate as of August 20, 2010. Some periods are linearly interpolated.

<sup>8</sup>Based on futures of 28-day interbank rates.

- In advanced economies, the central banks of Australia, Canada, Israel, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have recently raised policy interest rates. However, rates in these economies remain very low by historical standards, except where recovery is already more entrenched. The Reserve Bank of Australia—after raising the policy rate by a cumulative 150 basis points since October 2009 to 4.5 percent—has signaled a pause in its tightening given uncertainty about the global recovery. The U.S. Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, ECB, and Bank of England have kept the main policy rate near the zero bound, with the Federal Reserve indicating that conditions likely warrant exceptionally low interest rates for an extended period. The market response to concerns about the sustainability and pace of recovery has been a sharp decline in longer-term government yields. As financial institutions and markets heal, low interest rates should exert stronger stimulus.
- A number of emerging economies have effected monetary tightening, with rate hikes (e.g., Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Peru), increased cash reserve requirements (e.g., China, India, Turkey), or direct limits on credit growth (e.g., China). The tightening is expected to proceed at a gradual pace, as inflation is generally projected to be contained. The more pressing concern in a few economies is high credit growth for real estate purchases. In various Asian economies, the authorities have successfully intervened to slow such credit growth with prudential regulations. In some economies in emerging Europe, by contrast, central banks have cut rates in response to diminishing price pressures and growing uncertainty in western Europe (e.g., Hungary, Romania, and Russia).

Central banks had employed unconventional support measures during the crisis to help stabilize banks and markets. Some of these—such as the provision of a large quantity of excess reserves to the banking system—were designed to effect a general easing of credit when short-term interest rates were at the zero floor (“quantitative easing”). Others—such as the purchase of nontraditional financial assets—were designed to foster confidence and liquidity in specific markets that had broken down (“qualitative easing”). Central banks have appropriately terminated many of their unconventional support programs, but there have also been reversals:

- The Federal Reserve has rightly wound down most of its emergency facilities (the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) expired on June 30, 2010) and has also ended an asset purchase program. However, it recently decided to reinvest principal payments on its portfolio of Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) debt and mortgage-backed securities into longer-term Treasury bills. Although the quantitative impact of this measure is limited, it signals the Federal Reserve’s resolve to maintain supportive monetary conditions for an extended period.

- Renewed financial turmoil led the ECB to step into government bond markets with a Securities Markets Program.<sup>3</sup> Purchases under this program, which have exceeded €60 billion, helped lower volatility and have now been pared back in response to stabilizing conditions. The ECB has stopped its program of making limited purchases of covered bonds as well as its 12-Month Long-Term Refinancing Operation. However, many banks remain highly dependent on ECB financing facilities, and, pending further progress with recapitalization at the national level, moving away from fixed-rate, full-allotment operations and tightening collateral requirements would be risky.
- The Bank of Japan terminated its limited commercial paper and corporate bond purchasing program, expanded a fund-supplying facility aimed at reducing term premiums, and introduced a new facility to help finance lending to innovative firms. However, with the appreciation of the yen and declining equity prices, financial conditions have tightened and deflation remains a threat. Further monetary easing may thus be needed.
- The Bank of England halted its program of reserve-financed government bond purchases in February 2010. This was appropriate, given normalization in many parts of the financial sector, low long-term interest rates on government paper, and continued above-target inflation (due to price-level shocks).<sup>4</sup>
- Other central banks, such as the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, the Swedish Riksbank, and those in emerging economies have largely unwound liquidity support measures as their financial markets have healed and their economies have recovered robustly. In fact, a number of emerging economies have tightened prudential policies and practices in response to an upsurge in capital inflows or rapid credit growth.
- Given the sizeable U.S. dollar funding needs of many commercial banks outside the United States, the Federal Reserve and the central banks of Canada, the euro area, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom recently revived their dollar swap facilities as dollar funding strains emerged during the May-June financial turmoil.

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<sup>3</sup>Unlike the purchases of government bonds by the Bank of England, which ended some time ago, the stated objective of the ECB's intervention is not to lower long-term interest rates but to counter excessive volatility.

<sup>4</sup>Modest purchases of private-sector assets have continued but are financed by the issuance of Treasury bills or as part of cash management operations.

Sales of assets, tightening of collateral requirements, or the phasing out of other support for funding should be a gradual process because market volatility remains high, banks remain vulnerable, various wholesale markets are in disrepair, and many real-estate-related markets are weak.<sup>5</sup> In the meantime, central banks can absorb liquidity in a variety of ways should upside risks to inflation emerge.<sup>6</sup>


### *Fiscal consolidation*

Fiscal policy will tighten during 2011 (Figure 1.12). In advanced economies fiscal balances fell (i.e., deficits increased) by about 5 percent of GDP in 2009, following a 2½ percent fall in 2008. In structural, or cyclically adjusted, terms, the decline was about 2½ percent in 2009—the remaining 2½ percent resulted from the automatic effects of the recession on tax revenues and social spending. The balances are now forecast to increase by about a ½ percent in 2010 and a further 1¼ percent in 2011. This reflects revenue gains and expenditure reductions associated with the recovery and a continued discretionary loosening in 2010—by about ½ percent of

**Figure 1.12. General Government Fiscal Balances and Public Debt**

(Percent of GDP unless noted otherwise)

Fiscal policy will become contractionary in 2011, following significant expansion mostly during 2009. Nonetheless, public debt ratios are projected to continue to rise, unless further action is taken. Although fiscal and household consolidation can be expected to lower demand in advanced economies, domestic demand in key emerging economies is not projected to compensate for this. Similarly, the change in fiscal policies in emerging and advanced economies with low debt and external surpluses is not expected to differ much from policy elsewhere.



Source: IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Based on the IMF staff's Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues (CGER). CGER countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, euro area, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. For a detailed discussion of the methodology for the calculation of exchange rates' over- or undervaluation, see Lee and others (2008).

<sup>2</sup>These economies account for 19.4 percent of global GDP.

<sup>3</sup>These economies account for 21.6 percent of global GDP.

<sup>4</sup>These economies account for 44.0 percent of global GDP.

<sup>5</sup>Excludes Japan.

<sup>5</sup>None of the major central banks have discussed a timetable for selling securities.

<sup>6</sup>The Federal Reserve has recently deployed a Term Deposit Facility and tested reverse repurchase operations to absorb liquidity, if necessary.

GDP—followed by a 1 percent tightening in 2011.<sup>7</sup> In emerging economies, fiscal balances are forecast to increase by  $\frac{3}{4}$  percent of GDP in 2010 and by a further 1 percent in 2011, following a loosening of almost  $4\frac{1}{2}$  percent of GDP in 2009.

The fiscal policy change will likely prove contractionary for most economies in 2011, although the extent is difficult to determine. Chapter 3 presents an econometric analysis of past consolidation efforts in advanced economies, which reveals that fiscal tightening by 1 percent of GDP has typically caused a 1 percent decline in domestic demand after two years—about half the effect on real GDP usually being offset by higher net exports. Past experience may tell little about the likely impact of consolidation under present circumstances, but several considerations point to contractionary effects over the short term, especially in the major advanced economies. The introduction of credible, growth-friendly, medium-term fiscal consolidation plans would have beneficial effects on investment, but such plans are generally not on offer. Also, with many countries poised to adjust at the same time, the export channel will be muted. Furthermore, because markets already expect policy rates in the large advanced economies to remain near zero during the coming year, conventional monetary policy can offer only limited short term help when demand weakens, unlike during some past consolidation episodes. Relatively little is known about the effectiveness of unconventional monetary easing measures under fiscal tightening.

### *The forecast for 2010–11*

Overall, the recovery is expected to continue broadly in line with earlier forecasts. With negative and positive factors broadly canceling each other out over the next couple of years, WEO projections for 2010 and 2011 foresee little change in global growth. World GDP is forecast to expand by 4.6 percent in 2010 and by 4.3 percent in 2011 (Table 1.1 and Figure 1.13). The forecast assumes that the downside risks identified do not materialize: high uncertainty would weigh on private demand but would not forestall a continued recovery of investment, employment, and household consumption. This largely makes up for the diminishing fiscal stimulus, which starts in the second half of 2010.

The stable annual growth rates mask a temporary slowdown in activity. In advanced economies, where GDP growth is estimated at  $3\frac{1}{4}$  percent for the first half of 2010, projected growth in the second half is  $1\frac{3}{4}$  percent. Then, in response to expansionary factors, growth rises above  $2\frac{1}{2}$  percent in 2011 (see Figure 1.8). These are low growth rates considering the depth of the recession and the amount of excess capacity, and this means a very slow decline in high unemployment rates. In emerging and developing economies, generally healthy growth slows somewhat in the second half of 2010.


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<sup>7</sup>This represents consolidation of  $\frac{1}{4}$  percent of GDP more than forecast in the April 2010 *WEO*, mainly because of additional tightening in various euro area countries.

### Figure 1.13. Global Outlook

(Real GDP, quarterly percent change from one year earlier, unless noted otherwise)

With negative and positive factors broadly canceling each other out over the next couple of years, WEO projections for 2010 and 2011 foresee little change in global growth. In advanced economies, growth rates are forecast to remain low, considering the depth of the recession and the amount of excess capacity. In emerging economies, growth is projected to be robust, compared with the experience following past global recessions, except in a number of economies in emerging Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.



Sources: Haver Analytics; and World Economic Outlook database.

<sup>1</sup>Comprises China, India, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and economies listed in footnotes 4, 6, and 7.

<sup>2</sup>Includes only economies that report quarterly data.

<sup>3</sup>Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, and United States.

<sup>4</sup>Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.

<sup>5</sup>Newly industrialized Asian economies (NIEs) comprise Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>6</sup>Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

<sup>7</sup>Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

<sup>8</sup>Annual percent change from one year earlier.

Inflation is projected in general to stay low amid continued excess capacity and high unemployment (Figure 1.14). The recovery of commodity prices, however, has raised the level of consumer prices during 2010. Thus, in advanced economies, headline inflation has been running around 1¾ percent for many months but has lately begun to slow. Core inflation has been much lower, recently falling below 1 percent. In emerging economies, headline and core rates are about 6 percent and 3 percent, respectively. With market indicators suggesting that commodity prices should remain stable and with downward pressure on wages gradually diminishing, headline and core inflation in advanced economies should converge to about 1¼ percent in 2011 and in emerging economies to about 5 percent. Among some major emerging economies, capacity constraints are beginning to boost prices: Brazil, for example, has experienced gradual increases in inflation pressure, while India has seen a sharp rise in inflation.


***Risks to activity are mainly on the downside***

Risks to the growth projections are mainly to the downside. Financial and macroeconomic conditions are likely to remain unsettled for as long as fundamental economic weaknesses persist and the required reforms remain a work in progress. Major risks have already been discussed. Key is that room for policy maneuver in advanced economies has fallen. Refinancing requirements during the second half of 2010 and 2011 will be enormous. For example, among the advanced economies, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States will issue a gross volume of

**Figure 1.14. Global Inflation**

*(Twelve-month change in the consumer price index unless noted otherwise)*

Inflation is projected to stay low amid continued excess capacity and high unemployment. The recovery of commodity prices has raised the level of consumer prices. With market indicators suggesting that commodity prices should remain stable and with downward pressure on wages gradually diminishing, headline and core inflation in advanced economies should converge to about 1¼ percent in 2011, and in emerging economies to about 5 percent. Inflationary pressures are more elevated in economies that have had a history of unstable inflation or that are operating closer to capacity.



Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Personal consumption expenditure deflator.

<sup>2</sup>One-year-ahead Consensus Forecasts. The December values are the average of the surrounding November and January values.

<sup>3</sup>Consumer price index for industrial workers.

bonds with a value exceeding 40 percent of GDP. With such high volume passing through bond markets, small disturbances may propagate rapidly across sovereign debt markets, prompting changes in investor confidence and stalling the recovery.

Additionally, the financial sector remains very fragile. Banks face major funding requirements in a market that is still very risk averse. As recent experience has shown, funding troubles at individual institutions can have major macroeconomic ramifications. New capital shortfalls that require additional public financial sector support would add to the pressures on public finances, which in turn could further dampen market sentiment. As the October 2010 GFSR shows, intensifying funding strains could again stress banking systems.

- Under an adverse scenario, involving a combination of macroeconomic risks, sovereign financing pressures, and intensifying funding strains, it is estimated that the European banking system would need an additional €76 billion to avoid funding stress. If unaddressed, such funding pressures could reawaken deleveraging pressures and the adverse feedback loop between the euro area banking system and the regional economy. However, in most countries existing backstops are sufficient to cover needs under such a scenario.

In the United States the real estate sector could well dip again, exposing pockets of vulnerability in the banking system. A stress test of the top 40 U.S. bank holding companies suggests that, under an adverse scenario where residential and commercial real estate prices fall by 6 percent and 9 percent, respectively, and real GDP growth slows to 1.2 percent in 2011, banks would require a total of \$3 billion in additional capital in order to maintain a 6 percent Tier 1 ratio. While the capital of U.S. banks thus appears broadly sufficient, in the absence of GSE and other government interventions substantially more capital would be needed.

- In Japan, a near-term disruption in the government bond market remains unlikely, but the factors currently supporting the Japanese bond market are expected to gradually erode. Also, banks' ever larger holdings of government bonds and the increasing interest rate risk arising from their extension into longer-dated maturities create a potential risk to financial stability if there were a sudden increase in government bond yields.

### ***Quantitative risk indicators***

The IMF staff's quantitative indicators confirm that risks to activity are still high and to the downside in 2011 (Figure 1.15). Specifically, risks as measured by the dispersion in analysts' forecasts for real GDP growth or inflation, oil price options, and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX)<sup>8</sup> have moved up to varying degrees lately,

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<sup>8</sup> VIX is a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index.

although they remain appreciably lower than one year ago. Term spread data point to much larger upside risks to growth in 2010 than last April, consistent with upward revisions to WEO growth projections. For 2011, the slope of the yield curve is expected to flatten, and thus term spreads point to downside risks to activity. Options prices on the S&P 500 indicate much smaller upside risks from financial surprises in 2010–11 relative to last April. Options prices for futures on petroleum and other commodities suggest smaller downside risks to growth in 2010 than last April; risks for sharp increases in commodity prices are higher in the medium term, as spare capacity and inventory buffers diminish (Appendix 1.1).


The fan chart analysis also suggests that risks for a sharp global slowdown, including a “double dip” in advanced economies, over the coming year still appear low. Such a scenario would entail 2 percent or less real GDP over the coming year, with zero growth in the advanced economies and about 4 percent growth in the emerging and developing economies. According to the fan chart, the probability of global growth falling below 2 percent is less than 5 percent.

### ***Concerns about high inflation or deflation***

Inflation in advanced economies has declined by less than expected, considering the depth of the recession. For example, in the United States, the drop in core inflation from 2008 to 2010 was about 1 percent, whereas the drop during the

**Figure 1.15. Risks to the Global Outlook**

Risks to the growth projections are mainly to the downside. Financial and macroeconomic conditions are likely to remain unsettled for as long as the fundamental economic weaknesses persist and the required reforms remain a work in progress. The fan chart confirms that risks to activity are still high and to the downside in 2011. Risks as measured by the dispersion in analysts' forecasts for real GDP growth, oil prices, inflation, and the VIX<sup>1</sup> have moved up to varying degrees lately, although they remain appreciably lower than one year ago.



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Chicago Board Options Exchange; Consensus Economics; and IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>VIX: Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, a measure of the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500 index.

<sup>2</sup>The fan chart shows the uncertainty around the *World Economic Outlook* (WEO) central forecast with 50, 70, and 90 percent probability intervals. As shown, the 70 percent confidence interval includes the 50 percent interval, and the 90 percent confidence interval includes the 50 and 70 percent intervals. See Appendix 1.2 in the April 2009 WEO for details.

<sup>3</sup>Bars depict the coefficient of skewness expressed in units of the underlying variables. The values for inflation risks and oil market risks are entered with the opposite sign since they represent downside risks to growth.

<sup>4</sup>The series measures the dispersion of GDP forecasts for the G7 economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States), Brazil, China, India, and Mexico.

<sup>5</sup>The series measures the dispersion of term spreads implicit in interest rate forecasts for the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.


1981–83 recession was about 4 percent. The weaker inflation response may reflect a variety of factors, for example, more credible inflation control, intensified losses in productive capacity, and downward wage and price rigidities.

The improved credibility of monetary policy and its exceptionally strong response, together with temporarily low growth in potential output, which has kept output gaps from widening even further, may be key explanatory factors. With strong credibility, medium- to long-term inflation expectations are much more stable than the actual inflation rate—overpredicting inflation when it is below the presumed central bank target, and vice versa.

However, short-term *Consensus Forecasts* inflation expectations recently have also overpredicted the actual outcomes in a large number of countries, sometimes by surprisingly large margins (Figure 1.16). Assuming that these expectations are representative of those in the broader economy, their stickiness may explain part of the stickiness of actual inflation. This raises the question of why short-term expectations have been so high in some countries.<sup>9</sup> Possible explanations could be “turning point” mistakes (misjudging changes in the business cycle); optimistic views about the depth of the recession; fears of high commodity prices; or concerns about growing central bank balance sheets, diminishing central

**Figure 1.16. Inflation, Deflation Risk, and Unemployment**

Short-term *Consensus Forecasts* inflation expectations have overshot actual inflation by substantial margins. They have also been higher than indicated by past relationships with various fundamental determinants. This is surprising, as IMF staff analysis suggests that deflation rather than high inflation is the more pertinent risk. Assuming that these short-term expectations are representative of those in the broader economy, their stickiness may explain part of the stickiness of actual inflation.



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.  
<sup>1</sup>CAN: Canada; FRA: France; DEU: Germany; ITA: Italy; JPN: Japan; GBR: United Kingdom; USA: United States.  
<sup>2</sup>The residuals are differences between actual one-year-ahead Consensus inflation expectations and out-of-sample forecasts of for these expectations. The forecasts are obtained from regressions of one-year-ahead Consensus inflation expectations on lagged values of these expectations, Consensus expectations for unemployment rates, WEO expectations for output gaps, oil price growth rates, and long-term Consensus expectations for inflation. The regression sample typically cover 1999:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Positive residuals suggest that short-term Consensus expectations have been higher than could have been expected given their past relationship with unemployment rates, output gaps, oil prices, and long-term Consensus expectations.  
<sup>3</sup>For details on the construction of this indicator, see Kumar and others (2003) and Decressin and Laxton (2009). The figure also features an expanded indicator, which includes house prices. Vulnerability is as of 2010:Q2.  
<sup>4</sup>Major advanced and emerging economies.

<sup>9</sup>Short-term inflation expectations have also been higher than suggested by their past relationships with various fundamental variables, such as unemployment rates, commodity prices, capacity indicators, actual inflation, and medium- to long-term inflation expectations.

bank independence, or central banks' commitment to low inflation. In fact, concerns about the potential for high inflation in advanced economies in the future have been lingering in the background. Beyond a downside skew to growth from stronger-than-anticipated monetary tightening in the fan chart (see Figure 1.15), such concerns are reflected in record high prices for gold.

These concerns appear excessive for a variety of reasons. Measures of liquidity in advanced economies, such as the growth rate of broad money, show very little dynamism, and central banks have policy tools at their disposal to control liquidity, notwithstanding large balance sheets. Also, with open capital markets, higher inflation targets would quickly feed into higher public debt service.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, risks from commodity prices appear limited over the next couple of years: if, for example, oil prices were to jump unexpectedly, the fact that wages did not rise correspondingly during the 2005–07 oil price spikes is largely reassuring about the behavior of inflation. For high inflation to emerge, there would have to be multiple shocks, including a sudden move to financial or trade protectionism that would undo much of the integration of markets that has taken place over recent decades. Such a scenario seems remote.

Under present circumstances, deflation is the more pertinent risk. The reason is that risks to activity are clearly to the downside; households remain saddled with appreciable debt; the financial system remains vulnerable; and expectations could gradually catch up with actual inflation, putting further downward pressure on prices and wages. Judging by the IMF staff's deflation risk indicator, deflation risks have recently risen again to a high level, although they remain below the peaks reached one year ago (see Figure 1.16). How households will behave will crucially depend on how policymakers roll back large public deficits. Mistakes could cause a long period of deflation or low inflation and disappointing economic growth.<sup>11</sup>

### **Questions about Medium-Term Prospects**

One year into the recovery, it is the right time to take stock of some medium-term developments and assess what they portend for growth prospects. These include (1) the apparent worsening of fundamentals in advanced versus emerging economies, which has been amplified by the financial crisis and will delay a robust pickup in private demand, and (2) the limited extent to which emerging economies that have external surpluses can offset lower demand in advanced economies, which indicates that demand rebalancing is stalling.

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<sup>10</sup>The median gross financing need among G7 economies is estimated at about 40 percent of GDP during the second half of 2010 and 2011, whereas the median debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to reach about 85 percent of GDP in 2010.

<sup>11</sup>The underlying scenario analysis can be found in Chapter 1 of the April 2010 *World Economic Outlook*.

Together, these developments are consistent with a subdued recovery in many parts of the world.


This stocktaking sets the stage for a discussion of some of the key challenges facing advanced and emerging economy policymakers that are discussed in the subsequent section: (1) repair and reform of financial markets; (2) medium-term fiscal consolidation; (3) monetary and exchange rate policies; and (4) policy coordination.

**Deteriorating growth prospects in advanced versus emerging economies**

The latest crisis comes on top of an ongoing decline in advanced versus emerging economy growth rates. In advanced economies, this trend is being driven by a variety of fundamental factors, such as falling population growth (Figure 1.17). Developments in emerging economies have been quite different (see Box 1.1). As a group, emerging economies posted a string of impressive growth rates after the turn of the millennium. Looking ahead, advanced economies face appreciably weaker prospects for activity than over the past decade, absent significant reforms. The results of an analysis of potential output developments are sobering (Box 1.3): they point to large and persistent output losses from the recession. This is consistent with other empirical evidence that suggests that a portion of the sharp decline in GDP during the recession should be presumed to be permanent, unless there is significant policy change.<sup>12</sup>

**Figure 1.17. Global Imbalances**

The growth performance of emerging economies has been improving, whereas for advanced economies it has been deteriorating over the past couple of decades. This will continue to push capital flows toward emerging economies. Nonetheless, global imbalances are not projected to narrow over the medium-term, as these economies are finding it hard to absorb these inflows productively and are building up reserves to protect themselves against flow reversals, which have often occurred in the past. As a result, the savings surplus in Asia will rise relative to the GDP of advanced economies. This will limit the increase in long-term interest rates in response to rising public debt.



Source: IMF staff estimates.  
<sup>1</sup>1980–2015 real GDP growth data are de-trended as 10-year backward rolling averages. Dashed lines are trends for each group between 1990 and 2015.  
<sup>2</sup>China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand.  
<sup>3</sup>Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, and United States.  
<sup>4</sup>CHN+EMA: China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand; DEU+JPN: Germany and Japan; OCADC: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and United Kingdom; OIL: Oil exporters; ROW: rest of the world; US: United States.

<sup>12</sup>As outlined in Chapter 4 of the October 2009 *World Economic Outlook*, financial crises have typically been followed by large, permanent losses of output. However, the aftermath shows wide variation, not least because conditions and policy responses differed across countries.

One can best infer the path for potential output, which is by nature an unobservable variable, on the basis of the joint behavior of observable variables that potential output either influences (output growth, inflation, unemployment, and capacity utilization) or is influenced by (labor force growth, capital investment, and productivity growth). For example, the steep drop in business fixed investment during the recession has reduced manufacturing capacity (see Figure 1.9). This suggests lower potential output and hence a smaller output gap. In the opposite direction, U. S. labor productivity has been very strong until lately.

There are various ways to estimate potential output, each with its strengths and weaknesses. The most credible estimates, given current information, point to a substantial downward shift in the path of potential output for the United States and the euro area. Box 1.3 compares the most recent estimates of potential output growth and output gaps by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, or the European Commission with those obtained with IMF staff's Global Projection Model and the WEO. These estimates point to three conclusions: (1) a sizable and persistent reduction in potential output relative to the precrisis trend; (2) substantial excess supply—that is, large negative output gaps—for both regions;<sup>13</sup> and (3) considerable imprecision in the estimates, suggesting that the distribution of possible outcomes is a matter of substance for policymakers.

Taken at face value, the lower estimates for trend output levels in advance economies have significant policy implications. They imply that a large portion of fiscal revenue losses relative to precrisis revenue trends should be presumed permanent. In turn, this means that public expenditure programs would have to be scaled back (or taxes increased), or fiscal deficits and debt will continue to grow rapidly over medium term. More fundamentally, capital and labor will need to be reallocated from declining to expanding sectors, posing major social challenges. From a global perspective, Chapter 4 makes clear that the demand for imports by advanced economies will be below precrisis trends, in view of the high share of consumer durables and investment goods in trade. Emerging economies that relied heavily on demand from these economies will therefore have to rebalance growth further toward domestic sources to achieve growth rates similar to those before the crisis.

### ***Constraints on raising domestic demand in emerging economies***

Notwithstanding a relatively healthy growth outlook, emerging economies are unlikely to fully compensate for the lower demand from advanced economies over the medium term. In particular, recent developments in economies with excessive surpluses do not point to a significant acceleration in domestic demand relative to precrisis growth rates

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<sup>13</sup>Furthermore, a deeper analysis of labor productivity developments in the United States suggests that its recent increase is at least partly a cyclical phenomenon, reflecting, for example, that the least productive workers are likely to have lost their jobs first.

(Figure 1.12). For developing Asia, WEO projections suggest that saving rates will rise from about 44½ percent of GDP in 2010 to close to 45½ percent in 2015, while the investment ratio moves sideways.<sup>14</sup> Thus, global imbalances are not projected to narrow further. This reflects primarily four factors:

- **Structural constraints:** Some two-thirds of gross national saving in the region has been by China in the recent past. Even in a best-case scenario, however, China will provide only a partial offset to the weaker demand from advanced economies, given the relatively small size of both overall Chinese consumption and Chinese imports of consumer goods.<sup>15</sup> Also, in many emerging Asian economies investment in the services sector is low, with India being a notable exception. Policy efforts have been directed at allowing greater competition in infrastructure-related services, further opening the retail and financial sectors, and lifting restrictions on entry into social services, such as health and education. However, these will take time to bear fruit.
- **Restrictions on capital inflows:** Here it is useful to distinguish between restrictions from times before the latest crisis and recovery and restrictions imposed recently, in response to capital inflows. The former can have large effects on inflows but can be reduced only very gradually, in tandem with reforms to goods and services markets, financial systems, and prudential policies and practices. Controls imposed recently are reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2. Again, two types can be distinguished: (1) those that affect both domestic residents and foreign investors (macroprudential measures)—most of the measures adopted in emerging Asia fall into this category; and (2) those that target foreign investors specifically (classic capital controls)—these have been the main focus of some countries in Latin America (Brazil). Given the nature of measures adopted recently, their medium-term effects on global demand rebalancing are probably not large.
- **Concerns about destabilizing exchange rate appreciations and related losses of competitiveness:** These have led key emerging economies to mainly accumulate reserves rather than to allow the nominal exchange rate to appreciate in response to trade surpluses and capital inflows (see Figure 1.7). While offering insurance against sudden stops, accumulating reserves to mitigate currency appreciation pressures in response to sustained current account surpluses is likely to slow domestic demand and to gradually raise inflation. And it puts a burden on the budgets of emerging economies, given the difference between domestic and reserve-asset interest rates.

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<sup>14</sup>In the other region with high saving rates—the Middle East—the savings ratio is also projected to rise during 2009–15. In this case, it is a reflection of a modest correction from a large oil-price and fiscal-stimulus related fall during 2008–09.

<sup>15</sup>On this, see IMF (2010). IMF (2009) finds that despite recording above-average import growth rates over the last 15 years, China's imports of consumer goods still accounted for only 3 percent of global imports in 2008.

- Fiscal policy stances: Almost all major emerging market economies are consolidating, with only a few keeping support broadly unchanged (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia). The difference in the pace of consolidation in 2011 between economies with excessive external surpluses and deficits is modest (see Figure 1.12). Medium-term projections reinforce this point.

### **MORE PROACTIVE POLICIES ARE NEEDED**

To sum up, short- and medium-term prospects continue to point to the slow, sluggish recovery anticipated earlier and it remains subject mainly to downside risks. Policies need to accelerate the rebalancing of demand from public to private sources in advanced economies and from economies with external deficits to those with external surpluses. In many advanced economies, the financial sector remains the Achilles' heel of recovery prospects for private demand. Insufficient progress with repair and reform is weighing on credit and slowing the normalization of monetary and fiscal policies, with adverse spillovers for emerging economies. Accelerated financial restructuring and reform should thus be top priorities. So far, progress has been painfully slow. Fiscal consolidation needs to start in 2011. Government budgetary policies are in the process of moving from short-term stimulus to medium-term consolidation. However, fiscal policies need to urgently legislate measures that lower deficits over the medium term. This is necessary not only to halt and ultimately reverse the large rise in public debt ratios, but also to help create more room for policy maneuver in the short term. In addition, fiscal adjustment needs to be supported with structural reform. Policies that eliminate distortions to domestic demand in key emerging economies would strengthen prospects for global demand rebalancing, and thereby support a more robust recovery in both emerging and advanced economies. However, there are many constraints on what can be achieved over the medium term, and policymakers would be well advised to base their plans on prudent growth projections.

### **Repairing and Reforming the Financial Sector**

Financial sector policies are critical for sustaining a healthy recovery. Apparently isolated difficulties in a few spots can have large spillover effects via complex financial linkages and deterioration of fragile confidence. Failure to rapidly resolve, restructure, or consolidate weak banks and repair wholesale markets raises the need for further fiscal backstopping and low interest rates to support recovery, which can cause other problems, including spillovers to emerging economies. More progress with financial sector repair and reform should thus be a top priority for advanced economies.

As the October 2010 GFSR explains, insufficient progress in addressing the legacy problems of the crisis has left the system vulnerable to funding shocks and a loss of market confidence. Progress in addressing weak banks is urgently needed:

- U.S. banks have made considerable progress in recognizing losses and rebuilding capital. However, important risks continue to revolve around exposure to real estate,

especially by small and midsize banks, which are major providers of credit to small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). These account for a large part of total employment in the economy. In addition, continuing weakness in private-label securitization markets is limiting the ability of banks to offload risk from their balance sheets. Reforms to the housing finance system are crucial but remain unfinished.

- European banks face challenges from fragile funding and profitability, sovereign debt exposures, and real estate lending. Decisive actions are being undertaken in some countries (e.g., Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom) but much still remains to be done to put bank balance sheets on a sustainable footing. In other countries (e.g., Germany) longstanding problems are yet to be addressed. A range of measures should be considered, including forcing weak banks to raise additional capital, secure stable funding, and more decisively clean up their balance sheets. In cases when viable business models cannot be established, regulators should have the power to restructure or resolve quickly.

In the meantime, the public sector will remain heavily involved in financial intermediation. In the United States, for example, mortgage lending is being propped up by the government's purchase of GSE obligations. In Europe, a number of banks remain reliant on ECB financing facilities or on various forms of government support. Moreover, as underscored in the October 2010 GFSR, usage of governments' recapitalization and debt guarantee programs remains substantial in advanced economies, even if demand for these programs has declined. In fact, while programs were closed in some advanced economies, they had to be extended in many European economies. Given the "wall" of maturing bank debt, governments and central banks may need to reconsider exiting from funding guarantees and extraordinary liquidity facilities until banks clearly demonstrate their ability to self-fund unaided.

Beyond addressing the legacy problems, authorities face the challenge of putting in place prudential frameworks that deliver a safer global financial system. The most prominent of these reform efforts is the proposed changes to the Basel capital adequacy framework, with an ambitious agenda of reforms to be implemented beginning in 2011. Key elements of the enhanced Basel II reform agenda include capital and liquidity reforms to strengthen the quality, consistency, and transparency of buffers. As explained in the October 2010 GFSR, the strengthening of capital and liquidity standards has only a modestly adverse impact on output and clear net long-term benefits. While the recent amendments to the Basel proposals constitute a significant improvement over what was in place prior to the crisis, they also include a significant degree of accommodation, with transition periods that in some cases far exceed the four years suggested by the macroeconomic impact studies. The deferment of some of the implementation dates implies that the world will continue with the same regulatory inadequacies that were exposed during the crisis for a longer period, increasing the chances of renewed financial instability and placing a higher burden on supervision. Another major challenge is removing the ability of significant financial enterprises in the public or

private sectors to leverage (implicitly or explicitly) taxpayer-subsidized borrowing. This applies to a broad range of enterprises, such as the GSEs, many public sector banks in Germany and elsewhere, and many “too-important-to-fail” (TITF) entities. Excessive risk-taking in the financial system also needs to be mitigated by ensuring strong capitalization and risk management at significant nonbank institutions, by warehousing credit risk and by removing tax breaks to personal or corporate debt finance. Other policy challenges range from reforms to over-the-counter derivative exposures to more effective cross-border resolution frameworks, and better compensation practices to improved accounting standards.

The potential effects of the full set of reforms on credit and growth are hard to determine. Much will depend on their design and how they are phased in—they will likely detract from activity in the short term but will bring benefits in the long term. Basel Committee model-based assessments suggest that tighter capital regulation will affect macroeconomic activity, primarily through an increase in the cost of bank credit.<sup>16</sup> The new regulation is expected to reduce macroeconomic volatility by reducing bank vulnerability during crises and limiting credit expansion in upturns. However, the effectiveness of these bank-centric measures will depend critically on the rigor of implementation and the potential for the shift of activities toward less regulated, nonbank financial intermediaries or markets.<sup>17</sup>

Requirements differ in emerging economies. Many avoided financial excesses ahead of the crisis by adopting prudential policies and practices that were more stringent than those in the major financial centers, an approach that has been vindicated. The challenge facing these economies is to further deepen financial intermediation, with a view to fostering sound lending to households and small and medium-size enterprises. In some cases, this will require broader reforms to legal frameworks, including bankruptcy codes. At the same time, prudential policies and practices will have to stay one step ahead of the development of national financial systems.

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<sup>16</sup>Available estimates suggest that in the steady state, a 2 percentage point increase of required bank capital will permanently reduce the level of output by about 0.2–0.3 percentage points. However, model risks surrounding the estimate are skewed toward a more significant impact of up to 0.7 percentage points of output in some specifications. In any case, the calibration will have to be revisited in light of the latest capital adequacy and liquidity proposals. For further discussion, see “An assessment of the long-term economic impact of the new regulatory framework,” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 9 August 2010; “Assessing the macroeconomic impact of the transition to stringer capital and liquidity requirements,” Macroeconomic Assessment Group, August 2010.

<sup>17</sup>See also Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, Chapter III “Detecting Systemic Risk,” Claessens, Stijn, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven (2010), “Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis.” IMF working paper 10/44; and Viñals, Jose and Jonathan Fiechter (2010), “The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say “No”.”

### **“Growth-Friendly” Medium-Term Fiscal Consolidation Plans Are Still Missing**

Fiscal consolidation needs to start in earnest in 2011. Of utmost importance are firm commitments to ambitious and credible strategies to lower fiscal deficits over the medium term, preferably with legislated tax and expenditure reforms that become effective in the future and support investment and labor supply over the medium term. This task is now more urgent than it was six months ago, as further fiscal accommodation could be needed in the short term if global activity slows by markedly more than projected. Absent credible medium-term plans, however, such support could cause renewed turbulence in sovereign debt markets that could undermine the effectiveness of any support measures.

Plans should emphasize policy measures that reform major, rapidly growing spending programs, such as pension entitlements and public health care systems, and make permanent reductions in nonentitlement spending.<sup>18</sup> There is also wide scope to improve tax structures, for example, by shifting the tax burden from earnings to consumption spending or property. Well-designed spending and tax reforms can help rebuild confidence by reducing the fiscal burden for the future and by boosting the economy’s supply potential. Plans could also include legislation to strengthen fiscal institutions and to introduce binding multiyear targets. Measures that improve prospects for faster growth in incomes for the foreseeable future may also mitigate the adverse short-term effects that fiscal consolidation has commonly caused in the past. At the same time, governments should try to extend average maturity of their debt, proactively reducing refinancing risk.

In the near term, the extent and type of fiscal adjustment should depend on country circumstances, particularly the pace of recovery and the risk of a loss of fiscal credibility.

- Considering the widespread absence of strong, credible plans for medium-term consolidation and the latest turbulence in sovereign debt markets, fiscal consolidation plans for 2011 strike a broadly appropriate balance between progress toward stabilizing public debt and continued support for recovery. Countries with larger deficits, or debt, are generally planning to tighten more (Figure 1.18). Those facing severe foreign funding pressures have already had to retrench; in these economies, strong signals of commitment remain necessary.

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
<sup>18</sup>The net present value of future increases in health care and pension spending is more than ten times larger than the increase in public debt due to the crisis.

- In economies with excessive external surpluses and relatively low public debt, fiscal tightening should take a backseat to monetary tightening and exchange rate adjustment. This would help support domestic demand, as foreign demand temporarily weakens. In other emerging economies, fiscal tightening can start immediately, because recovery is already well under way. Fiscal tightening should be a top priority in those emerging economies that have relatively high public debt and are struggling to absorb large capital inflows productively.
- If activity threatens to weaken appreciably more than projected, countries with fiscal room should allow automatic stabilizers to play fully; in some countries with small stabilizers, temporary support through extended unemployment benefits or wage subsidies could be continued. Additionally, if needed for the recovery to continue, some of the consolidation planned for 2011 may also have to be postponed.

Looking further ahead, advanced economy governments need to begin legislating the consolidation measures they intend to implement in the future to achieve their medium-term fiscal objectives. Most advanced economy governments aim at stabilizing or lowering debt-to-GDP ratios sometime before or during 2015—objectives beyond 2015 have typically not been

**Figure 1.18. Medium-Term Fiscal Policies**

Some economies' medium-term economic growth projections appear optimistic, posing risks to their consolidation plans. Generally, economies with higher public debt ratios are targeting more fiscal adjustment; they also are emphasizing expenditure cuts. However, WEO projections suggest that not all will achieve an expenditure ratio appreciably lower than before the crisis, suggesting that room for further cuts remains.



Source: IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>For some economies, national projections are available only through 2012.

<sup>2</sup>Percent of GDP, except structural fiscal balance, which is in percent of potential GDP. All advanced economies with 2010 public debt greater than 60 percent of GDP. CAN: Canada; FRA: France; DEU: Germany; ITA: Italy; JPN: Japan; ESP: Spain; GBR: United Kingdom; USA: United States.

<sup>3</sup>Regression lines exclude Japan.

spelled out.<sup>19</sup> WEO projections suggest that many will achieve this objective, although typically one or two years later than planned. Their governments should soon adopt additional measures to reduce the likelihood of slippages. Among the major advanced economies with high or rapidly rising debt, only Spain and the United States would fail to stabilize debt by 2015, with Japan planning stabilization for 2020. For Spain and the United States, a major reason for the projected overshooting is that real GDP growth projections of the authorities are, on average, at least  $\frac{3}{4}$  percent a year higher than those of the WEO.<sup>20</sup> All three governments should soon specify significant adjustment measures to achieve debt stabilization by 2015.

As discussed, the fiscal adjustment that is shaping up is likely to detract from demand. Present fiscal plans for 2011 and beyond do not point to major differentiation across countries according to their external and public debt positions (see Figure 1.12). Chapter 3 suggests that such synchronized adjustment will make consolidation more painful. Encouragingly, however, some two-thirds of the planned adjustment is taking place on the expenditure side (notably lowering spending on wages, pensions, and public administration), which seems to depress output by less than revenue increases, according to Chapter 3. Also, indirect rather than direct taxes contribute mainly to revenue-raising measures, which should limit distortions to labor supply and investment and accelerate output gains over the long term.

Additional efforts could usefully focus on lowering spending and eliminating many tax exemptions and subsidies, notably those that favor debt over equity financing, and, in some economies, raising taxes on property.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, more could be done to secure long-term fiscal sustainability. This can help build confidence in public finances without necessarily detracting from demand today. Examples of such measures include linking

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<sup>19</sup>The forthcoming November 2010 *Fiscal Monitor* will provide a detailed assessment of fiscal policy challenges and objectives. Ideally, high debt countries should try to reduce debt ratios back to the precrisis median of 60 percent GDP: doing so by 2030 would require improvements in structural primary balances by almost 9 percentage points of GDP from the 2010 level. For emerging economies, using a similar methodology but assuming a lower debt target (40 percent, a threshold beyond which fiscal risks are often considered to rise in emerging economies), the adjustment averages less than 3 percentage points of GDP.

<sup>20</sup>This reflects the WEO's larger estimated reduction in potential output relative to precrisis trends as the major financial and real-estate-related shocks continue to reverberate for some time.

<sup>21</sup>Expenditure ratios in a number of advanced economies with high debt are not projected to fall much below pre-crisis levels and thus there still appears to be further room to lower spending. Revenue measures to consider include improving the performance of value-added taxes (VATs), for example by eliminating exemptions and reduced rates; in some countries, raising tobacco and alcohol excises to the advanced G20 average; and increasing property taxes in European countries to the level in other advanced countries. For the United States and Japan, introducing a VAT and raising the rate, respectively, could become significant sources of additional revenue.

statutory retirement ages to life expectancy and improving the efficiency of health care spending. Thus far, only a few governments have recently take steps in this direction. While rolling back deficits, governments will need to protect the most vulnerable segments of society.<sup>22</sup>

Fiscal consolidation should alleviate any undue pressure for longer-term interest rates to rise as the global economy approaches full potential output. Existing empirical evidence suggests that a lower debt ratio in advanced economies, equivalent to 10 percentage points of GDP, might lower equilibrium interest rates by at least 30 basis points over the long term, with a few estimates going as high as 100 basis points. The IMF staff estimates in Chapter 3 are close to the lower bound of this range. With plenty of excess capacity, real interest rates are presently not a relevant constraint on private investment. However, this may change, although a case for major, public-debt driven increases in rates beyond precrisis averages is far from evident considering the following.<sup>23</sup>

- In many advanced economies, absent major policy initiatives to raise potential output, household saving rates are likely to be higher than before the crisis and investment lower, in line with potential output.
- In key emerging economies, saving surpluses are forecast to continue to rise (see Figure 1.17). The gap between saving and investment in emerging Asia, following a recent contraction, would widen to above precrisis levels, if measured as a share of advanced economies' GDP.

Thus, to some extent features of the precrisis “savings glut” are going to remain in place. However, this should not induce advanced economies to postpone the adoption of measures that reduce fiscal deficits over the medium term. Waiting with fiscal consolidation in advanced economies until emerging economies have boosted internal demand increases downside risks, as can illustrated with the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (Box 1.4).

### **Monetary Policy Should Stay Accommodative in Many Economies**

Given subdued inflation and prospects for fiscal consolidation, monetary conditions should remain highly accommodative for the foreseeable future in most advanced economies. If downside risks to growth materialize, monetary policy would be the first line of defense.

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<sup>22</sup>For details on measures to support the unemployed, including their reintegration into labor markets, see Chapter 3 of the April 2010 *World Economic Outlook*.

<sup>23</sup>Measuring real interest rates raises a number of problems. IMF staff estimates suggest that long-term real interest rates were somewhat below the long-term historical average—commonly estimated at about 2½ percent—during the decade before the crisis.

At present, because of near-zero policy rates, central banks in key advanced economies would again have to rely on balance sheet expansion or changes in balance sheet composition to ease financial conditions. Although difficult to predict with great confidence, targeted “qualitative easing” measures are likely to be more effective than “quantitative easing” measures, given the still-weak state of banks, the disrepair in selected financial markets, and generally elevated volatility. To put it differently, risk premiums across markets should probably be of greater concern to policymakers than levels of long-term government bond rates. Central banks in emerging economies have more room for interest rate cuts, if needed.

Looking further ahead, monetary policy will have to carefully consider the implications of fiscal consolidation and key financial sector trends for inflation. A number of governments are planning revenue increases, notably from indirect taxes. Past experience in advanced economies suggests that central banks typically were less accommodative of revenue than of expenditure measures to cut deficits (see Chapter 3). In the face of weak labor markets, a long-term trend toward more job-friendly wage setting, and some labor market reforms, significant inflationary effects of sales tax hikes on wages appear unlikely in the current economic environment, and thus central banks can afford a more accommodative response. At the same time, risk premiums and financial intermediation costs can be expected to stay more elevated after the crisis. Other things unchanged, both trends would call for greater monetary accommodation.

Monetary policy requirements are diverse for emerging and developing economies. Some of the larger, fast-growing emerging economies, faced with rising inflation or asset price pressures, have appropriately tightened monetary conditions, and markets are pricing in some further moves (see Figure 1.11). Central banks in emerging and developing economies must be alert for second-round effects on wages from higher food prices or upside surprises to energy prices. Risks are more elevated in economies that have had a history of unstable inflation or that are operating closer to capacity. By the same token, if downside risks to global growth materialize, there may need to be a swift policy reversal. Looking further ahead, falling risk premiums would call for tighter monetary policy stances, other things remaining unchanged.

### **Exchange Rate Policies Should Support Global Demand Rebalancing**

In emerging economies with excessive external surpluses, monetary tightening should be supported with exchange rate appreciation as excess demand pressures build. In this regard, exchange rate instability and overshooting remain important concerns for many emerging economies. However, improvements in fundamentals in many of these economies relative to those of advanced economies are consistent with a long-term appreciation of their currencies.

The challenge for emerging economies is to determine the extent to which changes in exchange rates bring them in line with fundamentals. Such an assessment would have to be made on a case-by-case basis.

- If exchange rate overshooting and falling competitiveness become concerns, countries should consider reducing fiscal deficits to ease pressure on interest rates, some buildup of reserves, and possibly imposing some restrictions on capital inflows or removing controls on outflows. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, some countries in Latin America fall into this category. However, the restrictions on capital inflows appear to be second-best responses and it will be important to deploy suitable regulatory and supervisory responses, as is being done in some countries, to obtain more durable protection against speculative excesses.
- If exchange rates are undervalued from a medium-term perspective, then nominal appreciation should be part of the policy response to inflows. This applies to a number of countries in emerging Asia (discussed further in Chapter 2) and, in some respects, presents a problem that might best be addressed by collective action taken in a coordinated manner. Nonetheless, where inflows are associated with sector-specific overheating, targeted macroprudential measures to address the specific risks can play a useful supplementary role.

Taking a medium-term perspective, economies should continue to strengthen their prudential frameworks and open up sectors to domestic and foreign direct investment, with a view to creating opportunities for productive use of incoming capital. This will help fight speculative excesses and reduce the need for macroprudential interventions, including restrictions on capital inflows. As far as the latter are concerned, their objective should be to ensure a productive use of capital. However, determining what is productive and what is not can be a challenge. Also, relatively little is known about the effectiveness and efficiency of macroprudential measures and capital controls beyond the very short term.

### **Structural Reforms to Support Growth and Rebalancing**

Structural policies to develop productive potential and support global demand rebalancing are essential to forging a sustainable recovery. A detailed discussion of the challenges, which are very complex, lies beyond the scope of this report.<sup>24</sup> Requirements will vary both across and within the groups of advanced and emerging economies.

High and persistent unemployment poses a major policy challenge in many advanced economies. Aside from accommodative macroeconomic policies and financial sector repair

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<sup>24</sup>For further discussion, see, for example, OECD, “Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2010,” or World Bank, World Development Report 2010 (and earlier years).

(to facilitate access to credit by the many small and medium-size enterprises that account for most employment), labor and product market policies could enhance growth and job creation and reduce high unemployment over the medium term. Labor market reforms that could increase employment include: (1) measures that eliminate two-tier labor markets by lowering protection afforded to workers on permanent contracts, while raising protection available to those with temporary contracts; (2) measures to facilitate job searching, skills matching, and labor mobility; (3) better access to training and education to support ongoing sectoral changes; (4) well-designed employment subsidies for vulnerable groups (the long-term unemployed or the young) to help accelerate their reintegration into the labor market. Complementary product market reforms could strengthen the employment effects by boosting labor demand and real wages through greater competition and lower markups on prices.

Many emerging and developing economies have successfully concluded first-generation reforms that improved macroeconomic policy frameworks, strengthening their resilience to macroeconomic shocks. However, to further raise potential growth and employment efforts could usefully focus on simplifying product and services market regulation, raising human capital, and building critical infrastructure.

In key emerging Asian economies, the removal of distortions that drive high household or corporate saving rates and deter investment in nontradable sectors could boost domestically led growth, as demand from major advanced economies stays below precrisis trends. This could be helped with further deregulation and reform of financial sectors and corporate governance, as well as stronger social safety nets. Even with the rapid progress under way, however, such reforms will take some time to bear major fruit.<sup>25</sup>

### **Helping Developing Economies Cope with Potentially Tighter Financing Constraints**

Thanks to stronger policy frameworks, growth in the world's poorer economies is projected to return to around 6 percent in 2010–11, which is appreciably higher than during the 1990s. Encouragingly, foreign investors have not taken wholesale flight from developing economies, as evidenced, for example, by recovering equity markets, sovereign spreads that returned close to precrisis levels, and successful bond issuances (e.g., by Senegal in December 2009).

However, some developing economies could face the prospect of scarcer and costlier capital. With tighter capital markets, these economies will need to increasingly rely on domestic sources of funding. This puts a premium on financial development. Additionally, there is a need for supplementing traditional financing with innovative forms of finance such

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<sup>25</sup>For further information, see IMF, Spring 2010 Regional Economic Outlook for Asia; or, for China specifically, IMF Country Report No. 10/238.

as risk-mitigation guarantees; public-private partnerships; and South-South investments.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, initiatives should be taken to improve poor countries' market access, e.g., extending 100 percent duty-free and quota-free access to the Least Developed Countries with liberal rules of origin. Improved market access for poor countries would have to be complemented with a strengthening of trade facilitation and aid-for-trade programs to enhance these countries' trade capacity.

### **Policy Coordination Has Major Benefits**

Much progress has been made through coordination in alleviating liquidity strains and rebuilding confidence. Key actions—large interest rates cuts and unconventional monetary measures, financial support from the IMF and other international financial institutions, and global fiscal stimulus—all have involved international policy coordination.

The quality of coordination will now have to change. Accommodative macroeconomic policies and support for the financial sector were necessary to avoid costly, chaotic adjustments in response to structural shocks that, ultimately, will need to be met with fundamental reforms. The challenge ahead is to put in place these fundamental reforms in a coordinated manner. Unlike during the height of the crisis, the measures that are required now differ across countries. They will need to encourage less public demand in the advanced economies, more domestic demand in key emerging economies, and further financial sector repair and reform. A separate IMF report for the G-20 Mutual Assessment Program finds that the adoption of growth friendly medium-term fiscal consolidation programs by advanced economies, policies to rebalance demand in emerging economies, and structural reforms to boost potential output everywhere would raise global GDP by 2½ percent over the medium term.<sup>27</sup> Hence, policy coordination can have major benefits again, as it did at the height of the crisis.

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<sup>26</sup>See the “G20 and Global Development” report prepared by staff of the World Bank for the G-20 Mutual Assessment Process, G-20 Toronto Summit, Toronto, Canada, June 26–27, 2010.

<sup>27</sup>See G-20 Mutual Assessment Process—Alternative Policy Scenarios, G-20 Toronto Summit, Toronto, Canada, June 26–27, 2010.

### **Box 1.1. Does Slow Growth in Advanced Economies Necessarily Imply Slow Growth in Emerging Economies?**

The world economy has only recently begun to emerge from the deepest recession since World War II. In advanced economies, recoveries are predicted to be unusually sluggish compared with recoveries following previous recessions, with households and financial institutions seeking to repair balance sheets, credit growth constrained, and persistent demand and employment uncertainty.

What are the prospects for emerging economies? It has long been assumed that the fortunes of emerging economies follow those of advanced economies—when the United States sneezes, it has been said, the rest of the world catches cold. This view would imply that emerging economies are now likely to experience a period of below-average growth.

But is this assumption correct? This box reviews the growth of emerging economies in the aftermath of previous advanced economy recessions. A striking fact emerges: emerging economies have performed better after more recent advanced economy recessions than after those in the 1970s and 1980s. This fact holds across different measures of performance. However, emerging economies have also become more highly correlated with advanced economies over time. One explanation that might reconcile these dichotomous trends is improved domestic policies in emerging economies that have improved their resilience to shocks, even while increased integration has made them more correlated with advanced economy business cycles.

The analysis examines four recessions in advanced economies: 1974–75, 1980–82, 1990–93, and 2001. These dates are closely aligned with U.S. recessions identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).<sup>28</sup> All were significant downturns at a global level, with the majority of advanced economies experiencing outright recession during the first three episodes.<sup>29</sup>

Tracking emerging economy performance in the wake of major advanced economy recessions requires clear metrics. Real GDP is an obvious measure of macroeconomic performance, but relative to what? One reference point is the economy's own growth rate before the crisis—that is, was the economy able to bounce back with above-average growth in the immediate aftermath of the recession, or did it experience a period of below-average growth? This can be measured by calculating the difference between the economy's average

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The authors of this box are Jörg Decressin, Alasdair Scott, and Petia Topalova.

<sup>28</sup>The NBER identified separate recessions in 1980 and 1981–1982, but these are collapsed here into a single episode.


<sup>29</sup>For this reason, we extend the period of the 1990 recession to include 1992 and 1993, during which time many advanced economies were in recession.

growth rate in the three years after the recession and its average growth rate three years before that recession. These measures are termed “growth differences.” Another approach is to gauge how much output was lost as a result of the shock, which is estimated by calculating for each economy the difference between the level of output three years after the recession and the level of output implied by extrapolating a trend based on the seven years of output growth leading in to the recession. These measures are termed “level differences.” A third metric is the state of the world economy in the aftermath of the recession—that is, how well did each economy cope with the shock relative to the rest of the world? This involves calculating the difference between average growth rates during three years after the recession for a given emerging economy and the average growth rates over the same period in the (purchasing-power-parity (PPP)-weighted) average of advanced economy growth. These measures are termed “relative growth.”

Using these measures to examine real GDP data for emerging economies during the aftermath of the four advanced economy recessions considered here reveals an intriguing pattern:<sup>30</sup> the performance of emerging economies has improved after each subsequent advanced economy recession (first figure). For emerging economies as a whole, growth three years after the recessions of 1990–93 and 2001 exceeded growth three years before. In terms of levels of output, emerging economies actually experienced output *gains* relative to their precrisis trends after the 2001

### Emerging Economies Performance after Advanced Economy Recessions

(Percentage points unless noted otherwise)




Source: IMF staff calculations.

<sup>30</sup>The emerging economies are grouped as follows: Asia (China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand); Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru); Others (Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Israel, Morocco, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey). Advanced economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. The set of advanced economies is based on the *World Economic Outlook* industrial countries classification as of 1990. The set of emerging economies follows *The Economist* magazine grouping, with the addition of Argentina and Venezuela. Note that some economies that are currently classified as advanced were emerging during the earlier years under study here and are, for comparability, retained in the set of emerging economies (Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Taiwan Province of China). Each group is aggregated using PPP weights.

recession. And there was stronger growth in these economies than in advanced economies in the aftermath of the recessions. By contrast, the growth performance of emerging economies was poor after the earlier recessions of 1974–75 and 1980–82, with a substantial implied output loss. In these cases, emerging economies caught pneumonia when advanced economies fell sick. But such vulnerability is much less apparent in recent years.

One argument is that emerging economies have performed better because they have “decoupled.”<sup>31</sup> But many studies point to increasing integration of emerging economies into global trade and capital markets, which seems to contradict the decoupling hypothesis. And a shared theme in the economic histories of many emerging economies is a move away from highly directed, domestically oriented economies and toward increased market liberalization and openness to foreign competition in goods and capital. This pattern is supported by a simple calculation of rolling correlations between the detrended aggregate output of advanced and emerging economies (second figure).<sup>32</sup> These correlations steadily increased over time, accelerating in recent years—if anything, emerging economies are more “coupled” with advanced economies than ever.

**Correlation of Advanced and Emerging Economy Output**  
(Rolling correlations, 20-year window, window-end-years on x-axis)



Source: IMF staff calculations.

How can we reconcile that emerging economies seem to be more dependent on advanced economies but have managed nonetheless to be less affected by their recessions? One possibility is that improved macroeconomic management may have helped insulate emerging economies from the worst effects of recent advanced economy recessions. Empirical evidence suggests that economies with weaker external balances were particularly vulnerable to the recent crisis, and that economies that were particularly dependent on bank lending instead of foreign investment were susceptible to rapid capital outflows.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, analysis of the four episodes considered here shows that the current account balance at the onset of the advanced economy recession is a significant indicator of subsequent performance. Narrative evidence suggests that emerging economies

<sup>31</sup>The view was prominently articulated by Goldman Sachs in the early 2000s.

<sup>32</sup>As is common, the series is detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter. The filter passes through the variation in the series at business cycle frequencies (and higher) and removes low frequencies (i.e., very gradual shifts in underlying trends).

<sup>33</sup>See Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010); Walsh (2009); Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010); and Claessens and others (2010).

are now more flexible, and, as such, have been more resilient to foreign shocks. For example, flexible exchange rates helped to preserve competitiveness and allow trade to bounce back quickly following the downturn in the early 2000s, and capital inflows have been much less affected in recent episodes.

It could also be that the apparent pattern of better emerging economy performance over time is simply random, having more to do with the nature of the shocks that generated more recent recessions than any underlying trend to greater resilience. Unfortunately, from a statistical point of view, there are too few recession episodes and too many potential explanations to be able to rigorously test the various hypotheses. But there are good reasons to think that emerging economies' strong performance may persist.

### Box 1.2. Dismal Prospects for the Real Estate Sector

Real estate markets have been a source of strength during past recoveries, but this time is different. In many advanced economies, household sector deleveraging and the process of reallocating resources away from the construction sector will act as a drag on economic activity. In the United Kingdom and the United States, these problems are serious enough to raise concerns that there will be a “double dip” in the housing market. In some economies, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, real estate markets are rebounding, but a fear of overheating is leading to policy responses that are likely to keep these markets from providing a boost to near-term growth.

#### *Recent developments in real estate markets*

The real estate boom between 2002 and 2007 was synchronized, but the subsequent bust is not. Broadly speaking, economies fall into two clusters (first figure):<sup>34</sup>

- *Bust economies:* In the vast majority of economies, house prices are continuing to fall or are gradually stabilizing, which translates into a fall in both gross value added (GVA) in the construction sector and residential investment. In these economies house prices have fallen by over 10 percent a year since 2007, after rising about 8½ percent annually between 2000 and 2007. The cumulative decline in residential investment since 2007 is nearly 30 percent.
- *Rebound economies:* Several economies in the Asia-Pacific region, joined by most Scandinavian countries and Canada, are seeing a rebound in house prices and residential investment and a stabilization in construction GVA.

The rebound economies were those with better post-crisis growth prospects and better growth outcomes (second figure). Another factor influencing the cross-country variation in housing market outcomes since 2007 was the extent of the boom that preceded the bust. The greater the boom, the greater the subsequent fall (third figure).<sup>35</sup>


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The main authors of this box are Deniz Igan and Prakash Loungani. Philippe Bracke and Jair Rodriguez provided research assistance.

<sup>34</sup>A third group of economies lies in between. In this small group of economies (comprised of Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Israel, and Switzerland), house prices have modestly increased—by about 2 percent annually compared to a 2½ percent annual increase between 2000 and 2007—and residential investment has been flat.

<sup>35</sup>Policy interventions to support recovery in housing, long-term growth prospects and the debt burden on households are other possible explanations for the cross-country variation in real estate market outcomes.

**Asynchronized Adjustment<sup>1</sup>**




Sources: National sources; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Global Property Guide*; and IMF staff calculations.


<sup>1</sup>Rebound economies are Australia, Canada, China, Finland, Hong Kong SAR, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden. Bust economies are Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. House prices in Germany and Japan have been in decline for an extended period, so these countries are not included here.

<sup>2</sup>Residential investment data is only for advanced economies.

**GDP Prospects and Growth: Housing Rebound versus Bust Economies (Percent)**



**Cross-Country Differences**



Source: IMF staff calculations.  
<sup>1</sup>GVA = gross value added.


### *Collapse of residential investment in advanced economies*

In advanced economies, a feature of the real estate cycle over the past decade that differs sharply from past cycles is enhanced access to credit. Easy monetary conditions and financial innovation gave households greater access to credit and led to a buildup in leverage. The process of deleveraging could make the macroeconomic impact of this housing bust greater than during past busts. Moreover, household sector deleveraging proceeds at a much slower pace than corporate or financial sector deleveraging. This is because the largest portion of household balance sheets on both the asset and the liability side tends to be real estate, which is more difficult to sell off in a fire-sale than bonds and equities. Therefore, the recovery is likely to be slower than in recessions triggered by problems related to corporate balance sheets.

For countries such as Spain and Ireland there is an additional reason to expect slow recovery. The feedback loop between credit and collateral prices created construction booms, significantly distorting the allocation of economic activity. As a result, the construction sector grew disproportionately to other sectors of the economy and became the engine of growth in these economies. The share of construction in total value added stood at 12 percent in Spain and 10 percent in Ireland by the end of 2006, compared to the euro area average of just under 7 percent. The housing bust thus brought severe contraction in construction output and employment.<sup>36</sup> The unemployment rate is now three times its 2000–07 average in Ireland and twice its 2000–07 average in Spain, compared with a 20 percent increase on average among euro area countries. Reallocation of labor away from construction is likely to take considerable period of time, which will keep unemployment rates stubbornly high (Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal, 2009).

The fourth figure compares the paths of two major household-sector components for GDP, namely, consumption and residential investment, around house price cycle peaks in the current cycle and in previous cycles. For advanced economies as a whole, after a

**Advanced Economies: Previous versus Current Housing Cycles<sup>1</sup>**



Sources: Haver Analytics; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

<sup>1</sup>House price cycle peaks are dated for each country separately. All series are indexed to equal 100 at the peak date. The series shown under previous cycles is the average index value for all countries around all peaks except the most recent one.




<sup>36</sup>In general, there appears to be a relationship between pre-crisis real estate activity levels and the post-crisis economic performance: the higher the residential investment as a proportion of GDP in 2006, the larger the peak-to-trough drop in real GDP.

sizable initial decline, private consumption is reverting to the path evident in previous housing cycles. However, the path for residential investment is starkly different in this cycle than in the past. Residential investment does not appear likely to come back anytime soon, especially given the outlook for house prices. Historically, residential investment has been positively correlated with residential property price appreciation, with a cross-country average correlation coefficient of 0.3. If the gap between current house prices and their fundamental values based on an econometric model were to be corrected over the next five years in all advanced economies, real house prices would fall at an annual rate of between 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent on average between 2010 and 2015.<sup>37</sup> Hence, residential investment could remain depressed for several more years.

### *Double dip in U.K. and U.S. real estate markets?*

Comparing current and past housing cycles in the United States reinforces these observations (fifth figure). Residential investment remains severely depressed compared to past cycles, which can at least partially be explained by the pattern in house prices and household outstanding debt. The bleak outlook for house prices slows deleveraging for the household sector as mortgages remain underwater (with debt exceeding the market value of the property). The problem is compounded because, in this recession, U.S. states where the house price bust was more pronounced are also where unemployment has increased the most. This relationship likely reflects the importance of the construction sector in these states' economies as well as lower labor mobility resulting from problems in the housing sector.

**United States: Previous versus Current Housing Cycles**





Sources: Haver Analytics; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and IMF, *International Financial Statistics*

<sup>37</sup>It is hard to predict when the correction in real estate markets will be complete. Historically, downturns last roughly four years, suggesting that the current downturn could be over in the next two years. However, given that the duration of the latest upturn was 2.6 times that of historical upturns, the correction could last for the next eight years. The calculations in the text are based on a middle ground assumption that the correction will be complete in five years. The econometric model posits real house price growth to be a function of (1) changes in per capita disposable income, working-age population, construction costs, and credit and equity prices; and (2) the level of short-term and long-term interest rates.

In both the United Kingdom and the United States, tax measures temporarily increased activity, but housing demand fell and prices receded after the recent expiration of these incentives (sixth figure). Although this was anticipated, the drop was larger than expected. Especially in the United States, given the limited success of mortgage modification programs and the shadow inventory from foreclosures and delinquencies, this has renewed fears of a “double dip” in real estate markets.<sup>38</sup> A lot will depend on the path of economic recovery: if employment creation remains low, risks of a double dip in housing naturally increase.

There are other threats to the fragile stabilization in these two real estate markets. First, delinquency rates on commercial mortgage-backed securities have recently reached record highs, and considerable amounts of commercial real estate debt will become due over the next few years.<sup>39</sup> Second, resets on adjustable-rate loans are looming on the horizon. Refinancing options are limited, despite historically low mortgage rates, because many of these loans are underwater or have higher-than-original balances due to negative amortization and because borrowers face a depressed labor market.<sup>40</sup> Third, renewed strain on credit conditions may materialize from loan losses due to delinquencies, which still have not reached their peak, and higher capital and liquidity requirements in the context of new financial regulations.

#### Tax Relief to the Rescue?



Sources: Haver Analytics; Investment Property Databank; Moody's; and IMF staff calculations.  
<sup>1</sup>Residential real estate index for the United States is the Case-Shiller index. Residential real estate index for the United Kingdom is the Halifax index.

<sup>38</sup>In addition to the 2.3 million homes that are already in foreclosure, an estimated 3.3 million properties are at risk because they have been in default for 60 days or more. This estimate does not include modified loans, for which re-default rates reach 50 percent within a year of modification. On top of that, some of the 5 million underwater mortgages may strategically default if prices do not recover. All in all, the shadow inventory of houses for sale may reach 7 million, against a historical absorption of 700,000 units a year overall in the U.S. housing market.

<sup>39</sup>In the United States, \$566 billion in commercial real estate debt, the majority of which was provided by banks, comes due in 2010 and 2011, according to Foresight Analytics, LLC. In the United Kingdom, about £160 billion in commercial property debt will mature over the next five years.

<sup>40</sup>In the United States, the total balance of loans that will experience a payment shock because of interest rate adjustments is expected to peak sometime around mid-2011, reaching \$18 billion, according to Amherst Securities.

### *Another bubble in Asia and the Pacific?*

Several economies in the Asia-Pacific region, Canada, and most Scandinavian countries have experienced a rebound in real estate prices and residential investment since 2009. Will this rebound continue? In many of the advanced economies in this group, current price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios are still above historical averages, and econometric estimates still show a deviation of house prices from fundamental values. For the emerging market economies in this group (namely, China, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore), fundamentals appear to provide more support for the observed price increases, mainly due to strong growth prospects. But the econometric estimates are less reliable for these economies than for the advanced economies because data are available for only a fairly short period. More anecdotal evidence—reports of speculative activity, rising vacancy rates in commercial property, sizable mortgage credit growth, and massive capital inflows, especially in China—suggest that these real estate markets may be overheating. In China, deviation of house prices from fundamentals is estimated to be higher in Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen than in other cities (Ahuja and Porter, 2010).

In some cases, the rebound may be the result of policy measures put in place to help economic recovery during the crisis. For example, in China, tax incentives for home buyers and encouragement to banks to keep extending credit for real estate purchases coincided with the strong rebound in market activity. More recently, some governments in the region have taken measures to tame real estate markets. The Chinese government deployed a range of regulatory tools in the spring of 2010, including increases in transaction taxes and stricter controls on lending. The government will need to evaluate the impact of these measures over time and to fine-tune them to keep risks in check while avoiding excessive restraint on real estate investment.

To summarize, in contrast to past recoveries, there appears to be little hope for a sustained upside boost to the overall economy from the real estate sector. In economies where real estate markets are still in decline, the drag on real activity will continue. And in economies where house prices and residential investment are rebounding, concern about bubbles are eliciting policy actions that will temper any short-term boost to economic activity.

### **Box 1.3. Inferring Potential Output from Noisy Data: The Global Projection Model View**

The sluggish output growth experienced during the recovery to date has brought increasing attention to whether this is merely demand deficiency—a large, negative output gap—or whether much of it could be because trend output—otherwise known as potential output—has shifted downward.

This question is a perennial one, not the least because estimating potential output is a challenging task; for policy institutions, however, it is critical. The *growth rate* of potential output pins down for fiscal authorities and lawmakers how an economy’s tax base is likely to expand. It also establishes a baseline for GDP growth for forecasters and provides a benchmark for market watchers to interpret the flow of data in real time. The *level* of potential output defines the point toward which the economy should be expected to gravitate over the indefinite future and provides an estimate of incipient inflationary or deflationary pressures. This box reviews some issues associated with the measurement of potential output and outlines one method, among several, that is used by the IMF staff as an input for the *World Economic Outlook* (WEO), as well as for other purposes.

Intrinsically, potential output is unobservable; it must be inferred from the movement of actual output, either on its own or in conjunction with the comovements of associated variables. One popular approach is to use univariate time-series methods, such as split time trends and the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter. These have the advantage of simplicity and replicability, but disadvantages include the limited information that univariate methods employ, the inconsistency of “prefiltered” estimates because they are not estimated jointly with the forecast model in which they are used, and the sensitivity of the estimates to the data at the end of the sample.<sup>41</sup> The end-of-sample sensitivity of many detrending methods is a special case of the broader issue of how alternative methods respond to additions to data sets and revisions to existing data. All else equal, a user would prefer estimates of output gaps that are not significantly revised with the receipt of new data.<sup>42</sup>

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The main author of this box is Robert Tetlow. Petar Manchev provided research assistance.

<sup>41</sup>Box 1.3 from the October 2008 *World Economic Outlook* provides some discussion of the end-of-sample problem associated with, in this instance, the H-P filter.

<sup>42</sup>A univariate filter does not recognize a cycle until it is over. With multivariate methods, the more that the comovements of associated variables can pick up turning points in the cycle in real time, the less the addition of new observations will change prior estimates.

## The Global Projection Model

The Global Projection Model (GPM), a nonlinear, forward-looking, multicountry model formulated by the IMF's Research Department, includes a block that computes estimates of potential output and the associated output gap. The block is a member of a class of models called "unobserved components models," so called because their task is to split the observable variable output into two unobservables, the output gap and potential output. Potential output, in turn, is driven by permanent shocks to the level of potential and temporary (but possibly long-lasting) shocks to the growth rate of potential output. The model keys off of observables like output itself, as well as inflation, long-term inflation expectations, unemployment, and capacity utilization, to infer what potential output is likely to be.

The idea is best illustrated with a concrete example: conventional wisdom says firms respond to short-run fluctuations in sales by adjusting labor input, from which it follows that product market gaps are linked to labor market gaps, a nexus known as Okun's law. It follows that if output is rising and unemployment is falling, firms are facing increasing demand. If, however, output is rising and unemployment is flat or rising, firms are augmenting sales without increasing employment, and thus their costs must be falling so that a supply-side improvement is likely at work. Of course, in practice, matters are not so clean-cut. The relationship between unemployment and output is loose and dynamic. The linkage shows variation over stages of the cycle and over time more broadly. And the interpretation of changes in labor input that emerge from fluctuations in labor force participation and the average work week can differ from those stemming from changes in employment.

For this reason, GPM's estimates of potential output are conditioned on three variables, other than output itself. The first of these is unemployment operating through Okun's law, as just discussed. A second source of information is capacity utilization. If output is down because of a negative demand shock, production falls much more than industrial capacity, opening a substantial capacity-utilization gap. But if the shock is to productivity, the desired capital stock would fall and, accordingly, capital investment would also fall, reducing business capacity. Thus, a capacity-utilization gap that is disproportionately small *given the observed decline in output* signals a negative supply shock. The third indicator is inflation. At the crux of the Phillips curve is the notion that for inflation to be stable over time, there must be neither excess demand nor excess supply. As it happens, the influence of excess demand on inflation is a weak one, with a variety of other forces also at work, and thus inflation's role in pinning down potential output in GPM is often dominated by other factors.


The virtue of this system is its consistency, flexibility, and ability to render not just estimates of unobservables but measures of uncertainty around those estimates. But it is not a panacea. Consider the first figure which shows 90 percent confidence intervals for both year-over-year growth and the level of potential output in the United States. The green line in the

bottom panel showing the actual data is well outside the confidence interval, indicating that it is statistically safe to conclude that the current output gap is negative, an inference that is often difficult to make in more normal times. More generally, the figure exhibits noteworthy in-sample precision, but the bands widen substantially during the forecast period.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, while we can say that it is likely that the level of potential output in the United States will be higher in the future than it is currently, we cannot say much more than that with great confidence. Clearly, even in this instance where we are taking the model of potential output as given, there is a lot of uncertainty and considerable room for debate regarding the “best” projection for potential.

### Models as characterizations of the data

The evolution over time of estimates of potential output expresses how the user sees the incidence of shocks: smooth, deterministic time trends suggest that the user believes that supply shocks are rare and easily identifiable in real time. A volatile, stochastic process signals a view that supply shocks are an important source of business cycle fluctuations.<sup>44</sup> It is in this context that how the recent financial crisis is interpreted is important. The smooth-trends view represents the belief that the precrisis trend is sustainable and points directly to demand management policies to move actual output to that trend. The stochastic view entertains the notion that the crisis and its aftermath may have

### GPM Estimates of Potential Output in the United States with 90 Percent Confidence Bands<sup>1</sup>



<sup>43</sup>The block is estimated using a systems approach with Bayesian methods and the Kalman filter. This allows for potential output to be estimated simultaneously with two other unobservables, the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), and the equilibrium capacity-utilization rate. In the figures, the path for potential growth is the two-sided estimate from the Kalman smoother. In-sample confidence intervals are asymptotic estimates computed from the inverse of the model’s Hessian matrix.


<sup>44</sup>Two polar cases are represented by a simple time trend representing the highly Keynesian view that supply shocks play no significant role in the business cycle, and a view that all fluctuations in output are equilibrium phenomena, encompassing the real business cycle view that all shocks are supply shocks.

shifted potential downward, which would call for somewhat less activist policies on the demand side but perhaps more policy actions to boost aggregate supply.<sup>45</sup>

The top panel of the second figure illustrates the issue for the United States and the euro area. In both panels, the dark blue line captures the precrisis view of the (indexed) level of trend output as measured by a H-P filter to 2007 and then projected forward.<sup>46</sup> The other lines show estimates from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the WEO, and either the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or European Commission (EC), as applicable. The light blue line is from the GPM model. As is the case for the CBO and OECD estimates, GPM says potential output has fallen significantly below what the precrisis estimate would have been. At the same time, the GPM projections show some tendency to revert to a higher level; indeed, although it is not apparent from the chart, the GPM path implies a lasting effect on the level of potential output from the crisis, but no permanent effect on the growth rate. The output gaps that are implied by these estimates of potential are shown in the bottom panel. Taken together, these estimates suggest that the data had a substantial influence on estimates of potential and the ensuing output gaps regardless of the model, as indicated by the substantial vertical distance between the black line and the other lines in both figures. At the same time, all three estimates currently show substantial excess supply—that is, large negative output gaps—for both countries.

These estimates are a snapshot taken at a given point in time; it is also interesting to examine how estimates change with the receipt of new data. The third figure shows the evolution of estimates of potential output growth and the output gap during the late 1990s boom in the United States as measured by the GPM and the CBO. What makes this an interesting period to study is that, with hindsight, we know that the boom was driven by

### Estimates of Real Potential Output and Output Gap



<sup>45</sup>Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) provide evidence to suggest that financial crises may produce highly persistent reductions in output. See also Chapter 4 of the October 2008 *World Economic Outlook*.


<sup>46</sup>Pre-crisis historical estimates and forecasts from the OECD, WEO and the CBO or EC are similar to the applicable HP trend line path shown in dark blue in the figure.

persistent shocks to productivity.<sup>47</sup> Three vintages are shown, one before the boom was manifest, one as the boom crested, and the latest vintage.<sup>48</sup>

A homily of monetary economics is that central banks should work against demand shocks and accommodate supply shocks. How did the two models assess the incoming data? Were there substantial revisions to the historical record? As might be expected, there were significant upward revisions to the estimates of potential growth for both models. However, the CBO tended to shift potential growth more or less uniformly; that is, revisions affected both forecast growth and backcast. In contrast, the GPM revisions (top-left panel) varied more from date to date and affected forecast growth more so than backcast growth. The implications of this for real-time output gaps (right-hand panels) show that the GPM estimates of the output gap changed only modestly with the receipt of new data, whereas the CBO gaps changed substantially with revisions going back several years. To the extent that policy design depends on reliable real-time estimates of excess demand, this is a noteworthy observation.<sup>49</sup>

We have already noted the substantial changes in estimated potential growth since the onset of the financial crisis. The fourth figure decomposes the contributions to the change for 2010:Q2, relative to before the crisis in 2007:Q2. Not surprisingly, potential output growth has shifted downward, and a contributor to the change

### Evolution of Real-Time Estimates of Potential Output in the United States during the Late 1990s




<sup>47</sup>Tetlow and Ironside (2007) document the difficulties the U.S. Federal Reserve Board staff had in tracking potential output growth in the late 1990s. Other forecasters found the period similarly challenging.

<sup>48</sup>The end of the vintage sample period is shown by the appropriate vertical line. In fact, GPM has only been in service a few months. To construct these real-time GPM estimates for the figures in this box, we downloaded real-time data sets from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's ALFRED database and estimated the model for each vintage of data. It is always possible that the model we would have used in history might have differed from the one we use now. The CBO estimates are genuine real-time estimates using whatever methodology the CBO used at the time.

<sup>49</sup>The literature on the pitfalls of the use of unreliable real-time estimates of the output gap is huge. See, for example, Orphanides (1999).

in view was the collapse in GDP growth. The data on unemployment actually reduces potential output, and thus shrinks the absolute output gap slightly, because to the model the recent turnaround in unemployment from its peak earlier in the year was early; the model therefore infers that more of the decline in output must originate from the supply side. With some manipulation, the first two bars of the chart can be used to tease out the contribution of output per worker, a calculation of some interest given the strong growth in output per worker in 2009. The GDP growth contribution and (un)employment contribution approximately cancel out, which amounts to saying that the model sees output per worker in 2009 as a cyclical phenomenon.<sup>50</sup> More intriguing perhaps, given its small share of U.S. GDP, is the very large subtraction from potential growth—making the output gap less negative than otherwise—coming from capacity utilization. The mechanism here is as described above: the financial crisis reduced business fixed investment, and hence total industrial capacity, such that capacity utilization was not as low as would have been expected if the shock were entirely a demand disturbance.

**Decomposition of Revisions to U.S. Real Potential GDP Growth (Percent, Year over Year), as of 2010:Q2**  
(Percentage points; latest *GPM* versus 2007:Q3)



Source: IMF staff calculations.

<sup>50</sup>As it happens, in recent quarters growth in output per worker in the United States has declined substantially.

### Box 1.4. Downside Scenario

The scenario in this box is based on simulations using the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF), a multiregional dynamic general equilibrium model.<sup>51</sup> The scenario starts in 2011 and illustrates that postponing fiscal consolidation in advanced economies until emerging economies have boosted internal demand increases downside risks, in the form of an unfavorable market reaction that raises advanced economies' sovereign and corporate spreads. This in turn forces these economies into large, front-loaded, and ill-targeted fiscal consolidations that take many years to become credible and to bring spreads back down. Throughout, interest rates are assumed constant for two years in the advanced economies and for one year elsewhere, with emerging Asia following a flexible exchange rate regime. The figure shows WEO baselines in light blue (or, when gray-shaded, it shows deviations from WEO baselines).

The first part of the scenario (yellow lines) assumes that emerging Asia uses fiscal and structural policies to stimulate internal demand. It assumes increases of 2 percentage points of baseline GDP in both government investment and transfers targeted to individuals with a high propensity to consume, financed in equal parts by increases in the deficit and in consumption taxes. Domestic structural policies in the region produce an additional 1 percent gain in GDP relative to the baseline by 2014. The combined policies lead to a cumulative domestic output expansion of 2 percent by 2015. They also generate positive trade spillovers, particularly for strong exporters such as Japan and Germany.

Under regular circumstances, this would be only partly offset by higher policy interest rates in advanced economies in response to demand-driven inflation pressures. But because the policies reduce emerging Asia's external surpluses, they also reduce the region's demand for government debt from the advanced economies (emerging Asia has been a particularly heavy investor in U.S. debt). Particularly if accompanied by investor perceptions that advanced economies do not have in place credible medium-term consolidation plans, such a portfolio shock could lead to an increase in sovereign and corporate spreads (blue lines), especially for the United States. The simulation shows the effects of a widening of spreads by over 300 basis points for the United States and by about half as much for other advanced economies. This leads to an output decline of about 3 percent in the United States, with a very slow recovery thereafter, and of about 0.5 percent in other advanced economies.

The increase in borrowing spreads forces large, earlier-than-planned, and highly contractionary fiscal consolidations in the advanced economies starting in 2012.


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The main author of this box is Michael Kumhof.

<sup>51</sup>The GIMF divides the world economy into six regions, as shown in the figure, the United States, the euro area excluding Germany, Germany, Japan, emerging Asia, and remaining countries.

**Downside Scenarios<sup>1</sup>**

(Year on x-axis)



Source: Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) simulations.  
<sup>1</sup>Charts with a gray background depict the deviation of the series from the WEO baseline; charts with a white background depict levels of the series as found in the baseline and alternative scenarios.  
<sup>2</sup>G20 Mutual Assessment Process (G20, 2010).

Consolidations equal 2 percentage points of GDP in the United States and half as much in other advanced economies (red lines). Negative multiplier effects, including spillovers to regions that do not undertake fiscal consolidation, are large for two reasons. First, the cuts are assumed to be chosen on the basis of implementation speed rather than likely impact on output, with 40 percent accounted for by higher labor income taxes, 40 percent by cuts in transfers targeted to individuals with a high propensity to consume, and 20 percent by cuts in government investment. Second, the sudden, forced consolidations are assumed to become

credible only in 2014, so that their beneficial effects on risk premiums are quite gradual. By 2015 most regions are on their way to a full recovery. The exception is the United States, which takes several additional years to recover.

Maximum output losses relative to baseline under this scenario equal almost 4 percent in the United States and about 1 percent in other advanced economies, with emerging Asia experiencing only very small output losses in 2011 and 2012. The current account imbalance between the United States and emerging Asia improves significantly.

These results are of course sensitive to our assumptions about the sizes of shocks. Although there is reasonable agreement on the likely magnitudes and effects of fiscal measures, the likely magnitudes of spread-related shocks are subject to considerable uncertainty. But it seems clear that the negative growth effects of a generalized increase in risk premiums in all advanced economies should be larger than the positive growth effects of higher demand from emerging Asia, except of course for emerging Asia itself. The reason is that the advanced economies account for a very large share of the world economy. For the United States, the difference between the two effects is even larger, given the limited export flows from the United States to emerging Asia.

The policy conclusion from this box is that rebalancing from public to private demand in advanced economies and rebalancing from external to domestic demand in key emerging economies are closely related and that a robust recovery requires that they move ahead together.

## Appendix 1.1. Commodity Market Developments and Prospects


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After rising through early May 2010, commodity prices generally declined in the remainder of the second quarter and have moved sideways since (Figure 1.19, top panel). As a result, the IMF commodity price index in July was only 1 percent above its December 2009 level. These price dynamics have been broadly shared by all the main commodity groups, albeit with some differentiation. In particular, food and beverage prices have recently recovered the losses incurred earlier this year, largely because of a wheat price surge after the downgrading of harvest projections in Russia and some other major exporters.

The price declines in May and June occurred when much of the incoming commodity market data suggested robust or improving demand, as had been expected given forecasts for global growth. The peaking of excess inventories for many cyclical commodities has been another sign of normalization.

Recent commodity price developments were a reminder of the marked effects that broad financial market volatility has had on commodity prices during the global financial crisis and the early recovery. Such volatility spillovers from broader financial markets to commodity markets are not unusual, although their strength has varied depending on the underlying factors. When driven by rapidly changing expectations about future global economic

**Figure 1.19. Commodity and Petroleum Prices**



Sources: Barclays Capital; Bloomberg Financial Markets; and IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>Data are estimates provided by Barclays Capital.

<sup>2</sup>Inflows into exchange-traded products (ETPs) and medium-term notes (MTNs).

<sup>3</sup>The Continuous Commodity Index is a futures contract on a composite of 17 commodity futures prices (equally weighted), which is traded at the New York Board of Trade. Price prospects are based on prices of futures options of August 20, 2010.

prospects, as in May and June of this year, strong volatility spillovers are to be expected, given that commodities are both goods and real assets and that inventory demand is forward looking. Similarly, higher currency market volatility often leads to increased commodity price volatility.

In recent weeks, global financial market conditions have stabilized, as tail risks have been reduced by policy adjustment. Demand should continue to support commodity prices as the global recovery progresses under the baseline projections in this *World Economic Outlook*. In many cases, however, further upward price pressures will likely remain moderate and will be balanced by other forces. Demand growth should slow for some of the more cyclically sensitive commodities, notably metals, as the boost to manufacturing activity from the inventory cycle wanes. Within the broad global context, prospects for activity in China are particularly important for many commodities, given the rapid increase in that economy's share of global commodity demand over the past decade. Moderating growth in China will thus likely be a force on its own in restraining commodity demand expansion. On the supply side, there are still considerable capacity and inventory buffers. The commodity-specific impact of these broad forces will vary, depending on factors such as exposure to demand in China, sensitivity to global manufacturing activity, and the elasticity of supply to price and demand signals.

The recent wheat price surge has not altered this relatively benign near-term outlook. The surge has led to upward revisions in the wheat price projections through 2011, but with larger global wheat inventories now than in 2006–07, the market should be in a better position to absorb this temporary supply shock. Against this backdrop, price spillovers to other major food crops—through substitution linkages on the consumption and supply sides—have been limited so far.

Market expectations mirror this relatively benign near-term commodity market outlook. The probability distributions of future spot prices derived from options contracts suggest that risks remain tilted to the upside, although the probability of another broad-based commodity price spike close to or above 2008 peaks continues to be limited in the near term (Figure 1.19, third panel). The risks for extreme price spikes are primarily related to major disruptions to supply, including for geopolitical and weather-related reasons. Other risk factors include unexpected changes in the pace of the global economic recovery, as well as renewed financial market stress and volatility. Within this broad picture, the vulnerability of wheat markets to further supply disruptions has increased with the supply shocks of this summer, and any further significant shock through the remainder of this harvest year would likely also lead to large spillovers to other major crop prices.

While the near-term commodity market outlook is benign given global cyclical conditions, commodity prices are projected to remain high by historical standards over the medium term, with risks tilted to the upside. The upward shift in commodity demand growth that started some 10 years ago is expected to be sustained as global growth continues to be

driven by growth in emerging and developing economies. A sustained upward shift in commodity demand can lead to long periods of trend increases in real commodity prices because of sluggish supply responses, given long lags for exploration and investment. As discussed in Box 1.5, there is evidence that base metals are in the midst of such a trend upswing after 20 years of trend declines.

### **Oil and Other Energy Markets**

The spot price of one barrel of crude oil in the world market has broadly remained in the \$70–80 range that began to emerge in the fall of 2009, although there has been occasional trading above and below the band. Within the anchor provided by the band, price volatility has remained relatively elevated since concerns over fiscal positions and competitiveness in vulnerable euro area economies intensified in May.

The normalization in physical spot oil markets has continued since the release of the April 2010 *World Economic Outlook*. Oil demand strengthened more than expected in the first half of 2010, primarily reflecting stronger-than-projected global activity and an increase in Chinese oil demand above what would have been expected on the basis of activity. Current data indicate that global oil demand rose by 2.1 million barrels a day (mbd) on an annual basis in the first half of the year, the strongest year-over-year increase since 2004 (Table 1.2). While demand has improved more than expected in advanced as well as emerging and developing economies, the latter still account for virtually all the growth in demand (Figure 1.20, top left panel). In particular, oil demand in China increased by 14 percent in the first half of the year, exceeding real GDP growth by some 3 percentage points. Such divergences between oil demand and broad activity growth in China were observed in the past, notably in early 2004, but they seemed to reflect special factors and remained short-lived. Nevertheless, compared to other cyclically sensitive commodities, notably base metals, advanced economies still account for a relatively larger share of final oil consumption.

Oil production has edged up in the first half of 2010, almost matching the rise in demand. About half the supply increase has been accounted for by rises in total production outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), notwithstanding increasing production declines in the North Sea and Mexico (left middle panel). The turnaround in overall non-OPEC production reflected widespread gains, partly due to the incentives from high prices to ramp up production, including through the greater use of enhanced recovery techniques where feasible. Still-favorable cost conditions on the oil services side have reinforced these incentives.

Increases in OPEC production of natural gas liquids (NGLs), which are not subject to production quotas, have also accounted for a substantial share of the production increases in 2010 (top right panel). OPEC crude oil production in contrast has risen only marginally despite low capacity utilization in some major producers, highlighting the continued need for production curbs to keep prices in the \$70–\$80 range.

Table 1.2. Global Oil Demand and Production by Region  
(millions of barrels per day)

		2008	2009	2010 Proj.	2009 H2	2010 H1	Year-over-year Percent Change							
							2003 - 05 Avg.	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 Proj.	2009 H2	2010 H1
<b>Demand</b>														
Advanced Economies	▼	46.8	44.8	45.0	44.8	45.0	1.2	-0.6	-0.4	-3.5	-4.1	0.3	-2.7	0.3
<i>of which</i>	▼													
United States		19.8	19.1	19.3	19.1	19.3	1.7	-0.5	-0.1	-5.9	-3.7	1.0	-1.4	1.4
Euro Area	▼	11.2	10.5	10.3	10.4	10.3	0.5	-0.3	-1.5	-0.6	-6.0	-1.4	-7.5	-2.9
Japan	▼	4.8	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.4	0.1	-2.4	-3.1	-4.9	-8.8	-2.1	-4.0	0.1
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies	▼	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.7	1.0	2.1	4.5	-1.3	1.9	3.4	5.5	4.6
Emerging and Developing Economies	▼	39.2	39.9	41.6	40.6	41.3	4.1	3.7	4.2	3.0	1.8	4.3	3.6	5.4
<i>of which</i>														
Commonwealth of Independent States	▼	4.2	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.1	0.9	3.3	2.5	2.6	-5.6	4.8	-5.2	5.9
Developing Asia	▼	22.3	23.5	24.5	23.7	24.6	5.1	4.4	5.1	1.8	5.1	4.3	8.7	5.8
China	▼	7.7	8.4	9.1	8.7	9.1	10.3	7.6	4.4	2.5	8.0	9.2	13.3	14.4
India	▼	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.4	2.4	8.3	6.5	4.0	5.6	2.5	6.1	2.5
Middle East and North Africa	▼	8.3	8.5	8.8	8.7	8.7	5.1	3.5	3.6	5.1	3.5	3.5	4.0	4.1
Western Hemisphere	▼	5.6	5.6	5.8	5.7	5.8	2.5	3.8	5.7	5.4	0.0	4.2	0.7	4.6
World	▼	86.0	84.7	86.6	85.4	86.3	2.4	1.2	1.6	-0.6	-1.4	2.2	0.2	2.7
<b>Production</b>														
OPEC (Current Composition) 1/ 2/	▼	35.6	33.3	34.0	33.6	34.1	6.2	0.8	-1.0	2.9	-6.5	2.0	-5.3	3.0
<i>of which</i>														
Saudi Arabia	▼	10.4	9.3	...	9.3	9.4	7.5	-1.2	-4.7	4.2	-10.6	...	-10.6	0.8
Nigeria	▼	2.1	2.1	...	2.2	2.3	6.0	-4.4	-4.7	-8.2	-0.4	...	2.9	16.3
Venezuela	▼	2.6	2.4	...	2.4	2.4	1.6	-5.8	-7.8	-2.0	-7.8	...	-5.9	4.7
Iraq	▼	2.4	2.5	...	2.5	2.4	2.5	4.9	9.9	14.3	2.5	...	6.1	-0.3
Non-OPEC	▼	50.9	51.7	52.6	52.0	52.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.1	1.5	1.6	2.7	2.3
<i>of which</i>														
North America	▼	13.3	13.6	13.7	13.7	13.9	-1.1	0.4	-0.5	-3.8	2.2	...	5.0	2.9
North Sea	▼	4.3	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	-5.7	-7.6	-5.0	-5.1	-4.5	...	-6.1	-6.4
Russia	▼	10.0	10.2	10.5	10.3	10.4	7.7	2.2	2.4	-0.7	2.0	...	2.8	3.0
Other Former Soviet Union 3/	▼	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.1	7.6	11.2	11.5	3.2	9.2	...	15.2	2.4
Other Non-OPEC	▼	20.4	20.7	21.3	20.8	21.2	1.1	2.1	1.0	3.9	1.2	...	1.3	3.4
World	▼	86.6	85.0	...	85.6	86.7	3.0	0.9	0.0	1.2	-1.7	...	-0.6	2.6
<b>Net Demand 4/</b>	▼	-0.6	-0.3	...	-0.2	-0.4	-0.6	-0.4	1.2	-0.7	-0.4	...	-0.2	-0.5

Source: International Energy Agency, *Oil Market Report July 2010*, and IMF staff calculations.

1/ OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Includes Angola (subject to quotas since January 2007) and Ecuador, which rejoined OPEC in November 2007 after suspending its membership from December 1992 to October 2007.

2/ Totals refer to a total of crude oil, condensates, natural gas liquids, and oil from nonconventional sources.

3/ Other Former Soviet Union includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.


4/ Difference between demand and production. In the percent change columns, the figures are in percent of world demand.

Overall, however, oil markets have not yet reached a state of full cyclical normalization. With the broadly balanced expansion of demand and supply, the correction of excess cyclical inventories—those above seasonal five-year average levels—in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries has remained partial (right middle panel). And OPEC spare capacity buffers remain high despite some rise in crude oil production because capacity has increased even more. The continued upward slope in the oil futures curve (“contango”) is another reflection of the incomplete normalization in oil markets.

Oil demand will continue to rise as the global recovery progresses, with the buoyancy determined in part by the strength of the expansion in activity. Based on previous patterns in the early stages of expansions after global recessions, some of the recent buildup of oil demand momentum in emerging and developing economies is likely to carry into 2011. While the momentum will put upward pressure on prices, oil futures curves suggest that the extent of price pressure will remain limited (see Figure 1.19, bottom panel). On the demand side, despite the likely rapid demand expansion in emerging and developing economies, global oil demand growth is expected to be moderated by stagnation or subdued increases in advanced economies. Such expectations are consistent with both recent fuel efficiency trends and the estimated relationship between oil demand, activity growth, and real oil prices in advanced economies. Second, information on upstream investment projects analyzed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests that, under current execution plans, these projects will provide for a continued expansion in upstream production on the order of 1 percent per year. Though moderate, this pace of expansion can accommodate rapid demand growth in emerging and developing economies without substantial draws on OPEC spare capacity for much of the potential range of demand outcomes (Figure 1.20, lower left panel).

Under such relatively benign supply conditions, OPEC production policies would continue to remain an important factor in determining prices. In

**Figure 1.20. World Energy Market Developments**



Sources: IMF Primary Commodity Price System; International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report July 2010; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Annual change in percent.

<sup>2</sup>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) membership as of the first month of each episode. Months from oil price peak on x-axis.

<sup>3</sup>North Sea: Norway and United Kingdom. Other FSU: other former Soviet Union.

<sup>4</sup>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) stocks - deviations from five-year average (million barrels) on x-axis, OPEC effective spare capacity (million barrels a day) on y-axis.

<sup>5</sup>Based on the International Energy Agency supply forecast. Upper and lower bands show the 14th and 86th percentiles of stochastic simulations of oil demand growth in advanced and emerging economies based on demand equations estimated during 1981-2008.

particular, the price path will depend on (1) the target price at which OPEC members will accommodate an increasing call on their spare capacity, (2) the reservation price at which additional supply would be reduced, and (3) quota discipline among members.

The main upside risks to this baseline picture of relative stability in the oil market come from the supply side, whereas on the demand side they seem limited to large upward surprises. On the downside, demand risks related to risks to the global recovery remain important. In terms of the distribution of risks, oil futures market participants see relatively large price spikes to be more likely than large price drops, although such events remain tail risks.<sup>52</sup>

Supply risk factors with the potential for a sustained impact are likely to come from obstacles to investment projects, for both new and replacement projects, although some geopolitical risks may also have a longer-lasting price impact. High oil prices and lower costs have helped to keep capital expenditure at robust levels, supporting an unexpected increase in non-OPEC production despite ongoing declines in the North Sea and Mexico. But the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has illustrated the risks involved in projects at the technological frontier. The production effects of the moratorium on new deepwater drilling in the U.S. part of the Gulf will be small from a global perspective, as deep sea exploration and development elsewhere has continued. Nevertheless, expansion of this segment of unconventional oil production faces risks that extend beyond U.S. borders and safety-related government intervention.

Price differentiation has remained a hallmark of broad fuel market developments (Figure 1.20, bottom panel). Natural gas prices in the North American market have remained relatively low with the shale gas “revolution” (the so-called promise of using technological innovation to unlock large quantities of natural gas from shale deposits). With the implied shift in relative energy prices, natural gas has recouped some of its previous loss of competitiveness as a primary energy input, including in the power sector. The improvement in long-term U.S. gas supply prospects has also had reverberations in other gas markets. One transmission channel is through the redirection of liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments away from the United States in the context of an improved global distribution infrastructure, which has led to limited price arbitrage between markets and changes in pricing regimes, notably with respect to the indexing of gas contract prices to oil markets. How lasting the pricing changes will be depends on a number of factors, including prospects for developing shale gas production on other continents and the prices at which shale gas production can be economically expanded. The same factors will also determine whether natural gas will experience sustained global market share increases as a source of primary energy, with corresponding changes in structure of relative prices.

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
<sup>52</sup>Futures options prices as of July 26, 2010, suggest an expected price level of \$143.1 per barrel (a 90 percent difference from the first-month future price on that day) and a price of \$414 at the lower 5 percent (a 45 percent difference).

## Metal Market Developments

Metal prices have responded strongly so far to changing expectations about prospects for the global economic recovery in 2010. Following a sharp rise through May, due largely to a faster pace of recovery than expected, metal prices subsequently declined as turbulence in financial markets cast a cloud over the prospects for growth (Figure 1.21, top left panel). Reflecting the influence of common macroeconomic factors, metal prices have moved in tandem with broader financial conditions since the intensification of the crisis in the third quarter of 2008, notably with global equity markets (top right panel). Metal-specific supply developments have played some part in price behavior, but the relatively low dispersion of price changes so far in 2010 highlights the importance of common factors (middle left panel).

The outlook for metal demand depends importantly on growth prospects in China, given the rapid rise of this economy's share in global demand over the past decade (right middle panel). Following a strong rise in 2009, related to significant macroeconomic policy stimulus directed, in large part, toward infrastructure investment, China's metal demand has now stabilized at a high level, and two developments are likely to restrain demand growth in the quarters ahead. First, the pace of growth in China should continue to moderate as the effects of stimulus wane and efforts to slow credit growth affect investment. Second, end users may choose to run down the inventories that built up

Figure 1.21. Developments in Base Metal Markets



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; London Metal Exchange; Thomson Datastream; World Bureau of Metal Statistics; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Prices as of August 20, 2010.

<sup>2</sup>Correlation of log price change.

<sup>3</sup>Three-month average of the standard deviation of the cross-section of monthly log price changes in the prices of aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc.

<sup>4</sup>IMF index-weighted average of nickel, tin, zinc, and lead.

<sup>5</sup>Percent change from one quarter to the next, annualized.

<sup>6</sup>Excluding newly industrialized Asian economies (Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China).

rapidly during 2009 to support increased investment activities. Base metal stocks held in warehouses monitored by the Shanghai Futures Exchange have only just begun to decline from their recent cyclical peaks, with destocking in copper most advanced. Renewed appreciation of the Chinese renminbi may partially offset these factors by increasing the purchasing power of domestic metal consumers. There have been signs of recovering metal demand from advanced economies during early 2010, but the gradual pace of expansion anticipated for these economies suggests that emerging economies will remain the engine of demand growth (bottom left panel). On balance, this suggests that metal prices should increase modestly through the end of 2011.

Supply issues have not played a major role in price changes in recent months. The exception is iron ore, for which a shift from contract to spot pricing affected the price formation process and may explain some part of the recent rise in prices. However, over the medium term, constraints on the growth of supply may become more important in determining market balances and prices. Deteriorating mine productivity (copper and tin) and the impact of policies targeted at reducing the impact of metal smelting on the environment (lead) are among the most important constraints on supply. Inventory-to-use ratios increased during the recession and provide some buffer for shocks; however, they have begun to decline and would experience sustained falls in the event of physical market deficits (bottom right panel). The medium-term balance of risks for prices should thus remain tilted toward the upside, particularly for copper.

### **Food Market Developments**


Food prices broadly declined during the first two quarters of 2010 but have since recovered their losses to leave the IMF food and beverage price index about 3 percent higher for the year to date (Figure 1.22, top left panel). Price volatility has picked up somewhat in recent months, but it still remains some way below the elevated levels of the 2008–09 period, and the probability of future extreme price movements—implied from options prices—has fallen modestly (top right panel). In contrast to other commodities, including base metals and energy, food prices have shown little sensitivity in recent months to changing expectations of global growth or to changing global financial market conditions. Reflecting a return to more normal conditions, the correlation of food prices with other commodities has been steadily declining since peaking in early 2009, and comovement is now approaching the levels that characterized food markets before the 2008–09 boom and bust (middle left panel).

The normalization is due largely to the again-dominant influence of commodity-specific supply developments for major food crops. In particular, during the early part of 2010, as other commodity prices were rising on improving prospects for the global economy, food prices were drifting lower as demand projections remained relatively stable and global supply expectations were revised higher (middle right panel). The expansion of global acreage in response to higher prices in 2005–08 contributed to the rise in supply, along with robust yields, in part due to favorable weather patterns in key producers. In recent months,

global supply estimates for the major crops in 2010 have begun to stabilize, and some of the market's focus has shifted toward prospects for demand. There have been some exceptions to these patterns, notably including the sharp downgrades to expectations for the 2010 wheat harvest due to adverse weather conditions in Russia, Ukraine, and to a lesser extent North America. The spillovers from these supply shocks to other food prices has so far been limited, in part reflecting the temporary nature of the shocks, relatively ample wheat inventories, and prospects for buoyant supply this year from possible substitutes, including corn, rice, and crops that may be more indirectly affected by higher wheat prices, including soybeans.

The relatively low cyclical sensitivity of food demand has meant that actual and anticipated demand growth has remained modest. Emerging economies should continue to account for much of the growth in demand for major crops in 2010–12, with demand in advanced economies remaining relatively sluggish, continuing the pattern of recent years (bottom left panel). One factor that has restrained demand growth is the slowdown in the growth of biofuel production, as lower fuel prices led to a decline in the energy-to-food price ratio and thereby reduced the incentives for biofuel use. This slowdown may be a temporary, however, as energy prices have recovered faster than agricultural feedstock (bottom right panel). A number of large U.S. ethanol producers have now emerged from bankruptcy or have restarted idled production facilities, and the share of the U.S. corn crop used for ethanol production is expected to increase modestly to 35 percent in 2010. The prospects for a further increase in biofuel demand will also depend on public policies. Examples include changes in usage mandates and ceilings, including the outcome of the

Figure 1.22. Recent Developments in Markets for Major Food Crops



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates; Datastream; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Prices as of August 19, 2010.

<sup>2</sup>Implied from nine-month maturity option contracts and measured as the unweighted average of corn and wheat percent difference from current spot prices.

<sup>3</sup>Rolling 60-day correlation of log price changes between the IMF food index and the IMF metals and energy indices.

<sup>4</sup>Monthly unweighted average for corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat.

<sup>5</sup>Change in proportion of U.S. corn harvest used for ethanol, percentage points.

current review of the amount of ethanol in gasoline sold in the United States, and other forms of government support, such as subsidies.

Overall, food prices remain high in real terms compared to averages over the past few decades and, at this level, are expected to provide for a broadly balanced expansion of demand and supply. In the near term, with the exception of wheat, stock-to-use ratios could even increase as the markets for major crops may be in surplus in 2010 and 2011. Nevertheless, stock-to-use ratios are unlikely to improve back to long-term averages.<sup>53</sup> The capacity of some major food commodity markets to absorb supply shocks therefore may be relatively limited, suggesting that food prices will remain subject to upside risks over the medium term.

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<sup>53</sup>See Chapter 1 of the April 2010 *World Economic Outlook*, pp. 40–41.

### Box 1.5. Have Metals Become More Scarce, and What Does Scarcity Mean for Prices?<sup>54</sup>

Emerging economies have been an engine of growth during the current global economic recovery, and they are likely to continue to lead growth in the years ahead. Because their growth is more commodity-intensive than that of advanced economies, the rapid increase in demand for commodities over the last decade is therefore set to continue. Will supply keep pace with demand growth at prices close to today's levels, or will increasing commodity scarcity require that prices keep rising over the long term? This box addresses this question for base metals by assessing a commonly accepted indicator of scarcity, the long-term behavior of real prices.


What does economic theory predict for long-term commodity price behavior?

Hotelling (1931) showed that the price of a nonrenewable resource should reflect the marginal cost of extraction and the *in situ* value, that is, the marginal value of keeping reserves in the ground. This theory famously predicts that the resource price should increase at the rate of interest if marginal extraction costs remain unchanged. In equilibrium, the return from keeping reserves in the ground is just equal to what could be earned in interest, keeping the resource owner indifferent to extracting one more unit of the commodity. The increase in prices can then be interpreted as a "scarcity rent," and the price can be expected to continue rising until demand is choked off and the resource is effectively exhausted.

Changes in scarcity can mean that prices do not follow this rule in practice. Prices may rise faster than the rate of interest, due to permanent shifts in demand that cannot be met by a compensating change in supply due to physical or technological constraints (e.g., the finite availability of reserves or deteriorating ore quality). Prices may also remain broadly unchanged or even decline in the event that marginal extraction costs fall (and supply increases) or end users find lower-cost substitutes, both the result of new technology. This suggests that the long-term behavior of commodity prices can provide useful information for assessing how the nature of scarcity is changing.

The behavior of a real base metals price index going back to 1850 suggests that metal supply became more abundant during the 19<sup>th</sup> century as real prices declined, with somewhat

Low-Pass-Filtered Metal Prices: First Principal Component



Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; London Metal Exchange; and IMF staff calculations.  
<sup>1</sup>Spliced principal component incorporating the largest number of metals at each date based on data availability.

<sup>54</sup>The author of this box is Shaun Roache.

more balanced supply and demand growth since 1900 leading to broadly constant real prices (first figure). That Hotelling's rule of rising prices has not held for metals is largely due to technological innovation, which has allowed for a combination of lower extraction costs and new ore deposit discoveries. These developments over the very long term have been punctuated by upswings and downswings that have sometimes persisted for decades. One way to analyze time variation in long-term price behavior is to examine the so-called low-frequency component in these series. This component can be extracted with a low-pass filter, which removes the influence of fluctuations at seasonal or business cycle frequencies that play an influential role in commodity price behavior (Cashin, McDermott, and Scott, 2001). For commodities, in contrast to many macroeconomic variables, it may also be appropriate to filter out even longer periodic fluctuations that are unrelated to long-term scarcity.

Some previous studies have suggested the possible existence of "super cycles" for commodity prices (Cuddington and Jerrett, 2008), and this is supported by the empirical evidence. For example, a significant contribution to the total variation in real prices comes from slow-moving (or low-frequency) components, which includes the effects of long-term scarcity but also the existence of medium-term super cycles.<sup>55</sup> The underlying causes of these super cycles are the long implementation lags for discovery, exploration, and capital investment in minerals industries, rather than true long-term scarcity. For example, for base and precious metals, the average time needed to confirm a discovery following initial exploration can be as long as 20 years, with the average time from discovery to production estimated at about nine years (Sillitoe, 2000). The sluggish supply response to shifts in demand can then give rise to price cycles with a longer duration than the typical two-to eight-year business cycle (Slade, 1982).

For the purpose of this box, measures of the long-term component in real base metal prices were thus extracted with a low-pass filter that excludes all fluctuations with a cycle frequency of less than 30 years (including business and super cycles).<sup>56</sup> To distill the common factor in the long-term price measures for individual metals, the first principal component was computed for different groups among them, based on when price data first become available. The first principal component accounted for between 70 percent and 80 percent of total variance in all cases, depending upon which metals were included.

These measures show very similar behavior in the long-term component of real prices for base metals. They bottomed out between 1996 (aluminum) and 2000 (zinc) and have risen for all metals since then. This followed a period lasting about 25 years during which the

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<sup>55</sup>For most of the metals considered in this analysis, periodograms, which decompose the variance in real prices into cycles of different frequencies, show that cycles with durations significantly longer than the business cycle account for a particularly large share of the variation.

<sup>56</sup>This analysis uses U.S. dollar price indices deflated by the U.S. consumer price index and a Christiano-Fitzgerald asymmetric filter, with adjustments for I(1) series including aluminum, copper, iron ore, and lead.

trend component in real prices declined significantly. The measure of the common factor in long-term real base metal prices reached a trough in December 1998 and subsequently experienced its largest rise for at least a century over the past 12 years (see first figure).<sup>57</sup> The rise has not been interrupted by the global financial crisis or the Great Recession. The decline and recovery of metal prices observed since 2007 is instead largely explained by fluctuations in the business cycle component in prices.

What explains this evidence for increased long-term scarcity of base metals? The most important explanation is increasing commodity demand by emerging economies, particularly China, together with a relatively sluggish supply response (second figure). During 1998–2009, global base metal demand grew by about 4 percent on an annual average basis, slightly exceeding the growth of primary production.<sup>58</sup> As a result, most metal markets have moved into, or very close to, deficit, as measured by the difference between primary production and consumption. Deficits have been filled by running down inventories or using scrap, but these resources remain limited.


Supply has shown some signs of responding to higher prices, and global primary production grew at its fastest annual rate in at least 10 years in 2007; however, even in the aftermath of the Great Recession, concern has continued to build about the ability of supply to keep pace with future consumption growth. This is only partly related to a lack of capital investment. For some metals, technological and geological constraints have led to declining mine productivity—particularly for copper and tin. For other metals, constraints on current production technologies imposed by environmental policies may also curtail supply—especially for lead and, to a lesser extent, aluminum.

Does the evidence of increased scarcity mean that demand-supply balance will require even higher prices in the future? The measure of scarcity used in this analysis suggests that base metal prices are only about halfway through the current period of trend price increases. On average since 1850, the common factor in the long-term component of

<sup>57</sup>The first principal component, and was an approximately equal function of each metal price, suggesting that this represents the common factor in metals scarcity.

<sup>58</sup>Measured as the IMF-index-weighted average of aluminum, copper, iron ore, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc.

**Demand Growth Contributions and Market Balances**  
(Annual percent change unless otherwise specified)



Sources: World Bureau of Metal Statistics; and IMF staff calculations.

metal prices has taken about 20 years to move from trough to peak, although the duration of these upturns varies and depends on the pace of technological innovation.<sup>59</sup> Until now, there have been few convincing signs of a persistent increase in the growth of metal supply, and an ongoing global recovery will preclude a strong offset from cyclical factors. This would mean that the current era of higher scarcity, rising metal price trends, and a balance of price risks tilted toward the upside may continue for some time if demand continues to grow at the rates observed over the past decade.

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<sup>59</sup>Based on the Bry-Boschan methodology for identifying turning points. The average length of low-frequency cycles—a peak-to-peak cycle—using the low-pass filter is about 35 years.


### Appendix 1.2. Indicators for Tracking Growth

The author of this appendix is Troy Dale Matheson.

Growth indicators have recently been developed that utilize a wide range of economic data. This appendix discusses the methodology underlying the growth indicators and provides some details on the data used to compute the indicator for each country. Also discussed is how well the growth indicators fit the behavior of quarterly real GDP growth over history and how well they forecast relative to a simple time-series benchmark.

The colors in the growth tracker heat map (Figure 1.23) are based on the behavior of the new growth indicators over time. Figure 1.24 shows a stylized example of how to interpret what each color in the heat map means: an orange color indicates growth below trend and falling; red and pink indicate contraction at increasing and decreasing rates, respectively; the two lightest shades of blue represent rising growth rates, with the lightest blue indicating that growth is below trend; and the darkest blue indicates that growth is moderating but remains above trend.


Figure 1.23. Growth Tracker



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.  
 Note: The growth trackers are constructed using a large number of daily, monthly, and quarterly indicators and a dynamic factor model that incorporates all available data. The trackers are estimated and forecast at the monthly frequency. The classifications represented in the table are based on the behavior of a centered seven-month-moving average. The most recent estimates implicitly include forecasts and can change with the arrival of more data. The trend is the growth rate of potential output in the WEO projections. Within regions, countries are listed by economic size.

Figure 1.24. Stylized Example Illustrating Heat Map Colors

(Percent; month over month, annualized)



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.

As background, it is important to understand that economic data are often very noisy and available only with a substantial lag. Determining the underlying state of an economy is thus very difficult in practice, requiring a mix of information gleaned from economic and statistical models and – perhaps most important – the expertise of economists. Against this

backdrop, the growth indicators should be viewed as a useful addition to the toolkit for assessing the current state of economic activity.

### The Dynamic Factor Model

The growth indicators are estimated using a dynamic factor model (DFM).<sup>60</sup> The DFM is particularly useful in this context, because it can utilize a large number of economic time series in a timely fashion and can produce reasonable short-term forecasts.

The DFM assumes that real GDP growth  $y_t$  can be decomposed into a common component  $\chi_t$  and an idiosyncratic component  $\varepsilon_t$ . The common component captures the bulk of the covariation between growth and a wide range of economic indicators, while the idiosyncratic component is assumed to mainly only affect growth:

$$y_t = \mu + \chi_t + \varepsilon_t, \quad \text{where } \varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \psi), \quad (\text{A.1.2.1})$$

where  $\mu$  is a constant and  $\chi_t = \Lambda F_t$ , with  $F_t = (F_{1t}, \dots, F_{rt})'$  and  $\Lambda = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_r)$ . The common component is thus related to growth through a linear combination of a small handful of  $r$  common factors  $F_t$ . The common factors themselves are, in turn, estimated using information from a potentially large set of economic indicators. For each country, it is the common component of growth that is used as the growth indicator.

The dynamics of the common factors are captured by the following vector autoregressive process:

$$F_t = \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_i F_{t-i} + B v_t, \quad \text{where } v_t \sim N(0, I_q), \quad (\text{A.1.2.2})$$

where the  $\beta_i$ s are  $r \times r$  matrices,  $p$  is the lag length of the process,  $B$  is an  $r \times q$  matrix, and  $q$  is the number of underlying common shocks driving the economy. The number of static factors  $r$  is generally assumed to be large relative to the number of common shocks in order to capture the dynamic relationships in the economy. See Gianonne, Reichlin, and Sala (2005) for the detailed assumptions underlying the model.

For the growth indicators, the number of common factors  $r$  is chosen for each country and at each point in time using a simple rule that aims to avoid over fitting: the number of factors is chosen to minimize Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBC) in regressions of quarterly real GDP growth on the common factors. The number of common shocks  $q$  is then chosen using information criteria described in Bai and Ng (2007). The number of lags of the factors  $p$  included in the model is determined using the SBC.

One of the key advantages of this framework is that common components of growth can be estimated when some indicators have missing values at the end of sample due to publication lags. This allows all available information to be utilized in a timely fashion.

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<sup>60</sup>See Gianonne and others (2008), Matheson (2010, 2010a), and Liu and others (2010).

## Data Selection

Data selection is a crucial step in developing the indicators. Choosing series that are too focused on particular sectors of the economy will bias the estimates, deteriorating the effectiveness of the DFM in estimating the underlying factors driving growth.

For each country, close attention has been paid to choosing data from a broad cross-section of the economy. Given poor data quality, particularly for some emerging economies, a multistep procedure has been employed to clean from the data outliers and missing observations. The vast majority of the series are measured at a monthly frequency, with the remaining series measured at daily and quarterly frequencies. All series are converted to a monthly frequency, and where required, they have been transformed to be devoid of long-term trends (nonstationarity) prior to estimation of the DFM.<sup>61</sup>

Broadly speaking, the data were chosen to cover the following categories (with representative types of data listed):

- Activity (surveys) –purchasing managers indexes, consumer and business confidence indicators
- Activity (hard data) –retail sales, industrial production
- Trade –exports, imports, exchange rates
- Financial Conditions –interest rates, equity prices, credit conditions
- Employment and Income –employment, wages
- Prices and Costs –producer price and consumer price indices, inflation expectations.

Some information about the series used and their classifications can be found in Table 1.3. For most of the advanced economies, the sample period begins in 1994; the samples for many of the emerging market economies begin later due to a lack of available data and the presence of structural breaks. The number of series used also varies across countries depending on available data, ranging from 97 series for Kazakhstan to 290 for Sweden.

## Evaluating the Growth Indicators

To get an idea of the quality of the growth indicators in describing the behavior of real quarterly GDP growth over history, the percentage of the variance of growth explained

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<sup>61</sup>The quarterly series are interpolated, while the daily series are converted to monthly averages. Natural logarithms are taken of the series that cannot take negative values or are measured in percentages, and quarterly differences are taken of the nonstationary series. The remaining data are not transformed.

by the indicators,  $R^2$ , is computed. These statistics are displayed in Table 1.3. The indicators generally explain a sizable proportion of growth for the majority of countries, particularly for advanced economies. Because the growth indicators are estimates of the underlying, pervasive component of growth, their explanatory power tends not to be as great for emerging economies, where growth tends to be more volatile and subject to larger idiosyncratic shocks.

Assessing the underlying state of the economy is contingent on the behavior of the data at hand and the model used to analyze the data. As such, to the extent new data differ from previous estimates produced by the indicators, they can be revised over both the historical period and the forecast period. This may cause the indicators to produce some false signals in real time. Thus, to evaluate how well the indicators perform in real time, a simulated real-time forecasting experiment is conducted.

Specifically, over a forecast evaluation period, the indicators are estimated once every quarter using all data that would have been available at the beginning of the third month of each quarter.<sup>62</sup> Using the latest available data for real quarterly GDP growth as the target for the forecasts, root mean squared errors (RMSEs) for the indicators in predicting the next observation of quarterly real GDP growth are computed. For the purposes of comparison, RMSEs for simple autoregressive models (AR) are also calculated.<sup>63</sup> The ratios of the RMSEs of the growth indicators relative to those of the AR model are displayed in Table 1.3, where ratios less than one show that the growth indicator outperforms the AR model.

For the vast majority of countries, the growth indicators outperform the AR in forecasting, with India and Australia being the only exceptions. The relatively good forecasting performance of the growth indicators is confirmed in Matheson (2010a), using comparisons to forecasts from a range of more sophisticated models than reported here.

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<sup>62</sup>Due to a lack of available data, the data vintages that would have existed in real time are not used. Instead, we use the most recent vintage of data to simulate the data available each time a forecast is made.

<sup>63</sup>The number of lags is selected using the SBC.

**Table 1.3. Data Summary and Model Evolution***(Number of series in each category)*

Country	Sample begins	Activity (surveys)	Activity (hard data)	Trade	Financial Conditions	Employment and income	Prices and Costs	Total	$R^2$ (%)	Forecasts begin	Relative RMSE
Argentina	2003:M01	0	16	46	16	10	15	103	83	2008M01	0.89
Australia	1994:M01	32	37	42	8	20	32	171	55	2000M01	1.20
Brazil	1996:M01	17	31	56	22	10	12	148	59	2001M01	0.76
Canada	1994:M01	19	57	38	12	17	18	161	73	2000M01	0.87
Chile	2000:M01	9	29	53	30	12	17	150	47	2005M01	0.82
China	2000:M01	23	82	29	7	34	17	192	42	2006M01	0.80
Columbia	2000:M01	0	44	39	19	21	18	141	61	2005M01	0.68
Domenican Republic	2000:M01	0	1	96	11	30	11	149	52	2005M01	0.83
Ecuador	2000:M01	0	31	56	1	2	20	110	31	2005M01	0.84
Euro Area	1994:M01	20	27	17	17	6	29	116	91	2000M01	0.72
France	1994:M01	60	28	20	17	24	39	188	80	2000M01	0.80
Germany	1994:M01	58	31	39	18	26	15	187	84	2000M01	0.88
Greece	2000:M01	33	41	26	19	19	32	170	46	2005M01	0.97
India	2000:M01	32	25	36	18	4	12	127	66	2007M01	1.44
Indonesia	2004:M01	3	24	41	12	3	24	107	45	2008M01	0.68
Italy	1994:M01	55	32	23	22	12	30	174	80	2000M01	0.71
Japan	1994:M01	30	39	22	9	7	6	113	65	2000M01	0.84
Kazakhstan	2000:M01	0	10	51	12	5	19	97	58	2005M01	0.87
Korea	2000:M01	37	49	42	20	20	30	198	89	2005M01	0.48
Mexico	2000:M01	20	33	33	10	17	16	129	67	2005M01	0.69
Peru	2000:M01	0	48	24	18	14	20	124	68	2005M01	0.91
Portugal	2000:M01	26	44	37	26	30	38	201	78	2005M01	0.88
Russia	2000:M01	32	40	31	17	17	39	176	86	2005M01	0.45
Saudi Arabia	2000:M01	0	2	28	121	0	27	178	47	2005M01	0.99
South Africa	1994:M01	24	58	45	23	14	29	193	65	2000M01	0.88
Spain	1994:M01	44	68	33	17	41	59	262	87	2000M01	0.92
Sweden	1994:M01	59	60	66	14	42	49	290	58	2000M01	0.78
Turkey	2002:M01	52	46	38	17	15	19	187	73	2007M01	0.82
United Kingdom	1994:M01	63	58	34	22	29	36	242	88	2000M01	0.90
United States	1994:M01	15	41	15	15	21	24	131	72	2000M01	0.64
Uruguay	2001:M01	0	22	39	9	29	35	134	62	2006M01	0.74
Venezuela	2004:M04	0	26	22	41	3	28	120	72	2008M01	0.47

\* $R^2$  between quarterly real GDP growth and the DFM estimate of the common component of growth over the entire sample. Forecasts begin is the beginning of the out-of-sample evaluation period. Relative RMSE is the RMSE in forecasting the next quarterly real GDP release relative to the RMSE from an AR model. The DFM forecasts are made with the data that would have been available at the beginning of the third month of each quarter.

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This chapter begins with Asia, which is leading the global recovery. It then turns to North America, where there is renewed concern that the recovery may be stalling, with significant implications for the rest of the world. Next, the chapter reviews Europe's economic and policy challenges, which in many ways mirror those at the global level—the need for demand rebalancing within the region, financial sector repair, and medium-term fiscal consolidation. It then outlines the wide range of developments and prospects in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and sub-Saharan Africa.


### **Asia Is Advancing with Resilience**

Asia entered the global crisis on a strong footing and is continuing to lead the global recovery (Figure 2.2). In most parts of the region, resilience in domestic demand—thanks in part to proactive policy stimulus—has offset the drag from net exports (Figure 2.3). The handoff from public sector to private sector driven growth is well underway in most Asian countries. Industrial production and retail sales have been accelerating in China and India, among others. The strong activity in these countries in turn is helping power growth in the rest of Asia. In fact, China's strong and sustained growth over the past several years has served as a linchpin for global trade, benefiting exporters of commodities (for example, Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand) and of capital goods (for example, Germany, Japan, some NIEs).<sup>2,3</sup> Moreover, unlike in previous recoveries, a turnaround in private capital inflows has bolstered domestic demand by providing access to external financing. The region is projected to grow by about [7¾] percent in 2010 and [6¾] percent in 2011 (Table 2.1). The moderate deceleration in 2011 reflects the winding down of policy stimulus and tightening of policies in economies facing demand pressures, as well as negative downdrafts from policy adjustments in advanced economies.

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<sup>2</sup>Newly industrialized Asian economies comprise Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China.

<sup>3</sup>While China continues to be an important conduit in Asia's global supply chain, the much faster pace of increase in emerging Asia's exports to China in recent years—relative to China's own exports to advanced economies—points to the rising strength of China's final domestic demand in driving its imports from the rest of Asia (see Figure 2.3 and the April 2010 *Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific*).



Near-term growth performance will vary across countries because of differences with respect to the strength of stimulus and private demand along with underlying economic and financial conditions and risks. Thus, a massive fiscal stimulus and credit expansion has boosted domestic demand in China. In India, low reliance on exports, accommodative policies, and strong capital inflows have supported domestic activity and growth. In contrast, Japan's economic prospects remain weak, given lackluster domestic demand and a lack of fiscal room to further boost the economy. Prospects for economies at the lower end of the quality ladder in manufacturing exports and/or those where there is macroeconomic and financial uncertainty (Vietnam) are also weak. The outlook for Pakistan has deteriorated significantly after the recent massive flooding. Country-specific differences are discussed further below:


- In *China*, real GDP has sustained its strong upward trajectory, growing at 10¼ percent (year over year) in the second quarter compared with 11.9 percent in the first quarter. The momentum in domestic demand has helped offset the slack in external demand. Continued growth in retail sales and industrial production confirms that private sector activity has advanced above and beyond the lift from government stimulus. Overall, growth is projected to average [10½] percent in 2010 and [9½] percent in 2011, driven by domestic demand (particularly consumption). Thus, private domestic demand is poised to contribute two-thirds of near-term growth, and government activity about one-third, whereas the contribution from net exports will be close to zero on average. However, the pace of activity will slow in light of tighter quantitative limits on credit growth in 2010, measures to cool off the property market

and limit bank exposure to this, and the planned unwinding of fiscal stimulus in 2011. The pickup in inflation in the earlier part of the year reflected higher food prices rather than core inflation. China has served as the much needed engine of growth for commodity and capital goods exporters since the very early stages of the global recovery. Furthermore, its import demand has broadened since late 2009 to include consumer goods—notably, automobiles and miscellaneous manufacturing goods, including durables.

- India's* macroeconomic performance has also been vigorous, with industrial production at a two-year high. Leading indicators—the production manufacturing index and measures of business and consumer confidence—continue to point up. Growth is projected at [9½] percent in 2010 and [8½] percent in 2011, led increasingly by domestic demand. Robust corporate profits and favorable external financing will encourage investment. Whereas recent activity (8½ percent year-over-year real GDP growth in the first quarter) was driven largely by exports, the contribution from net exports is projected to turn negative in 2011, as robust investment further boosts imports. The rapid pace of domestic activity, evidenced by accelerating credit and rising inflation, led the central bank to increase the policy rate, in steps, by a cumulative 1 percentage point. The run-up in real estate market prices since 2009 recently stabilized, in part reflecting the adoption of countercyclical

**Figure 2.3. Asia: Leading the Global Recovery<sup>1</sup>**

Economic activity has bounced back on the back of domestic demand and rebounding exports. Robust import demand from China—particularly in commodities, machinery, and capital goods—has supported activity in both emerging and advanced Asia. The region is attracting capital inflows, which, while providing easy access to financing, has posed some macroeconomic policy challenges (see Box 2.1).



Sources: CEIC Asia database; Haver Analytics; IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup>Advanced Asia: Australia, Japan, and New Zealand; newly industrialized Asian economies (NIEs): Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China; ASEAN-5: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam; emerging Asia: ASEAN-5, China, India, and NIEs.

<sup>2</sup>Other investment includes financial derivatives.

**Table 2.1. Selected Asian Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment***(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)*

	Real GDP			Consumer Prices 1/			Current Account Balance 2/			Unemployment 3/		
	Projections			Projections			Projections			Projections		
	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
<b>Asia</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.9</b>	...	...	...
<b>Advanced Asia</b>	<b>-3.0</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>4.4</b>
Japan	-5.2	2.9	1.8	-1.4	-1.2	-0.2	2.8	3.2	2.6	5.1	4.9	4.7
Australia	1.3	3.0	3.5	1.8	3.0	3.0	-4.1	-2.4	-3.2	5.6	5.2	5.1
New Zealand	-1.6	3.0	3.2	2.1	2.5	5.5	-3.0	-4.6	-5.5	6.2	6.2	5.8
<b>Newly Industrialized Asian Economies</b>	<b>-0.9</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.7</b>
Korea	0.2	6.1	4.5	2.8	3.1	3.4	5.1	2.2	2.5	3.7	3.3	3.3
Taiwan Province of China	-1.9	8.1	4.4	-0.9	1.5	1.5	11.1	9.4	8.8	5.8	5.3	4.9
Hong Kong SAR	-2.8	6.0	4.7	0.5	2.7	3.0	8.7	8.1	8.1	5.1	4.4	4.1
Singapore	-1.3	15.0	4.5	0.6	2.8	2.3	17.8	20.5	18.6	3.0	2.1	2.2
<b>Developing Asia</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.2</b>	...	...	...
China	9.1	10.5	9.6	-0.7	3.5	2.7	6.0	4.7	5.1	4.3	4.1	4.0
India	5.7	9.4	8.4	10.9	13.2	5.5	-2.8	-2.6	-2.3	...	...	...
<b>ASEAN-5</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.7</b>
Indonesia	4.5	6.0	6.2	4.8	4.7	5.7	2.0	0.8	0.0	8.0	7.5	7.0
Thailand	-2.2	7.5	4.0	-0.8	3.0	2.8	7.7	3.6	2.6	1.4	1.4	1.4
Philippines	1.1	6.0	4.5	3.2	4.5	4.0	5.3	4.0	3.3	7.4	7.4	7.4
Malaysia	-1.7	6.7	5.3	0.6	2.2	2.1	16.5	14.7	13.8	3.7	3.5	3.2
Vietnam	5.3	6.5	6.8	6.7	10.4	8.2	-8.0	-9.0	-8.0	6.0	5.0	5.0
<b>Other Developing Asia 4/</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>-0.5</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	...	...	...
<i>Memorandum</i>												
Emerging Asia 5/	5.8	9.0	7.9	2.8	5.6	3.8	4.8	3.7	3.8	...	...	...

1/ Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.

2/ Percent of GDP.

3/ Percent.

4/ Other Developing Asia comprises Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Vanuatu.

5/ Emerging Asia comprises all economies in the Developing Asia and Newly Industrialized Asian Economies.

regulatory measures (including higher provisioning requirements for commercial real estate credit).

- In *Japan*, an export-led recovery since the second quarter of 2009 strengthened in early 2010, thanks to a stronger-than-anticipated recovery in the Western advanced economies, and rising demand for capital goods from China. Sporadic appreciation of the yen (for example, in May 2010, when financial volatility in Europe triggered safe haven inflows) and the recent cooling of the U.S. economy have, however, had a negative effect on exports. Although investment activity is projected to pick up—sparked by export-oriented businesses—the unwinding of fiscal stimulus and the sluggish labor market are likely to weigh on near-term growth. Real GDP growth is

projected at [3] percent in 2010 and [1¾] percent in 2011, although output will remain below its potential level.

- The rapid recovery in the NIEs has been driven by a rebounding inventory cycle, strong domestic activity, and robust regional demand for their exports (electronics for Singapore, services for Hong Kong SAR, and capital goods for Korea). Some NIEs have been experiencing sizable price increases in the property market (for example, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore), which has prompted the use of macroprudential policies to prevent the emergence of an asset price bubble. Inflation expectations are nevertheless broadly stable. Average growth for the region is projected at [7½] percent and [4½] percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
- The ASEAN economies<sup>4</sup> have also benefited from the strong regional upswing, particularly exporters of commodities and electronics. The broad-based export rebound is now feeding through an autonomous demand-driven recovery, particularly in private investment (although investment activity is not yet fully under way in Malaysia). In Vietnam, the macroeconomic situation has recently stabilized after the 2009 stimulus measures—which raised perceived risk and triggered market uncertainty—were partly reversed. Growth for the region is projected to average [6½] percent and [5½] percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively, underpinned both by exports and domestic demand.
- In other commodity-exporting advanced economies in the region (Australia, New Zealand), policy stimulus and exports continue to drive growth. Stronger trade links with China have increased these economies' resilience to cyclical downturns in traditional partners, such as the United States. Domestic demand, however, is still not well established, given weak household balance sheets. Growth is projected to average [3-3½] percent in both these economies during 2010–11.

Notwithstanding impressive performance so far, risks to near-term growth in emerging Asia are tilted slightly to the downside, mainly because of uncertainty in the external environment. Thus, a slower recovery in the United States and the euro area, a greater-than-anticipated slowdown in China, or negative spillovers from unanticipated financial shocks abroad could interrupt the pace of recovery. These risks are somewhat offset by an upside risk of even faster recovery in private sector activity. In advanced Asia, downside risks dominate as well, but also reflect domestic vulnerability. These risks include yen appreciation and worsening deflation in Japan; higher risk premiums, given high external debt in New Zealand; and a potential correction in house prices that could hit household wealth and consumer confidence in Australia and New Zealand.

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<sup>4</sup>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Looking beyond the crisis, Asia's medium-term prospects depend on how successfully it is able to rebalance the drivers of growth—with greater reliance on domestic sources compared with external demand. Such a rebalancing in China is critical to enhance the role of household consumption in domestic growth. To the extent that a stronger Chinese currency eases this process, other surplus countries in the region could follow suit, which would allow the needed shift toward domestic sources of growth. However, in addition to China, the entire region will need to adopt some combination of the following policies to support durable domestic demand: steady appreciation of the currency to enhance domestic income and purchasing power, removal of structural bottlenecks to domestic investment or consumption or both, and boosting productivity in the nontradables or service sector.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the macroeconomic and structural policy mix to address near-term challenges must—to the extent possible—be conducive to meeting the region's medium-term rebalancing needs.

Against this backdrop, fiscal policy—in particular the unwinding of stimulus—needs to be carefully calibrated to strike a balance between ensuring a self-sustained recovery in private activity over the near and medium terms and avoiding fiscal risk or overheating pressure. Therefore, fiscal withdrawal would be appropriate under the baseline projections, provided that a private demand recovery is robustly established. Some postponement of consolidation may be needed where there is fiscal room to do so, should external downside risks to growth materialize. In addition, some economies could reorient the composition of fiscal spending within the available fiscal envelope to further support the role of domestic demand in growth (for example, measures to encourage consumption in China and to improve the quality of infrastructure services in Indonesia). In contrast, consolidation should be a priority where fiscal risks are building (India, Malaysia, Philippines). In Japan, decisive fiscal consolidation is unavoidable, given the high level of public debt and anticipated fiscal needs related to the aging population. Consolidation should focus on entitlement spending and comprehensive tax reform. New Zealand's high external debt also argues for higher government savings.

Monetary policy needs to be responsive to the domestic cycle—that is, prospects for inflation, which are influenced by the degree of economic slack. Most economies in the region have already resumed rate hikes (Australia, India, Malaysia, Korea, New Zealand, Thailand), tightened liquidity management (reimposition of quantitative limits to credit growth in China, higher reserve requirements in China and India), or made use of other tools (steady appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate target by Singapore). The overall monetary stance, however, is still largely accommodative or neutral. Thus, economies that are beginning to face inflationary pressures should further tighten monetary policy. If domestic overheating is influenced by strong capital flows, monetary tightening should be

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<sup>5</sup>See also the 2010 April and October issues of the *Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific*.

accompanied by exchange rate appreciation to help offset inflationary pressures, discourage speculative inflows, and support medium-term rebalancing. Conversely, if private demand is not yet fully established and inflationary pressures are absent, monetary policy would need to remain accommodative to help jump-start private activity. Finally, if broad-based downside risks to growth begin to materialize, most Asian economies can use the available monetary room to support economic activity.

With the return of normal financial sector conditions, the time is also ripe for unwinding special support measures introduced during the crisis. Some countries have already started (for example, removal of guarantees on banks' wholesale funding in Australia and New Zealand, unwinding of the previously expanded central bank liquidity/rediscount window in Hong Kong SAR and Philippines). Others are tightening regulatory measures further to enhance financial system stability. Policymakers in New Zealand introduced a new liquidity policy, including a core funding ratio to improve bank liquidity and reduce banks' dependence on short-term funding. In China, prudential regulations were introduced to reduce banks' exposure to potentially risky property loans, and other direct measures were deployed to cool the property market (e.g., increase in minimum down payments, lower loan-to-value ratios and higher mortgage rates for second homes). The banking system thus appears well positioned to absorb moderate potential losses (see the October 2010 issue of the *Global Financial Stability Report—GFSR*). Similarly, policymakers in Hong Kong SAR took measures to address risks in property price inflation. These include maximum loan-to-value ratios on high-end properties and higher stamp duties on property sales, among others. Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Malaysia are employing a coordinated approach to withdraw blanket guarantees on banks' wholesale deposits.

The recent resurgence in capital inflows to emerging Asia, after a temporary stop during the global crisis in 2008, has raised potential policy challenges. On the one hand, capital flows have helped support domestic demand. On the other hand, the size of global inflows relative to the comparatively small financial markets has raised or intensified existing concerns, including the risk of inflation, asset price bubbles, financial sector instability (if inflows are not properly intermediated), excessive appreciation and risks associated with a sudden stop of capital flows. Given wide variation in capital account openness across countries and across alternative types of investment within the same country, it is possible that some countries may receive more capital inflows than they can efficiently intermediate. Alternatively, capital controls in one sector (for example, foreign direct investment—FDI) may be inducing excessive inflows into others (for example, portfolio, equity). Economies have been implementing a range of measures to deal with their varied situations (Box 2.1). The measures generally address potential financial stability concerns and do not impose

wholesale restraint on capital inflows. At the same time, it is not clear how much these policy responses will deliver. A few issues stand out:<sup>6</sup>

- Macroprudential measures should focus primarily on financial stability and not be used to postpone needed macroeconomic adjustment. Thus, where large current account imbalances may reflect an undervalued exchange rate, currency appreciation is the best response to capital inflows. Conversely, if the exchange rate is broadly at its medium-term equilibrium level, but reserves are assessed to be insufficient, capital inflows should be used to build up reserves. Many economies in emerging Asia are among the largest reserve holders, so they do not fall in this category.
- Greater exchange rate flexibility can reinforce macroprudential measures. For example, two-way exchange rate flexibility can increase the perception of exchange rate risk and discourage speculative capital inflows. This is especially important for economies with excessive external surpluses, where relatively sizable appreciation—apart from narrowing the current account imbalance—would increase the perception of exchange rate risk and therefore deter speculative capital inflows.
- Other macroeconomic policy options include a more aggressive unwinding of fiscal stimulus or even tightening—if inflows are concentrated in government securities—to prevent vulnerability to a sudden turnaround in investor sentiment, or a lowering of interest rates when inflation expectations are well grounded. However, given that the adoption of fiscal policies that improve the recipient economy’s macro fundamentals could in fact result in stronger inflows to the private sector, this on its own would not necessarily reduce the need for greater exchange rate flexibility.
- If the financial sector is healthy, restrictions on capital outflows can be eased to limit upward pressure on the currency and alleviate concerns about overvaluation or loss of external competitiveness. Furthermore, measures can be taken to free up restrictions in key growth sectors, which could help attract longer-term capital inflows (for example, FDI).

The best response to capital inflows may be a coordinated one, especially when they are driven by global factors or have global implications.<sup>7</sup> Thus, resistance to exchange rate appreciation by one country could discourage others because of competitiveness concerns. Alternatively, macroprudential measures by one country could divert flows to other countries in the region. A potential ratchet effect could lead to reserve accumulation in emerging

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<sup>6</sup>See also the April 2010 GFSR.

<sup>7</sup>See also “Reserve Accumulation and International Monetary Stability,” on the potential benefits of a coordinated approach ([www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/041310.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/041310.pdf)).

market economies—larger accumulation of reserves by one could induce further accumulation by others in the region if the level of reserves is perceived as a proxy for the credibility of a country’s policy framework.<sup>8</sup> International coordination could alleviate challenges of this nature.

Asia should also focus on various structural reforms to accomplish its medium-term rebalancing objectives. Specific policy options include implementing health care, education, and pension reforms to enhance the social safety net (China); promoting investment by small and medium-size enterprises (Japan); improving the business climate (Philippines); increasing the productivity of the nontradables or service sector (China, Japan, Korea); facilitating further product and labor market flexibility and productivity (China, Malaysia, some NIEs, Philippines); lowering corporate savings by realigning relative prices for a range of inputs, including capital, land, water, and energy (China); and further financial sector development and capital market deepening (China, India, Philippines, Thailand).

Many economies have already embarked on such reforms. Besides the recent resumption of a managed floating exchange rate regime in China, the government has launched a number of measures to enhance the social safety net.<sup>9</sup> In Korea, the government recently announced plans to further develop the service industry, including through streamlined regulation and greater competition. Singapore’s recent budget contains measures to enhance labor productivity. However, these measures will take time to be effective, which combined with an anticipated slower pace of adjustment in advanced economies (in light of the shorter-term economic challenges they face) suggests a protracted period over which global imbalances may eventually narrow.

### **The U.S. Recovery Is Moderating in the Face of Debt and Continued Uncertainty**

The U.S. economy is recovering, thanks to unprecedented macroeconomic policy stimulus, emergency financial stabilization measures, and a modest cyclical upswing. But the rate of expansion is beginning to moderate. The economy grew at an annualized rate of [1.6] percent in the three months to June, a slower pace than the 3.7 percent growth rate posted in the first quarter. Moreover, high-frequency indicators suggest a weak recovery in coming quarters.

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<sup>8</sup>See Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Xingwang Qian, 2009, “Hoarding of International Reserves: Mrs. Machlup’s Wardrobe and the Joneses,” *Review of International Economics*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 824–43.


<sup>9</sup>See *People’s Republic of China—2010 Article IV Consultation*, [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10238.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10238.pdf).

Much of the weakness of this recovery is due to sluggish personal consumption—by far the biggest component of U.S. GDP. After accelerating to an annualized growth rate of [2] percent in the third quarter of 2009, personal consumption expenditure has since limped along at an average rate of [1½] percent. There are several reasons for this weakness. First, household net worth has deteriorated sharply (Figure 2.4). House prices have fallen by [25-30] percent (depending on which index is used) over three years, with the brunt of the adjustment falling on households that have the highest marginal propensity to consume. Second, unemployment is high: it is currently 9½ percent of the workforce; a broader measure of unemployment (which takes into account those seeking full-time jobs but only finding part-time work) is 16.5 percent; the median duration of unemployment, 22 weeks, is nearly twice the peak level of the previous 40 years. A weak labor market hits incomes and the ability to obtain credit, and it raises job uncertainty for those currently employed. Third, banks are still reluctant to lend to consumers, restricting credit for larger purchases, as they struggle to reduce leverage and restore balance sheets. Overall, given the unusually low savings levels before the crisis and the steep decline in personal net worth since then, the desire to save is more likely to stay elevated relative to precrisis levels. The personal saving rate since the beginning of 2009 has averaged [6] percent—a level last seen in [1995]—and is projected to remain at about 5 to 6 percent through 2015.

In contrast to private consumption, private investment in software and equipment has rebounded strongly. Firms have also increased productivity, and unit labor costs have declined sharply. In the near term, fixed investment is likely to be the principal driver of domestic demand,

**Figure 2.4. United States and Canada: Differing Fortunes**

The pace of recovery in the United States has moderated. Consumers face headwinds of high debt and fallen asset values; weak credit growth, despite extraordinarily loose monetary conditions; and persistently high unemployment. Personal saving rates will remain higher than precrisis levels for a sustained period, and public balances are projected to deteriorate further. By contrast, the Canadian economy is less hampered by the same factors and is set to recover more strongly.



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimates.

as inventory accumulation slows. The current account deficit is projected to remain at about [3½] percent of GDP over the medium term—much lower than during the years leading up to the crisis—because the recovery in investment will be financed by strong private savings and improving fiscal balances.

The most likely prospect for the U.S. economy is for a continued but slow recovery, with growth far weaker than in previous recoveries, considering the depth of the recession. GDP growth is projected to be to about [3] percent in 2010 and [2½] percent in 2011 (Table 2.2; Figure 2.5). This implies that the gap between actual and potential output will remain wide, even though potential growth has itself suffered temporarily from the crisis. The unemployment rate is therefore expected to remain stubbornly high. Against this backdrop, inflation will remain low—it is projected to be [1½] percent in 2010 and [¾] percent in 2011.

**Table 2.2. Selected Advanced Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment**

*(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)*

	Real GDP			Consumer Prices 1/			Current Account Balance 2/			Unemployment 3/		
	Projections			Projections			Projections			Projections		
	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
<b>Advanced Economies</b>	<b>-3.2</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>-0.3</b>	<b>-0.2</b>	<b>-0.3</b>	<b>8.0</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>8.1</b>
United States	-2.6	2.9	2.5	-0.3	1.4	0.8	-2.7	-3.1	-3.3	9.3	9.6	9.4
Euro Area 4/5/	-4.1	1.1	1.3	0.3	1.3	1.4	-0.6	0.3	0.6	9.4	10.1	10.2
Japan	-5.2	2.9	1.8	-1.4	-1.2	-0.2	2.8	3.2	2.6	5.1	4.9	4.7
United Kingdom 4/	-4.9	1.6	2.1	2.1	3.1	2.5	-1.1	-2.6	-2.5	7.5	8.2	7.8
Canada	-2.5	3.3	2.8	0.3	1.8	2.0	-2.8	-2.7	-2.2	8.3	8.0	7.7
Other Advanced Economies	-1.1	5.0	3.6	1.5	2.5	2.6	5.0	4.8	4.6	5.0	4.9	4.8
<i>Memorandum</i>												
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies	-0.9	7.5	4.5	1.3	2.6	2.7	8.4	6.7	6.5	4.3	3.8	3.7

1/ Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Table A6 in the Statistical Appendix.


2/ Percent of GDP.

3/ Percent.

4/ Based on Eurostat's harmonized index of consumer prices.

5/ Current account position corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.

**Figure 2.5. United States and Canada: Average Projected Real GDP Growth in 2010–11**  
(Percent)



Risks to the outlook remain elevated and are tilted to the downside. Residential and commercial real estate markets are still fragile. Further loan write-downs at small- and medium-size banks could inhibit recovery of normal credit conditions. The sharp rise in government debt has increased vulnerability to financial market sentiment, although Treasury security yields have fallen significantly recently amid economic weakness, flight to quality, and expectations of additional government bond purchases by the Federal Reserve (Fed). Easing consumer price inflation, together with weak labor markets and relatively low consumption demand, points to a tail risk of deflation. On the upside, it is possible that business fixed investment could rebound faster from still-depressed levels.

Against this backdrop, U.S. authorities will need to find a way to exit from extraordinary policy intervention without undermining the fledgling recovery, while dealing with long-term legacies of fiscal imbalances, gaps and overlaps in financial regulation, and a weakened banking sector.

- A key macroeconomic challenge is to ensure that the public debt is put on a sustainable path without jeopardizing the recovery. Under current policies, the general government deficit is projected to be about 10 percent of GDP in both 2010 and 2011, and gross general government debt will increase to about [110] percent of

GDP by 2015. Given the risks posed by budgetary imbalances, the groundwork for fiscal consolidation must begin in 2011. The proposed fiscal tightening of about 1 percent of GDP in 2011 implied by the administration's mid-session review strikes the right balance between near-term support for the recovery and medium-term credibility. If downside risks to growth materialize, there is some room to reduce up-front adjustment while strengthening medium-term credibility. This could be achieved by further entitlement spending reforms, which would have little immediate impact on demand. However, the existing fiscal plans do not stabilize medium-term debt, which should be put firmly on a downward path to rebuild room for fiscal maneuvers and avoid negative effects on lending rates and long-term growth. Hence, a clear commitment to additional consolidation measures under credible economic assumptions (by enshrining targets and/or measures in legislation, for example) would be desirable. In this context, the President's Fiscal Commission is expected to play a key role in fostering political consensus, including in difficult areas such as tax policy and entitlement spending.

- Monetary policy should remain accommodative, because of muted inflation, subpar growth, and lingering financial strain. The Fed has maintained the policy rate at an all-time low while signaling that conditions are likely to warrant keeping the rate at exceptionally low levels for an extended period. In light of larger downside risks, the Fed's recent decision to resume its purchases of government securities (using resources from maturing government-sponsored enterprise debt and mortgage-backed securities in its portfolio) is appropriate. In the event that such risks materialize, policy responses could include a strengthened commitment to maintaining the ultra-low policy rate for an extended period, expanding asset purchases, and relaunching facilities to aid stressed markets. Meanwhile, the Fed has been developing a well-diversified tool kit for managing monetary conditions, which will help facilitate monetary exit when needed.
- Notwithstanding considerable efforts to improve financial stability, the banking system remains vulnerable. Capital will probably need to be raised to meet [pending] higher regulatory requirements. The new Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act expands oversight of systemically important financial firms. It establishes a special resolution authority, with the aim of facilitating orderly intervention procedures for systemically important nonbank financial institutions. It increases regulation of over-the-counter derivatives markets and establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The legislation also authorizes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which encompasses all the major financial supervisory bodies at the federal level and is chaired by the treasury secretary. The FSOC is authorized to (1) recommend higher prudential requirements; (2) designate financial firms, activities, or market utilities as systemically important; and (3) approve the breakup of large and complex companies if financial stability is threatened. However, the specifics will need to be worked out before it will be clear

how the legislation will be implemented in practice, especially concerning the setting of new prudential norms, the cross-border implementation of resolution procedures, and the functioning of the FSOC.

Policy choices in the United States matter greatly for the rest of the world. The huge prospective funding requirements of the government may have implications for other economies. To the extent that 10-year Treasury bonds set a benchmark for other assets, market nervousness about the fiscal position in the United States could cause an international increase in interest rates. In addition, because of the U.S. dollar's role as a reserve currency, and the importance of the United States as a financial center, policy inaction by the U.S. authorities would have far greater effects on other economies than would be implied by trade linkages alone. Shocks to confidence in the United States could cause an international increase in bond and equity risk premiums.

The Canadian economy has been relatively buoyant. Household balance sheets are healthier than in the United States, and the banks have very solid books. Monetary and fiscal stimulus, and strong international demand for commodities, helped boost the growth rate in the first quarter of this year to more than 6 percent, double that of the United States, with consumer spending especially robust. House prices held up relatively well during the crisis. The unemployment rate, at 7.9 percent, is well below that in the United States and has been declining steadily since early 2009. However, recent data indicate a moderation in growth, which nonetheless seems to remain above potential. Risks to the Canadian economy are mainly external. The economy is vulnerable to a dip in commodity prices, particularly for minerals and energy, and a slowdown in the U.S. economy, which buys about three-quarters of its exports.


Improving conditions have allowed policymakers to start unwinding policy stimulus. The Bank of Canada raised the overnight rate in July from 0.50 percent, where it had been since the crisis, to 0.75 percent. The fiscal stimulus package has been implemented as scheduled. Should conditions worsen unexpectedly, fiscal policy would be able to respond—the Canadian fiscal deficit is projected to be [3½] percent of GDP in 2011, with net public debt hovering around [35] percent of GDP.

### **Europe Is Facing a Gradual and Uneven Recovery**

In Europe, the road to recovery has been bumpy. Largely caused by unsustainable policies in some member countries, the sovereign debt crisis in the spring erupted before the euro area's recovery could gain traction. The crisis spread internationally, threatening the financial system as well as regional and global recovery. A strong and far-reaching policy response contained the situation. Unprecedented liquidity and credit support, new European financing instruments, and substantial fiscal action in affected countries arrested the financial turmoil, moderating its adverse impact on Europe's economic activity.

The recovery has finally gained some vigor, but it is still likely to be moderate and uneven (Figures 2.6 and 2.7). Advanced Europe's GDP is projected to grow at [1¼] percent in 2010, edging up to [1½] percent in 2011 (Table 2.3). Emerging Europe's growth is expected to be [3] percent in 2010, picking up to [3¼] percent in 2011. There are pronounced differences in economic prospects across the region, depending on the condition of public and private sector balance sheets and the extent to which macroeconomic policies can support the recovery.


**Figure 2.6. Europe: Average Projected Real GDP Growth in 2010–11**  
(Percent)



- Despite robust manufacturing exports in recent months, moderate recovery is expected in Germany because of weak trading partner growth going forward. In France, growth is projected to be modest, as private consumption is weakened by high unemployment and the withdrawal of stimulus measures. In Italy, the recovery is expected to be even more subdued, as a persistent competitiveness problem limits the scope for export growth and planned fiscal consolidation weakens private demand. Constrained by fiscal and competitiveness imbalances, growth is projected to be much lower in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Outside the euro area, the prospects for recovery are similarly diverse. In the United Kingdom, domestic demand is expected to remain subdued, particularly following the recent measures to cut the budget deficit.
- In emerging Europe, economies that experienced the mildest downturns (Poland), and others that faced the crisis with relatively strong household and bank balance sheets (Turkey), are projected to grow robustly, helped by the normalization of global trade

**Figure 2.7. Europe: A Gradual and Uneven Recovery**

The recovery is gradually taking hold, but domestic demand is expected to remain sluggish, especially in advanced Europe. Fiscal consolidation plans across Europe are rightfully differentiated: economies facing market pressure or external financing constraints have larger and more front-loaded adjustments than those with more manageable debt dynamics. Economic prospects are closely connected via cross-border bank flows and trade linkages, especially with Germany.



Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Haver Analytics; IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*; and IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>Change in structural balance in percent of potential GDP. Vulnerable euro area comprises Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Other euro area comprises euro area economies excluding vulnerable euro area. Other advanced comprises advanced Europe excluding the euro area.

<sup>2</sup>BGR Bulgaria; CZE Czech Republic; EST: Estonia; HRV: Croatia; HUN: Hungary; LTU: Lithuania; LVA: Latvia; POL: Poland; ROM: Romania; SVK: Slovak Republic; SVN: Slovenia; TUR Turkey.

and capital flows. However, those that had experienced unsustainable domestic booms (Bulgaria, Latvia) or have vulnerable private or public sector balance sheets (Hungary, Romania) are expected to recover more slowly. These problems have tightly constrained the room for policy maneuvers.

Risks to the outlook have become more balanced. Although downside risks continue to threaten Europe’s recovery, some upside risks have recently emerged. The main upside risk comes from higher-than-expected real activity in Germany, which could lift growth in Europe more generally, given the country’s substantial trade and production linkages. Nevertheless, downside risks still loom large. In the near term, as discussed in Chapter 1 of the GFSR, the potential for financial spillovers across sovereigns remains elevated in the euro area, particularly among peripheral economies. European banking systems are still heavily reliant on government support and are highly vulnerable to deterioration in the real economy, sovereign shocks, and funding strains. Hence, if unaddressed, renewed financial sector stress could spread—including to emerging Europe via trade and cross-border bank flows—and have significant adverse effects on real activity. In the medium term, the main risk is that fiscal and competitiveness imbalances in peripheral economies and insufficient action to tackle weak banks could lead to a protracted period of subpar growth and occasional crises.

Against this backdrop, the overarching policy challenge is to use the window of opportunity afforded by the unprecedented

policy support and address underlying problems through national and EU-level actions.

**Table 2.3. Selected European Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment***(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)*

	Real GDP			Consumer Prices 1/			Current Account Balance 2/			Unemployment 3/		
	Projections			Projections			Projections			Projections		
	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
<b>Europe</b>	<b>-4.1</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>10.0</b>
<b>Advanced Europe</b>	<b>-4.1</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>9.5</b>
Euro Area 4/5/	-4.1	1.1	1.3	0.3	1.3	1.4	-0.6	0.3	0.6	9.4	10.1	10.2
Germany	-4.9	1.6	1.6	0.2	1.0	1.1	4.8	5.7	5.7	7.5	7.3	7.8
France	-2.5	1.5	1.6	0.1	1.3	1.6	-1.9	-1.6	-1.6	9.4	10.0	10.0
Italy	-5.0	0.9	1.0	0.8	1.5	1.7	-3.4	-2.7	-2.5	7.8	8.7	8.6
Spain	-3.6	-0.4	0.6	-0.2	1.4	1.1	-5.5	-4.7	-4.0	18.0	19.3	18.7
Netherlands	-3.9	1.5	1.6	1.0	1.3	1.1	5.4	6.9	7.8	3.5	4.2	4.4
Belgium	-3.0	1.3	1.4	-0.0	1.6	1.7	0.3	-0.4	0.2	7.7	9.0	9.0
Greece	-2.0	-4.0	-2.6	1.4	4.6	2.2	-11.2	-10.8	-7.7	9.4	11.8	14.6
Austria	-3.9	1.5	1.6	0.4	1.5	1.7	2.3	2.1	2.2	4.8	4.5	4.5
Portugal	-2.7	0.5	-0.0	-0.9	0.8	1.2	-10.3	-9.8	-8.2	9.4	10.7	11.7
Finland	-7.8	1.2	2.0	1.6	1.4	1.8	1.3	1.8	1.8	8.3	8.8	8.7
Ireland	-7.6	1.5	2.3	-1.7	-1.6	-0.5	-3.0	-2.2	-0.7	11.8	13.5	13.0
Slovak Republic	-4.7	4.1	4.3	0.9	0.7	1.9	-3.2	-1.4	-2.6	12.1	14.1	12.7
Slovenia	-7.8	0.8	2.3	0.9	1.5	2.3	-1.0	-0.5	-0.6	6.0	7.8	8.1
Luxembourg	-4.1	2.9	3.1	0.4	2.2	1.6	5.7	6.7	6.9	6.0	5.8	5.6
Cyprus	-1.7	0.0	1.8	0.2	2.2	2.3	-8.3	-7.4	-6.9	5.3	7.8	7.5
Malta	-1.5	1.0	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	-6.1	-5.8	-5.6	7.1	7.3	7.2
United Kingdom 5/	-4.9	1.6	2.1	2.1	3.1	2.5	-1.1	-2.6	-2.5	7.5	8.2	7.8
Sweden	-5.1	3.0	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.0	7.2	5.9	6.4	8.3	9.3	8.8
Switzerland	-1.5	1.9	1.8	-0.5	1.0	1.2	8.3	10.0	10.7	3.6	3.9	3.6
Czech Republic	-4.2	1.7	2.6	1.0	1.6	2.0	-1.1	-1.5	-1.6	7.2	8.8	8.5
Norway	-1.6	0.7	1.8	2.2	2.7	1.7	14.1	17.4	17.5	3.2	3.5	3.6
Denmark	-5.1	1.2	1.6	1.3	2.0	2.0	4.2	2.8	2.4	3.3	4.2	4.7
Iceland	-6.5	-3.0	2.3	12.0	6.2	3.8	3.8	5.4	1.8	8.0	9.7	8.6
<b>Emerging Europe 6/</b>	<b>-3.6</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>-2.5</b>	<b>-3.7</b>	<b>-4.0</b>	<b>12.2</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>11.8</b>
Turkey	-4.7	6.1	3.6	6.3	8.7	5.9	-2.3	-4.7	-5.1	14.0	12.2	11.9
Poland	1.8	3.4	3.7	3.5	2.5	2.5	-1.7	-2.4	-2.5	8.2	9.9	9.6
Romania	-7.1	-1.9	1.5	5.6	5.9	5.2	-4.7	-6.0	-6.1	6.3	7.2	7.1
Hungary	-6.3	0.6	2.6	4.2	4.7	2.9	0.2	-0.1	-0.5	10.1	10.8	10.7
Bulgaria	-5.0	0.0	2.0	2.5	2.2	2.9	-9.5	-5.8	-5.5	6.8	8.3	7.6
Croatia	-5.8	-1.2	2.0	2.4	1.9	2.7	-5.3	-3.9	-5.3	9.2	9.5	9.0
Lithuania	-14.8	2.1	3.3	4.2	0.1	0.2	3.8	0.6	0.2	13.7	18.0	15.5
Latvia	-18.0	-3.5	3.3	3.3	-2.0	0.0	9.4	8.1	7.1	17.3	21.0	19.2
Estonia	-14.1	0.8	3.6	-0.1	0.8	1.1	4.6	4.7	3.9	13.8	16.3	15.1

1/ Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.

2/ Percent of GDP.

3/ Percent.

4/ Current account position corrected for reporting discrepancies in intra-area transactions.

5/ Based on Eurostat's harmonized index of consumer prices.

6/ Includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

Establishing public debt sustainability remains a top priority for many European economies. Across Europe, current fiscal consolidation plans are going in the right direction. They are rightfully differentiated—economies facing market pressure or severe external financing constraints (for example, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Spain) have larger and more front-loaded adjustment than countries benefiting from safe haven status (for example, Germany, the Netherlands). As a result, given the considerable near-term easing in Germany, the overall fiscal stance in the euro area will remain broadly neutral in 2010—as is appropriate, given the still-fragile recovery. Consolidation plans in 2011 are skewed toward expenditure cuts. This should dampen adverse effects on short-term growth, as discussed in Chapter 3. Plans for medium-term fiscal adjustment, however, need to be strengthened considerably to deliver permanent savings in the face of looming age-related spending. Ambitious entitlement spending reforms would deliver large credibility gains at a lesser cost in terms of short-term growth; they would also forestall a need for more painful reforms in the future. Some economies have taken steps in that direction (for example, Croatia, France, Italy), but more could be done. Key items will be raising the retirement age to reflect increased life expectancy, more efficient health care spending, and social security contribution reform that reduces distortions to the labor supply.

Monetary policy should remain very supportive for the foreseeable future in most European economies. In advanced Europe, inflation remains low, because output gaps are large, and inflation expectations are well anchored. Core inflation is projected to remain at about [1] percent in the euro area. Thus, in the euro area, it is appropriate to keep interest rates exceptionally low, and, given continued financial strain, to unwind nonstandard support measures and collateral-requirement changes very gradually. This will help support the recovery by dampening the adverse short-term effects of fiscal consolidation on domestic demand. If downside risks to growth materialize, central banks in advanced Europe may need to again rely more strongly on their balance sheets to further ease monetary conditions. In emerging Europe, inflation prospects are a bit mixed—reflecting different exchange rate regimes and varying degrees of economic slack—but are generally contained. In some economies, value-added tax hikes are likely to temporarily drive up inflation (for example, Poland, Romania). Nevertheless, in most economies with flexible exchange rate regimes (for example, Poland, Romania), central banks could still keep policy interest rates at relatively low levels in order to support activity.

The resilience of Europe's financial sector must be improved and its stability secured. Resolving banking sector issues is essential to spur lending, which is very important to firms' external funding. As discussed in the October 2010 GFSR, however, European banks continue to face challenges. These include heavy reliance on European Central Bank financing facilities—or on government support—and large exposure to risky sovereign debt. The stress tests conducted by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors have been helpful in improving disclosure regarding banks' condition. These tests also provide a useful guide for the need to recapitalize, restructure, or resolve vulnerable banks. In this respect, some economies (for example, Ireland, Spain) have made more progress than others (for

example, Germany) in tackling weak banks. Nonetheless, as discussed in the GFSR, an adverse funding scenario could have a significant impact on the European banking system. To cope with the wall of maturing bank debt, some blanket financial support measures may need to be extended, but not at the cost of postponing much-needed restructuring. Meanwhile, it will be important to resolve uncertainty about regulatory reforms, which would help increase banks' willingness to supply credit and support the recovery. Invigorating credit is also a challenge in emerging Europe, particularly given the deterioration in bank credit portfolios during the crisis.

Another crucial task ahead is the reform of EU policy frameworks. The cross-border dimension of many issues argues for a stronger role at the EU level. The crisis exposed long-standing problems in existing fiscal, structural, and financial stability policy arrangements. Such weaknesses need to be addressed in order to ensure Europe's future stability and growth.

A key challenge is the future of fiscal surveillance and sovereign crisis management. An arrangement along the lines of the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) is likely to prove useful in the future, but sharing fiscal burdens implies a need for shared responsibility for fiscal policy. This principle was recognized with the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact. However, economies failed to live up to its letter and spirit, by not adjusting sufficiently during good times. Thus, the Pact needs to be strengthened to feature better incentives for preventing and resolving fiscal imbalances. It needs to encourage the buildup of sufficient buffers in good times, to establish credible procedures for the enforcement of the common fiscal rules and to beef up centralized crisis management capabilities—a gap now temporarily filled by the ESM and the larger European Financial Stability Facility, the latter designed specifically for euro-area members.

In addition, the crisis has shown how financial sector problems in specific countries can very quickly have pan-European consequences. Differences in prudential policies and practices across countries encourage complex business structures, regulatory arbitrage, and rent seeking, with deleterious consequences for Europe's financial stability. Supervisory or regulatory gaps have major spillovers. Hence, joint accountability and responsibility for Europe's common good of "financial stability"—in the form of an integrated European financial stability framework—is urgently needed. Such a framework needs to be built on two pillars: integrated crisis management and resolution—for example through a European resolution authority—and, to make burden sharing acceptable, integrated supervision. Both are necessary to achieve a fully integrated, efficient, and stable market for financial services. Steps in this direction are being taken—for instance, the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board and discussions about a more integrated resolution framework. Nevertheless, considering the devastating consequences of the crisis and the magnitude of the challenge, progress is still very slow, hampered by narrow national interests.

Last, a better structural policy framework is also necessary to help improve competitiveness, address macroeconomic imbalances, and boost growth. The current policy agenda (Europe 2020) could be improved in several ways. Specifically, surveillance over structural bottlenecks, competitiveness, and imbalances needs to become more binding. It should also consider the fiscal and financial policy challenges facing countries. To speed the process of reform, priority should be given to a narrow range of strategic objectives that have major cross-border implications. For instance, most Mediterranean economies need to address labor market segmentation, inadequate wage flexibility, and skill mismatches; upgrade education systems; and foster capital deepening and innovation. In addition, reform to bankruptcy proceedings in these economies will help facilitate firm turnover and entrepreneurship. For all EU economies, further liberalization of product and services markets under the Single Market program will strengthen the employment effects of labor market reform.


### **Latin America Is Sustaining Its Growth Momentum**

The LAC region is exiting the global crisis at a faster pace than anticipated (Figures 2.8 and 2.9). This reflects solid macroeconomic policy fundamentals, sizable policy support, favorable external financing conditions, and strong commodity revenues. Robust commodity export revenues have boosted domestic income, which along with easy financing conditions has supported domestic demand. For many of these economies, the potential negative effect from subdued advanced economies' import demand will be manageable, given lower reliance on external trade<sup>10</sup> and greater dependence on commodity exports, for which external demand is projected to remain robust (see Chapter 1, Appendix 1.1). However, Mexico, with its deep real and financial links to the United States economy, and the commodity-importing Central American and Caribbean regions, with their dependence on tourism and remittance flows from the United States, will be more vulnerable to weak U.S. economic conditions than others.

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
<sup>10</sup>For instance, the share of exports plus imports in total GDP—a very rough measure of openness—averaged less than 50 percent in the LA5 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru) in the past five years (compared with more than 125 percent for the ASEAN economies).

**Figure 2.8. Latin America and the Caribbean:**  
**Average Projected Real GDP Growth in 2010–11**  
*(Percent)*



**Figure 2.9. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC): Advancing with Strength<sup>1</sup>**

A proactive crisis response and favorable terms of trade have driven Latin America's speedy recovery. Commodity exporters are also benefiting from increasing demand from emerging Asia, particularly China. Capital inflows have picked up sharply in some economies. Although inflows have boosted the equities market, the recovery in private credit has remained sluggish.



Sources: CEIC/BMED database; Haver Analytics; IMF, *Balance of Payments Statistics*; IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*; and IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>LA-4: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru; LA-5: LA-4 and Mexico; Other Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

<sup>2</sup>Rest of LAC in this panel excludes Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines due to lack of data on GDP components.

<sup>3</sup>Emerging Asia: ASEAN-5, China, India, and NIEs. See Figure 2.3 for list of NIEs and ASEAN-5.

<sup>4</sup>Latin America: LA-5 and Other Latin America (see footnote 1).

<sup>5</sup>FDI = foreign direct investment. Other investment includes financial derivatives.

<sup>6</sup>Annualized percent change of three-month moving average over previous three-month moving average.

Growth in the region is projected to average [5] percent in 2010, and [4] percent in 2011 (Table 2.4). Risks to the outlook are tilted slightly to the downside. This reflects mainly a worse-than-anticipated recovery in advanced economies, with its negative spillovers on commodity prices. An additional contagion channel arises from the large presence of foreign banks in Latin America (for example, Spanish banks). However, the fact that these banks have usually relied primarily on subsidiaries funded by local deposits rather than cross-border flows mitigates the risk.

**Table 2.4. Selected Western Hemisphere Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment**

*(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)*

	Real GDP			Consumer Prices 1/			Current Account Balance 2/			Unemployment 3/		
	Projections			Projections			Projections			Projections		
	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
<b>North America</b>	<b>-3.0</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>-2.6</b>	<b>-2.9</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.2</b>
United States	-2.6	2.9	2.5	-0.3	1.4	0.8	-2.7	-3.1	-3.3	9.3	9.6	9.4
Canada	-2.5	3.3	2.8	0.3	1.8	2.0	-2.8	-2.7	-2.2	8.3	8.0	7.7
Mexico	-6.5	4.5	4.4	5.3	4.5	3.3	-0.6	-0.9	-1.8	5.5	5.0	4.5
<b>South America</b>	<b>-0.2</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>-0.3</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>-1.4</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>8.0</b>
Brazil	-0.2	7.1	4.2	4.9	5.4	4.9	-1.5	-2.8	-3.1	8.1	7.8	7.6
Argentina 4/	0.8	6.5	3.5	6.3	10.6	10.6	2.0	1.7	1.4	9.3	9.3	9.3
Colombia	0.8	4.1	4.0	4.2	2.4	2.7	-2.2	-2.6	-2.8	12.0	10.5	9.5
Venezuela	-3.3	-4.1	-0.5	27.1	31.7	37.2	2.6	7.9	8.1	7.5	6.7	7.1
Peru	0.9	7.3	5.9	2.9	1.6	2.3	0.2	-1.4	-2.2	8.6	8.3	8.0
Chile	-1.5	5.0	6.0	1.7	1.7	3.0	2.6	-0.7	-2.0	9.6	9.0	8.7
Ecuador	0.4	2.5	2.2	5.1	4.0	3.5	-0.7	-1.0	-1.0	8.5	8.6	8.5
Bolivia	3.4	4.0	4.0	3.3	3.4	3.7	4.5	3.2	3.7	...	...	...
Uruguay	2.9	7.0	4.1	7.1	6.3	6.5	0.7	-1.0	-1.2	7.3	7.0	7.0
Paraguay	-3.8	8.5	4.0	2.6	4.4	4.9	-1.0	-1.2	-1.1	5.6	5.6	5.6
<b>Central America 5/</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>-5.2</b>	<b>-5.5</b>	...	...	...
<b>Caribbean 6/</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>-4.2</b>	<b>-2.9</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	...	...	...
<i>Memorandum</i>												
Latin America and the Caribbean 7/	-1.7	5.1	4.0	5.9	6.4	6.1	-0.6	-1.3	-1.6	8.2	7.7	7.4

1/ Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.

2/ Percent of GDP.

3/ Percent.

4/ Private analysts estimate that consumer price index inflation has been considerably higher. The authorities have created a board of academic advisors to assess these issues. Private analysts are also of the view that real GDP growth has been significantly lower than the official reports since the last quarter of 2008.

5/ Central America comprises Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

6/ The Caribbean comprises Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

7/ Includes Mexico and economies from the Caribbean, Central America, and South America.

Prospects within the LAC region are quite diverse given the varying strength of macroeconomic policy frameworks, the role of domestic demand, and different degrees of exposure to spillovers from global trade and financial markets:

- Impressive improvements in macroeconomic policy frameworks over the past two decades—combined with accommodative policies, easy external financing conditions, and strong commodity prices—are driving a robust recovery in the LA4 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru). Despite the expected dynamism in domestic demand, current account balances are projected to deteriorate only marginally in 2010 and 2011. High commodity prices and continued vitality in Asia are expected to sustain exports.
- Mexico is staging a somewhat slower but steady recovery. Growth is projected to average over [4½] percent in 2010–11—despite the 2009 hard landing and the drag from the U.S. economy. As in the LA4, recovery has been underpinned by strong policy frameworks in the run-up to the crisis. However, Mexico’s outlook arguably faces larger downside risks than the LA4. A weaker-than-projected recovery in the U.S. economy would have important implications for Mexico. Furthermore, with more than 80 percent of domestic system assets owned by systemic global banks, substantially higher capital charges arising from global financial sector regulatory reform could potentially have knock-on effects, affecting the availability of credit for the private sector in Mexico as well.
- The outlook for the rest of the LAC region is a somewhat mixed picture. Overall, the commodity exporters will continue to benefit from the strength in their terms of trade, growing links with China, and strong intraregional linkages. Thus, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are set to experience reasonably high growth, supported by strong trade ties vis-à-vis Brazil, as well as a sharp rebound in agricultural production following last year’s severe drought. Conversely, despite high oil prices, Ecuador’s recovery will be muted given supply-side constraints. Venezuela’s recession will deepen in 2010, reflecting severe supply bottlenecks, challenges from capital flight, and generally weak policy frameworks. Growth in most of the Caribbean countries will be subdued amid weak prospects for tourism and remittances and limited room for policy support in light of chronic public debt burdens.<sup>11</sup>

Over the medium term, like Asia, LAC economies need to establish policies to achieve strong and sustainable growth. However, unlike Asia, medium-term policy priorities are not driven by rebalancing more towards domestic demand (given relatively low reliance on external trade, although the tourism-dependent Caribbean countries are notable

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<sup>11</sup>See the October 2010 *Regional Economic Outlook: Western Hemisphere* for a more detailed discussion of the challenges and prospects in the rest of the LAC region.

exceptions), but rather by a need to ensure that the growth processes do not give rise to balance sheet vulnerabilities. Macroeconomic and prudential policies would need to be designed to ensure that the recovery becomes well entrenched and at the same time contain the risks of overheating and the buildup of fiscal and financial sector risks.


Thus, the priority for the region is now to use the window provided by the cyclical upswing to start unwinding stimulus, regain room for policy maneuvers, and sustain its relatively recent track record of strong macroeconomic credentials. In many economies the policy mix should favor early withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus, while allowing the withdrawal of monetary stimulus to proceed at a slower pace. Fiscal tightening will help address risks of inflation pressure (Peru, Uruguay) and exchange rate overvaluation (Brazil), reduce the generally high public debt and associated vulnerability, and provide a cushion for future contingencies. Moreover, given policy challenges arising from strong and persistent capital inflows in some countries, fiscal tools are likely better options to deal with overheating pressures than monetary tools. However, in Chile, fiscal stimulus can be withdrawn only gradually in the context of earthquake-related reconstruction spending, so tighter monetary conditions may be needed to rein in inflation. For the rest of Latin America as well, it is also critical to use the cyclical upswing to rebuild fiscal room and avoid procyclical policies. However, the pace of stimulus withdrawal would need to be slowed if downside risks to growth were to materialize, especially for countries with available policy space.

With respect to the approach to capital inflows, the focus among the LA5 (LA4 plus Mexico) has appropriately been to deepen capital markets and improve the supervisory and regulatory framework to enable absorption of capital inflows without endangering financial stability. Other priorities for the region include structural reforms to improve the investment climate, which would attract stable FDI inflows and improve external competitiveness (for example, streamlining business regulations, upgrading infrastructure, labor and product market reforms). However, these reforms will take time to implement. In the meantime, economies have begun to use a combination of macroeconomic and macroprudential measures to address the challenges posed by capital inflows (Box 2.2). Regarding the use of capital controls in particular, preliminary indications are that they may have helped somewhat in changing the composition of inflows but not the volume (see the April and October 2010 issues of the GFSR). In this context, the possible use of capital controls should be supported by other measures—for example, continued two-way exchange rate flexibility to discourage speculative inflows, fiscal consolidation (where public debt is high and private sector recovery entrenched), and enhanced financial sector monitoring and supervision.

### **The CIS Region Is Experiencing a Modest Recovery**

The recovery in the CIS region has been supported by high commodity prices, normalizing trade and capital flows, accommodative policies, and positive regional spillovers


(Figures 2.10 and 2.11). The region is benefiting from Russia's gradual recuperation. Some economies in the region have already experienced an increase in remittances from Russia.<sup>12</sup>



<sup>12</sup>Alturki, Espinosa-Bowen, and Ilahi (2009) find that Russia appears to influence regional growth mainly through the remittance channel. In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in growth of remittances from Russia is associated with a 0.3 percentage point GDP increase in growth in the CIS countries, with a 0.4 percentage point increase in oil-importing CIS countries' growth.

**Figure 2.11. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): A Modest Recovery**

The recovery in the CIS region is gaining traction, supported by high commodity prices, normalizing trade and capital flows, accommodative policies, and positive spillovers from Russia. Amid a more favorable external environment, capital flows are expected to pick up, but to lower levels than before the crisis. In Russia, the more flexible exchange rate regime, alongside cuts in policy interest rates, has helped deter speculative capital inflows. But the focus now should be on inflation control.



Sources: Haver Analytics; IHS Global Insight; IMF Primary Commodity Price System; and IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>Domestic demand data available only through 2010:Q1.

<sup>2</sup>Net energy exporters include Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Net energy importers include Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.

<sup>3</sup>OF: official flows; OFF: other private financial flows; PDI: private direct investment; PPF: private portfolio investment.

Real activity for the CIS region is expected to grow at about [4½] percent in 2010 and 2011 (Table 2.5). As in other regions, prospects vary considerably. Exposure to commodity prices, the degree of integration with global financial markets, the extent of policy support, and links to Russia are factors that differ importantly across economies.

**Table 2.5. Commonwealth of Independent States: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment**

(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)

	Real GDP			Consumer Prices 1/			Current Account Balance 2/			Unemployment 3/		
	Projections			Projections			Projections			Projections		
	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011	2009	2010	2011
<b>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 4/</b>	<b>-6.5</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.6</b>
Russia	-7.9	4.3	4.3	11.7	6.3	5.8	4.0	4.8	4.1	8.4	7.5	7.3
Ukraine	-15.1	3.7	4.3	15.9	9.9	10.7	-1.5	-0.5	-1.5	8.8	8.8	7.9
Kazakhstan	1.2	4.1	4.8	7.3	7.6	6.6	-3.2	3.6	2.8	8.0	7.8	7.6
Belarus	0.2	7.7	5.7	13.0	7.4	9.5	-13.1	-13.2	-12.6	0.9	0.9	0.9
Azerbaijan	9.3	3.6	1.6	1.5	4.5	3.5	23.6	25.1	23.6	6.0	6.0	6.0
Turkmenistan	6.1	9.4	11.5	-2.7	3.9	4.8	-16.1	-4.4	3.9	...	...	...
Mongolia	-1.6	8.5	7.0	6.3	10.5	8.9	-9.8	-13.9	-22.9	11.6	3.0	3.0
<b>Low-Income CIS</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>9.1</b>	...	...	...
Uzbekistan	8.1	8.0	7.0	14.1	10.6	11.4	2.7	3.7	6.6	0.2	0.2	0.2
Georgia	-3.9	5.5	4.0	1.7	4.8	5.3	-11.7	-12.0	-11.8	16.9	16.8	16.7
Armenia	-14.2	4.8	4.0	3.4	6.7	5.3	-15.7	-13.9	-12.3	6.8	7.0	7.0
Tajikistan	3.4	5.5	5.0	6.5	7.0	8.0	-4.9	-4.9	-5.8	...	...	...
Kyrgyz Republic	2.3	-3.5	7.1	6.8	4.8	7.1	2.1	-5.4	-9.3	5.8	5.6	5.4
Moldova	-6.5	2.5	3.6	0.0	9.3	6.0	-9.1	-10.4	-11.2	6.4	5.0	4.5
<i>Memorandum</i>												
Net Energy Exporters 5/	-6.0	4.4	4.4	10.8	6.4	5.9	3.8	5.2	4.7	7.3	6.6	6.5
Net Energy Importers 6/	-9.5	4.8	4.7	13.1	8.8	9.7	-5.8	-5.2	-5.9	8.0	7.7	7.1

1/ Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Table A7 in the Statistical Appendix.

2/ Percent of GDP.

3/ Percent.

4/ Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure.

5/ Net Energy Exporters comprise Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

6/ Net Energy Importers comprise Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.

- In Russia, despite relatively high oil prices, the near-term outlook is for a modest recovery. Output growth is projected to reach [4¼] percent in 2010 and 2011. Although the current heat wave and related wildfires could detract from near-term growth, and the ongoing rebound still depends on policy support, a self-sustained consumption-led recovery should gradually take hold. The adjustment of bank balance sheets appears to have run its course, and banks seem poised to cautiously expand lending. Gradually rising real wages and lower unemployment should support consumption.

- High commodity prices benefit other energy exporters in the region as well. Large-scale investment and higher volumes of gas exports are projected to boost growth in Turkmenistan to about [9½] percent in 2010 and [11½] percent in 2011. In Uzbekistan, real activity is expected to expand by [8] percent in 2010 and [7] percent in 2011. Kazakhstan is set for a slower recovery, due to lingering problems in its financial system.
- For energy importers as a group, growth is projected to pick up to about [4¾] percent in both years, reflecting the global recovery and financial stability (for example, Ukraine). Some of these economies (for example, Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan) will benefit from the rebound in remittances from Russia.

Overall, near-term risks to growth in the region are broadly balanced. On the upside, more favorable external developments—particularly higher commodity prices and a renewal in capital inflows—or a more rapid recovery in credit could push growth higher. The recently launched customs union (among Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia) could also boost regional growth further. On the downside, external shocks—adverse changes in commodity prices or a shock to investor confidence—present the key downside risks. With some exceptions (for example, Kazakhstan), foreign banks have a minor role in CIS economies. At the same time, the region—and Russia in particular—continues to be very vulnerable to volatility in capital flows and global risk appetite. For instance, the euro area crisis in May led to a fresh bout of volatility in Russian stock markets and renewed downward pressure on the ruble. A worse-than-expected growth outcome in Russia would have knock-on effects throughout the region, mainly through remittances and trade.

The fiscal challenges vary across the region. In Russia, the task is to ensure that the large fiscal stimulus (about 9 percent of GDP) is unwound as the global economy gathers strength—in this regard, a key concern is that some three-quarters of the fiscal package entailed permanent measures (for example, higher pension outlays). Given the composition of government spending, reversing the fiscal stimulus will be difficult without undertaking significant public sector reforms that allow savings in socially sensitive areas such as health care, social protection, and pensions. Energy importers in the region have limited fiscal room and are mostly aiming for a neutral fiscal stance or modest fiscal adjustment in 2010.

Most economies in the region operate under pegged or heavily managed exchange rate regimes, which deprive them of one means of adjusting to shocks. In this respect, the recent greater exchange rate flexibility in Russia is welcome. So far, the more flexible exchange rate regime, alongside cuts in policy interest rates, has helped deter speculative capital inflows. But the focus now should be on inflation control, and the monetary easing cycle should be paused. In Kazakhstan, the economy would benefit from greater exchange rate flexibility, once the problems in the banking system have been resolved. This would facilitate monetary management, help the economy adjust to external shocks, and promote local currency financial market development.

Banking sector balance sheets remain impaired in several CIS economies, calling for continued policy attention. In Russia, restoring normal credit expansion will require decisive actions to improve provisioning standards and to enhance the powers of the supervisory authority, including over connected lending. In Kazakhstan, a transparent and comprehensive strategy to resolve bad debts—that involves an independent assessment of systemic banks to evaluate recapitalization needs—is critical for restoring financial sector health. In Ukraine, financial sector reforms are also essential to revitalizing the banking system, by ensuring an adequate level of capitalization. More independence for the central bank to pursue monetary and financial stability would also be desirable.

Over the medium term, the overarching challenges in the region are to improve the investment climate and diversify the pattern of growth. In Russia, for instance, there is a need for public administration reform, civil service reform, and judicial reforms to ensure a level playing field for all investors. Such reforms will be critical to modernizing the economy. It will also be important to use capital flows wisely, to help move the economy from its dependence on oil revenues. In other energy exporters in the region, the priority is to facilitate private sector development and, in some economies, diversify away from the hydrocarbon sector. Such policies will help achieve sustained welfare gains.


### **The Middle East and North Africa Region Is Recovering Strongly**

The strength of the recent economic recovery in the MENA region is largely underpinned by the rebound in oil prices from their trough in 2009, which has boosted receipts for oil exporters in the region. In addition, a sizable and rapid fiscal policy response, especially in oil-exporting economies, has played a substantial role in supporting the non-oil sector in these economies. These expansionary policies have had spillover effects on the region's oil importers—where fiscal expansion was of a more moderate size—due to close trade links between these two groups of economies (Figures 2.12 and 2.13).

These positive factors contribute to an expected growth rate for the region as a whole of [4] percent in 2010 and [5] percent in 2011 (Table 2.6).

- Average growth rates among oil exporters are projected to be higher over the next two years, compared with 2009. Supported by sizable government infrastructure investment, real activity in Saudi Arabia is expected to grow at [3¾] percent in 2010 and [4¼] percent in 2011.
- Growth in oil-importing economies is expected to remain robust in 2010 and 2011. Members of this group managed to weather the global recession relatively well, partly due to relatively limited global financial links. Some economies that experienced a boom-bust cycle in capital flows, such as Egypt, responded by drawing down reserves to limit the impact on the exchange rate and the real economy. In fact, net capital inflows have already turned positive in Egypt since the second half of 2009. Within

the group, Lebanon continued to register strong growth through the recession supported by signs of political stability and strong capital inflows.



The economic outlook in the region is closely linked to global developments, primarily through the impact of global economic activity on oil prices. The impact is not just confined to the oil exporters. Oil-importing economies in the region also benefit (roughly one-fourth of their exports go to oil exporters). Although oil prices have rebounded from the lows in 2009, increases going forward are projected to be modest. Expansion in demand by rapidly growing emerging markets is expected to be offset by stagnant demand from advanced economies (see Appendix 1.1 in Chapter 1 for further discussion of commodity developments). Oil and gas production capacity is set to increase, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, underpinned by continued expansion of productive capacity. The balance of risks to oil prices, as evidenced in options prices, is currently to the upside, which augurs well for the region. Nevertheless, the tail risk of a collapse in oil prices has significant implications for the region, especially for lower-income oil-exporting economies.

The possibility of heightened economic turbulence in Europe poses a significant downside risk for oil importers in the MENA region. Europe is their largest trading partner, accounting for about half of total exports. In addition, the Maghreb economies (for example, Tunisia, Morocco) are heavily reliant on Europe as a source of tourism, remittances, and FDI


flows. The volatile global environment poses significant policy challenges for the region. Fiscal policy strategies have varied, largely due to the respective strengths of public sector balance sheets. Most oil exporters are continuing to implement stimulus measures in 2010. Although particular country circumstances vary, plans to consolidate should be in place once recovery is more entrenched or if signs of incipient overheating emerge. Some oil importers, on the other hand, have already begun the process of consolidation. Debt levels in these economies are, on average, higher than in oil-exporting economies.

Monetary policy in the region largely mirrors that of the United States because of the large number of economies that have fixed exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Economies that have independent monetary policies, mostly the oil importers, have appropriately halted their easing in the face of growing inflation pressure.

An immediate challenge for policymakers in this region is to revive the financial intermediation process. In many economies, credit growth has been sluggish in the aftermath of the crisis due to weak balance sheets both for the banking sector and the nonfinancial corporate sector. Prominent corporate defaults in Dubai, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have contributed to increased uncertainty regarding the health of the corporate sector generally. The spillover from these episodes to broader lending conditions in other MENA economies, however, has thus far been limited—possibly due to relatively rapid and orderly restructuring. The decline in external sources of funds, along with slow deposit growth, has nevertheless curtailed the

**Figure 2.13. Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Recovering Strongly**

Recovery in the region is supported largely by the rebound in oil prices from their trough in 2009. In addition, government spending programs, especially in the oil-exporting economies, have played a significant role in supporting the non-oil sector in these economies. This fiscal stimulus has had positive spillovers to the oil-importing economies, which have close trade and financial links with the oil exporters.<sup>1</sup>



Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*; IMF, *International Financial Statistics*; and IMF staff estimates.  
<sup>1</sup>Oil exporters include Algeria, Bahrain, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, and Republic of Yemen. Oil importers include Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, and Tunisia. LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean. Other includes Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States.  
<sup>2</sup>"Exp" refers to exporters and "Imp" to importers. "FDI" refers to "direct investment in the reporting economy," and "Port." refers to "portfolio investment, liabilities."

ability of banks to extend loans.

**Table 2.6. Selected Middle East and North African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment**

(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)

	Real GDP			Consumer Prices 1/			Current Account Balance 2/			Unemployment 3/		
	2009	Projections		2009	Projections		2009	Projections		2009	Projections	
		2010	2011		2010	2011		2010	2011		2010	2011
<b>Middle East and North Africa</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>5.5</b>	...	...	...
<b>Oil Exporters 4/</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>8.1</b>	...	...	...
Iran, Islamic Republic of	1.1	1.6	3.0	10.8	7.5	8.0	3.6	4.2	4.5	...	...	...
Saudi Arabia	0.6	3.7	4.2	5.1	5.2	5.0	6.1	7.7	6.9	10.5	10.5	10.8
Algeria	2.4	4.1	4.1	5.7	5.5	5.2	0.3	4.3	3.4	10.2	10.0	9.8
United Arab Emirates	-1.8	2.6	3.3	1.2	2.0	3.1	4.3	6.1	6.0	...	...	...
Kuwait	-4.8	2.1	4.5	4.0	3.8	3.6	29.1	30.1	31.2	1.6	1.6	1.6
Iraq	4.2	2.6	11.5	-2.8	5.1	5.0	-25.7	-14.4	-8.6	...	...	...
Qatar	8.6	16.0	18.6	-4.9	1.0	3.0	14.3	15.9	23.6	...	...	...
Sudan	4.5	5.5	6.2	11.3	10.0	9.0	-12.9	-8.7	-7.0	14.9	13.7	12.6
<b>Oil Importers 5/</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>-4.1</b>	<b>-4.3</b>	<b>-4.0</b>	...	...	...
Egypt	4.7	5.0	5.5	16.2	11.7	9.5	-2.4	-2.3	-2.0	8.8	9.0	8.8
Morocco	4.9	3.2	4.5	1.0	1.5	2.2	-5.0	-5.0	-4.4	9.1	9.6	9.1
Syrian Arab Republic	4.0	5.0	5.5	2.8	5.0	5.0	-4.7	-4.1	-3.3	...	...	...
Tunisia	3.1	3.8	4.8	3.7	4.8	3.5	-2.9	-4.5	-4.1	14.7	14.6	14.5
Lebanon	9.0	8.0	5.0	1.2	5.0	3.5	-9.5	-11.1	-11.2	...	...	...
Jordan	2.3	3.4	4.2	-0.7	5.7	5.0	-5.0	-7.0	-8.3	13.0	13.0	12.5
<i>Memorandum</i>												
Israel	0.7	3.5	3.6	3.3	3.0	2.8	3.8	3.9	3.8	7.7	7.4	7.1
Maghreb 6/	2.4	4.9	4.7	3.6	4.2	3.9	1.1	4.3	4.4	...	...	...
Mashreq 7/	4.8	5.2	5.4	11.9	9.8	8.1	-3.8	-4.0	-3.7	...	...	...

1/ Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Tables A6 and A7 in the Statistical Appendix.

2/ Percent of GDP.

3/ Percent.

4/ Includes Bahrain, Libya, Oman, and Republic of Yemen.

5/ Includes Djibouti and Mauritania.

6/ The Maghreb comprises Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

7/ The Mashreq comprises Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic.

The region has largely been bypassed by the recent surge in capital flows to emerging markets, with the notable exception of Egypt and Lebanon. Portfolio flows turned negative in 2009 and are expected to remain so over the next two years. Bank flows to the region are also unlikely to rebound quickly because of the ongoing restructuring and regulatory changes in advanced economies.

In line with the improvement in oil prices, the overall external balance in the region is expected to recover, although not to precrisis levels. For oil exporters, the current account balance, which fell from a surplus of close to 20 percent of GDP in 2008 to [4½] percent in 2009, is projected to increase to [7] percent of GDP in 2010 and [8] percent of GDP in 2011. Surpluses of roughly this magnitude are expected to continue through 2015. The counterpart is a large buildup in net foreign assets, which historically have flowed into government

securities and private equity investments in the United States and advanced economies in Europe.

As discussed in the forthcoming October 2010 *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia*, a key medium-term objective is to raise potential growth and create jobs for the region's rapidly growing population. The region needs to redirect trade toward today's growth engines, attract FDI from these economies, and exploit the potential for intraregional trade and FDI. This underlines the need for structural measures to enhance competitiveness. Improving the business environment, including through the establishment of strong legal and regulatory frameworks, is essential. Building human capital through greater emphasis on education and training will be particularly important. And, as in all emerging market regions, increased financial sector depth and stability and a track record of macroeconomic stability and policy would increase the prospects for robust, self-sustaining growth.

### **Africa's Growth Is Accelerating**

As sub-Saharan Africa rebounds from the slowdown in 2009, strong macroeconomic fundamentals through much of the region leave it well positioned to benefit from the global recovery now under way (Figure 2.14). The slowdown to  $[2\frac{1}{4}]$  percent in 2009 was brief, helped also by the rapid implementation of countercyclical policies made possible by the policy room that many economies had built up prior to the downturn. Output growth in the region is projected to accelerate to  $[5]$  percent in 2010 and  $[5\frac{3}{4}]$  percent in 2011, supported not only by the recovery in exports and commodity prices, but also by robust domestic demand in a number of economies (Table 2.7). Foreign inflows to the region, including official flows, FDI, and remittances, were less affected than had been feared by the global downturn, although the outlook remains uncertain (Figure 2.15).

**Table 2.7. Selected Sub-Saharan African Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment***(Annual percent change unless noted otherwise)*

	Real GDP			Consumer Prices 1/			Current Account Balance 2/			Unemployment 3/		
	2009	Projections		2009	Projections		2009	Projections		2009	Projections	
		2010	2011		2010	2011		2010	2011		2010	2011
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>-1.3</b>	<b>-2.2</b>	...	...	...
<b>Oil Exporters</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>7.4</b>	...	...	...
Nigeria	5.6	7.0	7.3	12.4	11.9	9.8	13.7	12.8	12.0	4.5	4.5	4.5
Angola	0.7	5.9	7.5	13.7	13.3	11.3	-5.0	1.7	1.9	...	...	...
Equatorial Guinea	5.3	0.9	2.1	7.2	8.0	7.1	-16.0	-2.2	-10.3	...	...	...
Gabon	-1.4	5.2	4.9	2.1	7.5	9.0	13.2	5.3	4.9	...	...	...
Chad	-1.6	4.3	3.9	10.1	6.0	3.0	-33.7	-31.2	-24.2	...	...	...
Congo, Republic of	7.5	10.6	8.7	4.3	4.9	3.5	-7.8	4.1	8.5	...	...	...
<b>Middle-Income</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>-4.0</b>	<b>-4.4</b>	<b>-6.8</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>24.2</b>	<b>23.8</b>
South Africa	-1.8	3.2	3.8	7.1	5.6	5.8	-4.0	-4.3	-6.8	24.3	24.8	24.4
Botswana	-3.7	8.4	4.8	8.1	6.7	6.3	-2.1	-0.5	0.4	...	...	...
Mauritius	2.5	3.6	4.1	2.5	2.5	2.6	-7.8	-9.4	-9.0	8.1	7.5	7.3
Namibia	-0.8	4.4	4.8	9.1	6.5	5.9	-1.7	-2.6	-6.0	...	...	...
Swaziland	1.2	2.0	2.5	7.6	6.2	5.6	-6.2	-12.6	-12.3	30.0	30.0	30.0
Cape Verde	3.0	4.1	6.0	1.0	1.8	2.0	-9.9	-18.6	-18.2	17.0	17.0	17.0
Seychelles	-7.6	4.0	5.0	31.8	3.2	2.5	-23.1	-32.5	-28.8	5.1	4.6	4.1
<b>Low-Income 4/</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>-6.5</b>	<b>-8.0</b>	<b>-8.2</b>	...	...	...
Ethiopia	9.9	7.0	7.7	36.4	2.8	7.1	-5.0	-7.8	-9.3	...	...	...
Kenya	2.4	4.1	5.8	9.3	4.8	5.0	-6.6	-6.7	-7.2	...	...	...
Tanzania	6.0	6.2	6.7	12.1	7.2	4.8	-9.9	-10.7	-11.1	...	...	...
Cameroon	2.0	2.6	2.9	3.0	1.6	2.5	-2.7	-3.6	-3.9	...	...	...
Uganda	7.2	5.8	6.1	14.2	9.6	5.5	-4.0	-6.3	-9.2	...	...	...
Côte d'Ivoire	3.8	3.0	4.0	1.0	1.4	2.5	7.2	7.0	3.3	8.0	7.8	7.3


1/ Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages. December–December changes can be found in Table A7 in the Statistical Appendix.

2/ Percent of GDP.

3/ Percent.

4/ Includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

**Figure 2.14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Average Projected Real GDP Growth in 2010–11 (Percent)**




The pickup in global demand and the strengthening of oil prices are supporting growth in Africa's oil-exporting economies. In the region's largest oil exporter, Nigeria, continued strong growth in the non-oil sector is being supported by increasing oil production, a result of reduced instability in the Niger Delta region. As a result, Nigeria's output growth is expected to accelerate from [5½] percent in 2009 to [7] percent in 2010 and [7¼] percent in 2011. Growth in Angola, the region's second-largest oil exporter, is also expected to recover in 2010, following the decline in oil exports and the tightening of its budget in 2009. Angola's growth is projected to increase from less than 1 percent in 2009 to [6] percent in 2010 and [7½] percent in 2011.

Sub-Saharan Africa's middle-income economies—whose output contracted in 2009 due to their stronger global trade linkages—are now firmly on the path to recovery. The region's largest economy, South Africa, has benefited from continued strong demand for commodities from emerging Asia and from a recovery in demand for manufactures from its largest export market, the euro area. There are also signs that the monetary easing pursued last year is supporting a recovery in domestic demand. After contracting by almost 2 percent in 2009, South Africa's output is expected to grow by [3¼] percent in 2010 and by [3¾] percent in 2011.

**Figure 2.15. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): Growth Is Accelerating**

The slowdown in 2009 was brief, in part due to rapid implementation of countercyclical policies. A recovery in exports and commodity prices is helping support the rebound, as is robust domestic demand in many economies. Nonportfolio flows have been stable. Although the United States is the main trading partner of oil exporters, Europe is the main export destination for many low- and middle-income economies in the region.



Sources: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*, and IMF staff estimates.  
<sup>1</sup>Excluding Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zimbabwe.

The relatively low degree of exposure of the region’s low-income economies to international trade and financial flows shielded them from the worst of the global downturn. Correspondingly, the acceleration of growth this year is expected to be modest. Output growth in these economies is expected to rise from 4½ percent in 2009 to [4¾] percent in 2010, and further to [6½] percent in 2011. About half a percentage point of the growth in 2011 reflects oil production in Ghana coming on stream. Growth in low-income economies is generally expected to be driven as much by domestic factors as by the global recovery. In Kenya, for example, a recovery in tourism inflows and improved rainfall are expected to support the acceleration of output growth, to [4] percent in 2010.

The primary risk to the outlook for the region is a faltering global recovery. But different economies in the region have differing exposure. For the oil-exporting economies, spillovers from a global slowdown would be manifested primarily through its impact on oil prices. In contrast, middle- and low-income economies’ exposure comes from their exports to Europe—which are almost four times larger than their exports to the United States. In addition to these trade linkages, continued weakness and measures to

cut budget deficits in advanced economies may affect the low-income economies of sub-Saharan Africa by reducing aid and private financial flows to the region. For example, remittances are an important source of foreign inflows to the region, amounting to almost 10 percent of GDP in, for example, Senegal. These may be susceptible to weaker conditions in economies employing migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa.

Asset market spillovers resulting from increased global volatility or risk aversion are likely to be limited. Portfolio flows are a less critical component of overall capital flows in sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world, and most economies in the region have relatively underdeveloped financial markets. South Africa is the notable exception: its equity and currency markets are often more sensitive to shifts in global sentiment than other emerging markets in Asia or Latin America, since nonresident transactions account for a relatively high share of turnover.



Finally, with the recovery in progress, fiscal policies in many economies in the region should begin shifting focus toward addressing medium-term priorities. As private and external demand recovers, economies will need to rebuild fiscal room and reorient its use. Where output growth has recovered, debt levels are rising, and primary deficits are above levels that will stabilize debt over the medium term, more prudent fiscal balances are in order. However, where output growth is still weak, outstanding debt is low, and fiscal deficits are in check, there may be scope to sustain higher levels of spending in priority areas such as education, health, and infrastructure investment. One of the positive aspects of the response to the recent downturn was the ability of many economies in the region to shield such pro-poor and pro-growth public spending. As was highlighted in the April 2010 *Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa*, spending on health and education actually increased in real terms in 20 of 29 low-income economies in 2009. Public capital spending also increased in real terms in half the economies in the region.

### Box 2.1. Emerging Asia: Responding to Capital Inflows

Emerging Asia is experiencing a revival in capital inflows. Total inflows to the region over the past four quarters more than quadrupled relative to 2008 levels, although, the size of capital inflows is dwarfed by the region's generally large current account surpluses (box figure). Many economies are largely responding to balance of payment surpluses through reserve accumulation rather than exchange rate appreciation. In addition, some economies have preemptively adopted a variety of macroprudential measures to address potential financial stability issues and/or discourage speculative inflows:

- Prevention of asset price bubbles—maximum loan-to-value ratios, increase in provisioning vis-à-vis real estate credit, and other measures specifically targeting the real estate market (Hong Kong SAR, India, Korea, Singapore).
- Tighter liquidity control and management—measures to prevent excessive volatility of capital flows (for example, a one-month holding period for central bank certificates for both resident and nonresident investors in Indonesia); higher required reserves for banks (India).
- Limits on banks' foreign exchange exposure—prudential limits on banks' forward open position limits and net open positions (Korea).
- Tighter financial supervision—tighter prudential limits on capital, liquidity, and leverage; enhanced stress testing; enhanced corporate governance (Hong Kong SAR, Singapore).
- Capital controls on inflows—prevention of nonresidents' opening short-term time deposit accounts (Taiwan, Province of China); limits on external borrowing operations (India).
- Further liberalization of selected outflows—India.

**Emerging Asia: Recent Experience with Capital Inflows<sup>1</sup>**



Sources: CEC Asia database; Haver Analytics; IMF, *International Financial Statistics*; and IMF staff calculations.

<sup>1</sup> Emerging Asia: ASEAN-4, China, India, and NIEs; newly industrialized Asian economies (NIEs): Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China; ASEAN-4: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.

<sup>2</sup> Other investment includes financial derivatives.


### Box 2.2. Latin America-5: Riding Another Wave of Capital Inflows

After a brief hiatus during the height of the global crisis in 2008, the LA5 economies are experiencing a resurgence in capital inflows (box figure). Strong capital inflows have been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, they have provided cheap and readily available financing to boost domestic demand. On the other hand, these flows have increased concern about domestic overheating, external competitiveness (given considerable currency appreciation in the context of most exchange rates at or above their medium-term values), increased sterilization costs (with sizable interest rate differentials vis-à-vis external rates), and heightened risks of a potential boom-bust cycle—problems this region has confronted in the past. The situation today raises fewer financial stability concerns, because domestic credit is staging a relatively slow recovery. However, capital inflows have induced booms in many equity markets, and concerns about asset price bubbles have been growing.

Against this backdrop, country authorities have responded by adopting a number of measures to safeguard financial sector stability, eliminate asset price bubbles, and discourage inflows:

- Financial sector supervision—All the LA5 countries are at various stages of further enhancing financial sector regulatory standards for capital adequacy, liquidity, and asset quality.
- Tighter liquidity control and management—higher required reserves for banks (Brazil)
- Capital controls on inflows—direct tax on fixed income and equity inflows (reintroduced in October 2009 by Brazil after a brief break), and minimum stay rules for FDI (implemented by Colombia before the crisis but removed in October 2008).
- Prudential capital controls—unremunerated reserve requirements on foreign borrowing (maintained by Colombia from before the crisis but currently zero-rated) and higher reserve requirements on short-term (less than two years) external loans (Peru).
- Further liberalization of selected outflows—Chile, Colombia, Peru.

LA-5: Handling the Capital Inflows Bonanza<sup>1</sup>



Sources: CEICMED database; Haver Analytics; IMF, *Balance of Payments Statistics* and IMF staff calculations.  
<sup>1</sup>LA-5: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  
<sup>2</sup>Other investment includes financial derivatives.