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Service Offshoring, Productivity, and Employment: Evidence from the United States

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Abstract

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This paper estimates the effects of offshoring on productivity in U.S. manufacturing industries between 1992 and 2000, using instrumental variables estimation to address the potential endogeneity of offshoring. It finds that service offshoring has a significant positive effect on productivity in the US, accounting for around 11 percent of productivity growth during this period. Offshoring material inputs also has a positive effect on productivity, but the magnitude is smaller accounting for approximately 5 percent of productivity growth. There is a small negative effect of less than half a percent on employment when industries are finely disaggregated (450 manufacturing industries). However, this affect disappears at more aggregate industry level of 96 industries indicating that there is sufficient growth in demand in other industries within these broadly defined classifications to offset any negative effects.

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Contents	Page
I. Introduction.....	3
II. Model and Estimating Framework.....	6
A. Model.....	6
B. Estimation	8
Productivity.....	8
Employment.....	9
III. Data and Measurement of Offshoring.....	10
IV. Results.....	12
A. Total Factor Productivity	12
B. Labor Productivity	12
Additional Controls.....	13
Sensitivity: Measurement Error	13
Sensitivity: Outliers	14
C. Endogeneity	14
D. Discussion of Results.....	17
E. Employment.....	17
More Disaggregated Effects	18
V. Conclusions.....	18
Tables	
1. Offshoring Intensity: 1992–2000	20
2. Offshoring of Services, by Type: 1992–2000.....	20
3. Summary Statistics.....	21
4. Total Factor Productivity	22
5. Labor Productivity	23
6. Labor Productivity and Additional Controls.....	24
7. Labor Productivity – Long Period Differences.....	25
8. Labor Productivity – Outliers	26
9. Labor Productivity – Instrumental Variables.....	27
10. Labor Productivity – GMM Analysis	28
11. Employment and Outsourcing	29
12. Employment and Outsourcing: Instrumental Variables.....	30
13. Employment and Outsourcing: More Disaggregated Manufacturing Industries.....	31
14. Employment and Outsourcing: Instrumental Variables (SIC).....	32
Appendix Tables	
15. Data Sources	33
References.....	34

I. INTRODUCTION

New technologies are making it increasingly possible for firms to source their service inputs from suppliers abroad. Recent examples include call centers in India, as well as some more skill-intensive tasks such as computer software development. The practice of global production networks has been commonplace for decades. In the OECD, the use of imported inputs in producing goods that are exported accounted for 21 percent of trade in 1990, and this grew by 30 percent between 1970 and 1990 (see Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001).² However, until recently, global production networks mostly involved the offshoring of manufactured intermediate inputs, whereas now many services that were previously seen as non-tradable have become tradeable. Whilst service offshoring by manufacturing industries in the United States is still at fairly low levels, the practice is growing rapidly, at an average annual rate of 6.3 percent between 1992 and 2000.³ (Table 1). This increasing practice has led to strong opposition. Support for free trade among white collar workers with incomes over \$100,000 slid from 57 percent in 1999 to 28 percent in 2004, according to a study by the University of Maryland. Furthermore, on March 4, 2004, the U.S. Senate passed restrictions on offshoring by barring companies from most federal contracts if they planned to carry out any of the work abroad.⁴ Yet the empirical evidence on the effects of service offshoring is scant. In this paper we address whether these fears of job losses due to offshoring are well founded. We estimate whether offshoring does lead to job losses and whether there are any offsetting benefits in the form of productivity growth.⁵

Offshoring can increase productivity either due to compositional or structural changes. If a firm relocates its relatively inefficient parts of the production process to another country, where they can be produced more cheaply, it can expand its output in the stages for which it has comparative advantage. In this case, the average productivity of the remaining workers increases due to the change in the composition of the workforce. Moreover, structural changes that increase the productivity of the remaining workers are also likely. These benefits can arise due to offshoring material inputs or service inputs due to the access of new input varieties. However, even larger

²The fragmentation of production stages has been widely studied within a trade theory framework by Dixit and Grossman (1982), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 1999, 2001), Deardorff (1998, 2001), Cordella and Grilo (1998), Amiti (2005), and others. This same phenomenon has also been referred in the literature as international production sharing, globalized production, de-localization, slicing up the value chain and offshoring. Some authors go on to distinguish between who owns the production stage abroad: when it is owned by the same firm it is referred to as vertical Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or intrafirm trade; and when it is owned by a foreign firm it is referred to as arm's-length trade or international outsourcing. Antras and Helpman (2004) distinguish between domestic and international outsourcing.

³See Amiti and Wei (2005) for world trends in service offshoring.

⁴Some exceptions were to apply, for example: defense, homeland security, and intelligence contracts deemed necessary for national security, but this legislation was not passed in the House.

⁵Note that we do not undertake an overall welfare analysis, and recognize that there could be negative effects such as a deterioration in the terms of trade. See Samuelson (2004).

benefits are likely to arise from offshoring service inputs, such as computing and information services, either due to workers becoming more efficient from restructuring or through firms learning to improve the way activities are performed from importing a software package, for example. We estimate the effects of both service and material offshoring on productivity.

These productivity benefits can translate into job losses since the same amount of output can be produced with fewer inputs. Also, lower prices of imported inputs could lead to substitution away from domestic labor. Alternatively, offshoring could result in higher demand for labor due to scale effects. Higher productivity can lead to lower prices, generating further demand for output and labor. As firms become more competitive, demand for their goods could rise and hence increase derived demand for labor, and so the net effect in theory is ambiguous. Hence, rigorous empirical analysis is necessary to determine the net effect on employment. We use a standard labor demand framework to estimate the effects of offshoring on employment.

Measuring offshoring by industry requires detailed input/output (I/O) tables. These are provided on an annual basis for the period 1992 to 2000 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the U.S. economy. We combine the I/O information with trade data, to measure service and material offshoring, defined as the share of imported services and materials, respectively, analogous to the measure of material offshoring in Feenstra and Hanson (1999). Thus our measure includes imports from affiliated and unaffiliated firms. Total factor productivity (TFP) and labor productivity are also measured using data from the BLS. The data are aggregated up from 450 SIC manufacturing industries to 96 manufacturing industries to measure productivity in order to match the level of aggregation of the I/O tables, which provides details of service inputs. It is important to net out service inputs when calculating productivity in order to avoid conflating measures due to missing inputs. Labor productivity in manufacturing grew at an annual average rate of 4 percent between 1992 and 2000. We use both levels of aggregation to estimate employment effects.

A key estimation issue is the possible endogeneity of offshoring. High productivity firms may be the ones that are more likely to engage in global production strategies which could lead to reverse causality. Alternatively, it could be the low productivity firms that engage in offshoring in the expectation that this would improve productivity, hence it is unclear which way the bias would go. If the same set of firms are most likely to engage in offshoring over the sample period then industry fixed effects in a time differenced equation would suffice. However, if there are time varying factors that affect offshoring and productivity growth then it is necessary to instrument for offshoring. Service offshoring is also likely to be measured with errors leading to a downward bias. Instrumental variable estimation can potentially address this bias as well.

A good instrument is one that only affects productivity through service offshoring, and has sufficient explanatory power in predicting changes in service offshoring.⁶ Changes in technology that have made transactions possible through the internet and digital telephone services are likely candidates for changes in service offshoring. Freund and Weinhold (2002) found evidence that internet penetration, measured by the number of internet hosts in a country, had a significant

⁶See Murray (2005) for a discussion of desirable features in instruments.

positive effect on services trade between 1997 and 1999. In line with this, we use the number of internet users in the countries that the United States imports most of its service inputs, to reflect the change in technology that has enabled the offshoring of services. These time varying country measures are interacted with the share of services in total output at the beginning of the period to provide time/industry varying instruments. Those with higher service intensities would be most affected by changes in technology that enable service offshoring. The instrument for material offshoring is the freight cost of inputs.

The results show that service offshoring has a significant positive effect on productivity in the manufacturing sector. It accounts for around 11 percent of labor productivity growth over the sample period. These results are robust to including additional controls such as the use of high technology capital, and the share of total imports. The instrumental variables estimates indicate a slightly larger positive productivity effect from service offshoring than those indicated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Material offshoring also has a positive effect on productivity but this was not robust across all specifications, and the magnitude of the effects is lower than service offshoring, only accounting for 5 percent of total labor productivity growth between 1992 and 2000.

Using this same level of aggregation of 96 manufacturing industries, we find that service offshoring has no significant effect on employment. However, at a more disaggregated division of the manufacturing sector of 450 industries, we were able to detect a significant negative effect. Service offshoring reduced manufacturing employment by around 0.4 of a percent. Interestingly, one does not need to aggregate sectors very much to find that this effect washes out.

The focus in the media and politics has been on offshoring and job losses. The newspapers are full of estimates on the effects of offshoring on jobs, which primarily come from management consultants. For example, management consultants at McKinsey forecast offshoring to grow at the rate of 30 to 40 percent a year over the next five years. They report that a leading IT analyst, Forrester, projects that the number of U.S. jobs that will be offshored will grow from 400,000 jobs to 3.3 million jobs by 2015, accounting for \$136 billion in wages. Of this total, 8 percent of current IT jobs will go offshore over the next 12 years. The report goes on to say that fears of job losses are being overplayed, but it is unclear how their numbers are derived. The only rigorous study of job market effects in the United States is by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) but their focus is on material offshoring and its effects on the skill wage premium. They do not consider the effects of service offshoring, nor do they consider the effects on employment. Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) found that material offshoring explained over 40 percent of the increase in nonproduction wages in the 1980s.⁷

This is the first comprehensive study to find a link between service offshoring and productivity. There is only one other study on productivity and international offshoring of services in the

⁷More recently, a number of studies have analysed employment effects of offshoring in Europe. For example, Ekholm and Hakkala (2005) disentangle the employment effects by skill, using Swedish data; and Lorentowicz, Marin and Raubold (2005) analyze the wage skill premium in Austria and Poland.

United States (see Mann, 2004),⁸ which is a "back of the envelope" type calculation and considers only the IT industry. Mann calculates that offshoring in the IT industry led to an annual increase in productivity of 0.3 percentage points for the period 1995 to 2002, which translates into a cumulative effect of \$230 billion in additional GDP.⁹ There have been a few more studies on the productivity effects of offshoring using European data. Gorg and Hanley (2003) find that service offshoring had a positive impact on productivity in the electronics industry in Ireland between 1990 and 1995. However, this affect disappears when they extend the study to all manufacturing industries in Ireland, and over a longer period, between 1990 and 1998 (see Gorg and Hanley, 2005). The only instruments provided in these studies are predetermined ones whereas our study also includes exogenous instruments. A related study by Girma and Gorg (2004) finds positive evidence of service outsourcing on labor productivity and total factor productivity in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1992, but this study does not distinguish between domestic and foreign outsourcing, and the study only covers three manufacturing industries.¹⁰ In contrast, we focus on international sourcing of inputs and our data covers all manufacturing industries in the United States.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sets out the model and estimation strategy. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the results and Section V concludes.

II. MODEL AND ESTIMATING FRAMEWORK

This section describes a conceptual framework that motivates the empirical specification.

A. Model

The production function for an industry i is given by:

$$Y_i = A_i(oss_i, osm_i)F(L_i, K_i, M_i, S_i), \quad (1)$$

where output, Y_i , is a function of labor, L_i , capital, K_i , materials, M_i , and service inputs, S_i . The technology shifter, A_i , is a function of offshoring of services (oss_i), and offshoring of material

⁸Ten Raa and Wolff (2001) find evidence of positive effects of domestic outsourcing on U.S. manufacturing productivity – it explains 20% of productivity growth, but does not consider the effects of international outsourcing.

⁹This is calculated as follows: globalization led to a fall of 10 to 30 percent in prices of IT hardware; taking the mid-point of 20% times the price elasticity of investment equals the change in IT's investment to productivity growth. See footnote 5 in Mann (2004).

¹⁰Egger and Egger (2005) study the effects of international outsourcing of materials inputs. They find that material input outsourcing has a negative effect on productivity of low skilled workers in the short run but a positive effect in the long run. They found that international outsourcing contributed to 3.3% of real value added per low-skilled worker in the European Union from 1993 to 1997. They attribute the negative short-run effect to imperfections in the E.U. labor and goods markets. However, they do not include services in their study.

inputs (osm_i).

There are at least four possible channels through which offshoring can affect productivity, A_i : (i) a static efficiency gain; (ii) restructuring; (iii) learning externalities; and (iv) variety effects. First, when firms decide to outsource materials or services to overseas locations they relocate the less efficient parts of their production stage, so average productivity increases due to a compositional effect. Second, the remaining workers may become more efficient if offshoring makes it possible for firms to restructure in a way that pushes out the technology frontier. This is more likely to arise from offshoring of service inputs, such as computing and information, rather than offshoring of material inputs. Third, efficiency gains might arise as firms learn to improve the way activities are performed by importing services. For example, a new software package can improve the average productivity of workers.¹¹ Fourth, productivity could increase due to the use of new material or service input varieties as in Ethier (1982). Since we cannot distinguish the exact channel of the productivity gain arising from offshoring, we will specify it in this more general way as entering A_i .

We assume that a firm chooses the total amount of each input in the first stage and chooses what proportion of material and service inputs will be imported in the second stage. The fixed cost of importing material inputs, F_k^M , and the fixed cost of importing service inputs, F_k^S , vary by industry k . This assumption reflects that the type of services or materials required are different for each industry, and hence importing will involve different amounts of search costs depending on the level of the sophistication of the inputs.

Cost minimization leads to the optimal demand for inputs for a given level of output, Y_i . The conditional labor demand is given by:

$$L_i = g(w_i, r_i, q^m, q^s, Y_i) / A_i(oss_i, osm_i). \quad (2)$$

It is a function of wages, w_i , rental, r_i , material input prices, q_i^m , service input prices, q_i^s , and output. Offshoring can affect the labor demand through three channels. First, there is a substitution effect through the input price of materials or services. A fall in the price of imported services would lead to a fall in the demand for labor if labor and services are substitutes. Second, if offshoring leads to a productivity improvement then firms can produce the same amount of output with less inputs. Hence, conditional on a given level of output, offshoring is expected to reduce the demand for labor. Third, offshoring can affect labor demand through a scale effect. An increase in offshoring can make the firm more efficient and competitive, increasing demand for its output and hence labor. To allow for the scale effect, we substitute in for the profit maximizing level of output, which is also a function of offshoring, then the labor demand function is given by

$$L_i = g(w_i, r_i, q^m, q^s, p_i, oss_i, osm_i) / A_i(oss_i, osm_i), \quad (3)$$

¹¹Most people would expect that learning externalities would go from the United States to other countries rather than to the United States, but it is in principle a possibility and there has been some evidence showing that U.S. productivity increased as a result of inward FDI. See Keller and Yeaple (2003).

where p_i is the price of the final output, which is also a function of factor prices. Thus offshoring may have a positive or negative effect on employment depending on whether the scale effect outweighs the negative substitution and productivity effects.

B. Estimation

Productivity

Taking the log of equation (1), and denoting first differences by Δ , the estimating equation becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \ln Y_{it} = & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \Delta oss_{it} + \alpha_2 \Delta osm_{it} \\ & + \beta_1 \Delta \ln L_{it} + \beta_2 \Delta \ln K_{it} + \beta_3 \Delta \ln M_{it} + \beta_4 \Delta \ln S_{it} + \delta_t D_t + \delta_i D_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

This first difference specification controls for any time-invariant industry-specific effects such as industry technology differences. In this time differenced specification, we also include year fixed effects, to control for any unobserved time-varying effect common across all industries that affect productivity growth, and in some specifications we also include industry fixed effects. Some industries may be pioneering industries that are high-growth industries and hence more likely to offshore inputs; and some industries might be subject to higher technical progress than others. Adding industry fixed effects to a time differenced equation takes account of these factors, provided the growth or technical progress is fairly constant over time. We estimate equation (4) using OLS, with robust standard errors corrected for clustering. We hypothesize that α_1 and α_2 are positive. We also include one period lags of the offshoring variables to take account that productivity effects may not be instantaneous.¹²

There are a number of econometric issues that will need to be addressed. First, the choice of inputs is endogenous. To address this, we estimate the total factor productivity equation using the Arellano-Bond (1991) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which uses all possible lags of each variable as instruments. An alternative way to address the endogeneity of inputs is to estimate productivity as value added per worker. Since the dependent variable is redefined as real output less materials and services, divided by labor, the inputs would not be included as explanatory variables.

Second, there may also be a problem of potential endogeneity of offshoring, which is not adequately addressed with lagged values as instruments. More productive industries might self select into offshoring, or conversely, firms that expect a fall in productivity growth might increase their level of offshoring in the hope of increasing their productivity. Hence the bias could go either way. In addition, the extent of offshored activities are likely to be measured with errors which also contributes to the downward bias. We use two-stage least squares to address this concern, as well as the Arellano-Bond GMM analysis, with additional exogenous instruments, which we describe below.

¹²Longer lags were insignificant.

Employment

The conditional labor demand, equation (2), will also be estimated in first differences as a log-log specification as is common in the empirical literature (see Hamermesh, 1993; and Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2004), as follows:

$$\Delta \ln l_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \Delta oss_{it} + \gamma_2 \Delta osm_{it} + \gamma_3 \ln \Delta w_{it} + \gamma_4 \Delta \ln Y_{it} + \delta_t D_t + \delta_i D_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (5)$$

The source of identification of employment in these type of industry labor demand studies is the assumption that the wage is exogenous to the industry. This would be the case if labor were mobile across industries. However, if labor were not perfectly mobile and there were industry-specific rents then wages would not be exogenous. Provided these rents are unchanged over time then they would be absorbed in the industry fixed effects and the results would be unbiased.

In general, an increase in output would be expected to have a positive effect on employment and an increase in wages a negative effect; whereas an increase in the price of other inputs would have a positive effect if the inputs are gross substitutes.

The question arises as to which input prices to use for imported inputs. If the firm is a multinational firm deciding on how much labor to employ at home and abroad then it should be the foreign wage. But not all offshoring takes place within multinational firms, and also with imported inputs sourced from many countries it is unclear which foreign wage to include, if any. Firms that import inputs at arm's-length do not care about the foreign wage per se but instead are concerned about the price of the imported service. We assume that all firms face the same price for other inputs, such as imported inputs and the rental on capital, which we assume is some function of time, $r = f(t)$.¹³ In this time differenced equation, these input prices will be captured by the time fixed effects, δ_t . In a conditional demand function, we expect that if offshoring increases productivity, then this will have a negative effect on the demand for labor since less inputs are needed to produce the same amount of output.

Substituting in the price of output for the quantity of output, we allow for scale effects:

$$\Delta \ln l_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \Delta oss_{it} + \gamma_2 \Delta osm_{it} + \gamma_3 \ln \Delta w_{it} + \gamma_5 \Delta \ln p_{it} + \delta_t D_t + \delta_i D_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (6)$$

In this specification it is unclear what the net effect of offshoring is on labor demand (see equation (3)) as it will depend on whether the scale effects are large enough to outweigh the substitution and productivity effects. In some specifications we will estimate a more reduced form of equation (6), omitting p_{it} , which is a function of input prices.

We estimate equations (5) and (6) using OLS, with robust standard errors corrected for clustering.

¹³Note that in Amiti and Wei (2005), which estimates a labor demand equation for the United Kingdom, the offshoring intensity is interpreted as an inverse proxy of the price of imported service inputs, i.e., the lower the price of imported service inputs, the higher the offshoring intensity. Similarly, in this specification, the offshoring intensity may be picking up the productivity effect and/or the substitution effect.

III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT OF OFFSHORING

We estimate the effects of offshoring on productivity for the period 1992 to 2000. The offshoring intensity of services ($oss_{i,t}$) for each industry i at time t is defined as the share of imported service inputs and is calculated analogously to the material offshoring measure in Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), as follows:

$$oss_i = \sum_j \left[\frac{\text{input purchases of service } j \text{ by industry } i, \text{ at time } t}{\text{total non-energy inputs used by industry } i, \text{ at time } t} \right] * \left[\frac{\text{imports of service } j, \text{ at time } t}{\text{production}_j + \text{imports}_j - \text{exports}_j \text{ at time } t} \right]. \quad (7)$$

The first square bracketed term is calculated using annual input/output tables from 1992 to 2000 constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 1992 benchmark tables. The BEA use SIC 1987 industry disaggregation, which consist of roughly 450 manufacturing industries. These are aggregated up to 96 input/output manufacturing codes by the BLS.¹⁴ We include the following five service industries as inputs to the manufacturing industries: telecommunications, insurance, finance, business services, and computing and information. These service industries were aggregated up to match the IMF Balance of Payments statistics. Business services is the largest component of service inputs with an average share of 12% in 2000 ; then finance (2.4%); telecommunications (1.3%); insurance (0.5%); and the lowest share is computing and information (0.4%).

The second square bracketed term is calculated using international trade data from the IMF Balance of Payments yearbooks. Unfortunately, imports and exports of each input by industry are unavailable and so an economy-wide import share is applied to each industry. As an example, the U.S. economy imported 2.2 percent of business services in 2000 – we then assume that each manufacturing industry imports 2.2 percent of its business service that year. Thus, on average, the offshoring intensity of business services is equal to $0.12 * 0.022 = 0.3$ percent. We aggregate across the five service inputs to get the average service offshoring intensity for each industry, oss_i . An analogous measure is constructed for material offshoring, denoted by osm_i .

Table 1 presents averages of offshoring intensities of materials and services, weighted by industry output. The average share of imported service inputs in 2000 is only 0.3 percent whereas the average share of imported material inputs is 17.4 percent. Both types of offshoring have been increasing over the sample period, with higher growth rates for service offshoring at an annual

¹⁴We were unable to use the more disaggregated BEA I/O tables because the next available year is 1997 and this is under a different classification system, called NAICS. Unfortunately, the concordance between SIC and NAICS is not straightforward, thus there would be a high risk that changes in the input coefficients would reflect reclassification rather than changes in input intensities. In contrast, the BLS I/O tables use the same classification throughout the sample period.

average of 6.3 percent, compared to an average growth rate of 4.4 percent for materials.

The breakdown of the two components of the offshoring intensity ratio for each service category is provided for 1992 and 2000 in Table 2. The first column shows the average intensity of each service category (the first term in equation (7)), and the last column gives the average import intensity of each service category (the second term in equation (7)). We see from column 1 that business services is the largest service category used across manufacturing industries, and this has grown from an average of 9.7 percent in 1992 to 12 percent in 2000. There is also much variation between industries. For example, in 2000, in the “household audio and video equipment” industry business services only accounted for 2 percent of total inputs whereas in the “greeting cards” industry it was 45 percent. From the last column, we see that the import share of all service category, except communications, increased over the period.

There are a number of potential problems with these offshoring measures that should be noted. First, they are likely to underestimate the value of offshoring because the cost of importing services is likely to be lower than the cost of purchasing them domestically. While it would be preferable to have quantity data rather than current values, this is unavailable for the United States. Second, applying the same import share to all industries is not ideal, but given the unavailability of imports by industry this is our “best guess”. The same strategy was used by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) to construct measures of material offshoring. This approach apportions a higher value of imported inputs to the industries that are the biggest users of those inputs. Although this seems reasonable, without access to actual import data by industry it is impossible to say how accurate it is. Despite these limitations, we believe that combining the input use information with trade data provides a reasonable proxy of the proportion of imported inputs by industry.

Productivity is estimated at the more aggregate BLS I/O industry level because service inputs by industry are only available from the I/O tables and these need to be subtracted from gross output in order to ensure that productivity growth is not inflated in service-intensive industries as an artifact of an omitted variable. The capital stock data was only available from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) at the SIC level and so needed to be aggregated up to the I/O level. We adopt the perpetual inventory method to extend the capital stock series beyond 1996, using average depreciation rates that were applied in the NBER (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996) database: 7.7 percent depreciation for equipment and 3.5 percent for structures.

The employment equations are estimated at two different levels of aggregation: (i) BLS I/O categories comprising 96 manufacturing industries; and (ii) SIC categories comprising 450 industries. In order to aid comparison between these different levels of aggregation, the employment equations all use data from the NBER Productivity database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996) which provides input and output data at the 4-digit SIC level up to the year 1996. We extend this data to 2000 using the same sources as they do, which include the BEA and ASM, and the same methodology wherever possible. See Table A1 in the Appendix for details of the data sources. All the summary statistics are provided in Table 3.

IV. RESULTS

We estimate equations (4), (5) and (6) at the industry level for the period 1992 to 2000. All variables are entered in log first differences, except offshoring which is the change in offshoring intensity. All estimations include year fixed effects and some specifications also include industry fixed effects. The errors have been corrected for clustering at the I/O level, which is the aggregation level of the offshoring variables.

A. Total Factor Productivity

The results from estimating equation (4) using OLS are presented in Table 4. Columns 1 to 4 include year fixed effects, and columns 5 to 9 include year and industry fixed effects. All columns show that service offshoring has a positive significant effect on total factor productivity. That is, holding all factors of production constant (total services, materials, labor and capital stock), increasing the share of service offshoring leads to higher output. In the first column we only include the change in offshoring in period t ; in the second column we only include the lagged value ($t-1$); whereas in the third column we include both the contemporaneous and lagged values of offshoring. In column 4, we split employment by production and non-production workers (proxies for unskilled and skilled workers respectively, to ensure that changes in skill composition are not driving the results.¹⁵ We find this breakdown hardly affects the size of the offshoring coefficients. In each specification, service offshoring is individually significant in the current and lagged periods, and jointly significant, with a p -value less than 0.01. Similarly, service offshoring is positive and significant in columns 5 to 8 with industry effects, with the coefficients now larger. The coefficient on material offshoring is positive and significant only in some of the specifications.

The endogeneity of input choices could result in biased estimates using OLS estimation. In addition, offshoring may be measured with errors. To address these issues, we re-estimate equation (4) using the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation technique in column 9. In this specification, all possible lags of each variable are used as instruments, and the lagged dependent variable is also included but this is insignificant. The coefficient on service offshoring remains positive and significant, with the size of the joint effect of the current and lagged offshoring variables a little smaller than the coefficients in the OLS estimation. The effect of material offshoring is now higher, with the lagged coefficient positive and significant.

B. Labor Productivity

An alternative way to address the endogeneity of labor, material and service inputs is to estimate the effect of offshoring on labor productivity. This is measured by value added per worker, calculated by taking the difference between real output and real materials and services, divided by employment. The results are presented in Table 5.¹⁶ In columns 1 to 3, with only year fixed

¹⁵This was the most detailed skill level data available.

¹⁶All specifications include capital stock as an explanatory variable. However, estimates without capital stock produce the same results.

effects, we see that lagged service and material offshoring are positive and significant in columns 2 and 3. Once we add industry effects in columns 4 to 6, the size of the coefficients on service offshoring become larger, and both the contemporaneous and lagged variables are significant, however material offshoring becomes insignificant.

Additional Controls

There may be concern that the service offshoring measure is correlated with omitted variables such as high-technology capital or total imports, which may be inflating the coefficients on service offshoring. To address this we include two measures of high-technology capital as in Feenstra and Hanson (1999), and the share of imports by industry. The data for high-technology capital stock are estimates of the real stock of assets within two-digit SIC manufacturing industries, from the BLS. High-technology capital includes computers and peripheral equipment, software, communication equipment, office and accounting machinery, scientific and engineering instruments, and photocopy and related equipment. Each capital asset is then multiplied by its ex post rental price to obtain the share of high-tech capital services for each asset within each two-digit SIC industry (also estimated by BLS), and reflects the internal rate of return in each industry and capital gains on each asset. As an alternative, the capital stock components are multiplied by an ex ante measure of rental prices used by Berndt and Morrison (1995), where the Moody rate of Baa bonds is used to measure the ex ante interest rate and the capital gains term is excluded.

The high-tech capital share measured with ex post rental prices is included in column 1 of Table 6; and the high-tech capital share with ex ante rental prices in column 2. Neither of these measures are significant. Import share, defined as the ratio of total imports to output by industry, is included in column 3. This shows that tougher import competition has a positive effect on labor productivity, but its inclusion leaves the effect of service offshoring unchanged. Again, we find that the service offshoring coefficients are significant and larger with industry effects in columns 4, 5, and 6, and lagged material offshoring is also significant with fixed industry effects. We see from column 4 that the ex post measure of high-tech capital becomes significant at the 10% level whereas the ex ante measure remains insignificant. The import share with industry fixed effects, in column 6, also becomes insignificant. Although the high-tech capital share, with industry fixed effects, has a positive effect on productivity, it does not affect the size of the service offshoring coefficients (comparing column 4, Table 6 with column 6, Table 5).

Sensitivity: Measurement Error

There is a risk that taking first time period differences could induce measurement error, particularly when the variables are aggregated at the industry level.¹⁷ To address this concern, we re-estimate the equations using longer time differences to help wash out measurement error. In columns 1 to 3 of Table 7, all variables are in two period differences and include industry fixed effects. We see that, as in the previous table, service offshoring is positively correlated with labor productivity

¹⁷See Griliches and Hausman (1986).

and material offshoring is insignificant. The ex post high-tech capital measure is significant at the 5 percent level and import share has a negative significant effect on productivity.¹⁸ In the next three columns, all variables are calculated as the difference between the average of the last three years less the average of the first three years.¹⁹ This averaging and differencing helps reduce measurement error and having only one observation per industry avoids any serial correlation, but this is at the cost of a smaller number of observations. The technology and import share variables are now insignificant. Interestingly, in all of the specifications, service offshoring is positively correlated with labor productivity, and in these long differenced specifications so too is material offshoring but with much smaller coefficients.

Sensitivity: Outliers

With industry level data and a short time series there is concern that outlier industries might be driving the results. To check that this is not the case here we reestimate the equations, both in one period and two period differences, using robust regressions in columns 1 (one period differences) and 3 (two period difference) – this uses an iterative process, giving less weight to outlier observations.²⁰ The service offshoring coefficients are still significant but the point estimates are now smaller. Inspection of the data reveals that the tobacco industry is the main outlier. Omitting tobacco from the estimation (in columns 2 and 5) provides similar results to the robust regressions. However, omitting the two high-tech industries, computing and electronics, in columns 3 and 6 makes almost no difference to the results. To ensure that no one industry is driving the results, we drop tobacco from the subsequent estimations.

C. Endogeneity

Which industries engage in more offshoring may not be random, and hence could lead to biased estimates. If the industries that self select into offshoring do not change over time, then the industry effects should take account of this. However, if there is some time-varying effect, then the bias might persist. In order to address this potential problem, we re-estimate the equations using instruments for service offshoring and material offshoring. An instrumental variables approach can also mitigate potential bias from measurement error. A good instrument is one that would

¹⁸The ex ante measure is insignificant in all specifications and so we only include the ex post measure in all subsequent tables to conserve space.

¹⁹Two outliers, computer and electronics industries, were dropped from the long difference estimations because they had unusually high growth in value added that was unrelated to outsourcing. The computing industry experienced growth in labor productivity 6 standard deviations higher than the mean and the electronics industry 5 standard deviations higher than the mean.

²⁰Using the `rreg` command in STATA, an initial screening is performed based on Cook's distance >1 to eliminate gross outliers before calculating starting values, followed by an iterative process: it performs a regression, calculates weights based on absolute residuals, and regresses again using those weights, beginning with Huber weights followed by biweights as suggested by Li (1985).

only affect productivity through its effect on offshoring.

New technologies that have led to an increase in service offshoring can be related to the level of internet development in foreign countries, which can be measured by the number of internet hosts or internet users in the countries that supply the largest share of imported services to the United States. Of course, there are also other technological changes that affect service offshoring, such as changes in digital telephone technology. It turns out that all of these measures are highly correlated so could not all be included in one estimation, and when included in separate estimations they produced similar results. Thus the number of internet hosts can be thought of as a proxy for technology changes more generally.

Industries that rely heavily on service inputs are more likely to respond to technology changes that reduce the cost of service offshoring. To capture this idea, we interact the number of internet hosts in each country c at time t , (IH_{ct}) with total services as a share of output at the beginning of the sample for each industry in the first stage regression, thus

$$\Delta oss_{it} = f \left(\sum_c \gamma_c * \left(\Delta \ln IH_{c,t} * \frac{services_{i,1992}}{output_{i,1992}} \right) \right),$$

which provides us with c instruments that vary by industry and time. Although the offshoring measure is not by country, firms respond to technological changes in different countries when making their importing decisions. The γ'_c s will be estimated in the first stage regression of the two-stage least squares estimation. We would expect that industries would respond to technological developments in different ways as each country differs in its technology and the type of services they provide.

The number of internet users are from the International Telecommunication Union (2003) Yearbook. To determine which countries' internet developments to include we turn to the BEA bilateral services trade statistics to identify the countries that the U.S. imports the largest shares of its services. For the year 2000, these countries are United Kingdom (21%), Canada (10%), Japan (7%), and Germany (7%). We also include the number of internet hosts in India. Even though the U.S. share of service imports from India are only 1.5% as reported by the BEA, Indian statistical sources show this number to be much higher.²¹

For material offshoring, we use the average freight and insurance rate, FI_{it} , on U.S. imports, averaged across all partner countries, from import data at the fob and cif basis provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Then for each industry, i , this is weighted by the share of input j used in industry i , using weights from the I/O tables, a_{ij} at the beginning of the sample (1992).

$$\Delta \ln FI_{i,t} = \Delta \ln \left(\sum_j a_{ij,1992} * FI_{j,t} \right)$$

²¹See Wedding, 2005.

The results for the one period differenced variables are presented in the first four columns of Table 9; and for two period difference variables in columns 4 to 8. In all of the specifications, the instruments for service offshoring provide a good fit in the first stage regressions. In column 1, where only one endogenous variable is included, lagged service offshoring, the $F(5, 44) = 14.27$ with a p -value less than 0.01. When there is more than one endogenous variable, the Shea partial R-squared provides an indication of the goodness of fit, taking into account the collinearity between the endogenous variables.²² In all specifications, this statistic indicates a good fit for the first stage regression of service offshoring, with values ranging between 0.31 to 0.43, however the instrument for material offshoring does not provide such a good fit.

The first stage regression results for lagged service offshoring are provided in panel *B* of Table 9. All the internet coefficients are significant. Note that the first stage regression also includes all the other variables from the second stage, including year and industry effects, which are suppressed to save space. In all cases, they pass the overidentification tests. The p -values are higher when only the lagged offshoring variable is included ranging from 0.11 to 0.59, indicating that these are statistically valid instruments. One might expect that the coefficients on the interactive internet host variables would be positive, however some of these coefficients are actually negative. This is likely due to collinearity of the internet measures across countries. Since our main interest is in the aggregate effect, rather than individual country effects, this does not invalidate the instruments.

The net effect of service offshoring on productivity remains positive in all columns, however, in column 1 with only the lagged offshoring variable included the coefficient is insignificant with a z -statistic equal to 1.52. Column 2 shows that the contemporaneous and lagged service offshoring variables are jointly significant at the 10 percent level but not individually significant. Once we control for high-tech capital and import share, the lagged service offshoring becomes significant at the 10 percent level in column 4. It may be that these variables are not highly significant because the instruments are not able to take care of all the errors in measuring offshoring, and the errors possibly induced by first differencing.

The two period differenced results using instrumental variables are presented in columns 4 to 8, and the OLS two-period differenced results are included in column 9 for comparison. We see that the lagged service offshoring variable is positive and significant in all of these specifications, with the coefficient larger than the OLS estimates (comparing columns 8 and 9). In the two-period difference results, using internet users or the number of digital telephone users produces the same results as internet hosts.

A more general specification would allow for a lagged dependent variable, but this would result in a correlation with the error term, which is particularly problematic in a fixed effects model. Thus, as a final robustness check on the labor productivity estimates we re-estimate the equations using Arellano-Bond GMM analysis. We also include the high-tech capital share and import share variables in all estimations. In the first three columns of Table 10 we use all lagged variables as instruments. In the next three columns we also include the number of internet hosts by most

²²For further details, see Shea (1997).

important partner country, interacted with service intensity at the beginning of the period, as well as freight costs. The results show that service offshoring and high-tech capital have a positive significant effect on labor productivity; material offshoring has a positive insignificant effect; and imports have a negative effect. In all of the specifications, service offshoring has a positive and significant effect on productivity whereas the positive effect from material offshoring is not robust across all specifications.

D. Discussion of Results

To get an idea of the magnitude of the effects, we calculate the total effect of service offshoring on productivity using the coefficients from the IV estimates. These range from 0.3 using the Arellano-Bond estimates in column 6, Table 10, to 0.38 using one period differences two-stage least squares estimates (column 4, Table 9) and 0.46 using two-period differenced variables in column 8 of Table 9. Service offshoring increased by 0.1 percentage point over the sample period, from 0.18 to 0.29 (see Table 1) so this implies that service offshoring led to an increase of 3 to 4.5 percent in labor productivity over the sample period. Given that value added per worker increased by an average of 35 percent over the sample period, this suggests that service offshoring accounted for 11 to 13 percent of the average growth in labor productivity.

E. Employment

The results show that service offshoring has no significant effect on manufacturing employment, when the manufacturing sector is divided into 96 industries.²³ In Table 11, we present results from estimating the conditional employment equation, and allowing for scale effects, with one and two period differences using OLS. All of these specifications show that the contemporaneous and the lagged service offshoring variables are individually and jointly insignificant. Material offshoring has a positive effect on employment, but this is only significant in columns 2 and 3, which allow for scale effects in the one period differenced variables.

Robustness checks for potential endogeneity, using instrumental variables estimation and GMM as in the productivity specification, are presented in Table 12. None of these specifications show a negative significant effect from offshoring on employment. In fact, two stage least squares estimation in columns 1 and 2 show a positive effect from service offshoring; and all of the specifications in Table 12 show a significant positive employment effect from material offshoring. This finding is consistent with Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003), which finds that expansion in the scale of activities by foreign affiliates appears to raise demand for labor in U.S. parents.²⁴

²³All of the employment specifications exclude the tobacco industry; and all include year and industry fixed effects.

²⁴Harrison and McMillan (2005) report correlations between US multinational employment at home and abroad. Their preliminary findings also suggest a positive correlation between jobs at home and abroad.

More Disaggregated Effects

It is possible that any negative effects from offshoring could be washed within broadly defined industry classifications. To explore this possibility, we re-estimate equation (5) and (6) using the more disaggregated 4-digit SIC categories of 450 manufacturing industries. Note that it was only possible to construct the offshoring measures at the BLS I/O classification comprising 96 industries, hence we cluster standard errors at the BLS I/O industry category.

In fact, we do see a negative effect from service offshoring on employment in Table 13 using the more disaggregated industry classifications, and this effect persists with two period differences in columns 4, 5, and 6. Service offshoring has a significant negative effect in all specification in Table 13, and there are no offsetting scale effects. That is, the size of the negative coefficients on service offshoring are of similar magnitude in all columns, with and without controlling for output. However, the material offshoring effect has now become insignificant.

Robustness checks for potential endogeneity are presented in Table 14. The instruments fail some of the overidentification tests. It could be that the industry effects are sufficient to address endogeneity in the employment equations. With instrumental variables, service offshoring is negative in all specifications, but it is not significant in all specifications. The coefficients on material offshoring are positive in all specification but insignificant in Table 14.

Using estimates from Table 13, with scale effects, the effect from service offshoring on employment is equal to 0.3. Since service offshoring grew by 0.1 percentage point over the sample period, this implies a loss of 3 percent employment. However, weighted by employment shares this number falls to 0.4 of a percent.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Sourcing service inputs from abroad by U.S. firms is growing rapidly. Although the level of service offshoring is still low compared to material offshoring, this business practice is expected to grow as new technologies make it possible to access cheaper foreign labor and different skills. This has led to concerns that jobs will be transferred from the United States to developing countries. To see if these concerns have any foundation, we estimate the effects of service and material offshoring on manufacturing employment in the United States between 1992 and 2000. We also analyze whether there are any benefits that manifest themselves through increased productivity.

We found that offshoring has a positive effect on productivity: service offshoring accounts for 11 to 13 percent of labor productivity growth over this period; and material offshoring for 3 to 6 percent of labor productivity. The positive effect of service offshoring on productivity is robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects, high-technology capital share and import shares. The key econometric issue in this analysis is finding a valid instrument for service offshoring. We used the number of internet hosts in the countries that supply the largest shares of services to the United States. These reflect changes in new technologies that would only affect U.S. productivity

through their effect on offshoring. These time-varying measures are interacted with the services intensity at the beginning of the period to reflect that those industries that rely heavily on services are more likely to respond to new technologies that affect offshoring costs. We find the positive effect of service offshoring on productivity is robust across all specifications, however the material offshoring effect is only significant in some of the specifications.

On the employment effects, we find there is a small negative effect of less than half a percent on employment when industries are finely disaggregated (450 manufacturing industries). However, this effect disappears at more aggregate industry level of 96 industries indicating that there is sufficient growth in demand in other industries within these broadly defined classifications to offset any negative effects.

Our analysis suggests a number of possible avenues for future research. First, data limitations have prevented us from identifying the channels through which service offshoring has increased productivity. Improvements in the collection of data at the firm level with information distinguishing between domestic input purchases from imports, combined with detailed skill level data would be a major step forward in making this type of analysis possible. Second, as well as productivity effects, offshoring is likely to have terms of trade and income distribution effects. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) found that material outsourcing explained about 40 percent of the increase in the skill premium in the United States in the 1980s. Given that service offshoring is likely to be more skill- intensive than material offshoring, it will be interesting to see what effects, if any, service offshoring has on the wage skill premium. Third, disaggregated data by skill would also make it possible to study whether any particular skill groups are relatively more affected.

Table 1. Offshoring Intensity: 1992-2000

Year	Share of Imported Material Inputs - OSM		Share of Imported Service Inputs - OSS	
	%	%Δ	%	%Δ
1992	11.72	0.00	0.18	0.00
1993	12.68	5.25	0.18	4.88
1994	13.41	5.06	0.20	6.39
1995	14.18	4.65	0.20	4.10
1996	14.32	1.75	0.21	6.64
1997	14.55	1.75	0.23	6.97
1998	14.94	2.97	0.24	6.57
1999	15.55	3.49	0.29	16.73
2000	17.33	10.12	0.29	-2.23
1992-2000		4.38		6.26

Table 2. Offshoring of Services, by Type: 1992-2000

Services	Share of Service Inputs (%)				Import of Services (%)
	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	
(1992)					
Communication	1.16	0.79	0.25	4.82	2.47
Financial	1.91	0.63	0.93	4.72	0.25
Insurance	0.43	0.18	0.16	1.39	1.82
Other business service	9.69	7.16	1.87	37.93	1.47
Computer and Information	0.55	0.44	0.02	2.53	0.16
(2000)					
Communication	1.27	0.94	0.28	5.45	1.18
Financial	2.37	0.86	0.71	5.28	0.51
Insurance	0.47	0.22	0.10	1.36	2.84
Other business service	12.02	8.55	1.89	44.99	2.23
Computer and Information	0.38	0.31	0.01	2.01	0.62

Source: BLS, Input-Output Tables and IMF, *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*.

Table 3. Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
BLS I/O Classifications					
oss _{i,t}	864	0.239	0.162	0.040	1.071
Δoss _{i,t}	768	0.016	0.032	-0.145	0.411
osm _{i,t}	864	14.949	9.808	1.220	69.255
Δosm _{i,t}	768	0.694	1.950	-16.173	21.220
ln(value-added per worker) _{i,t}	864	-2.591	0.480	-4.034	-0.526
Δln(value-added per worker) _{i,t}	768	0.043	0.070	-0.231	0.364
ln(real output) _{i,t}	864	10.112	0.953	6.549	12.979
Δln(real output) _{i,t}	768	0.036	0.074	-0.256	0.443
ln(materials) _{i,t}	864	9.032	1.034	5.577	12.498
Δln(materials) _{i,t}	768	0.031	0.103	-0.567	0.544
ln(services) _{i,t}	864	7.060	1.025	3.892	9.875
Δln(services) _{i,t}	768	0.045	0.075	-0.316	0.418
ln(labor) _{i,t}	864	11.834	0.847	8.618	13.836
Δln(labor) _{i,t}	768	-0.001	0.038	-0.165	0.139
ln(capital stock) _{i,t}	844	9.175	1.030	5.979	11.701
Δln(capital stock) _{i,t}	748	0.029	0.043	-0.809	0.301
htech (<i>ex post</i>) _{i,t}	864	10.070	6.302	2.574	24.112
Δhtech (<i>ex post</i>) _{i,t}	768	0.265	0.959	-2.899	4.410
htech (<i>ex ante</i>) _{i,t}	860	9.738	5.961	2.508	23.149
Δhtech (<i>ex ante</i>) _{i,t}	764	0.107	0.338	-0.729	1.512
import share _{i,t}	855	0.257	0.486	0.000	3.408
Δ(import share) _{i,t}	760	0.014	0.050	-0.375	0.579
(SIC aggregated to BLS I/O)					
employment	823	181,824	158,096	4,936	838,385
Δln(employment)	728	-0.00005	0.048	-0.2496	0.2541
wage	823	32,581	8,068	14,709	56,506
Δln(wage)	728	0.0299	0.0235	-0.0796	0.1464
real output, \$1M	823	39,023	49,277	785	495,348
Δln(real output)	728	0.0322	0.069	-0.323	0.4424
price (1987 = 1.00)	823	0.983	0.096	0.37	1.99
Δln(price)	728	0.010	0.047	0.34	0.28
(SIC 4 digit level)					
employment	4,018	37,548	54,458	100	555,063
Δln(employment)	3,565	-0.0077	0.0937	-0.803	0.7368
wage	4,018	31,115	8,947	12,350	72,157
Δln(wage)	3,566	0.0307	0.0476	-0.2826	0.6219
real output, \$1M	4,018	8,613	52,802	24	2,292,522
Δln(real output)	3,566	0.0222	0.1086	-1.100	0.84
price (1987 = 1.000)	4,018	1.2218	0.1682	0.0407	2.012
Δln(price)	3,567	0.0113	0.0469	-0.4854	0.405

Note: 1) htech is defined as (high-tech capital services / total capital services).

Table 4. Total Factor Productivity

Dependent variable: $\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t}$									
	OLS						GMM		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	0.235*** (0.059)		0.249*** (0.042)	0.241*** (0.045)	0.341*** (0.051)		0.331*** (0.071)	0.335*** (0.073)	0.258*** (0.043)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$		0.094** (0.036)	0.079* (0.040)	0.065 (0.041)		0.082*** (0.030)	0.097*** (0.027)	0.093*** (0.027)	0.098*** (0.019)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.001* (0.001)		0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)			0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0004)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$		-0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0003)		-0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0004* (0.0002)
$\Delta \ln(\text{materials})_{i,t}$	0.389*** (0.041)	0.358*** (0.038)	0.404*** (0.033)	0.406*** (0.033)	0.432*** (0.047)	0.365*** (0.040)	0.443*** (0.042)	0.445*** (0.043)	0.432*** (0.019)
$\Delta \ln(\text{services})_{i,t}$	0.563*** (0.048)	0.592*** (0.042)	0.548*** (0.036)	0.546*** (0.036)	0.508*** (0.047)	0.566*** (0.043)	0.496*** (0.042)	0.495*** (0.042)	0.506*** (0.022)
$\Delta \ln(\text{labor})_{i,t}$	0.059*** (0.021)	0.056** (0.022)	0.056** (0.022)		0.013 (0.025)	0.017 (0.028)	0.006 (0.026)		
$\Delta \ln(\text{skilled labor})_{i,t}$				0.029** (0.015)				0.006 (0.018)	-0.0004 (0.015)
$\Delta \ln(\text{unskilled labor})_{i,t}$				0.008 (0.013)				-0.007 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.010)
$\Delta \ln(\text{capital})_{i,t}$	0.013 (0.021)	0.010 (0.025)	0.009 (0.021)	0.579* (0.032)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.007 (0.051)	-0.007 (0.040)
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t-1}$									0.009 (0.008)
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Industry fixed effects	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Joint significance tests:									
$\Delta \text{oss}_t + \Delta \text{oss}_{t-1} = 0$			F(1,95)=27.99 <i>p</i> -value=0.00	F(1,95)=20.71 <i>p</i> -value=0.00			F(1,95)=21.70 <i>p</i> -value=0.00	F(1,95)=20.24 <i>p</i> -value=0.00	$\chi^2(1)=31.81$ <i>p</i> -value=0.00
$\Delta \text{osm}_t + \Delta \text{osm}_{t-1} = 0$			F(1,95)=2.57 <i>p</i> -value=0.11	F(1,95)=2.36 <i>p</i> -value=0.13			F(1,95)=2.19 <i>p</i> -value=0.14	F(1,95)=2.12 <i>p</i> -value=0.15	$\chi^2(1)=0.64$ <i>p</i> -value=0.42
Observations	748	652	652	640	748	652	652	640	541
R-squared	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent; Sargan over identification test in column (9) estimation $\chi^2(20)=23.08$, *p*-value=0.28; and H_0 : no autocorrelation $z=1.85$ $\text{Pr}>z=0.06$.

Table 5. Labor Productivity

Dependent variable: $\Delta \ln(\text{value added per worker})_t$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	0.214 (0.150)		0.236 (0.162)	0.298** (0.143)		0.386** (0.167)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$		0.310* (0.174)	0.292* (0.154)		0.414** (0.164)	0.418*** (0.150)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.001 (0.002)		0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.004)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$		0.003* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{capital})_{i,t}$	0.166* (0.097)	0.186* (0.101)	0.196* (0.100)	0.099 (0.063)	0.108*** (0.033)	0.129*** (0.036)
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Industry fixed effects	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Joint significance tests:						
$\Delta \text{oss}_t + \Delta \text{oss}_{t-1} = 0$			F(1,95)=3.84 <i>p-value</i> =0.05			F(1,95)=10.53 <i>p-value</i> =0.00
$\Delta \text{osm}_t + \Delta \text{osm}_{t-1} = 0$			F(1,95)=2.45 <i>p-value</i> =0.12			F(1,95)=0.38 <i>p-value</i> =0.54
Observations	748	652	652	748	652	652
R-squared	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.39	0.41	0.42

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.

Table 6. Labor Productivity and Additional Controls

Dependent variable: $\Delta \ln(\text{value added per worker})_t$						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	0.222 (0.171)	0.243 (0.162)	0.227 (0.158)	0.383** (0.171)	0.399** (0.164)	0.394** (0.159)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$	0.289* (0.150)	0.299* (0.156)	0.306** (0.150)	0.425*** (0.138)	0.428*** (0.148)	0.426*** (0.136)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{capital})_{i,t}$	0.196* (0.100)	0.201** (0.101)	0.202** (0.101)	0.130*** (0.037)	0.131*** (0.035)	0.129*** (0.036)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	0.001 (0.003)			0.003 (0.003)		0.003 (0.003)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	0.005 (0.005)			0.008* (0.004)		0.008* (0.004)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t}$ (<i>ex ante rental prices</i>)		-0.007 (0.018)			-0.010 (0.015)	
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1}$ (<i>ex ante rental prices</i>)		-0.001 (0.011)			-0.001 (0.012)	
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t}$			-0.142 (0.128)			-0.274 (0.182)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t-1}$			0.158** (0.065)			-0.012 (0.059)
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Industry fixed effects	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Joint significance tests:						
$\Delta \text{oss}_t + \Delta \text{oss}_{t-1} = 0$	F(1,95)=3.44 <i>p-value</i> =0.07	F(1,95)=3.96 <i>p-value</i> =0.05	F(1,94)=4.03 <i>p-value</i> =0.05	F(1,95)=11.56 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,95)=11.64 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,94)=13.47 <i>p-value</i> =0.00
$\Delta \text{osm}_t + \Delta \text{osm}_{t-1} = 0$	F(1,95)=2.16 <i>p-value</i> =0.15	F(1,95)=2.27 <i>p-value</i> =0.14	F(1,94)=4.49 <i>p-value</i> =0.04	F(1,95)=0.22 <i>p-value</i> =0.64	F(1,95)=0.65 <i>p-value</i> =0.42	F(1,94)=1.97 <i>p-value</i> =0.16
$\Delta(\text{htech})_t + \Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1} = 0$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	F(1,95)=0.67 <i>p-value</i> =0.42			F(1,95)=3.09 <i>p-value</i> =0.08		F(1,94)=3.45 <i>p-value</i> =0.07
$\Delta(\text{htech})_t + \Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1} = 0$ (<i>ex ante rental prices</i>)		F(1,95)=0.17 <i>p-value</i> =0.68			F(1,95)=0.49 <i>p-value</i> =0.48	
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_t + \Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1} = 0$			F(1,94)=0.02 <i>p-value</i> =0.88			F(1,94)=2.52 <i>p-value</i> =0.12
Observations	652	648	645	652	648	645
R-squared	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.43	0.44	0.45

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.

Table 7. Labor Productivity–Long Period Differences

Dependent variable: $\Delta \ln(\text{value-added per worker})_t - \Delta \ln(\text{value-added per worker})_{t-k}$						
	2 period difference			long difference ⁽¹⁾		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	0.035 (0.248)	0.064 (0.259)	0.076 (0.254)	0.546* (0.287)	0.535* (0.292)	0.529* (0.292)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$	0.607*** (0.117)	0.582*** (0.111)	0.588*** (0.102)			
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.029*** (0.010)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)			
$\Delta \ln(\text{capital})_{i,t}$	0.111** (0.054)	0.101* (0.060)	0.089 (0.054)	0.135 (0.091)	0.136 (0.092)	0.146 (0.092)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)		-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)		0.308 (0.976)	0.110 (1.071)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)		0.011* (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)			
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_t$			-0.321** (0.141)			0.044 (0.110)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1}$			-0.000 (0.085)			
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	n/a	n/a	n/a
Industry fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	n/a	n/a	n/a
Joint significance tests:						
$\Delta \text{oss}_t + \Delta \text{oss}_{t-1} = 0$	F(1,95)=4.53 <i>p-value</i> =0.04	F(1,95)=4.39 <i>p-value</i> =0.04	F(1,94)=4.92 <i>p-value</i> =0.03			
$\Delta \text{osm}_t + \Delta \text{osm}_{t-1} = 0$	F(1,95)=0.09 <i>p-value</i> =0.76	F(1,95)=0.03 <i>p-value</i> =0.86	F(1,94)=0.40 <i>p-value</i> =0.53			
$\Delta(\text{htech})_t + \Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1} = 0$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)		F(1,95)=0.90 <i>p-value</i> =0.35	F(1,94)=1.15 <i>p-value</i> =0.29			
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_t + \Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1} = 0$			F(1,94)=2.94 <i>p-value</i> =0.09			
Observations	556	556	550	89	89	88
R-squared	0.64	0.65	0.68	0.19	0.19	0.19

Notes: 1) Variables in columns (4) to (6) are the difference between the average of the first three and the last three years. Two industries, electronic components and computer and office equipment, were dropped – these were large outliers with unusually high labor productivity growth unrelated to offshoring. Note that the taking difference between 2000 and 1992 produces similar sized coefficients but much higher standard errors. 2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent; 3) Import shares for metal coating and engraving (I/O code=36) are missing.

Table 8. Labor Productivity–Outliers

Dependent variable: $\Delta \ln(\text{value-added per worker})_t$						
	One period difference			Two period difference		
	Robust regression	Without tobacco industry	Without tobacco and high- tech	Robust regression	Without tobacco industry	Without tobacco and high- tech
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δoss_t	0.342*** (0.077)	0.235 (0.217)	0.240 (0.218)	0.013 (0.117)	-0.119 (0.258)	-0.104 (0.260)
Δoss_{t-1}	0.266*** (0.075)	0.266** (0.116)	0.267** (0.116)	0.369*** (0.091)	0.438*** (0.145)	0.429*** (0.146)
Δosm_t	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Δosm_{t-1}	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
$\Delta \ln(\text{capital})_t$	0.110** (0.048)	0.122*** (0.038)	0.124*** (0.039)	0.055 (0.051)	0.073 (0.056)	0.072 (0.058)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_t$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	0.004* (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	0.008* (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.012** (0.005)	0.014** (0.005)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_t$	-0.186*** (0.040)	-0.270 (0.187)	-0.283 (0.190)	-0.159*** (0.050)	-0.322** (0.145)	-0.341** (0.146)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1}$	0.124*** (0.042)	-0.011 (0.058)	-0.007 (0.059)	0.280*** (0.055)	0.007 (0.088)	0.012 (0.091)
Year fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Industry fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Joint significance tests:						
$\Delta \text{oss}_t + \Delta \text{oss}_{t-1} = 0$	F(1,535)=31.53 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=6.03 <i>p-value</i> =0.02	F(1,91)=6.29 <i>p-value</i> =0.01	F(1,441)=10.89 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=1.66 <i>p-value</i> =0.20	F(1,91)=1.73 <i>p-value</i> =0.19
$\Delta \text{osm}_t + \Delta \text{osm}_{t-1} = 0$	F(1,535)=10.41 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=1.09 <i>p-value</i> =0.30	F(1,91)=1.12 <i>p-value</i> =0.29	F(1,441)=7.36 <i>p-value</i> =0.01	F(1,93)=0.08 <i>p-value</i> =0.78	F(1,91)=0.07 <i>p-value</i> =0.79
$\Delta(\text{htech})_t + \Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1} = 0$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	F(1,535)=9.20 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=2.79 <i>p-value</i> =0.10	F(1,91)=2.58 <i>p-value</i> =0.11	F(1,441)=4.90 <i>p-value</i> =0.03	F(1,93)=0.93 <i>p-value</i> =0.34	F(1,91)=0.83 <i>p-value</i> =0.36
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_t + \Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1} = 0$	F(1,535)=1.14 <i>p-value</i> =0.29	F(1,93)=2.14 <i>p-value</i> =0.15	F(1,91)=2.20 <i>p-value</i> =0.14	F(1,441)=5.66 <i>p-value</i> =0.02	F(1,93)=2.56 <i>p-value</i> =0.11	F(1,91)=2.70 <i>p-value</i> =0.10
Observations	645	638	624	550	544	532
R-squared	0.60	0.44	0.29	0.81	0.67	0.48

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.

Table 9. Labor Productivity—Instrumental Variables

A. Dependent variable : $\Delta \ln(\text{value added per worker})_t$									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	One period differences			Two period differences					
									OLS
Δoss_t		0.226 (0.146)				-0.078 (0.168)			
Δoss_{t-1}	0.277 (0.182)	0.266 (0.189)	0.328 (0.201)	0.380* (0.206)	0.382* (0.213)	0.418* (0.220)	0.467* (0.251)	0.457* (0.250)	0.380*** (0.132)
Δosm_{t-1}			0.006 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)			0.007 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.0001 (0.002)
$\Delta \ln(\text{capital})_t$	0.111*** (0.027)	0.122*** (0.028)	0.104*** (0.029)	0.100* (0.031)	0.105*** (0.032)	0.100*** (0.035)	0.103*** (0.034)	0.078* (0.041)	0.080* (0.048)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)				0.006** (0.003)				0.011** (0.004)	0.012** (0.005)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1}$				-0.045 (0.144)				-0.200** (0.098)	-0.183* (0.100)
$\Delta \text{oss}_t + \Delta \text{oss}_{t-1} = 0$		$\chi^2(1)=3.29$ <i>p-value=0.07</i>				$\chi^2(1)=2.08$ <i>p-value=0.15</i>			
B. First Stage Results									
Service intensity _{i,1992} interacted with:	Dependent variable:								
$\Delta(\text{IH})_{\text{Canada},t}$	Δoss_{t-1}	Δoss_{t-1}							
	0.017*** (0.004)	0.024** (0.011)							
$\Delta(\text{IH})_{\text{Germany},t}$	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.028*** (0.007)							
$\Delta(\text{IH})_{\text{India},t}$	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.013** (0.005)							
$\Delta(\text{IH})_{\text{Japan},t}$	0.018*** (0.005)	0.012* (0.006)							
$\Delta(\text{IH})_{\text{UK},t}$	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.009 (0.006)							
Shea Partial R^2 : Δoss_t		0.37				0.43			
Δoss_{t-1}	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.35	0.37	0.31	0.32	
Δosm_t									
Δosm_{t-1}			0.04	0.04			0.04	0.03	
Hansen J statistic	4.03	7.90	2.83	2.90	7.62	7.61	7.24	6.69	
	$\chi^2(4)=0.40$	$\chi^2(4)=0.10$	$\chi^2(4)=0.59$	$\chi^2(4)=0.58$	$\chi^2(4)=0.11$	$\chi^2(3)=0.05$	$\chi^2(4)=0.12$	$\chi^2(4)=0.15$	
Observations	645	645	645	638	550	550	550	544	544

Note: All columns include year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; ***; * significant at 1 percent level.

Table 10. Labor Productivity–GMM Analysis

Dependent variable: $\Delta \ln(\text{value-added per worker})_t$						
Additional Instruments:	$\Delta \ln(\text{Internet hosts})_{c,t}$					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δoss_t	0.330* (0.193)	0.320 (0.201)	0.266* (0.140)	0.248 (0.200)	0.241 (0.206)	0.219 (0.196)
Δoss_{t-1}	0.378*** (0.122)	0.387*** (0.122)	0.294* (0.164)	0.296** (0.125)	0.320*** (0.121)	0.301** (0.14)
Δosm_t	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)
Δosm_{t-1}	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{capital})_t$	0.116*** (0.027)	0.134*** (0.028)	0.136*** (0.029)	0.111*** (0.026)	0.131*** (0.027)	0.126*** (0.027)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_t$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)		0.005 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)		0.005 (0.003)	0.003 (0.0026)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)		0.009** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)		0.009** (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_t$			-0.341** (0.171)			-0.339* (0.182)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1}$			-0.150* (0.079)			-0.131 (0.086)
$\Delta(\text{vaw})_{t-1}$	-0.199*** (0.063)	-0.196*** (0.063)	-0.276*** (0.063)	-0.204*** (0.062)	-0.202*** (0.062)	-0.281*** (0.063)
Joint significance tests						
$\Delta \text{oss}_t + \Delta \text{oss}_{t-1} = 0$	$\chi^2(1) = 10.80$ <i>p-value</i> =0.00	$\chi^2(1) = 9.75$ <i>p-value</i> =0.00	$\chi^2(1) = 6.71$ <i>p-value</i> =0.01	$\chi^2(1) = 4.98$ <i>p-value</i> =0.03	$\chi^2(1) = 5.13$ <i>p-value</i> =0.02	$\chi^2(1) = 4.06$ <i>p-value</i> =0.04
$\Delta \text{osm}_t + \Delta \text{osm}_{t-1} = 0$	$\chi^2(1) = 0.04$ <i>p-value</i> =0.85	$\chi^2(1) = 0.07$ <i>p-value</i> =0.79	$\chi^2(1) = 0.64$ <i>p-value</i> =0.42	$\chi^2(1) = 0.05$ <i>p-value</i> =0.82	$\chi^2(1) = 0.10$ <i>p-value</i> =0.76	$\chi^2(1) = 0.48$ <i>p-value</i> =0.49
$\Delta(\text{htech})_t + \Delta(\text{htech})_{t-1} = 0$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)		$\chi^2(1) = 4.69$ <i>p-value</i> =0.03	$\chi^2(1) = 2.18$ <i>p-value</i> =0.14		$\chi^2(1) = 4.16$ <i>p-value</i> =0.04	$\chi^2(1) = 3.31$ <i>p-value</i> =0.07
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_t + \Delta(\text{impshare})_{t-1} = 0$			$\chi^2(1) = 4.73$ <i>p-value</i> =0.03			$\chi^2(1) = 3.74$ <i>p-value</i> =0.05
Sargan test	$\chi^2(20) = 28.65$ <i>p-value</i> =0.10	$\chi^2(20) = 29.09$ <i>p-value</i> =0.09	$\chi^2(20) = 29.19$ <i>p-value</i> =0.08	$\chi^2(29) = 37.77$ <i>p-value</i> =0.13	$\chi^2(29) = 38.63$ <i>p-value</i> =0.11	$\chi^2(29) = 39.61$ <i>p-value</i> =0.09
H_0 : no 2 nd order autocorrelation	$z = -0.22$ <i>p-value</i> =0.83	$z = -0.40$ <i>p-value</i> =0.69	$z = 0.40$ <i>p-value</i> =0.69	$z = -0.46$ <i>p-value</i> =0.65	$z = -0.60$ <i>p-value</i> =0.55	$z = 0.22$ <i>p-value</i> =0.83
Observations	550	550	544	550	550	544

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.

Table 11. Employment and Outsourcing

Dependent variable : $\Delta \ln(\text{employment})_t$						
	One period difference			Two period difference		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	0.015 (0.106)	-0.123 (0.131)	-0.129 (0.134)	0.058 (0.120)	-0.209 (0.168)	-0.232 (0.173)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$	-0.035 (0.077)	0.079 (0.094)	0.055 (0.090)	-0.050 (0.125)	0.154 (0.133)	0.142 (0.131)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t}$	-0.498*** (0.092)	-0.327*** (0.109)	-0.325*** (0.109)	-0.575*** (0.145)	-0.409** (0.161)	-0.398** (0.161)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t-1}$	0.071 (0.077)	0.161* (0.093)	0.163* (0.093)			
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t}$	0.489*** (0.060)			0.485*** (0.071)		
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t-1}$	0.066 (0.042)					
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t}$		0.060 (0.042)			0.110** (0.054)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t-1}$		0.089 (0.056)				
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004* (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t}$	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t-1}$	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Joint significance tests						
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1} = 0$	F(1,93)= 0.02 <i>p-value</i> =0.89	F(1,93)= 0.05 <i>p-value</i> =0.82	F(1,93)= 0.15 <i>p-value</i> =0.69	F(1,93)=0.00 <i>p-value</i> =0.96	F(1,93)=0.05 <i>p-value</i> =0.82	F(1,93)=0.13 <i>p-value</i> =0.72
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1} = 0$	F(1,93)= 1.98 <i>p-value</i> =0.16	F(1,93)= 2.87 <i>p-value</i> =0.09	F(1,93)= 2.47 <i>p-value</i> =0.12	F(1,93)=0.51 <i>p-value</i> =0.48	F(1,93)=0.26 <i>p-value</i> =0.61	F(1,93)=0.14 <i>p-value</i> =0.71
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t} + \Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1} = 0$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	F(1,93)= 1.57 <i>p-value</i> =0.21	F(1,93)= 1.73 <i>p-value</i> =0.19	F(1,93)= 2.50 <i>p-value</i> =0.12	F(1,93)=0.97 <i>p-value</i> =0.33	F(1,93)=1.74 <i>p-value</i> =0.19	F(1,93)=2.30 <i>p-value</i> =0.13
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t} + \Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t-1} = 0$	F(1,93)= 0.71 <i>p-value</i> =0.40	F(1,93)= 8.17 <i>p-value</i> =0.01	F(1,93)= 8.02 <i>p-value</i> =0.01	F(1,93)=0.09 <i>p-value</i> =0.77	F(1,93)=13.5 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=13.1 <i>p-value</i> =0.00
Observations	626	626	626	620	620	620
R-squared	0.63	0.44	0.44	0.74	0.60	0.60

Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent; 2) Import shares for metal coating and engraving (I/O code 36) are missing; 3) All columns have year and industry fixed effects.

Table 12. Employment and Outsourcing: Instrumental Variables

Dependent variable : $\Delta \ln(\text{employment})_t$						
Instruments	IV		GMM		GMM	
	Internet hosts*service intensity				Exogenous Instrument	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	0.236*	0.110	-0.040	-0.123	0.050	-0.065
	(0.139)	(0.207)	(0.094)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.125)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$	0.339	0.621**	-0.104	0.024	0.000	0.142
	(0.217)	(0.282)	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.093)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.009	0.007	0.003**	0.005***	0.003**	0.005***
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$	0.010*	0.017***	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t}$	-0.459***	-0.284***	-0.425***	-0.28***	-0.43***	-0.26***
	(0.081)	(0.098)	(0.084)	(0.108)	(0.082)	(0.104)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t-1}$	0.131*	0.264***	0.128	0.185*	0.119	0.174
	(0.077)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.110)	(0.093)	(0.109)
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t}$	0.478***		0.509***		0.519***	
	(0.047)		(0.054)		(0.053)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t-1}$	0.056		0.046		0.056	
	(0.038)		(0.062)		(0.059)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t}$		0.107		-0.002		0.02
		(0.099)		(0.053)		(0.051)
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t-1}$		0.246***		0.066		0.095*
		(0.095)		(0.063)		(0.058)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.002	-0.003	0.000	-0.002	0.000	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.005**	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t}$	-0.000	-0.003**	0.000	-0.002***	0.000	-0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t-1}$	-0.000	-0.001*	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{employment})_{i,t-1}$			0.063	0.152**	0.044	0.128*
			(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.066)
Joint significance tests						
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1} = 0$	$\chi^2(1) = 3.57$ <i>p-value</i> =0.06	$\chi^2(1) = 3.22$ <i>p-value</i> =0.07	$\chi^2(1) = 1.18$ <i>p-value</i> =0.28	$\chi^2(1) = 0.34$ <i>p-value</i> =0.56	$\chi^2(1) = 0.10$ <i>p-value</i> =0.75	$\chi^2(1) = 0.18$ <i>p-value</i> =0.67
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1} = 0$	$\chi^2(1) = 3.41$ <i>p-value</i> =0.06	$\chi^2(1) = 3.65$ <i>p-value</i> =0.06	$\chi^2(1) = 2.74$ <i>p-value</i> =0.10	$\chi^2(1) = 8.8$ <i>p-value</i> =0.00	$\chi^2(1) = 3.23$ <i>p-value</i> =0.07	$\chi^2(1) = 8.63$ <i>p-value</i> =0.00
H_0 : no 2 nd order autocorrelation			$z = -0.35$ <i>p-value</i> =0.72	$z = -0.21$ <i>p-value</i> =0.83	$z = -0.63$ <i>p-value</i> =0.53	$z = -0.27$ <i>p-value</i> =0.79
Hansen J statistic			Sargan test			
4.75						
5.66						
$\chi^2(4) = 0.31$			$\chi^2(20) = 29.8$	$\chi^2(20) = 32.3$	$\chi^2(29) = 34.8$	$\chi^2(20) = 45.93$
$\chi^2(4) = 0.23$			<i>p-value</i> =0.07	<i>p-value</i> =0.01	<i>p-value</i> =0.21	<i>p-value</i> =0.02
Observations	626	626	529	529	529	529

Note: 1) All columns include year and industry fixed effects 2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 3) 3) Shea R²: $\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$ (0.35), $\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$ (0.13), $\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$ (0.03), $\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$ (0.03).

Table 13. Employment and Outsourcing
More disaggregated Manufacturing Industries (450 industries- SIC)

Dependent variable : $\Delta \ln(\text{employment})_t$						
	One period difference			Two period difference		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	-0.069 (0.084)	-0.253** (0.119)	-0.278** (0.111)	-0.192* (0.097)	-0.263* (0.146)	-0.297** (0.141)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$	-0.175* (0.105)	-0.007 (0.114)	-0.047 (0.106)	-0.303 (0.191)	-0.157 (0.152)	-0.166 (0.153)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t}$	-0.646*** (0.083)	-0.531*** (0.090)	-0.527*** (0.090)	-0.544*** (0.075)	-0.510*** (0.083)	-0.506*** (0.083)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t-1}$	0.039 (0.039)	0.075** (0.033)	0.077** (0.034)			
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t}$	0.523*** (0.029)			0.425*** (0.034)		
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t-1}$	0.050*** (0.017)					
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t}$		0.113** (0.045)			0.097 (0.073)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t-1}$		0.072 (0.063)				
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t}$	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t-1}$	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Joint significance tests						
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1} = 0$	F(1,93)=2.37 <i>p-value</i> =0.12	F(1,93)=1.52 <i>p-value</i> =0.22	F(1,93)=2.82 <i>p-value</i> =0.10	F(1,93)=4.15 <i>p-value</i> =0.04	F(1,93)=2.83 <i>p-value</i> =0.10	F(1,93)=3.71 <i>p-value</i> =0.06
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1} = 0$	F(1,93)=1.43 <i>p-value</i> =0.23	F(1,93)=0.02 <i>p-value</i> =0.88	F(1,93)=0.14 <i>p-value</i> =0.70	F(1,93)=0.15 <i>p-value</i> =0.70	F(1,93)=0.39 <i>p-value</i> =0.53	F(1,93)=0.59 <i>p-value</i> =0.44
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t} + \Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1} = 0$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	F(1,93)=3.36 <i>p-value</i> =0.07	F(1,93)=5.37 <i>p-value</i> =0.02	F(1,93)=5.87 <i>p-value</i> =0.10	F(1,93)=9.85 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=9.17 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=9.34 <i>p-value</i> =0.00
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t} + \Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t-1} = 0$	F(1,93)=0.22 <i>p-value</i> =0.64	F(1,93)=28.0 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=28.8 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=20.6 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=24.7 <i>p-value</i> =0.00	F(1,93)=25.2 <i>p-value</i> =0.00
Observations	3,018	3,018	3,018	2,581	2,581	2,581
R-squared	0.55	0.33	0.33	0.55	0.48	0.48

Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent; 2) There are 13 SICs with missing import data, and several SICs that have missing employment data for various years; 3) All columns have year and industry fixed effects.

Table 14. Employment and Outsourcing: Instrumental Variables (SIC)

Dependent variable : $\Delta \ln(\text{employment})_t$						
Instruments	IV		GMM		GMM	
	Internet hosts*service intensity				Exogenous Instrument	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$	-0.111 (0.193)	-0.270 (0.236)	-0.224 (0.147)	-0.392* (0.179)	-0.112 (0.153)	-0.276 (0.190)
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$	-0.099 (0.207)	0.181 (0.260)	-0.341*** (0.121)	-0.159 (0.149)	-0.216* (0.124)	-0.0003 (0.154)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$	0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t}$	-0.647*** (0.064)	-0.532*** (0.067)	0.662*** (0.073)	-0.557*** (0.08)	0.661*** (0.073)	0.554*** (0.08)
$\Delta \ln(\text{wage})_{i,t-1}$	0.039 (0.041)	0.077 (0.048)	0.018 (0.06)	0.042 (0.065)	0.013 (0.060)	0.039 (0.065)
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t}$	0.524*** (0.025)		0.517*** (0.034)		0.518*** (0.034)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{real output})_{i,t-1}$	0.049*** (0.017)		0.052 (0.032)		0.056* (0.032)	
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t}$		0.116*** (0.043)		0.136** (0.053)		0.152*** (0.052)
$\Delta \ln(\text{price})_{i,t-1}$		0.108* (0.057)		0.095 (0.090)		0.112 (0.087)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)
$\Delta(\text{htech})_{i,t-1}$ (<i>ex post rental prices</i>)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t}$	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.0002** (0.00001)	-0.0009*** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0009*** (0.0001)
$\Delta(\text{impshare})_{i,t-1}$	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)
$\Delta \ln(\text{employment})_{i,t-1}$			-0.334 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.033)
Joint significance tests						
$\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=0.38$ <i>p-value</i> =0.54	$\chi^2(1)=0.04$ <i>p-value</i> =0.83	$\chi^2(1)=5.9$ <i>p-value</i> =0.01	$\chi^2(1)=3.88$ <i>p-value</i> =0.05	$\chi^2(1)=1.75$ <i>p-value</i> =0.18	$\chi^2(1)=0.80$ <i>p-value</i> =0.37
$\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t} + \Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1} = 0$	$\chi^2(1)=0.64$ <i>p-value</i> =0.42	$\chi^2(1)=0.39$ <i>p-value</i> =0.53	$\chi^2(1)=1.65$ <i>p-value</i> =0.2	$\chi^2(1)=0.74$ <i>p-value</i> =0.39	$\chi^2(1)=2.21$ <i>p-value</i> =0.14	$\chi^2(1)=1.06$ <i>p-value</i> =0.30
H_0 : no 2 nd order autocorrelation			$z = -0.57$ <i>p-value</i> =0.57	$z = -0.89$ <i>p-value</i> =0.37	$z = -0.89$ <i>p-value</i> =0.37	$z = 0.26$ <i>p-value</i> =0.79
Hansen J statistic			Sargan test			
10.68 $\chi^2(4)=0.03$			6.57 $\chi^2(20)=29.35$ <i>p-value</i> =0.08	32.55 $\chi^2(20)=32.55$ <i>p-value</i> =0.04	45.56 $\chi^2(29)=45.56$ <i>p-value</i> =0.03	64.6 $\chi^2(29)=64.6$ <i>p-value</i> =0.00
Observations	3018	3018	2581	2581	2581	2581

Note: 1) All columns include year and industry fixed effects, 2) Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent; 3) Shea R²: $\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t}$ (0.33), $\Delta \text{oss}_{i,t-1}$ (0.17), $\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t}$ (0.03), $\Delta \text{osm}_{i,t-1}$ (0.04).

Table 15. Data Sources

Variable	Code	Years available	Source
Input/output tables	BLS	1992 to 2000	BLS
Trade (Manufacturing)	HS10 digit	1992 to 2001	Feenstra
Trade (Services)	Balance of Payments	1992 to 2001	IMF
Output (Manufacturing)	SIC 4 digit	1992 to 2001	BEA
Output (Services)	SIC 3 digit	1992 to 2001	BEA
Value-Added per worker	BLS	1992 to 2000	BLS
Employment	SIC 4 digit	1992 to 2001	ASM
Payroll	SIC 4 digit	1992 to 2001	ASM
Capital stock	SIC 4 digit SIC 4 digit	1992 to 1996 1996 to 2001	NBER Productivity database Constructed using investment perpetual method
Capital expenditure	SIC 4 digit	1996 to 2001	ASM
Investment deflators	SIC 2 digit	1996 to 2001	BLS
Materials	SIC 4 digit	1992 to 2001	ASM
Material deflators	SIC 4 digit SIC 4 digit	1992 to 1996 1997 to 2001	NBER Productivity database BEA output deflators with 1992 BEA I/O table

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