

February 26, 1945

Mr. Brenner

Mrs. Lewis and Messrs. Dyer and McNeill

An examination of pertinent material has been made to determine the extent of bankers' opposition to legislation since 1933. Attached as Appendix A are quotations found in hearings and taken from statements and articles by bankers in various banking journals and papers.

It should be noted that the quotations on the Banking Act of 1935 have been limited to statements advocating delay and to broad denunciatory statements. This has been felt advisable because many of the bankers' particular criticisms and suggestions were successful and led to changes in the Act.

Appendix B lists the hearings, magazines, etc., examined.

Attachments

APPENDIX "A"

Banking Act of 1933

Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, on H. R. 10241, 72nd Cong. entitled "A bill to amend the national banking act and the Federal reserve act, and to provide a guaranty fund for depositors in banks and for other purposes." (This bill was not enacted but the views expressed would appear to be equally applicable to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation established by the Banking Act of 1933.)

Ronald Ransom, President of the Georgia Bankers Association, Atlanta, Georgia, p. 170, 174.

"Mr. Ransom. I do not believe that there is any one subject that could be suggested to the Georgia bankers in which there would be more unanimity than the subject of guaranty of deposits. I will hazard the opinion they are nearly 100 per cent opposed to it."

* * *

"Mr. Ransom. I would rather discuss it in an informal sort of way, and bring out one thought if we can. It seems to me if we adopt the present bill we are going to run into this dilemma upon its passage; as soon as it becomes a law there is going to be a feeling on the part of depositors in the non-member banks that they are not as safe and not as secure as they would be if their deposits were in the member banks under the guaranty. That, it seems to me will be the first effect which will result from its passage. It would penalize at once those non-member banks and be a very severe blow for our dual system of banking. Whether the dual system is the right or wrong one, I personally approve it, and I like it; and I think we ought to retain it."

"Mr. Ransom. ... I do think very sincerely that the effect of this particular guaranty bill will be first to destroy part of the bankers and then to drive the rest of them out of the system if they can get out; and if they can not, that will be just too bad. * * *"

William S. Elliot, Vice president of the Bank of Canton, Canton, Georgia; and also Vice president of the Georgia Bankers Association, p. 178, 180.

"Mr. Elliot. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I want to say at the outset that I agree with what Mr. Ransom has already said. However, I want to supplement perhaps in a few words what he has said, speaking from the view point of a country banker; and if you will pardon the personal reference our bank has been running for 40 years in the mountains of north Georgia, and we are strictly a unit bank - we are not connected as a branch or affiliated with any other institution. We are entirely independent, locally owned, and I want to say that we are opposed to the guaranty of deposits. We do not believe it is fundamentally sound. We do not believe it is fair to the good banks who have built up under the independent system, under State supervision, a strong and going institution which has weathered the very serious depression, and not only this depression that has come across the country. You gentlemen are quite familiar with what 40 years have brought forth in the way of panics and financial reverses, and so forth.

"We feel that to invoke the guaranty of deposits embracing all the members of the Federal system would force the State banks who are not now members of the system to either come into the system and join in the contributions to the guarantee fund or go out of business. And we feel that it is not fair treatment of the country banks who are operating under State charters to require our institution to put up initially about \$10,000 and instead of our showing a small profit, as we would for last year's operation, it would put us in the 'red,' and as a country bank seriously hamper our existence and our progress.
* * *

"Mr. Elliot. ... I do not think it is the Government's business to step in and guarantee to stabilize any line of investment. I think it is starting us on a socialist program that where there will be no stopping."

Gordon L. Groover, Savannah, Georgia - Vice president
Citizens Southern National Bank, Savannah, Georgia, p. 195.

"Mr. Groover. ... I do not really know that I have got very much more to say. I believe that the passage of this bill would be extremely unfortunate. I do not think you ought to put a tax on me and compel me to pay out my pro rata of the \$200,000,000, because you just take it out of the banks that are good, and you are taking it out of the banks whose deposits are protected, and we know

that they are protected. I do not think I ought to have staring before me the balance of my life the idea of four or five men coming in and saying, 'Old man, we are going to tax the member banks another \$100,000,000 this year.'

"The Chairman. Of course, the records show it would not require, over a long period of years, any such amount as that. The record shows that the losses for the first 60 years of the national banking law amount to something like \$750,000 a year. That is how small the losses were over that long period.

"Now, if you take them over that long a period, the assessment will not be enormous; there is nothing to frighten anybody, whatever may be the difference of viewpoint as to the principle involved.

"Mr. Groover. I have got it staring me in the face all of the time.

"Mr. Ransom. Mr. Chairman, I would like to express this thought, because I know all three of us have it, and we have discussed it among ourselves: We only believe that the passage of this bill would have the effect of clearly increasing bank failures, and therefore impose a heavier burden than you gentlemen ever contemplated when you made it up."

D. N. Stafford, Executive Vice president of the First National Bank of Waycross, Georgia, p. 199.

"Mr. Stafford. * * *

"The history of my experience, gentlemen, with reference to Federal legislation dates back a number of years. The first thing that concerned me, or in which I was very much interested, was the Federal reserve act, which was being considered back in 1913. You know the history back of that.

"I was attending a meeting of the American Bankers Association in Boston that year. As you know, gentlemen, that whole convention was fraught with the idea of doing everything they could to defeat the proposed Federal reserve act, for the reason that they felt it was inimical to the interests of banks, particularly the central reserve

banks; that it was forcing them to put up the capital for this new institution and by that very act taking away a vast amount of business from them, which was depository business, reserve central business. You know how they felt and you know that they were fighting it tooth and nail.

"You know the whole history of how it first developed as a big central reserve bank and then how it was divided into 12 districts for the purpose of trying to decentralize somewhat the money of the country.

"In that connection, gentlemen, I just want to make this observation. I think that there is no banker today but who feels that the Federal reserve act was the most beneficent piece of legislation that was enacted in a financial way in the history of our country, even though it did compel member banks to put up the capital and even though it did take away from those member banks, certain central reserve city banks, a large volume of business. Even those banks today would not strike down the Federal reserve system. * * *"

A. L. M. Wiggins, Hartsville, South Carolina, President of the South Carolina Bankers Association, pp. 230, 232.

* * *

"Mr. Wiggins. I would like to make briefly just one or two other points. The fact that all banks would be equally safe, assuming that a guaranty fund provided safety, there would, of course, be no discrimination by the banks, which in turn would encourage what I would term 'wild-cat' management, taking the chances to make a profit and if they made a profit it belonged to the stockholders; if they busted the bank, the guaranty fund would pay the depositors, which I think would increase materially the number of failures that we might expect, once the bank guaranty fund began to operate."

* * *

"Mr. Wiggins. There is one further point I would like to make, then I will stop. If there is a newspaper man here, I would prefer he not quote me on this. I fear very much that with the immediate situation that confronts this country, a favorable report of this bill at the moment, together with

the discussion it will provoke - I fear that it may bring on a further serious situation. To argue for this bill publicly at the present time is to admit a further serious banking situation, so far as the depositor is concerned. I think the very argument for it will add to the withdrawal of money from the banks at the present time. Furthermore, I think it will add fuel to the fire internationally in the fight that is being made on the gold dollar, particularly by France, which, in my opinion, is the biggest threat to our stability in the present time.

* * *

"The Chairman. (interrupting). Do you think that there is anybody in this country that has sense enough to find the way to a bank with a dollar to deposit, who does not know of the distressed condition among banks and of the bank failures we have had; and who does not already share in the fear that has grown out of that situation?

"Mr. Wiggins. I think they share it.

"The Chairman. You think they share it and know it, but that if an effort is made to correct it, that effort would scare them worse?

"Mr. Wiggins. I think they would think if it was bad enough for Congress to pass a law to guarantee deposits that they would believe it is a lot worse than they think it is, and they would go to town and get their money."

F. F. Beattie, President of the First National Bank, Greenville, South Carolina and President of the Piedmont Saving and Trust Company of Greenville, South Carolina, pp. 234-235.

"Mr. Beattie. * * * I feel that any guaranty system which we might have had in this country during the existing conditions through which we have just passed would have gone to smash. I think in normal times a guaranty fund might be built up, but when a catastrophe comes, when the crises comes, it is going to smash.

"A mutual insurance company gets along nicely so long as they do not have any fire; but a conflagration which covers the country puts it out of business.

"I think it would be the most costly experiment this country could undertake, and one which would not be successful in the long run.

** * *

"I am thoroughly of the conclusion that bank deposits guaranty is unwise, and I think undoubtedly in the course of time it would end in a catastrophe. If it runs along pretty well it might create a fund, but I say again when we have another crisis, which we will have, your guaranty fund will be a most expensive experiment."

AMERICAN BANKER, April 6, 1932, p. 1.

PATON OPPOSES ALL DEPOSIT GUARANTEE LEGISLATION PENDING.

"Thirteen bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives and three in the Senate having for their purpose the guaranty of deposits in national banks and in the State bank members of the Federal Reserve System", says Thomas B. Paton, general counsel of the A.B.A., writing in the A.B.A. Journal. "This large number", he says, "indicates considerable sentiment among members of Congress for legislation of this character. It would seem none too early for bankers, before this sentiment becomes too deep-rooted, to point out to their representatives that such a policy is wrong in principle and the dangerous results which would ensue.

AMERICAN BANKER, May 17, 1933, p. 1.

GLASS-STEAGALL DEPOSIT GUARANTY SCORED BY SISSON

"Bank deposit insurance plans, proposed in the Glass and Steagall bank reform bills now before Congress, are not different in fundamental principles from the guaranty of deposits plans that have been tried by eight Western States and proved disastrous failures in every instance, Francis H. Sisson, vice-president of the Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, and president of the American Bankers Association, declared on Tuesday. He said the Association is in favor of the aims and most of the provisions of the Glass bill, but is opposed to the new insurance feature that has been incorporated in it. Mr. Sisson's statement is as follows:

"The American Bankers Association has declared its endorsement of the major aims of the Glass banking reform bill and of the greater part of its specific provisions. It has itself put forward an affirmative program of legislation to bring about improved banking conditions that in some respects goes even further than the Glass bill. But the association is firmly on record as opposed in principle to any law carrying a guaranty of deposits, such as is now incorporated in the new Glass bill before the present session of Congress.

* * *

"If experience means anything, the history of the eight State guaranty plans shows that the idea is inherently fallacious. It is based on erroneous premises and assumptions. It is peculiarly one of those plausible, but deceptive, human plans that, in actual application, only serve to render worse the very evils they seek to cure.

"It is fundamental that the only real guaranty for bank deposits is good banking. Deposit guaranty is not good banking. The guaranty of deposits cannot be made to take the place of sound public banking policies.

* * *

"Foremost among the deleterious effects of the guaranty of deposits in every case where it was tried, was that it served as a smoke-screen for bad banking. It dimmed the perceptions of the public and its discrimination between sound and unsound banks by creating the false impression that deposits were safe in any kind of a bank. Also within the banks it tended to dull the sense of responsibility resting upon the individual banker to defend the sanctity of his depositors' money by every faculty at his command, since a large part of that responsibility had supposedly been taken over by the State.

"The obvious injustice of penalizing good banking for the protection of bad banking, of hazarding the funds of sound institutions to cover the losses of the unsound, must be clear to anyone who will give this matter impartial consideration. It is entirely possible that the unwarranted burden which this would place on good banks might threaten the stability of the entire banking structure. It is an impracticable scheme to salvage incompetency and failure in others that might imperil the very existence of sound and well managed institutions'."

AMERICAN BANKER, May 17, 1933, p. 1.

"Kansas bankers consider the guarantee of deposits,-- insurance, liquidating corporation, or what-not--no matter what name it may be given in the banking legislation now pending in Congress, to be not only fundamentally unsound, but another lure to enforce membership in the Federal Reserve System.

"They 'are utterly opposed to any legislation of this nature'.

"'It would result in a national catastrophe'.

"'The proponents of legislation of this kind are very strong supporters of one system of banking which is nothing more than a forerunner of branch banking, and under the guise of a guarantee of deposits they are attempting to put over such legislation as would tend to eliminate the dual system of banking, and once a single system has been established branch banking will be the next step'.

"These remarks punctuated the address of H. W. Koenke, bank commissioner of Kansas, before the afternoon session here, yesterday, of the Kansas Bankers Association. He spoke from the standpoint of the leading bankers themselves, whom he had previously had in conference at his office to discuss the very matters he covered."

AMERICAN BANKER, May 27, 1933, p. 1.

BIG NEW YORK BANKS MAY LEAVE RESERVE

"Discussions in Wall Street about the deposit guaranty plan contained in both the Glass and Steagall bills which have now gone to conference, developed a sentiment that many of the large New York City banks will resign from the Federal Reserve system and become simply State banks rather than to submit to legislation which they consider basically unsound."

AMERICAN BANKER, June 16, 1933, p. 1.

"Francis H. Sisson, president of the American Bankers Association, June 14, sent the following telegram to member banks in regard to the deposit guaranty provisions of the Glass-Steagall bill:

"'The American Bankers Association fights to the last ditch deposit guaranty provisions of Glass-Steagall bill as unsound, unscientific, unjust and dangerous. Overwhelming opinion of experienced bankers is emphatically opposed to deposit guaranty

which compels strong and well managed banks to pay losses of the weak. This legislation as passed yesterday by Congress has not had approval of Federal Reserve Board, Treasury Department nor sympathetic cooperation of the President. Senator Glass himself successfully opposing guaranty plank is reported to have made following statement before last Democratic national convention: "The guaranty plank in our platform would create anxiety, would cause disturbance within our ranks, and raise opposition to our party in November, which I regard is entirely unnecessary. The guaranty of bank deposits has been tried in a number of States and resulted invariably in confusion and disaster to the financial structure of the States, and if our party when returned to power should incorporate such a scheme in the Federal organization, we would drive the strongest member banks from the Federal Reserve System. These strong banks should not be assessed to pay a premium for mismanagement." If you agree with this pronouncement a wire to President Roosevelt urging veto may yet be effective'."

AMERICAN BANKER, July 6, 1933, p. 1.

The letter of the National City Bank for July discusses the Bank Act of 1933, taking a critical attitude toward the Deposit Guaranty features, and expressing the opinion that the act goes too far in eliminating interest on demand deposits.

Speaking of the Bank Act of 1933, the National City's letter says:

* * *

"The establishment of deposit guarantees or insurance in this country has always been regarded with apprehension, in view of the failure of the system in eight States where it has been tried. The fundamental objection to the plan is that it makes good bankers responsible for the losses of the poor ones, and naturally this is more likely to eliminate the former than the latter. It makes all banks equally safe for depositors and hence relieves the public of responsibility in the choice of banks. Thus it puts the burden of maintaining sound banking upon regulation by the Government, and takes it off the public, which would bear part of it.

"The element of character in the choice of a bank is eliminated, and the competitive appeal is shifted to other and lower standards, such as liberality in making loans. The natural result is that the standards of management are lowered, bankers may take greater risks for the sake of larger profits, and the economic loss which accompanies bad bank management increases. All the arguments for the system are based upon the assumption that there will be no increase of bank failures because of it, and this assumption is fallacious."

OVERWHELMING SENTIMENT AMONG BANKERS AGAINST FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE PLAN, 56 Trust Companies, 680 (June 1933).

In a recent address before the Illinois Bankers Association, Francis H. Sisson, president of the American Bankers Association and vice president of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, expressed the strong sentiment among American bankers which is opposed to the scheme of deposit insurance incorporated in the Glass banking bill passed at the last session of Congress. He said in part:

"It is a matter of general regret among bankers that Senator Glass and the members of the Banking Committee have yielded to importunities and included a so-called insurance of deposits plan in the banking reform bill. There is so much good in the Glass bill that its aims and most of its provisions have commanded the wide support of bankers.

"Bankers generally, however, cannot give their endorsement to the deposit insurance proposal. It is not different in essential principles from the guaranty of deposits schemes that have been tried in eight western states and invariably failed. The Economic Policy Commission of the American Bankers Association has just completed a searching re-study of the history and results of the guaranty plans and the simple facts of these cases put them beyond the pale of sound remedies for the banking problem."

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF BANKING AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE, by Nathan Adams, President, First National Bank of Dallas, Texas, 56 Trust Companies, p. 710.

The Glass bill recently enacted by Congress precludes the payment of interest on demand deposits. This will seriously affect agriculture and will destroy the continuity of credit relations between the banks in the producing sections of the country and the terminal points, thus compelling the agricultural commodities to be settled for in cash at the Federal Reserve Bank instead of being accepted for credit as they have heretofore been handled.

Unless a bank is allowed to pay interest there will be no incentive to carry balances with each other and these balances will naturally go to the Federal. It will mean that all cotton and grain drafts must be paid in cash and Texas alone handles one-third of the nation's cotton crop.

* * *

The banks who own the stock of the Federal Reserve Banks should have a voice in its affairs and they should demand that Congress give them the same opportunity to earn for their stockholders a reasonable dividend as they give the post office department of the United States which belongs to all of us and which makes a charge for the services it performs.

Let's go back to the simple ways of doing business. Let's put our faith in each other with the understanding that the more we go to the government for assistance the more tax we will pay and the more our individual initiative will be destroyed. Governments were established for the purpose of governing and they were to be supported by the people, not to support the people. We have wandered far afield from that and while I admire greatly President Roosevelt's courage since his induction in the high office there must be some stopping place, otherwise, we will find our railroads and our banks controlled wholly by the Government. We know the Government has begun to edge its way into all lines of endeavor, particularly banking and agriculture. In my opinion, the Federal Reserve System has made all this necessary because they have a power which should never have been given them.

EDITORIAL, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, June 1933, p. 28.

* * *

"The obvious injustice of penalizing good banking for the protection of bad banking, of hazarding the funds of sound institutions to cover the losses of the unsound, must be clear to anyone who will give this matter impartial consideration. It is entirely possible that the unwarranted burden which this would place on good banks might threaten the stability of the entire banking structure. It is an impractical scheme to salvage incompetency and failure in others that might imperil the very existence of sound and well managed institutions".

* * *

"Deposit insurance, as defined in the Glass and Steagall bank bills now before Congress, does not differ in fundamental principle from the various guaranty schemes which have failed disastrously in every state where they have been tried."

OPINIONS ON THE NEW BANKING ACT, CHARTERED FROM WEST TO EAST, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 1933, pp. 22-23.

"* * * an objective survey of banking sentiment in the country at large made by the Journal during the past two months shows reactions ranging from fairly enthusiastic approval to heated disapproval. For most provisions of the bill there is, on the whole, rather general approval. In the matter of the insurance of deposits and in respect to the concentration of further authority in the Federal Reserve system in that connection there is almost universal disapproval".

* * *

"They (Kansas) bankers regard the objectionable features of the law as far outweighing its good points and think the country would have been better off if the Act had not been passed".

* * *

"The new Act seems to have very few friends among bankers in the eastern states. The East, in fact, throws off all responsibility for the measure".

BARRON'S, SEPTEMBER 11, 1933, QUOTING FROM AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION RESOLUTIONS WIRED TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

* * *

"Putting into effect the deposit-insurance provisions at the beginning of 1934 would involve genuine and serious danger and * * * such action should be postponed.". A.B.A. resolutions wired to President Roosevelt.

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, OCTOBER 1933, G. E. ANDERSON, pp. 18-19.

"Objections to the new system on the part of the small non-member banks of the country are based less upon opposition to the general principles of deposit insurance or guaranty although some of these banks have had bitter experience in state guaranty systems, than upon that special feature of the new system which is to force them into the Federal Reserve System -- or up a tree.

AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 9, 1934

An editorial referring to the virtue of the Glass Guarantee Act which requires all State banks applying for deposit insurance to join the Federal Reserve System quoted Elmer A. Benson state banking commissioner of Minnesota as follows: "This provision is destructive because it would virtually destroy State banking sovereignty. * * * If this law is not amended it will be the first step in the direction of branch banking and a complete monopoly of the credit business of this country, a dangerous course".

AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 12, 1934, p. 1.

J. M. Nichols, President of the First National Bank of Englewood, stated that he would refuse to make payments to the FDIC. Asserts that his employees were working 52 hours a week and he "defied anyone to do anything about it".

AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 18, 1934, p. 5.

Percy H. Johnston, President of the Chemical Bank & Trust Co. in opposition to the FDIC said, "Had this law been in effect during the past five years, more than one-half of this company's capital funds would have been dissipated to pay the losses of other banks." * * * "The law puts a premium on unsound banking and is unfair to well-managed banks".

AMERICAN BANKER, July 11, 1934, p. 1.

J. M. Nichols, President of the First National Bank of Englewood is keeping up his hammering against the FDIC, which he refuses to have his bank join. In an advertisement appearing in the Chicago newspapers, Mr. Nichols says:

"If sold on today's market, the proceeds from our Government bonds, together with cash on hand and balance due from correspondent and Federal Reserve banks, would actually net us \$6,765,000.65 in cash, which is \$244,810.60 more than necessary to immediately pay every depositor in full. Within an hour's time every dollar of this cash could be transferred to our vaults here on Sixty-third Street.

"To join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. would but weaken this enviable position. Under their permanent plan, every dollar of our depositors' money would be in jeopardy. This FDIC is the most contemptible and impractical thing ever forced on sound banking. Many insolvent banks, which should have been closed a year ago in March, are, of course, taking to it like ducks to water -- anything to prolong their existence -- but the sound bankers

from Coast to Coast are bitterly protesting against this theory of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Nothing this Administration has so far done better exemplifies its policy of 'soaking the thrifty' than does this shake-down of sound banking institutions for the purpose of protecting its political favorites. Were these New Dealers truly interested in sound banking, we have it! We have always had it! And they should be commending rather than condemning us. But that is not their aim. It is very apparent that complete socialization and regimentation of finance and industry are the goals towards which they strive. It is these we are fighting, and will continue to fight."

Gold Reserve Act of 1934

Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. on S. 2366.

Dr. Benjamin M. Anderson, Jr., Economist, The Chase National Bank, p. 112, 135, 225.

"Senator Wagner. Would you limit the particular office you are going to create now, to manage the \$2,000,000,000 fund? Would you limit the powers of that office any more than we limit the powers conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury?"

"Mr. Anderson. The powers given to the Secretary of the Treasury seem to be much too wide. I would limit it to an exchange stabilization fund, with ability to buy Government securities, but I think that last you do not need to do. I think it is not very desirable to do it. You create an artificial Government-securities market. I would rather make just sound general policy, and you will find that the Government can borrow all it needs."

* * *

"Stabilization is an artificial makeshift, used just temporarily, at best, until we get a definite gold rate fixed, and then gold against dollars and dollars against gold, and you do not have need for any stabilization fund at all. That is the way we did it for 50 years. Whether it is gold coin or gold bullion does not matter greatly, so far as the effectiveness is concerned."

T. R. Preston, President, Hamilton National Bank, Chattanooga, Tenn.; representing U. S. Chamber of Commerce, p. 167, 169.

"The surrender of the actual gold, combined with the broad powers the bill proposes to vest in the Treasury, presents the possibility of weakening the Federal Reserve System and impairing its utility. This is not necessary in connection with stabilizing the currency. We recommend that the bill be changed to provide that the Federal Reserve System, in surrendering to the Treasury the so-called 'profit' resulting from devaluation, shall retain title to its gold reserves under carefully devised restrictions upon its rights to release such gold.

"* * * The purposes and methods of operation of the proposed stabilization fund should be more expressly stated, and there should be excluded all power not directly necessary for the stabilization of the dollar in foreign exchange."

James P. Warburg, Vice Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Manhattan Company, New York, N. Y., p. 189, 190.

"* * * To all intents and purposes it seems to me that the bill endows the Secretary of the Treasury with most of the powers usually vested in a government note-issuing institution and with several other powers as well. To some extent this is doubtless necessary in an emergency, but I see nothing in the bill to limit it to an emergency.

"One cannot precisely define what constitutes an emergency. But one can define one's ultimate aim. I believe the bill could be improved if it were made to state that our purpose is to return to a fixed ratio to gold, and that to this end we seek the establishment of an improved international gold standard. (I have set forth a detailed proposal for an improved gold standard in my testimony before the House committee.) If our ultimate aim were so defined, the powers conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury could then be made to lapse when this ultimate aim is realized."

"* * * It seems to me that the bill contains the elements of a drastic change of the Federal Reserve System. I have said that I believe the Government should take the profit from devaluation, but I question gravely the advisability of

taking the Reserve bank's gold and giving them gold certificates, which are only convertible into gold at the option of the Secretary of the Treasury, and in an amount of gold to be fixed by him. * * *

Editorial, "NOT FOR US", BARRON'S October 9, 1933, p. 12.

* * *

"Is there anyone who can visualize the possibility of such an 'Equalization Fund' being operated in this country? Can the imagination picture the Congress handing over a billion and three quarters of dollars to anyone for such a purpose with full powers to act, and no strings upon those powers? That is but a beginning of the necessary flight of fancy. We then have to suppose that Congress, House and Senate, sits quiet and does not ask to know what is going on, with 'politics adjourned' --all right, imagine that we can get that far! We still have to reckon with what a portion of our press conceives as 'enterprise,' and we have had plenty of reason to know that that concept includes everything from intelligent deduction down to bribery, and, if need be, burglary--possibly even murder. Could the 'secret' last a single month?

"The thing is simply unthinkable. It is totally incompatible with our psychology. It is possible in England only because of the fact that the English concept of these things is different in all respects from our own. Whether it is or is not a 'higher' concept is quite irrelevant; it is the fact of the difference that is important. In the light of that fact it is simply impossible for us to conduct the kind of operation that the English Treasury and the Bank of England are conducting with the 'Equalization Fund.' Whatever else we can do, we cannot do that, and we might as well cease talking about it."

BRITAIN'S EXCHANGE EQUALIZATION FUND, BY ALZADA COMSTOCK, BARRON'S, December 4, 1933.

"Two difficulties stand in the way of the use of such a fund in the United States. The first is the fact that the temper of the American public would not tolerate such a cloak of secrecy as that with which the British fund is surrounded. Neither public officials nor private bankers in this country could win from Congress and the people the confidence which the unknown managers of the British fund have received from the majority of the people. In this we pay, perhaps, for the sins of a past generation. But the price must be paid.

"In the second place, it is unlikely that there exists in the United States at the present time the ability necessary for the manipulation of the complicated European exchanges. The technique can be learned only by experience, and our experience is slight. Buying and selling gold is an easier matter. There has been, to be sure, a vast amount of scuttling around since the Exchange Equalization Fund began to take gold, to find out what it was all about. But there are long years of apprenticeship which must still be passed through. A successfully managed exchange equalization fund is the tool of a more experienced and more conscientious society."

THE GOLD BILL - INFLATION OR STABILIZATION? BY SHERWIN C. BADGER,
BARRON'S, JANUARY 22, 1934.

The greatest dangers of the proposed Gold Act are (1) it increases our already redundant gold supply; (2) the mere presence of this additional gold through revaluation must always remain a threatening cause for a credit inflation, of long or short duration, which could be very much greater than the post-war credit inflation which caused our present sufferings; (3) it provides the mechanism whereby at least \$2,000,000,000 may be added to our credit base; (4) it sets a maximum limit for the devalued dollar which practically insures that this \$2,000,000,000 will be added to the credit base; and (5) it concentrates powers in the Executive branch of the government which far transcend the powers of the Federal Reserve System and hence eclipse the latter in the monetary field.

AMERICAN BANKER, March 3, 1934, p. 8.

"Tremendous inflation and other troubles are likely to develop from the Gold Reserve Act of 1934". Dr. William W. Cumberland of Wellington and Co. of New York.

Banking Act of 1935

Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, U. S. Senate, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1715 and H. R. 7617.

Winthrop W. Aldrich, Chairman, The Chase National Bank, p. 385, 389.

"* * * But I find nowhere among the central banking organizations abroad so complete political control as the present bill provides for. The members of the Federal Reserve

Board are already 100 percent appointed by the President acting solely on his own initiative, subject, of course, to the advice and consent of the Senate. It is to this group, three of whom are directly representative of the political administration, that the bill would grant powers more extensive than are granted to any foreign central bank that I know of--first, the power to force on the Federal Reserve System an indefinite amount of Government obligations of any and all maturities whether purchased directly from the Treasury or not; second, the power to fix rates of discount and interest charged by the Reserve banks; third, the power to fix at will what deposits the member banks shall keep with the Reserve banks; fourth, the power to lower the standards fixed in the law describing the quality of paper the Federal Reserve banks may buy or lend upon; fifth, the power to dilute the currency; and sixth, the power to force the Reserve banks to engage in whatever open-market operations it may decree. This is not liberalizing the Federal Reserve System. It is making it over into an instrument of despotic authority."

Benjamin M. Anderson, Jr., Economist, Chase National Bank, p. 435, 436, 459.

"So that I see no reason for the enactment of title II in a hurry. There is plenty of time to work the matter out right if you are going to reorganize the Federal Reserve System."

The primary function of Federal Reserve banks, as I see it, is to do these old-fashioned things: Protect the currency, maintain quality of credit, check wild booms, meet emergencies, meet seasonal needs, and things like that. The other theory, that they must try to regulate commodity prices especially, I think is dead wrong.

F. F. Beattie, President, First National Bank, Greenville, S. Car., p. 825, 827.

"I appear, gentlemen, to protest earnestly against the passage by Congress of title II of the Banking Act of 1935, which act is now before you for consideration. I am of the opinion that title II of this act gives to this administration and to such administrations as may follow enormous and unprecedented control over the resources of the Federal Reserve System. I think that it is a most dangerous power which this bill seeks to create--dangerous not only to those interested in banking, but to the very liberties of the people of America. It is well recognized that a government desiring dictatorial power seeks first to

seize control of the credit, machinery of a nation. Given the dictatorial control of credit, governmental power over the destinies of a people may easily become supreme. I think also that the open market features of the bill confer powers which may easily lead to currency inflation such as has been experienced since the World War by Germany and other European powers, using the same methods. I cannot believe that this Nation is willing to take the chance of such a disastrous experience."

I desire to say, gentlemen, that I am of that school of thought which believes that the business of banking in this Nation is already unduly controlled and regulated by Government. Such control is now far more vigorous and rigid than exists in other enlightened nations of the world. The banks of this Nation are already so controlled by laws and regulations as to substantially retard their operations and cripple their proper functions, from which communities suffer. A condition has thus been brought about in the banking business where new capital refuses to come into this business and young men are reluctant to choose the business of banking as a career.

I assert in all earnestness that sound banking and politics will not mix. Political banking is disastrous, whether it be in a local community or on a national scale. The simple reason for this, I think, is that the ability to say "no" firmly and courteously when that word is required is an absolute essential of sound banking; and politicians, thinking about the chief or the boys back home, often have difficulty in pronouncing this simple word. The only way that a bank or banking system can be kept free from political pressure and control is through a board of directors who hold no political office and who have no political aspirations, and manned by executives of the same caliber.

John B. Byrne, President, Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. - Chairman of Special Committee of Connecticut Bankers' Assn., p. 667, 670, 671.

"If I may go on to title III next, we feel that it contains changes for the most part technical but seem to us, on the whole, to be beneficial, and we believe that title III should be passed. We have no objection to that at all. As to title II, we oppose vigorously the whole of it and believe that it should be taken out of the bill. We regard as extremely dangerous the possibilities of the centralization of

control over our money and credit in the hands of a small group supposedly under complete political domination."

"However, whether opposed or in favor of the far-reaching changes contained in title II of the proposed bill, we think that all would agree that these changes are revolutionary, and there is no disputing the fact that they are controversial. We see no emergency existing at the present time which calls for drastic and hurried action and feel that no attempt, therefore, should be made to rush through such revolutionary and controversial legislation."

Frank C. Ferguson, President, Hudson County National Bank, Jersey City, New Jersey; Chairman of Committee on Federal legislation of the New Jersey Bankers' Association, p. 193, 202.

"Haste should not prevail in the passage of title II. Under the Federal Reserve Act at the present time any emergency can be met. In the meanwhile a National Monetary Commission, as proposed earlier in this statement, should be formed to study our problems of money and banking; and then a bill should be drafted, based upon its conclusions as a result of its findings and observations."

William J. Field, President, The Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey, representing the New Jersey Bankers' Association, p. 187, 193.

"I think that title II should be eliminated. If title II is retained, we oppose the whole bill. Title II is so radically out of order that we do not stand for it for a minute."

R. S. Hecht, President, American Bankers Association, p. 515, 518.

"It is not our opinion that an emergency exists which makes it immediately necessary to have this legislation.

"In making this statement I do not wish to appear to question the propriety of the Government's exerting a certain amount of control over banking operations so far as they affect the Nation's currency and general monetary policy. Nor do we object to broad powers of supervision over the operation of our banking institutions because of the semi-public responsibilities they carry. But when it comes to such matters as the

granting of credit and the making of investments by our banks, these are questions of business policies that surely should not be under the sole control of a board so constituted as to be dependent upon partisan or political considerations under any administration."

James H. Hughes, Jr., Director and Counsel, Delaware Trust Co., Wilmington, Delaware, p. 268, 274.

"I think title II ought to be eliminated entirely. I do not believe the people of this country want that; I don't think the bankers want it, and I don't think the depositors want it."

Howard A. Loeb, Vice President, Federal Advisory Council, (3rd Fed. Dist.); Chairman, Tradesmen's National Bank & Trust Co., Philadelphia, Pa., p. 549.

"That no emergency now exists that warrants a fundamental change in our banking laws--in any event until a complete study is made of the subject by a competent commission, made up of representatives of interested groups, both economic and social. Pending the result of such a study it may be deemed advisable to re-enact section 10 B (which automatically expired on March 3, 1935), for a definite period.

James H. Perkins, Chairman, National City Bank, New York, N. Y.; Member, Federal Advisory Council, (2nd Dist.) p. 544.

Advocated changes in title II or postponement until subjected to further study and examination.

Henry Ridgely, President, Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, p. 265, 266.

"Our position, then, is that in our opinion title II should be dropped from this bill."

Thomas M. Steele, Member, Federal Advisory Council, (1st Dist.); President, First National Bank & Trust Co., New Haven, Conn., p. 574, 585, 586.

"SENATOR GLASS. I just want to ask one question, and I regret that I did not ask it of every witness that we have had before the committee.

"SENATOR MCADOO. You might recall them.

"SENATOR GLASS. It is unnecessary to do that. I know what the answer would be.

"Have you found a single intelligent banker in the United States or a single business man who understands the philosophy and the mechanism of banking who is in favor of this bill?

"MR. STEELE. Personally I have not talked to anybody who is in favor of it.

"SENATOR MCADOO. Have you talked to any intelligent people?

"MR. STEELE. Surely I have. I have talked with a great many bankers up in my district, the First Federal Reserve District.

"SENATOR GLASS. Have you found any of them in favor of title II of this bill?

"MR. STEELE. Not one that I have talked with.

"SENATOR MCADOO. Are they just as unanimously against this bill as they were against the Federal Reserve Act?

"MR. STEELE. Oh, no. There are a great many parts of title III that everybody is anxious to have enacted.

"SENATOR GLASS. I confined my question to title II."

James P. Warburg, Vice Chairman, Bank of the Manhattan Co., New York, p. 71, 72.

"The proposed Banking Act of 1935 consists of three titles. I shall confine myself to a discussion of title II, which deals with the proposed amendments to the Federal Reserve Act. I shall do this for the same reason that if someone were to say to me, 'I am going to do three things for you: Buy you a dinner, buy you a drink, and cut your throat', I would not waste very much time choosing my drink or ordering my dinner.

"Let me state at the outset that I am unequivocally opposed to the present enactment of title II of the proposed bill, with or without modifications. I say this for three reasons: (1) Because I am convinced that no amount of changes which might be made in this section of the bill would in any way alter its

fundamental purpose or materially alter the practical results of its enactment; (2) because I profoundly disagree with the fundamental purpose of this section of the bill; and (3) because there is no present emergency which necessitates hasty action, whereas there is every reason why a matter of such far-reaching effect upon the future economic welfare of the country should be given the most careful study by competent authorities."

L. M. Wiggins, President, Bank of Hartsville, S. Car., p. 828, 830, 831.

"We regard the major and underlying purpose of title II of the Banking Act of 1935 as a perversion of the Federal Reserve System from the sound principles on which it was founded and a deliberate attempt to appropriate to the Government the banking reserves of this Nation, with the result that they may be used as the means for promoting the financing of governmental needs with a minimum checks and with a maximum of political control, by whatever administration happens to be in power."

"I cannot agree with those who believe that title II of this bill can be changed so as to correct the dangers that lie within it. Of course, many of its most dangerous provisions may be changed, but it is my conviction that the whole major premise on which the theories promulgated in title II rest is unsound, violates the sound, common-sense judgment of the American people, and belongs to the realm of dictatorships. Without desiring to raise any unnecessary alarm, I say to you frankly and honestly that it is my deliberate opinion that, carried to its ultimate conclusions, title II of this bill, as now written, will destroy the Federal Reserve System of banking in the United States."

Editorial in the AMERICAN BANKER, June 1, 1935, p. 4.

FAIR PLAY FOR TITLE II
ARE ONLY WALL STREET OBSTRUCTIONISTS OPPOSING GOVERNOR ECCLES?

We want information.

Governor Eccles of the Federal Reserve Board, last Saturday night gave the impression that it was only the Wall Street bankers and misanthropic obstructionists who were fighting the Banking Act of 1935. This left the impression that bankers of the rest of the country were for Title II.

Also, in supporting the bill in a magazine article last week, A. P. Giannini offered the contention that the majority of bankers desired its passage.

During the past several weeks, quite a number of bankers' associations have met, discussed the Banking Act of 1935 and Title II, and passed resolutions.

We have searched our own records diligently. We fail to find a single banking group or association which has expressed itself in favor of the controversial sections of Title II as urged by Governor Eccles.

Title II of the Banking Act of 1935 is as unpopular on Main Street, it seems, as on Wall Street.

AMERICAN BANKER, February 28, 1935, p. 1.

"That the proposed new banking bill virtually means the writing of a death certificate for private banking control in the United States is the conclusion reached by Dr. H. Parker Willis, noted banking authority and consultant economist of the Fitch Service. All vestiges of independence or self-government in banking are to disappear according to Dr. Willis."

THE ECCLES BILL AND AFTER, by H. Parker Willis (Professor of Banking at Columbia University) 131 Bankers Mag. 176, 177 (1935).

"I think the proposed Eccles Bill is the worst and most dangerous banking measure that has ever come before Congress. It is a bill whose purpose it is, first of all, to compel state banks so far as possible to become members of the Federal Reserve System; to vest in the President of the United States despotic and uncontrolled power over the banking mechanism of the United States, to establish a dependent and incompetent board at Washington who shall be authorized to interfere in every detail with the doings of Reserve banks - and for that matter of their members as well - with the power to enforce their mandates upon the bankers of the country, practically under penalty of having to go out of business should such bankers fail or refuse to do as directed.
* * *

"For these reasons, the proposed measure must be regarded as a complete departure from our fundamental conceptions of banking, and an effort to introduce into the United States those proposals for despotic planning and direction of industry which have given to various foreign countries a completely regimented life, directed and shaped according to the orders of some self-appointed group or leader so long as such a group was able to maintain itself in the saddle.

* * *

"* * * I take it for granted that the Eccles Bill is admitted to be the 'worst ever', beyond hope of satisfactory amendment or redemption, and hence, needing no further critical analysis for the moment.

* * *

"Now, from all this, I draw the following conclusion, which I lay before you with the utmost regret, and only after bitter reflection. This is, that the Federal Reserve System has lost its usefulness and should the proposed measure be adopted ought to be brought to an end. * * *"

A "NEW DEAL" IN BANKING, by H. Parker Willis, 141 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 1153, 1154, 1156, and 1157. 141 Part 1; July-September, 1935.

"Early as the time is, it is not too early to assert with conviction that the Banking Act of 1935 is a stopgap. It obviously must be a bitter disappointment and a merited rebuke to those who originally conceived it. But it is equally plain that the measure does not correct the weak points in Federal Reserve centralization of our entire banking structure, and that it raises many problems of first importance which can hardly be successfully worked out under existing law. New, carefully studied legislation must finally be sought.

"American bankers are not prepared for the Banking Act of 1935. It took a long time and much exhortation, by public men and others, to get them to realize the sweeping character of what was proposed last winter when Governor Eccles first took to Congress a bill which the President then told Senators he had never read and which the Reserve Board testified it had never heard of. They became gradually alarmed by what they learned of the bill, began to study it, and finally undertook a serious discussion of banking principle which has called forth more genuine public expression of opinion than had been heard for some 20 years. But many bankers never joined in this study, or in the debate which followed it; and practically all of the bankers seem to have failed to examine with care the numerous doubtful, obscure, or ambiguous provisions contained in the 'technical amendments' to the banking laws or in the 'Federal Deposit Insurance' provisions which were included in 'Titles I and III' of the measure. Now that the proposed bill is a law, real study of these obscure provisions will begin, and it is safe to say that there will be many surprises to the students. The latter have, rightly, concentrated attention for the most part upon the terms of these

general changes in banking contained in 'Title II' of the Act, which if enacted in their first form, would have transformed our banking system into a financial despotism ruled by a political clique in Washington. But there are many points of which the public has never heard, and of which we may well believe that not many yet realize the full force. The Banking Act of 1935 is thus an unexpected and uncomprehended innovation, forced upon the nation without warning after a series of months in which legislative and Administrative leaders had repeatedly assured the community that nothing was planned that was of first class importance. Some technical adjustments in the powers of Reserve banks, some rearrangement of banking supervisory requirements were admitted-- but that would be all for the winter.

"The new mechanism is clumsy and will not work well. It will probably be of short life, but it bridges over what threatened to become an impasse.

"That point of what has been said, and of much more that might be said to like purport, is that the insurance-of-deposits system is to become a plan of direct oversight and Government interference and participation in banking, that, taken in connection with the Federal Reserve System and its membership requirements, will develop the tightest and most extreme system of banking supervision and control that exists perhaps in any country of the world, certainly the tightest ever existing in the United States. We may well wonder whether any such system is worth its cost; and its cost will be heavy, not merely in direct assessments but also in abridgment of business liberty and freedom to carry on ordinary banking operations necessary or useful to the community.

"Regardless of the ultimate liability involved in the conduct of the Corporation, the large bank which finds it possible under the Act to insure deposits only up to \$5,000 for any one depositor must shortly recognize that it is making a substantial contribution to meet the liabilities of the smaller banks of the country whereas it gets but a limited return in increased safety to its own depositors of whom a much larger proportion are above \$5,000 for each account. These elements of cost will necessarily weigh heavily with practical bankers of all sizes and classes, but the far more important thing for them to consider is the sacrifice of their own legitimate business liberty of action which they will necessarily have to suffer if they put their heads into the 'permanent' deposit insurance noose-- or, having them already in, elect to continue there. * * * like the ancient Hydra it retains its vitality and constitutes the means for extensive 'socialization of the banking business' * * *.

"It contains as already said many hidden and dangerous provisions to which no, or only a bare, reference has here been made. He would be an unappreciative student of American finance who should minimize the great and patriotic service that has been rendered in transforming this Act from its original form even into its present one; but he would be an inattentive or superficial student who should fail to recognize the terrible risks carried by the measure as it stands. The situation is too serious to permit any masking of the issue whether the Federal Reserve Banks of the country ought to continue members of the system under this enactment and whether non-members ought, under any circumstances, to insure their deposits-- much less to accept membership in the system. * * * There is something now much more at stake than the avoidance of bank failures. That is the question whether we in the United States value the existence of an independent banking system, with freedom on the part of the individual to engage in the business under proper restrictions. The new Act goes far toward the creation of a financial monopoly under Government guidance and direction.

* * *

"This is the situation. It has a certain grimness, but it is not hopeless, with the newly awakened conscience of the nation at work against further expropriation and eviction."

Securities Act

AMERICAN BANKER, May 15, 1934, p. 3.

"It seems fairly clear that the act has operated to restrict the issuing of new industrial stocks and bonds. The only other explanation of the decline would be that industry is not now seeking new funds for expansion. This is hardly a tenable theory, for in previous recoveries there has always been rapid capital expansion. This was notably true in 1922, and the increases were not in the rail and municipal securities but in the industrials and the utilities.

"In the decade from 1921 through 1930 the volume of new securities averaging nearly seven and a half billion dollars a year, and in the last three years of the prosperity period their average was well over 10 billions a year. In 1933 they amounted to little more than one-billion."

AMERICAN BANKER, May 15, 1934, p. 1.

Leonard P. Ayers, Vice President and Economist of the Cleveland Trust Co., blamed the Federal Securities Act as "an important factor in contributing to the stoppage" of "the flow of new capital into enterprise."

AMERICAN BANKER, June 12, 1934, p. 1.

Hugh Knowlton of Kuhn, Loeb and Co., described the Securities Act as "un-American".

Revenue Act of 1936

(Excess Profits Tax)

AMERICAN BANKER, April 8, 1936, p. 1.

"The Administration's proposed tax on corporation surpluses is a direct attack on the structure of capitalist society," Franklin W. Fort, president of the Lincoln National Bank at Newark, N. J., told the House Ways and Means Committee last week, according to a record of testimony just published.

"If the bill is passed, it will cause the securities of all affected corporations to be written down, will hurt the market for securities and will cause a tightening of bank credit," Mr. Fort maintained.

"The bill," he said, "is essentially contrary to the basis of any capitalistic society. It constitutes, in my honest opinion, a more direct attack upon the structure of capitalism than any attack that has come directly upon it. Economists may define capitalism as they please. Actually it is nothing but the encouragement of thrift.

"No system of private property has any other base, and none can endure if that base be destroyed. The essence of thrift is the acquisition of reserves, whether it be by an individual, a corporation or a Government."

AMERICAN BANKER, May 12, 1936, p. 1.

"The proposed Federal tax law would drive many small corporations out of business, in the opinion of Dr. Benjamin M. Anderson, Jr., economist of the Chase National Bank, writing in the current issue of The Chase Economic Bulletin, out today.

"(1) The proposed law would drive many small corporations to disincorporate," Dr. Anderson asserts, "while it would operate to prevent all corporations from accumulating adequate reserves in prosperous times.

"(2) It would tend to increase the debt of corporations for needed expansion in prosperous times, particularly when taken in connection with the hampering effects of the Securities and Exchange Act upon the issue of new stocks."

AMERICAN BANKER, May 21, 1936, p. 1.

"Warning was served upon the American people that the destruction by confiscatory taxes of the reserves which industry has created will stop business revival and expansion dead in its tracks, in an address here today by Frank F. Brooks, president of the Pennsylvania Bankers Association and president of the First National Bank at Pittsburgh, opening the 42nd annual convention of the Association.

"Mr. Brooks declared that the foundation of American commercial supremacy is based upon the system of plowing the profits of industry back into industry, of charging the cost of replacing outworn machinery and plants against profits, of using surplus to develop new fields of commerce and manufacture, and of continuing dividends out of surplus even in time of depression. He charged that the present threat to force the distribution of these surpluses by the imposition of confiscatory taxes, would, if fulfilled, hamstring industrial expansion permanently."

Miscellaneous

AMERICAN BANKER, May 18, 1934, p. 6.

Government housing projects were opposed by the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks.

AMERICAN BANKER, February 1, 1936, p. 1.

"SAYS SECURITY ACT IS UNSOUND AND UNWORKABLE

"Speaking before the mid-Winter meeting of the Michigan Bankers Association held here January 21 and 22, W. B. Cudlip of Detroit, general counsel for the association, charged that the Federal Social Security Act was 'unsound, unworkable, and would be a Frankenstein monster if it ever got out of hand.' He declared that a practical program of security is the greatest problem today, but said that such a program should not involve the centralization of authority in Government hands."

AMERICAN BANKER, February 19, 1934,

George F. Bauer, Chairman of the World Trade League, declared that the Export-Import Bank (the first bank organized to finance trade with Russia, the predecessor of the present Export-Import Bank) was "unnecessary and creator of needless competition with established private banking institutions."

APPENDIX "B"

Material Examined

Hearings

<u>Bill</u>	<u>Committee</u>	<u>Subject Matter</u>
<u>72nd Congress</u>		
<u>House:</u>		
H.R. 5060, 5116, 7360	Banking & Currency	R. F. C.
H.R. 11362	Banking & Currency	Guaranty deposits
H.R. 12280	Rules	Home Loan Bank Act
<u>73rd Congress</u>		
<u>House:</u>		
H.R. 3835	Agriculture & Forestry	Agricultural Adjustment Act
H.R. 6670	Agriculture	Federal Farm Mortgage
H.R. 9620	Banking & Currency	National Housing
H.R. 6976	Coinage, Weights & Measures	Gold Reserve Act
S. 2999	Banking & Currency	Amend. HOLC
<u>Senate:</u>		
S. 2366	Banking & Currency	Gold Reserve Act

There are ~~no~~ hearings listed on H.R. 5661 (Banking Act of 1933), H.R. 5240 (H.O.L.C.), and S. 1094 (Amendment to R.F.C.).

Appendix "B" con't:

<u>Bill</u>	<u>Committee</u>	<u>Subject Matter</u>
<u>74th Congress</u>		
<u>House:</u>		
H.R. 4120, 7260	Ways & Means	Social Security
<u>Senate:</u>		
H.R. 4120, 7260	Finance	Social Security
S. 1175	Banking & Currency	RFC extension
S. 3998	Banking & Currency	Commodity Credit
S. 4023	Banking & Currency	Securities Act
<u>75th Congress</u>		
<u>Senate:</u>		
S. 3255	Banking & Currency	Securities Act
<u>76th Congress</u>		
<u>House:</u>		
H.R. 6635	Ways & Means	Social Security Admendment
H.R. 4011, 3429, 4012, 3383	Banking & Currency	Commodity Credit
H.R. 9931	Banking & Currency	Commodity Credit
H.R. 10212, 8477, S. 3069	Banking & Currency	Export Import Bank

Appendix "B" con't:

<u>Bill</u>	<u>Committee</u>	<u>Subject Matter</u>
<u>76th Congress</u>		
<u>Senate:</u>		
H.R. 6635	Finance	Social Security
S. 1084	Banking & Currency	Commodity Credit
S. 3998	Banking & Currency	Commodity Credit
S. 3609	Foreign Relations	Export Import Bank

Periodicals

American Banker (daily newspaper)	January, 1933 through December, 1936
Barron's (weekly)	January, 1933 through July, 1934 January, 1935 through July, 1935
American Bankers Association Journal	Volumes 25 and 26
Bankers Magazine	Volumes 126, 127, 128, 130, 131
Bankers Monthly	Volumes 49, 50, 51
Banking	Volumes 27, 28, 36
Trust Companies	Volumes 56, 57, 60
Magazine of Wall Street	Volumes 52, 56
Forbes	Volume 35
National City Bank	July, 1933; February, 1934; June, 1935