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In the period after the World War the science of International Law, in keeping both with the general trend of legal philosophy and with the developments in conventional International Law and arbitral practice, abandoned to a large extent the rigid adherence to the positivist view. The great majority of writers now recognise that the triumph of positivism was not accomplished without the loss of certain important factors making for the development of International Law. It is now generally admitted that, in the absence of rules of law based on the practice of States, International Law may be fittingly supplemented and fertilised by recourse to rules of justice and to general principles of law, it being immaterial whether these rules are defined as a Law of Nature in the sense used by Grotius, or a modern Law of Nature with a variable content, or as flowing from the 'initial hypothesis' of International Law, or from the fundamental assumption of the social nature of States as members of the international community, or, in short, from reason. In fact recourse to such rules is a frequent feature of the practice of States, especially as evidenced in arbitration conventions, and of judicial and arbitral decisions. In adopting Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice the signatory States have sanctioned that practice. Whatever may have been its merits in the past history of International Law, rigid positivism can no longer be regarded as being in accordance with existing International Law. Probably what has been described above as the Grotian school comes nearest to expressing correctly the present legal position.