

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
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1943.

The Treasury today made public a letter from Secretary Morgenthau to the Ministers of Finance of thirty-seven countries inviting them to send technical experts to Washington to discuss suggestions for an International Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations. The text of the letter is as follows:

My dear Mr. Minister:

I am sending for your examination a preliminary draft of a Proposal for an International Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations. This draft was prepared by the technical staff of the United States Treasury in consultation with the technical experts of other departments of this Government.

The document is sent to you not as an expression of the official views of this Government but rather as an indication of the views widely held by the technical experts of this Government. I hope you will examine the draft and submit it for critical study by the technical experts of your Ministry and your Government. After you and your experts have had opportunity to study it, you may wish to send one or more of your technical experts to Washington to give me your preliminary reaction to the draft proposal, and to discuss with our technical experts the feasibility of international monetary cooperation along the lines suggested therein, or along any other lines you may wish to suggest. We are informed that the technical experts of the British Government have also been studying the question and will doubtless make their views available.

It seems to me that the enclosed draft proposal points the way to an effective means of facilitating

through cooperative action the maintenance of international monetary stability and the restoration and balanced growth of international trade. It is my hope that as a result of unofficial discussions involving no commitments, we may find a sufficient area of agreement to warrant proceeding on a more formal basis.

Very truly yours,

HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.,
Secretary of the Treasury.

The countries to whose Finance Ministers the letters were addressed are the following:

Australia	Mexico
Belgium	Netherlands
Brazil	New Zealand
Canada	Nicaragua
China	Norway
Costa Rica	Panama
Cuba	Poland
Czechoslovakia	South Africa, Union of
Dominican Republic	Union of Soviet
El Salvador	Socialist Republics
Ethiopia	Yugoslavia
Great Britain	Bolivia
Greece	Colombia
Guatemala	Chile
Haiti	Ecuador
Honduras	Paraguay
India	Peru
Iraq	Uruguay
Luxembourg	Venezuela

MEMORANDUM

A Stabilization Fund
of the
United and Associated Nations

It is still too soon to know the precise form and magnitude of post-war monetary problems. But it is certain that we shall be confronted with the task of dealing with three inseparable monetary problems: to prevent the disruption of foreign exchanges, to avoid the collapse of some monetary systems, and to facilitate the restoration and balanced growth of international trade. Clearly, such a formidable task can be successfully handled only through international action.

The creation of instrumentalities adequate to deal with the inevitable post-war monetary problems should not be postponed until the end of hostilities. It would be ill-advised if not dangerous to leave ourselves unprepared at the end of the war for the difficult task of international monetary cooperation. We should begin now to devise an international monetary agency, for the task is certain to take many months at least. Specific and practical proposals must be formulated by the experts and must be carefully considered by the policy-shaping officials of the various countries. In each country acceptance of a definitive plan can follow only upon legislative or executive action. And even when a plan is finally adopted, much time will be consumed in gathering personnel and in establishing an organization before an international institution for monetary cooperation can begin effective work.

There is another important reason for initiating now concrete discussions of specific proposals. A plan for international monetary

cooperation can be a factor in winning the war. It has been suggested, and with much cogency, that the task of assuring the defeat of the Axis powers would be made easier if the victims of aggression, actual and potential, could have greater assurance that a victory of the United Nations will not mean in the economic sphere a repetition of the exchange instability and monetary collapse that followed the last war. That assurance should be given now. The people in all of the United Nations must be encouraged to feel themselves on solid ground. They must be given to understand that a victory of the United Nations will not usher in another two decades of widespread economic disruption. The people must know that we at last recognize the fundamental truth that prosperity, like peace, is indivisible.

One of the appropriate agencies to deal with international economic and monetary problems would be an international stabilization fund with resources and powers adequate to the task of helping to achieve monetary stability and to facilitate the restoration and balanced growth of international trade. A proposal drafted by American technical experts is appended. The draft presents only the essential elements of an international stabilization fund. The provisions of the proposal are in every sense tentative, intended as a basis for discussion and exchange of views. Obviously, there are many details that have been omitted and that can be better formulated after there is agreement on the general principles.

It is recognized that an international stabilization fund is only one of the instrumentalities which may be needed in the field of international economic cooperation. Other agencies are also needed to provide capital

for post-war reconstruction and development, to provide funds for rehabilitation and relief, and to promote stability in the prices of primary international commodities. There is a strong temptation to embrace within a single international agency the responsibility for dealing with these and other international economic problems. We believe, however, that international economic institutions can operate more effectively if they are not burdened with important but extraneous duties for which they have not been devised and for which they are unsuited. For example, the highly specialized nature of international monetary stabilization and the provision of long-term capital would seem to call for separate institutions each designed to deal with its distinct problems.

It should be emphasized that the appended draft deals only with an international stabilization fund. It is anticipated that there will also be submitted for consideration a preliminary draft of a proposal for an international agency whose function will be to provide capital for reconstruction and development. It is hoped that the appended draft will call forth from the experts of the United Nations, critical comment and constructive suggestions. It is our belief that a workable and acceptable plan can emerge only from the joint efforts of the United Nations.

Washington, D. C.
January, 1943.

U.S. Treasury Department

Preliminary Draft Outline of
Proposal for a United and Associated Nations
Stabilization Fund

I. Purposes of the Fund

1. To stabilize the foreign exchange rates of the currencies of the United Nations and nations associated with them.
2. To shorten the periods and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of member countries.
3. To help create conditions under which the smooth flow of foreign trade and of productive capital among the member countries will be fostered.
4. To facilitate the effective utilization of the abnormal foreign balances accumulating in some countries as a consequence of the war situation.
5. To reduce the use of foreign exchange controls that interfere with world trade and the international flow of productive capital.
6. To help eliminate bilateral exchange clearing arrangements, multiple currency devices, and discriminatory foreign exchange practices.

II. Composition of the Fund

1. The Fund shall consist of gold, currencies of member countries, and securities of member governments.
2. Each of the member countries shall subscribe a specified amount which will be called its quota. The aggregate of quotas of the member countries shall be the equivalent of at least \$5 billion.

The quota for each member country shall be determined by an agreed upon formula. The formula should give due weight to the important factors relevant to the determination of quotas, e.g., a country's holdings of gold and foreign exchange, the magnitude of the fluctuations in its balance of international payments, and its national income.

3. Each member country shall provide the Fund with 50 percent of its quota on or before the date set by the Board of Directors of the Fund on which the Fund's operations are to begin.

4. The initial payment of each member country (consisting of 50 percent of its quota) shall be 12.5 percent of its quota in gold, 12.5 percent in local currency, and 25 percent in its own (i.e., government) securities. However, any country having less than \$300 million in gold need provide initially only 7.5 percent of its quota in gold, and any country having less than \$100 million in gold need provide initially only 5 percent of its quota in gold, the contributions of local currency being increased correspondingly. A country may, at its option, substitute gold for its local currency or securities in meeting its quota requirement.
5. The member countries of the Fund may be called upon to make further provision toward meeting their quotas pro rata at such times, in such amounts, and in such form as the Board of Directors of the Fund may determine, provided that the proportion of gold called for shall not exceed the proportions indicated in II-4 above, and provided that a four-fifths vote of the Board shall be required for subsequent calls to meet quotas.
6. Any changes in the quotas of member countries shall be made only with the approval of a four-fifths vote of the Board.

III. Powers and Operations

The Fund shall have the following powers:

1. To buy, sell, and hold gold, currencies, bills of exchange, and government securities of member countries; to accept deposits and to earmark gold; to issue its own obligations, and to discount or offer them for sale in member countries; and to act as a clearing house for the settling of international movements of balances, bills of exchange, and gold.

All member countries agree that all of the local currency holdings shall be free from any restrictions as to their use. This provision does not apply to abnormal war balances acquired in accordance with the provisions of III-9, below.

2. To fix the rates at which it will buy and sell one member's currency for another, and the rates in local currencies at which it will buy and sell gold. The guiding principle in the fixing of such rates shall be stability in exchange relationships. Changes in these rates shall be considered only when essential to

correction of a fundamental disequilibrium and be permitted only with the approval of four-fifths of member votes.

3. To sell to the Treasury of any member country (or stabilization fund or central bank acting as its agent) at a rate of exchange determined by the Fund, currency of any member country which the Fund holds, provided that:
 - a. The foreign exchange demanded from the Fund is required to meet an adverse balance of payments on current account with the country whose currency is being demanded.
 - b. The Fund's holdings of the currency of any member country shall not exceed during the first year of the operation of the Fund, the quota of that country; it shall not exceed during the first two years 150 percent of such quota; and thereafter it shall not exceed 200 percent of such quota; except that upon approval by four-fifths of the member votes, the Fund may purchase any local currency in excess of these limits, provided that at least one of the following two conditions is met:
 - i. The country whose currency is being acquired by the Fund agrees to adopt and carry out measures recommended by the Fund designed to correct the disequilibrium in the country's balance of payments, or
 - ii. It is believed that the balance of payments of the country whose currency is being acquired by the Fund will be such as to warrant the expectation that the excess currency holdings of the Fund can be disposed of within a reasonable time.
 - c. When the Fund's net holdings of any local currency exceed the quota for that country, the country shall deposit with the Fund a special reserve in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board of Directors. This provision does not apply to currencies acquired under III-9 below.
 - d. When a member country is exhausting its quota more rapidly than is warranted in the judgment of the Board of Directors, the Board may place such conditions upon additional sales of foreign exchange to that country as it deems to be in the general interest of the Fund.

- e. A charge at the rate of 1 percent per annum, payable in gold, shall be levied against any member country on the amount of its currency held by the Fund in excess of the quota of that country. Abnormal war balances acquired by the Fund (in accordance with III-9 below) shall not be included in the computed balance of local currency used as a basis for this charge.
 - f. When the Fund's holdings of the local currency of a member country exceed the quota of that country, upon request by the member country, the Fund shall resell to the member country the Fund's excess holdings of the currency of that country for gold or acceptable foreign exchange.
- 4. The right of a member country to purchase foreign exchange from the Fund with its local currency for the purpose of meeting an adverse balance of payments on current account is recognized only to the extent of its quota, subject to the limitation in III-3 above and III-7 below.
 - 5. With the approval of four-fifths of the member votes, the Fund in exceptional circumstances may sell foreign exchange to a member country to facilitate transfer of capital, or repayment or adjustment of foreign debts, when in the judgment of the Board such a transfer is desirable from the point of view of the general international economic situation.
 - 6. When the Fund's holdings of any particular currency drop below 15 percent of the quota of that country, and after the Fund has used for additional purchases of that currency,
 - (a) Gold in an amount equal to the country's contribution of gold to the Fund, and
 - (b) The country's obligations originally contributed,

the Fund has the authority and the duty to render to the country a report embodying an analysis of the causes of the depletion of its holdings of that currency, a forecast of the prospective balance of payments in the absence of special measures, and finally, recommendations designed to increase the Fund's holdings of that currency. The Board member of the country in question should be a member of the Fund committee appointed to draft the report. This report should be sent to all member countries and, if deemed desirable, made public.

Member countries agree that they will give immediate and careful attention to recommendations made by the Fund.

7. Whenever it becomes evident to the Board of Directors that the anticipated demand for any particular currency may soon exhaust the Fund's holdings of that currency, the Board of Directors of the Fund shall inform the member countries of the probable supply of this currency and of a proposed method for its equitable distribution, together with suggestions for helping to equate the anticipated demand and supply for the currency.

The Fund shall make every effort to increase the supply of the scarce currency by acquiring that currency from the foreign balances of member countries. The Fund may make special arrangements with any member country for the purpose of providing an emergency supply under appropriate conditions which are acceptable to both the Fund and the member country.

The privilege of any country to acquire an amount of other currencies equal to or in excess of its quota shall be limited by the necessity of assuring an appropriate distribution among the various members of any currency the supply of which is being exhausted. The Fund shall apportion its sales of such scarce currency. In such apportionment, it shall be guided by the principle of satisfying the most urgent needs from the point of view of the general international economic situation. It shall also consider the special needs and resources of the particular countries making the request for the scarce currency.

8. In order to promote the most effective use of the available and accumulating supply of foreign exchange resources of member countries, each member country agrees that it will offer to sell to the Fund, for its local currency or for foreign currencies which it needs, all foreign exchange and gold it acquires in excess of the amount it possessed immediately after joining the Fund. For the purpose of this provision, including computations, only free foreign exchange and gold are considered. The Fund may accept or reject the offer.

To help achieve this objective each member country agrees to discourage the unnecessary accumulation of foreign balances by its nationals. The Fund shall inform any member country when, in its opinion, any further growth of privately-held foreign balances appears unwarranted.

9. To buy from the governments of member countries, abnormal war balances held in other countries, provided all the following conditions are met:
- a. The abnormal war balances are in member countries and are reported as such (for the purpose of this provision) by the member government on date of its becoming a member.
 - b. The country selling the abnormal war balances to the Fund agrees to transfer these balances to the Fund and to repurchase from the Fund 40 percent of them (at the same price) with gold or such free currencies as the Fund may wish to accept, at the rate of 2 percent of the transferred balances each year for 20 years beginning not later than 3 years after the date of transfer.
 - c. The country in which the abnormal war balances are held agrees to the transfer to the Fund of the balances described in (b) above, and to repurchase from the Fund 40 percent of them (at the same price) with gold or such currencies as the Fund may wish to accept, at the rate of 2 percent of the transferred balances each year for 20 years beginning not later than 3 years after the date of transfer.
 - d. A charge of 1 percent, payable in gold, shall be levied against the country selling its abnormal war balances and against the country in which the balances are held. In addition a charge of 1 percent, payable in gold, shall be levied annually against them on the amount of such balances remaining to be repurchased by each country.
 - e. If the country selling abnormal war balances to the Fund asks for foreign exchange rather than local currency, the request will not be granted unless the country needs the foreign exchange for the purpose of meeting an adverse balance of payments not arising from the acquisition of gold, the accumulation of foreign balances, or other capital transactions.
 - f. Either country may, at its option, increase the amount it repurchases annually. But, in the case of the country selling abnormal war balances to the Fund, not more than 2 percent per annum of the original sum taken over by the Fund shall become free, and only after 3 years shall have elapsed since the sale of the balances to the Fund.

- g. The Fund has the privilege of disposing of any of its holdings of abnormal war balances as free funds after the 23 year period is passed, or sooner under the following conditions:
 - i. its holdings of the free funds of the country in which the balances are held fall below 15 percent of its quota; or
 - ii. the approval is obtained of the country in which the balances are held.
- h. The country in which the abnormal war balances are held agrees not to impose any restrictions on the use of the installments of the 40 percent portion gradually repurchased by the country which sold the balances to the Fund.
- i. The Fund agrees not to sell the abnormal war balances acquired under the above authority, except with the permission or at the request of the country in which the balances are being held. The Fund may invest these balances in ordinary or special government securities of that country. The Fund shall be free to sell such securities in any country provided that the approval of the issuing government is first obtained.
- j. The Fund shall determine from time to time what shall be the maximum proportion of the abnormal war balances it will purchase under this provision.

Abnormal war balances acquired under this provision shall not be included in computing the amount of foreign exchange available to member countries under their quotas.
- 10. To buy and sell currencies of non-member countries, but shall not be authorized to hold such currencies beyond sixty days after date of purchase, except with the approval of four-fifths of the member votes.
- 11. To borrow the currency of any member country, provided four-fifths of the member votes approve the terms of such borrowing.
- 12. To sell member-country obligations owned by the Fund provided that the Board representative of the country in which the securities are to be sold approves.

To use its holdings to obtain rediscounts or advances from the central bank of any country whose currency the Fund requires.

13. To invest any of its currency holdings in government securities and prime commercial paper of the country of that currency provided four-fifths of the member votes approve, and provided further that the Board representative of the country in which the investment is to be made approves.
14. To lend to any member country its local currency from the Fund for one year or less up to 75 percent of the currency of that country held by the Fund, provided such loan is approved by four-fifths of the member votes.
15. To levy upon member countries a pro rata share of the expenses of operating the Fund, payable in local currency, not to exceed 1/10 percent per annum of the quota of each country. The levy may be made only to the extent that the earnings of the Fund are inadequate to meet its current expenses, and only with the approval of four-fifths of the member votes.

The Fund shall make a service charge of 1/4 percent or more on all exchange and gold transactions.

16. The Fund shall deal only with or through
 - a. The treasuries, stabilization funds, or fiscal agents of member governments;
 - b. The central banks, only with the consent of the member of the Board representing the country in question; and
 - c. Any international banks owned predominantly by member governments.

The Fund may, nevertheless, with the approval of the member of the Board representing the government of the country concerned, sell its own securities, or securities it holds, directly to the public or to institutions of member countries.

IV. Monetary Unit of the Fund

1. The monetary unit of the Fund shall be the Unitas (UW) consisting of 137 1/7 grains of fine gold (equivalent to \$10 U.S.). The accounts of the Fund shall be kept and published in terms of Unitas.

2. The value of the currency of each member country shall be fixed by the Fund in terms of gold or Unitas and may not be altered by any member country without the approval of four-fifths of the member votes.
3. Deposits in terms of Unitas may be accepted by the Fund from member countries upon the delivery of gold to the Fund and shall be transferable and redeemable in gold or in the currency of any member country at the rate established by the Fund. The Fund shall maintain a 100 percent reserve in gold against all Unitas deposits.
4. No change in the value of the currencies of member countries shall be permitted to alter the value in gold or Unitas of the assets of the Fund. Thus if the Fund approves a reduction in the value of the currency of a member country (in terms of gold or Unitas) or if, in the opinion of the Board, the currency of a member country has depreciated to a significant extent, that country must deliver to the Fund when requested an amount of its local currency equal to the decreased value of that currency held by the Fund. Likewise, if the currency of a particular country should appreciate, the Fund must return to that country an amount (in the currency of that country) equal to the resulting increase in the gold or Unitas value of the Fund's holdings. The same provisions shall also apply to the government securities of member countries held by the Fund. However, this provision shall not apply to currencies acquired under III-9 (abnormal war balances).

V. Management

1. The administration of the Fund shall be vested in a Board of Directors. Each government shall appoint a director and an alternate, in a manner determined by it, who shall serve for a period of three years subject to the pleasure of their government. Directors and alternates may be reappointed.

In all voting by the Board, the director or alternate of each member country shall be entitled to cast an agreed upon number of votes. The distribution of voting power shall be closely related to the quotas of member countries, although not in precise proportion to the quotas. An appropriate distribution of voting power would seem to be the following: Each country shall have 100 votes plus 1 vote for the equivalent of each 100,000 Unitas (\$1 million) of its quota.

Notwithstanding the approved formula for distributing voting power, no country shall be entitled to cast more than one-fourth of the aggregate votes regardless of its quota. All decisions, except where specifically provided otherwise, shall be made by a majority of the member votes.

2. The Board of Directors shall select a Managing Director of the Fund and one or more assistants. The Managing Director shall become an ex officio member of the Board and shall be chief of the operating staff of the Fund. The Managing Director and the assistants shall hold office for two years, shall be eligible for reelection, and may be removed for cause at any time by the Board.

The Managing Director of the Fund shall select the operating staff in accordance with regulations established by the Board of Directors. Members of the staff may be made available, upon request of member countries, for consultation in connection with international economic problems and policies.

3. The Board of Directors shall appoint from among its members an Executive Committee to consist of not less than eleven members. The Chairman of the Board shall be Chairman of the Executive Committee, and the Managing Director of the Fund shall be an ex officio member of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee shall be continuously available at the head office of the Fund and shall exercise the authority delegated to it by the Board. In the absence of any member of the Executive Committee, his alternate shall act in his place. Members of the Executive Committee shall receive appropriate remuneration.

4. The Board of Directors may appoint such other committees as it finds necessary for the work of the Fund. It may also appoint advisory committees chosen wholly or partially from persons not employed by the Fund.
5. The Board of Directors may at any meeting, by a four-fifths vote, authorize any officers or committees of the Fund to exercise any specified powers of the Board. The Board may not delegate, except to the Executive Committee, any authority which can be exercised only by a four-fifths vote.

Delegated powers shall be exercised only until the next meeting of the Board, and in a manner consistent with the general policies and practices of the Board.

6. The Board of Directors may establish procedural regulations governing the operations of the Fund. The officers and committees of the Fund shall be bound by such regulations.
7. The Board of Directors shall hold an annual meeting and such other meetings as it may be desirable to convene. On request of member countries casting one-fourth of the votes, the chairman shall call a meeting of the Board for the purpose of considering any matters placed before it.
8. A country failing to meet its obligations to the Fund may be suspended provided a majority of the member votes so decides. While under suspension, the country shall be denied the privileges of membership but shall be subject to the same obligations as any other member of the Fund. At the end of two years the country shall be automatically dropped from membership unless it has been restored to good standing by a majority of the member votes.

Any country may withdraw from the Fund by giving notice, and its withdrawal will take effect two years from the date of such notice. During the interval between notice of withdrawal and the taking effect of the notice, such country shall be subject to the same obligations as any other member of the Fund.

A country which is dropped or which withdraws from membership shall have returned to it an amount in its own currency equal to its contributed quota, plus other obligations of the Fund to the country, and minus any sum owed by that country to the Fund. Any losses of the Fund may be deducted pro rata from the contributed quota to be returned to the country that has been dropped or has withdrawn from membership. The Fund shall have five years in which to liquidate its obligation to such a country. When any country is dropped or withdraws from the Fund, the rights of the Fund shall be fully safeguarded.

9. Net profits earned by the Fund shall be distributed in the following manner:
 - a. 50 percent to reserves until the reserves are equal to 10 percent of the aggregate quotas of the Fund.
 - b. 50 percent to be divided each year among the members in proportion to their quotas. Dividends distributed to each country shall be paid in its own currency or in Unitas at the discretion of the Fund.

VI. Policies of Member Countries

Each member country of the Fund undertakes the following:

1. To maintain by appropriate action exchange rates established by the Fund on the currencies of other countries, and not to alter exchange rates except with the consent of the Fund and only to the extent and in the direction approved by the Fund. Exchange rates of member countries may be permitted to fluctuate within a specified range fixed by the Fund.
2. To abandon, as soon as the member country decides that conditions permit, all restrictions and controls over foreign exchange transactions (other than those involving capital transfers) with other member countries, and not to impose any additional restrictions without the approval of the Fund.

The Fund may make representations to member countries that conditions are favorable for the abandonment of restrictions and controls over foreign exchange transactions, and each member country shall give consideration to such representations.

3. To cooperate effectively with other member countries when such countries, with the approval of the Fund, adopt or continue controls for the purpose of regulating international movements of capital. Cooperation shall include, upon recommendation by the Fund, measures that can appropriately be taken:
 - a. Not to accept or permit acquisition of deposits, securities, or investments by nationals of any member country imposing restrictions on the export of capital except with the permission of the Government of that country and the Fund;

- b. To make available to the Fund or to the Government of any member country full information on all property in the form of deposits, securities and investments of the nationals of that member country; and
 - c. Such other measures as the Fund shall recommend.
4. Not to enter upon any new bilateral foreign exchange clearing arrangements, nor engage in multiple currency practices, except with the approval of the Fund.
 5. To give consideration to the views of the Fund on any existing or proposed monetary or economic policy, the effect of which would be to bring about sooner or later a serious disequilibrium in the balance of payments of other countries.
 6. To furnish the Fund with all information it needs for its operations and to furnish such reports as it may require in the form and at the times requested by the Fund.
 7. To adopt appropriate legislation or decrees to carry out its undertakings to the Fund and to facilitate the activities of the Fund.

Statement of Secretary Morgenthau
before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and
Banking and Currency and the Special Committee on
Post-War Economic Policy and Planning

Monday, April 5, 1943

For some time we in the Treasury have been deeply concerned with the threat of international monetary chaos at the end of this war.

We feel that international currency stability is essential to reconstruction in the post-war period and to the resumption of private trade and finance. It is generally held that this formidable task can be successfully handled only through international cooperation.

I think further that most of us would agree that the establishment of a program adequate to deal with the inevitable post-war monetary problems should not be postponed until the end of hostilities. It would be ill-advised, if not dangerous, to be unprepared for the difficult task of international monetary cooperation when the war ends. No one knows how long or how short the war will be. We therefore believe it is desirable to begin now to devise an international monetary agency adequate to cope with the problems with which we shall be confronted when the war does end.

The completion of such a task is certain to take many months at the least. Specific and practical proposals must be formulated and must be carefully considered by the policy-shaping officials of the various countries. In each country acceptance of a definitive plan can follow only upon legislative or executive action. And even when a plan is finally adopted, much time will be consumed in establishing an organization capable of beginning effective work.

There is another important reason for dealing with this problem now. A plan for international monetary cooperation can be a factor in winning the war. It has been suggested, and with much cogency, that the task of assuring the defeat of the Axis powers would be made easier if the victims of aggression, actual and potential, could have greater assurance that a victory of the United Nations will not mean in the economic sphere a repetition of the exchange instability and monetary collapse that followed the last war. That assurance should be given now. The people in all of the United Nations must be encouraged to feel themselves on solid ground. They must be given to understand that a victory of the United Nations will not usher in another two decades of widespread economic disruption. The people must know that we at last recognize the fundamental truth that prosperity, like peace, is indivisible.

With these points in mind the technical experts of the Treasury and other agencies of the Government for some time have been studying methods by which post-war monetary stability can be achieved. No specific plan has as yet been considered by this Government, but preliminary suggestions of our technical experts have been formulated and have been made available for exploratory study of the experts of other interested Governments. The technical men of other Governments have likewise been studying the problem.

Our own thinking along the lines of currency stability has not been addressed to concocting some panacea that will automatically cure all the economic ailments of a post-war world. Rather, we have attempted to address ourselves to the specific problem of foreign exchange stability and the common-sense way of achieving this end.

Our views are based on the rich experience that this country has had in cooperating with other Governments in our attempts to maintain exchange stability. We have tried to adapt that experience to the broader and more difficult currency problems confronting the world during the post-war years. We have also kept in mind the pattern laid down by the Tripartite Agreement and our own stabilization agreements.

Our tentative proposal is to establish an international stabilization fund in which all the United Nations and those nations which are associated with them in this war would participate. This Fund would constitute an international agency with powers and resources adequate to promote the maintenance of currency stability. The cooperating Governments who would participate in the program would, among other things, undertake not to engage in competitive depreciation of their currencies. This stability would be in large measure secured by fixing the value of currencies in terms of gold, and by providing that changes could not be made without consultation with other members.

The resources of the Fund that we have in mind would be provided by the participating governments in an amount and form suited to each nation. Participation would be in the form of gold and local currency and public obligations of the member countries. The operations of the Fund would include buying and selling of foreign exchange under adequate safeguards.

The Fund would deal only with Treasuries and central banks. It would not compete with private banks or existing agencies. Its operations would be maintained only to supplement the efforts made by each member government to maintain monetary stability. The established channels of international trade and international banking would be retained in full for all international transactions.

We have given special attention to the solution of certain troublesome monetary problems growing out of the war and have included suggestions for the handling of such problems. In particular, the Fund would facilitate the restoration of free exchange markets and liberate the abnormal balances which have accumulated in some of the countries as a consequence of war conditions.

The control of the operations of the Fund would be in the hands of an international board appointed by the governments of the member countries and the voting power on that board would be related to the contribution which each country makes to the required revolving fund.

The creation of an international agency of the character that we are contemplating is a logical development of the various tentative steps which have been made in the direction of stabilization of currencies during the immediate pre-war years.

I have been anxious to discuss this matter with you and to keep you informed of developments. Obviously, we are still in the early stages of our thinking and discussions. However, I did want you to know what we are doing and I do want to feel free to come back from time to time and discuss the subject with you and obtain your views and advice.

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(Prepared by Press Relations for use of the Press)

The Stabilization of Exchange Rates: The purpose of the proposed Stabilization Fund is to stabilize the value of the currencies of member countries. The Fund would fix the rates at which it will buy and sell member currencies. Changes in exchange rates could be made only with the approval of the Fund and only to meet an extreme situation. Because changes in exchange rates would be the result of international consultation, competitive currency depreciation among the member countries would be prevented.

Resources of the Fund: To achieve this desired currency stability the Fund would, with adequate safeguards, meet the legitimate needs of member countries for foreign exchange for their current transactions. For this purpose, member countries would subscribe at least \$5 billion, making initial payments of one-half of the subscription in the form of gold, currency and government securities. Each country's subscription would be based on a combination of such factors as its holdings of gold and foreign exchange, its national income, and changes in its balance of payments position.

Removal of Exchange Controls: With these provisions, the need for continuance of exchange control by individual countries would be almost entirely removed. No member country could adopt new exchange control measures except to curb undesirable capital movements and then only with the consent of the Fund. Multiple currency devices and bilateral exchange clearing arrangements would also be prohibited unless approved by the Fund. The Fund would make possible the liberation of blocked balances growing out of the war where immediate unblocking of such balances would cause serious domestic and international repercussions.

Powers of the Fund: The Fund would be given the power to buy and sell gold, currencies and, with their approval, securities of member countries. The Fund could also borrow local currency with the approval of the governments concerned. The Fund would deal only with the treasuries, central banks, or fiscal agents of member countries, and with international banks owned predominantly by member countries.

New International Unit: The proposal provides for an international gold monetary unit called the Unitas, equal in value to \$10, in terms of which accounts of the Fund would be kept. The Fund would not issue Unitas coins or notes, but member countries could deposit gold with the Fund for a credit in Unitas, redeemable in gold, which could be transferred between member countries.

Management of the Fund: The Fund would be managed by a Board of Directors representing the member governments. Each country would have voting power related to its subscription to the Fund, but no country could have more than 25 percent of the total votes. In general, the decisions of the Board of Directors would be made by a majority vote except for certain important operations where a four-fifths vote would be necessary. The day-to-day operations would be carried on by a Managing Director and an Executive Committee appointed by the Board.