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To the Editor of The Times

The editorial in The Times of March 16 dealing with the Boothby letters is inaccurate and unfair.

The facts are simple. Mr. Boothby, a member of Parliament but not an official of the British Government, has come on a personal visit to this country at a time when our Congress is considering the Bretton Woods Agreements. Mr. Boothby wrote a letter to the New York Times alleging four obscurities which he insists should be cleared up before this Government acts on the Bretton Woods Agreements.

The officials of this Government quite properly made no reply in The Times to Mr. Boothby's letter. On March 14, The Times published another letter from Mr. Boothby reiterating his view that there are obscurities in the Bretton Woods Agreements.

The editors of The Times must be aware that such unauthorized actions as Mr. Boothby's letters, if they were allowed to become the basis for a private controversy with our Government, could do untold harm in all of our relations with other Governments. The officials of this Government have shown great restraint in avoiding any statement which could in any way disturb the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. They have, however, answered Mr. Boothby's questions when they were asked at a Congressional hearing.

Obviously, it is an important part of Mr. Boothby's design to leave the impression that he is a strong advocate of international monetary cooperation but that he is troubled by obscurities in the Fund.

The Times has lent itself to this design by inaccurately describing Mr. Boothby's position. In an editorial note to the first letter, Mr. Boothby was said to be a member of the British Delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference. I presume that you now know that he was not although no correction was made for your readers. In an editorial note to the second letter Mr. Boothby was said to be "chairman of the Monetary Policy Committee in London which includes members of Parliament of all parties." Whether or not so intended, this description clearly leaves the impression that Mr. Boothby is head of a Parliamentary Committee on monetary policy. The fact is that Mr. Boothby's Committee has no official standing whatsoever and is not authorized to talk for the British Government.

When these same questions were asked by a Congressional Committee we felt it necessary to make clear what Mr. Boothby's position really is. We did so with a dignity and restraint that neither Mr. Boothby nor The Times has shown on this matter. The record reads:

A. "It is our understanding he (Mr. Boothby) is a member of Parliament, a very able man, who, I understand, is one of the leaders of the opposition to the proposal. I am not in a position to know, but it may be that his opposition springs from the fact that there is a misunderstanding. It may well be that he saw fit to come to the United States just at this point in order to clear up that misunderstanding. But, if so, he did not come to the place where he could have had it cleared

up, which was either the State Department or the Treasury, or the Federal Reserve Board. Nor, to my knowledge, did he go to the Treasury in Britain, though he might have done so. What he did was to write a letter to the New York Times."

Q. "What is the Committee that he is Chairman of, over there?"

A. "He is a member of an informal committee including members of Parliament who are interested in monetary questions. So far as I know, it has no legal status."

Q. "I understand he was chairman of some committee."

A. "Yes, sir, of an informal committee which is interested in monetary questions. It is not a committee of Parliament. So far as I understand, he has been against these proposals before the Bretton Woods document was drafted, and his opposition is founded very largely on a belief that Britain should undertake any kind of bilateral discriminatory arrangements that it finds convenient at any time."

Surely, this is a fair way to speak in Congress of Mr. Boothby who has shown no restraint in discussing the attitude of this country toward international monetary cooperation. Compare what we said with this statement over Mr. Boothby's signature in a London newspaper:

"It was American Big Business, not the United Nations, which won the great victory at Bretton Woods. For that agreement was a victory of gold over goods. And practically all the gold in the world is at present buried in the vaults of American Banks.

"If the House of Commons accepted Mr. Morgenthau's advice and ratified the Bretton Woods Agreement, it would deliver this country, bound hand and foot, to the money power represented by the vested interests of international finance."

Compare what we said with Mr. Boothby's statement in Parliament:

"A fixed link to gold would mean our total submission to the economic power of the United States -- it would mean selling out to America. Private individuals in the United States would ultimately own all our industries if we accepted the views of the Bretton Woods experts."

What can be the justification for saying in your editorial:

"Treasury spokesmen, discussing Mr. Boothby's contentions before the House Banking and Currency Committee, do not appear to have dealt with them very satisfactorily. They questioned Mr. Boothby's motives and his purpose in being in this country at this time. Such personal considerations do not meet the real issue, which is, Do the obscurities and ambiguities which Mr. Boothby alleges to be in the Bretton Woods agreement in fact exist?"

The fact is that officials of the Treasury replied directly to the four questions in Mr. Boothby's letter. The replies as taken from the record of the hearings is as follows:

A. "Thank you. The question is, first of all, "Does it or does it not mean that the participating countries must apply the principle of nondiscrimination to international trade?" The answer to that question, it seems to me, is this:

Insofar as discrimination is applied through currency devices, it is clearly forbidden.

"For example, it would not be possible for Britain to allow purchasers of British goods a specially favored rate for sterling. It would not be possible under this agreement. There may be some types of trade arrangements, through quotas, by which Britain might be able to allow more imports from, say, Argentina than from some other country. But I should point out that our own reciprocal trade agreement with Britain takes care of discriminations on trading.

"Question two: 'Does it put an end to the sterling area?' The sterling area right now means two important things.

"The first thing the sterling area means is this: Countries having close trade relations with Britain, and with other countries in the British Empire, find it very convenient to carry large balances of sterling. That was true before the war, just as many American Republics carried balances of dollars in the United States. There is nothing in the agreement that prevents a country from voluntarily carrying balances in London in sterling if it so wishes.

"That is one aspect. There is, in the agreement, provision which forbids the use of compulsion to keep new sterling balances after the transition. If a country exports more to Britain than it buys from

Britain, Britain cannot compel it to keep a sterling balance by blocking the proceeds of its current exports.

"But now, during wartime, the sterling area has taken on one additional aspect. That is purely a wartime concept, which the British have announced that they will terminate after the war.

"That is the so-called dollar pool. In order to allow the British Empire to carry on its war with the greatest effect, all members of the British Empire, except Canada, which is not a part of the sterling area, agreed to pool their dollar resources and to have them allocated where they will be most useful for the war.

"A dollar pool would be discriminatory after the war, because it might compel some countries to restrict their purchases of goods from the United States, even though dollars accrued to them, and it would be out under the Fund agreement.

"The third question is, 'It is widely assumed that the proposed Fund will insure stability of exchange rates, apart from certain clearly defined exceptions. But is this assumption justified? Article IV, Section 4 (a) states: 'Each member undertakes to collaborate with the fund to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, and to avoid competitive exchange alterations.'

"Does this mean each member undertakes to maintain its currency at the agreed par value with gold or United States dollars, and thereby with each other currency? If it does mean this, it would have been easy to say so — although it would then have been less easy to persuade the British public that the scheme does not involve a return to the gold standard.'

"May I rephrase the question? Does the Agreement mean that every country that is a member of the Fund agrees to keep its currency, the foreign exchange value of its currency, at a par with the United States dollar or with gold, allowing one percent above and below the parity for the ordinary market fluctuations. The answer to that question is very distinctly yes. A country, when its parity is fixed, agrees that it will keep the value of that currency within one percent above or below that parity, unless the parity is changed in accordance with the provisions of the Fund.

"The next question: 'Does that represent the gold standard?' It depends entirely upon what is meant by the gold standard.

"If they mean by the gold standard the keeping of exchange rates within a narrow range around the parity, unless the parity is changed, the answer is that the agreement does mean stable exchange rates within one percent above and below the parity, until and unless the parity is changed in accordance with the provisions of the Fund.

"If they mean by the gold standard, one of a number of other tests, that a country cannot, for example, issue additional currency unless they keep certain gold reserves, then in this respect the Agreement does not compel a country to relate the quantity of its currency to its gold reserves.

"One final point now. He says, 'Article VIII (4) requires each member country to buy balances of its currency held by another member country (presumably at par) if these balances have arisen through current transactions, but not if they have arisen through capital transactions. Article VI permits, but does not enjoin, control of capital movements and definitely

prohibits the use of the Fund's resources to meet a capital outflow from a member country.

'Suppose a country has, simultaneously, a capital outflow, and a deficit on income account. She is not allowed to use the Fund to check the former. She is apparently obliged to use the Fund up to the limit of her quota to prevent any depreciation of her currency caused by the latter, although, under Article V (8), she may be subjected to penal charges for doing so. What, precisely, are her obligations in this situation? It is one that is not unlikely to arise.'

May I rephrase the question in simple terms? Here is a country that has a capital outflow. That is to say, its own citizens are sending their balances abroad into foreign countries, or people abroad are withdrawing their balances; or loans are being made abroad. Any one of those cases. The other part of the question concerns a deficit on current account, that is to say, in payment for imports, services, income from investments and similar transactions. Suppose the two are going on simultaneously. What are the obligations of a country? The answer, it seems to me, would be approximately as follows:

So far as the country wants to use the Fund to meet its current deficit, if the Directors of the Fund agree that the meeting of that current deficit in those reasonable amounts are conducive to carrying out the purposes of the Fund -- stability of exchange rates and other purposes -- the country can do so.

If it is simultaneously having a capital outflow, if it is very small, the Executive Directors might take the attitude that the small outflow



is insignificant and that no steps need be taken to stop it.

If the capital outflow is large and sustained, the Executive Directors might well take the view, which would be in accordance with the provisions of the Fund, that such a large capital outflow would weaken the position of the country in its efforts to maintain the value of its currency stable, and that it is contrary to the purposes of the Fund for a country like that, to be weakening its position, with respect to its obligation to keep its currency stable while it is using the Fund to allow too large an outflow of capital.

It would depend, then, Mr. Crawford, on the magnitude of the outflow, on the current deficit, and on the fundamental question of whether a capital outflow will undermine the country's position in keeping its currency stable.

"The Fund is not intended to provide resources to support an untenable exchange rate. If this capital outflow has that effect, the Fund would not permit it."

These are the facts on the obscurities and ambiguities of which Mr. Boothby wrote. On this general point, a Treasury official told the House Committee:

"Clearly there should be a minimum of misunderstanding with respect to provisions. It is entirely possible that there are some provisions which may mean slightly different things to each of the forty countries, in the same way that there are provisions in our Constitution that apparently mean different things to various members of the Supreme Court, and to the Supreme Court at various times. That does not mean that the

Constitution was a bad document. The document was drafted, however, by a large number of lawyers, in addition to economists, and one of their objectives was to remove, as much as possible, the grounds for differences of opinion and interpretation. It was recognized fully, however, that there may be differences of interpretation, and there is a provision, in both the Fund and the Bank, to meet precisely those situations. We can refer to them later, if you like.

"After that introductory statement, I may say that there is no difference of opinion in interpretation with respect to the points that Mr. Boothby pointed out. There may be among some people in England, including Mr. Boothby. He may have some doubts. He cannot speak for England on that point, nor can he speak for the Delegation, that is the British Delegation that was there. He was not a member of the Delegation; he did not participate in the discussions which took place at Bretton Woods or the discussions before Bretton Woods, which were very lengthy.

"It may well be that Mr. Boothby is confused, but that is quite a different thing from assuming that there is a difference of interpretation on major points between the two governments."

Passionate opposition to the Bretton Woods agreements seems to have deprived the editors of their usual common sense in the matter of the Boothby letters. Here is the Times, the advocate of propriety in international behavior, vigorously criticizing the officials of the United States for avoiding a controversy with a private member of Parliament on an important international issue now under consideration by our Congress.