

Jan. 4, 1944

U.K.: Waley, ^{Cris} Grant (U.K. Treasury)

U.S.: ^{Luxford} White, ^{Beinstein} Stein, Lundgren
Snyder, Goldenweiss, Gordon
Kendall, Brown

3 (2) "Net" successfully guaranteed. British
much closer in their position, but will com-
municate with London.

4 (2)(c) agreed

(5) subject to 10(3)

(6) "direct or indirectly" added

(8) "as indicated by a required quarterly state-
ment" added — Waley suggested a period
of a year, but did not press his point.
The 75% provision is apparently accepted.

(7a) 50-50 provision agreed.

5 (1) British can't explain "still less a par".

6 (1) "examination of efforts" resisted on the
part of British politicians.

"approval of member countries central"
remains a point of disagreement.

British want to load over half of all
provisions including the 150%.

11 (i) "of 10 (3) above" apparently accepted.

The discussion leads to a suggestion that the introductory ^{section} should include a statement that the Fed is

^(opposed) part of a general program. Let ^{violently} any suggestion that Fed couldn't stand alone if necessary.

The Treasury re-writing of the rest of 11 appears to need acceptance, except that the British want a specific reference to exchange rates in the last paragraph.

United Version: Waley says London attitude increasing importance to it. Chances of obtaining a favorable decision from British Ministers and Parliament would be very much greater on the basis of the version. Bernstein replies that it might reduce British losses from 80 to 70, but their version might reduce ours from 51 to 40. Waley wonders if Lloyd would give 40% odds on our plan today!

"International Exchange Fund" wins favor as a compromise name, the Treasury would mind refer "stabilization".