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From: The Secretary  
Subject: **Review of the Role of Trade in the Work of the Fund**

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February 27, 2023

## REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF TRADE IN THE WORK OF THE FUND

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Open, stable, and transparent trade policies remain key for economic growth and resilience and for addressing key global challenges.** Open trade has been an essential part of the global policy agenda to bolster growth, allowing millions of people to raise their living standard and exit poverty. Diversification through trade is also crucial to improve macroeconomic resilience, as evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Large global gains remain to be derived from further trade reforms, including in services and environmental goods needed to combat climate change. Together with domestic policies to help share the gains more widely, open trade—while paying due attention to its possible adverse side effects—can promote balanced growth and support cooperation on other global priorities, such as climate change, food and health security, and poverty reduction.

**The deteriorating global trade landscape poses risks to the current levels of prosperity.** Trade tensions that have emerged in recent years have deep underlying causes. After rising sharply in the 1990s and early 2000s, the ratio of trade to GDP has been flat since about 2005. Following a stagnation of traditional trade reforms and limited take up of new opportunities in services and other emerging areas, trade restrictions, trade-distorting subsidies, and other distortive policy measures began to spread, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. More recently, the trade tensions between China and the United States, the COVID pandemic, and the war in Ukraine have accelerated these trends. A weakened multilateral trading system has been ill-equipped to address these challenges.

**The Fund's longstanding role in international trade and trade policy is deeply rooted.** Article I of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement specifies that one purpose of the IMF is "to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade...". The Fund fulfills its mandate primarily through analysis and policy advice in the context of its multilateral and bilateral surveillance, as well as in the context of preventing currency manipulation and the use of unapproved exchange restrictions. These surveillance activities are complemented by trade work related to lending and capacity development.

**Although the Fund has responded quickly to key trade developments in its multilateral surveillance, the review shows that attention to trade policy has declined and improved expertise is needed.**

Over the past two decades, there has been a significant decline in attention to trade policy even as the economic importance of trade issues rose, the pace of trade reforms slowed and then reversed, and the global trading system came under threat. Moreover, there have been persistent gaps in translating the lessons from multilateral surveillance into bilateral policy advice. Staff see the need to scale up its internal trade policy expertise to ensure that the Fund's work on trade remains central in policy areas of growing relevance (e.g., services and digital trade) and key sources of trade tensions (e.g., subsidies and climate change). The scale up of the Fund's trade expertise will be achieved via internal reprioritization.

**This review outlines an agenda to reinvigorate the role of the Fund in trade to help country authorities address the key trade-related challenges.**

These include addressing trade opportunities and risks associated with new technologies, promoting policy coherence between trade and non-trade objectives, and managing growing risks of geo-economic fragmentation. The Fund should bring its macroeconomic perspective to identify major trade-related developments and risks and to translate this analysis into policy advice tailored to different countries' needs, including on the domestic policies needed to share the gains from trade and technological progress more widely. This requires providing country teams with the tools and policy guidance they need to carry out their work effectively and efficiently. The Fund should continue to be a vocal advocate for open, stable, and transparent trade policies and a strong multilateral trade system that oversees these policies. Enhanced trade-related collaboration with other international organizations, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO), will be key to achieve these goals.

**To help implement the enhanced trade strategy, there is a need for greater attention to a number of key issues.**

First, core trade areas deserve continued attention, but would benefit from more granular analysis. For example, more attention to the spillover effects of trade and domestic policies could help to underpin improved international policy cooperation. Second, the Fund needs to further analyze "modern" trade areas such as services trade that have increasing macroeconomic ramifications. Regionally, more attention should be devoted to Africa, given its persistent trade-related challenges and potential for growth and reforms. Third, the Fund should not fall behind in its use of new data and tools. Trade work requires investment in more granular data (including firm-level data and trade policy data) and specific expertise.

Approved By  
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## Glossary

AB	Appellate Body (WTO)
AD	Anti-dumping
AEs	Advanced Economies
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Agreement
BCA	Border Carbon Adjustment
BoP	Balance of Payments
CD	Capacity Development
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease of 2019
CVD	Countervailing Duty
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
DDA	Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) (WTO)
EMs	Emerging Markets
EMDEs	Emerging Markets and Developing Economies
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G-20	Group of 20
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO)
GEF	Geo-Economic Fragmentation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GTA	Global Trade Alert
GVCs	Global Value Chains
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office (IMF)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMF IV	International Monetary Fund Institutional View
IMS	International Monetary System
ISD	Integrated Surveillance Decision
LICs	Low-Income Countries
MC-12	WTO 12th Ministerial Conference
MFN	Most Favored Nation
NTBs	Non-Tariff Barriers
NTM	Non-Tariff Measure
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
REO	Regional Economic Outlook
RTAs	Regional Trade Agreements

SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
STRI	Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (OECD)
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TFA	Trade Facilitation Agreement (WTO)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UFR	Use of Fund Resources
USMCA	United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
WEO	World Economic Outlook
WTO	World Trade Organization

## INTRODUCTION

**1. The Fund has a longstanding role in providing trade policy advice to its members through multilateral, regional, and bilateral surveillance.** The root of the IMF’s mandate primarily lies in Article I, which specifies that one purpose of the IMF is “to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade...” (see Background Paper, Section 1). Trade work is carried out in three broad areas: (i) surveillance, where the bulk of the work takes place, (ii) lending, and (iii) capacity development.

**2. While the underlying mandate has been constant throughout the Fund’s history, the level of attention and the type of issues addressed have evolved with changes in the global economy as well as staffing.** As the 2009 Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) Evaluation highlighted, trade work peaked in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, a slowdown in the pace of trade reform, an increase in protectionism, and risk of further reversals have been a drag on trade, productivity, and income growth (IMF, October 2016, WEO Chapter 2). Throughout the same period, the absolute number of IMF staff positions specifically focused on trade has declined by about three quarters (presently accounting for about 0.1 percent of staff), prompting the IEO to underscore the need to maintain a “critical mass” of trade policy expertise.

**3. This review follows the Board-endorsed recommendation by the IEO in 2009 to conduct periodic assessments of the Fund’s work on trade.** The last review took place in 2015, in which the Executive Board called for a work agenda to better embed trade in surveillance work, including by translating key implications of the global trade landscape into surveillance (IMF, 2015). The Board also called for tailoring coverage of trade issues in Fund surveillance to specific needs of individual countries and ensuring that the Fund’s approach to trade policies was evenhanded. At the same time, several Directors expressed reservations about a broader trade agenda that may have resource implications. The 2019 IEO Update called for (i) better translation of multilateral surveillance into bilateral policy advice; (ii) deepened cooperation with other trade-related international organizations; and (iii) greater attention to rapidly developing issues such as digitization and e-commerce (IEO, 2019) (see Box 1).<sup>1</sup>

**4. Implementation of these recommendations has been mixed.** Amid declining overall coverage of trade policy issues and limited resources, the focus has been on responding to major global developments (e.g., the trade war) (see Chapter 3). As a result, in most cases there has been little attention to proactive policy advice tailored to a country’s own reform needs and bilateral trade policy surveillance has been focused on systemic countries. Some forms of cooperation with the WTO have improved (in particular, joint policy analysis has demonstrated thought leadership and helped establish common views and perspectives), although there is further room to leverage synergies with the WTO and other international organizations (Chapter 4).

<sup>1</sup> The 2019 IEO Update did not include recommendations for the Executive Board’s endorsement.

**5. An overarching goal of this Review is to ensure that the Fund fulfils its mandate in this important area of work in line with changes in the world economy.** Beyond this broad goal, the current review has three specific objectives. First, to assess how the Fund’s work has promoted open, stable, and transparent trade. Second, to review and update policy advice on topical trade issues. Third, to engage the Board on a future trade agenda for the Fund in light of the changing trade and trade policy landscape.

**6. The review identifies three key trade-related challenges that the country authorities will face in the coming years.**

- **Climate change and technology.** Structural forces such as climate change and technology are poised to reshape global trade by altering comparative advantage and making some previously non-tradeable services tradeable. Resistance to shifting trade patterns could further erode support for open trade, underscoring the importance of domestic policies to adapt and to share the gains from trade and technological progress more widely.
- **Using trade to accomplish non-trade objectives.** This includes environment, inequality and inclusion, food security, public health, as well as national security concerns. Closer links between trade and other policy areas has increased the need for policy coordination, as governments need to cooperate to keep trade open and carefully assess the impact of their measures on economic and non-economic outcomes at home and abroad.
- **The intensification of geopolitical tensions.** Geopolitical tensions increase the risk of geo-economic fragmentation, introducing uncertainty, reducing economic efficiency, and distorting investment patterns and decisions (Aiyar and others, 2023). The WTO-based multilateral trading system was not designed to resist such pressures. For instance, the WTO has active monitoring and transparency functions, but, in contrast to the IMF surveillance function, does not provide policy advice. Mitigating risks from increased trade restrictiveness will require building awareness of the costs, voicing concerns, and promoting better policy choices.

**7. A reinvigorated trade strategy should bring macroeconomic perspectives to the trade challenges identified above and bring a “Fund” perspective to key global trade policy debates—including in the WTO.** The strategy should bring macroeconomic perspectives in a way that is selective and effective to best meet the Fund’s broad mandate on trade. While much of the work will remain decentralized across Fund departments, this more active engagement will require to scale up the internal trade policy expertise to support surveillance and other activities. Fund work on trade should continue to be carried out through three main channels:

- **Analysis and multilateral surveillance** should boost efforts to identify major trade-related developments and risks and provide the intellectual leadership and analytical underpinnings for Fund policy positions.

- The Fund should also redouble efforts to translate analysis and multilateral surveillance into **bilateral surveillance** and better integrate trade policy into broader macro-structural reforms at a time when these policies become more frequent and complex.
- **Trade-related collaboration** with other international organizations, especially with the WTO, should exploit synergies in critical areas such as addressing the risks of runaway geo-economic fragmentation.
- **To better tailor trade-related bilateral surveillance**, staff will provide additional support to country teams through policy guidance, data, and other tools.

**8. Fund members at all income levels should aim for greater trade openness in traditional and “new” trade areas and facilitate domestic adjustment to better share the benefits of trade, while protecting the vulnerable.** In addition:

- **For advanced economies**, priorities include avoiding trade fragmentation, further opening markets to products—especially those of export interest to low-income developing countries (LIDCs) and reducing barriers to services trade.
- **For emerging markets**, priorities include further liberalization of goods and services markets, including for products of export interest to LIDCs, and better integrating trade policy into the structural reform agenda.
- **Low-income countries** should complement openness with improved trade infrastructure, better economic institutions, and increased access to regional and global markets, including through the implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.<sup>2</sup>

**9. The remainder of the report expands on these themes and is organized as follows.**

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the changing trade and trade policy landscape during the review period (2014–2022). Chapter 3 describes the modalities of Fund work on trade and evaluates the Fund’s bilateral and multilateral coverage of key trade issues. Chapter 4 elaborates on the emerging challenges in global trade and provides a roadmap for reinvigorating the Fund work to meet these challenges. The accompanying Background Paper provides technical information and in-depth analysis of several key trade issues.

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<sup>2</sup> Section II of the Background Paper discusses the Fund’s role in capacity development on customs administration.

**Box 1. Past Recommendations and Actions Taken**

*This box describes key Executive Board conclusions from the 2015 Review of the Role of Trade in the Work of the Fund. The second and third columns summarize both IEO (2019) and staff comments.*


<b>2015 Trade Review Recommendation</b>	<b>IEO (2019) Comments</b>	<b>Staff Comments</b>
<p>To better embed trade in IMF surveillance work, Directors called for “enhancing efforts to translate key implications from the evolving trade landscape and continuing analytical work” into IMF surveillance, and for “further developing a work agenda for the Fund for the next five years.”</p>	<p>IEO (2019) noted that translating “multilateral surveillance work into practical bilateral policy advice remains a work in progress, as authorities would appreciate more specific and well-tailored advice...” and encouraged deepening “bilateral trade policy surveillance and advice beyond the largest economies....”</p>	<p>Multilateral surveillance reacted to shocks that affected trade and trade policy, but given limited resources and the need to respond to major global developments, coverage of trade policies in bilateral surveillance has been focused on systemic countries. This review proposes developing a specific work agenda to address the current gaps in trade policy coverage.</p>
<p>Directors felt “coverage of trade issues in Fund surveillance should be tailored to the specific needs of individual countries” and reflect varied priorities across income levels. Key areas were: (i) for AEs, “new trade policy areas such as services, regulations, and investment,” (ii) for EMDEs, “traditional liberalization and anchoring to global supply chains,” and (iii) for LICs, “sustained efforts to reduce trade costs.”</p>	<p>IEO (2019) noted that staff’s response to high stress in the trading system had “stretched available trade policy expertise and resources thin, implying less attention to other relevant issues.” “This situation may not be sustainable if trade tensions are long-lasting.”</p>	<p>Amid declining overall coverage of trade policy issues and limited resources, the focus has been on responding to major global developments (e.g., the trade war). As a result, in most cases there has remained little attention to proactive policy advice tailored to a country’s own reform needs. This review proposes to address the identified gaps.</p>
<p>Directors called for continued collaboration with the WTO.</p>	<p>IEO (2019) described cordial, effective relationships among IMF and WTO staff, leading to influential joint policy work, but identified a “generalized concern at the WTO that the Fund’s overall interaction with the institution has decreased over time ... despite the greater role of trade in the global economy and increased linkages between trade and other policies.” The small size of the IMF trade team also presented a “key person risk” for the institutional relationship.</p>	<p>Joint policy analysis with the WTO and other IOs demonstrated thought leadership and helped establish common views and perspectives. This includes an April 2022 paper on <a href="#">subsidies</a>, a 2018 <a href="#">paper</a> on reinvigorating trade and inclusive growth, and a 2017 joint <a href="#">paper</a> on how to share the gains from trade more widely. Joint staff efforts also have helped to broaden somewhat the scope of operational collaboration, such as regarding WTO accession preparations for certain IMF members, and joint advocacy on issues such as the pandemic response and food security.</p>

# THE CHANGING TRADE AND TRADE POLICY LANDSCAPE

## A. Changing Trade Landscape


*Global trade is not in retreat, but it is changing and facing mounting risks. In recent years, the growth of goods trade has decelerated, while services trade has shown more dynamism; EMs have been playing a larger role in world trade, including trading more with each other; and shocks such as the pandemic have put world trade under stress, although global value chains have so far shown resilience.*

**10. In the past three decades, the growth of goods trade has decelerated, while services trade continued to expand more rapidly (Figures 1 and 2).** Since 2011, the growth rate of goods trade has slowed to an annual average of 4.1 percent (down from an annual average of 9.1 percent during 1990 to 2008). Global goods trade also reduced as a share of global GDP, from 51.0 percent in 2008 to 46.5 in 2021. Meanwhile, the world economy experienced a robust growth of services trade from \$1.6 trillion in 1990 to \$11.5 trillion in 2021, an average annual growth rate of 6.9 percent. Trade costs in services have traditionally been much higher than those in goods but due to the advances in digital technologies, they are dropping at a faster rate—a trend that is likely to continue in the future (Chapter 4).





**11. The persistent slowdown in goods trade started before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) mostly due to structural factors.**

The rise of GVCs promoted by technological innovation and trade liberalization enabled the rapid growth of goods trade starting in the late 1980s. The increasing fragmentation of production stages across multiple countries allowed many emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) to expand their participation in international trade. However, this expansion slowed over time as the impact of technological innovation and trade reforms waned. Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta (2020) find that this slower expansion in GVCs, especially as China's growing production of intermediate goods replaced imported inputs, is a main driver of the long-term decline in the growth of goods trade (Figure 3). Other factors, such as the weakness in economic activity after the GFC, particularly in investment, and the waning pace of trade liberalization and the persistent increase in trade protectionism have contributed to holding back world trade growth (IMF, October 2016, WEO Chapter 2).




**12. The contribution of EMs to global trade has grown notably in the past three decades, albeit at a slower pace since 2011.**

As shown in Figure 4, AEs accounted for 82 percent of global goods trade in 1991. Since then, EMDEs have robustly improved their share in global merchandise trade, driven by the integration of China and other EMs in the world economy. AEs account for more than 75 percent of services trade, a share that has been fairly stable over the period (Figure 5). EMs have increased their share in services trade to 24 percent, although this growth was mostly concentrated in China and India. The low participation of other EMs and LICs points to the more limited investment and higher barriers to services trade.




**13. There has been a significant shift in the pattern of international trade flows from and towards EMDEs.**

In the past three decades, the share of trade among EMDEs has increased by more than fivefold, from 3.4 percent in 1990 to 18.7 percent in 2021 as more EMDEs participated to global value chains. The share of exports of AEs to EMDEs has been relatively stable while the share of trade among AEs in global exports has declined from 68.8 percent to 37.1 percent (Figure 6). For LICs, the major improvement has been in the share of their exports to EMs (from 0.3 percent to 2.7 percent of global exports) partly due to rising commodity demand in EMs and their growing domestic markets.



**14. Goods trade in some regions is more integrated than others, but in the last decade the shares of trade among regions have been stable across the globe (Figure 7).**

The share of goods trade within Europe and East Asia and Pacific is substantially higher compared with the other regions of the world. This higher share in part reflects the importance of regional value chains and trade reforms at the national (East Asia) and regional (Europe) level. In the past decade, the shares of regional trade have been largely stable in most areas. Deeper forms of regional trade agreements, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), can be important in promoting intra-regional trade in regions that currently display low levels of integration and support further integration into the global economy.<sup>3</sup>



<sup>3</sup> See Maliszewska and Ruta (2020) for a study of the impact of the AfCFTA.

**15. The pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine have disrupted international trade, although their long-term implications are still unfolding.** World trade sharply declined at the outset of the pandemic, but goods trade recovered quickly (see Box 2). The war in Ukraine primarily impacted trade in food and energy products (Russia and Ukraine together account for a quarter of global exports of wheat and natural gas) and had broader short-term effect through multiple channels, including logistics, especially shipping, disruptions and sanctions that were imposed on Russia and Belarus (Ruta, 2022). In the longer term, these events have contributed to reduce the trust in the open trade system and have exacerbated geopolitical tensions which are in part responsible for the surge in trade distortive measures discussed in the next section. While structural factors have played a major role in explaining long-term trends in world trade, as discussed above, the increase in trade policy activism could become a more significant headwind for trade integration.

**Box 2. COVID-19 and Trade**

**Although global trade was negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, goods trade recovered rapidly.** At their troughs in 2020Q2, goods and services trade values dropped by 12.2 and 21.4 percent, respectively, compared with 2019Q4. Nonetheless, goods trade bounced back quickly in response to strong demand while rebound of services trade was sluggish mainly because of the drastic collapse and slow recovery of travel and tourism services. The growth in services trade progressively gained momentum as COVID restrictions were removed.

**GVCs were especially affected by the pandemic, but they have proven remarkably resilient as disruptions were short-lived.** GVC-intensive industries suffered greater declines, given (by definition) their greater exposure to potential disruptions across multiple countries and that they constitute more durable goods where consumption can be postponed in times of uncertainty. This drop was quickly reversed in a sharp recovery, in contrast to previous recessions; trade in services was slower to recover due to travel and tourism (IMF, April 2022, WEO Chapter 4).


**Factors unique to the pandemic contributed to the sharp decline and faster than usual rebound in goods trade.** Lockdown policies were a key driver of the trade collapse early in the pandemic; these spillovers were mitigated in industries where telework was a possibility and have diminished over time as firms adapt to the public health measures (Espitia and others, 2022; IMF, April 2022, WEO Chapter 4).

**Annual Growth Rate of Trade Values (Percent)**



Source: WTO.

**Trade of GVC-Intensive vs. Non-GVC Intensive Industries Early in the Pandemic (January 2020=100)**



Source: WEO April 2022 – Chapter 4.

### Box 2. COVID-19 and Trade (concluded)


Fiscal and monetary stimulus, the simultaneous rotation of consumer demand away from services into durable goods in AEs, and the increase in demand for imported pandemic-related medical goods contributed to the strong rebound in goods trade, surpassing pre-pandemic levels in 2021 (August 2022 ESR–Chapter 1).

#### Global shipping costs spiked during the pandemic and further impacted trade flows.

Shipping costs soared as consumption shifted away from services to durable goods and lockdowns, labor shortages, and strains on logistics networks mounted. These effects further disrupted the world’s supply chains (Carriere-Swallow and others, 2022; Celasun and others, 2022; Komaromi, Cerdeiro, and Liu, 2022). Global container rates surged throughout 2021, but it also shows that these rates declined afterwards, and eventually returned to pre pandemic levels, as consumer spending on services recovered and pressure on global supply chains eased.

**A key policy lesson from the pandemic is the need to improve diversification through open trade as a means to enhance GVCs resilience.** Future shocks can have very different geographic origins and contagion dynamics, but some policy lessons from the pandemic are generalizable. The Fund has advised against mutually harmful export restrictions and reshoring-type policies and emphasized instead the need to increase diversification through trade to limit the disruptions that supply and demand shocks can have on GVCs. This includes moving away from domestic sourcing of inputs, and the need for greater substitutability in input sourcing (IMF, April 2022, WEO Chapter 4). Specifically, supply chain disruptions can be minimized by implementing policies that reduce trade costs, such as reducing non-tariff barriers and investing in transport and logistics infrastructure. This point is supported by recent evidence showing that non-tariff barriers on imported inputs reduced the resilience of exporters facing changes in foreign demand (Cali and others, 2022).

Global Container Freight Index and Global Supply Chain Pressure Index



Source: Freightos and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, <http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/gscpi.html>.


## B. Trade Policy

*The trade policy landscape has worsened significantly in recent years. Trade restrictions, non-tariff measures (NTMs) and subsidies have risen sharply. The stagnant pace of trade reforms has left in place trade distortions in key sectors and has weakened the multilateral trading system. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) can reduce trade costs in regions such as Africa where they have been historically high and can help advance “frontier” issues, but they should be complemented by a strong WTO.*

### Trade Measures


**16. Tariffs have decreased only slightly over time, while NTMs are on the rise (Figures 8 and 9).** Average tariffs are inversely related to development level—i.e., higher for LICs and for EMs than AEs, but the latter tend to impose higher tariffs on agricultural products and other sectors such as textile, where LICs have a comparative advantage. Average tariffs have also decreased only slightly since the early 2000s. The number of notified NTMs, meanwhile, has continued to rise steadily.

Technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) make up the bulk of this increase.<sup>4</sup> The number of contingent measures such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards, is below early 2000s levels and has remained steady over the review period, but their coverage of trade reached record levels in 2019 (Bown, 2022). AEs are relatively larger users of NTMs, although their use has increased also in EMs.



**17. Goods, more than services, trade has been hit by new trade restrictive measures.** The

number of new trade restrictive measures that increased in 2018 as trade tensions between the United States and China ramped up (see Box 3), further escalated during the pandemic, and with Russia’s war in Ukraine (see Box 4). While in recent years a higher share of these measures affects services, most new restrictions continue to apply to goods. Data from the WTO show that the share of G-20 imports that is affected by trade restrictive measures increased to



more than 11 percent in 2021 (Figure 10). In addition, the number of trade restrictions targeting high-tech sectors has increased steadily since the GFC, due to the critical role of these sectors in national security and economic competition (IMF REO: Asia and Pacific, 2022).

<sup>4</sup> Governments use NTMs to achieve various public policy goals recognized by multilateral trade rules. The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, for example, permits governments to maintain appropriate SPS protection to ensure food safety and animal and plant health.

### Box 3. China–U.S. Trade War

#### Elevated trade tensions between the United States and China resulted in rounds of bilateral tariff hikes and retaliations in 2018–19. In

summers of 2018 and 2019, the China–U.S. tariff war increased the average tariffs on Chinese goods imported to the United States from 3.8 to 21 percent at their peak, and on the U.S. goods imported to China from 8.4 to 21 percent at their peak. These tariff disputes resulted in an unprecedented spike in global trade policy uncertainty. Later, in early 2020, the two countries signed a trade agreement which did not foresee a reduction in bilateral tariffs but it effectively allowed to stop a further escalation in tariffs.

#### The China–U.S. trade war reduced trade values between the two countries and did not improve the U.S. trade balance.


Tariff escalation between the United States and China has been costly and has repressed trade between the two countries as the share of their total trade.<sup>1</sup> In the United States agriculture, transport equipment, and chemical sectors, and in China electronics, machinery, and other manufacturing sectors were the most affected. While the bilateral trade deficit of the United States with China shrank in 2019, the overall trade deficit of the United States did not improve. IMF April 2019 WEO Chapter 4 finds that bilateral trade balances are mostly driven by macroeconomic factors and changes in bilateral tariffs have a smaller role in the evolution of bilateral trade balances. The chapter concludes that targeting specific bilateral trade balances will only lead to trade diversion and offsetting in trade balances with other trading partners.

#### The trade war also led to substantial trade diversion, impacting different countries differently, and led to income losses concentrated in the United States and China.

For some emerging market economies including Mexico, India, and Malaysia, trade diversion created gains that outweighed the losses from repressed investment and negative income effects. Fajgelbaum and others (2021) show that the impact of the China–U.S. trade war has varied across countries. They find that trade among bystander countries, as well as trade between the United States and these countries, increased notably and conclude that rather than only reallocating trade flows, the trade war might have created new trade opportunities for some countries. The direct effects of the trade war were concentrated in the United States and China and were estimated by various studies to range from 0.01 to 0.1 percent of GDP in the U.S. and from 0.09 to 0.29 percent of GDP in China (Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal, 2022). These direct effects do not account for the dynamic losses caused by the trade tensions on the global economy such as those linked to the chilling effect on investment of growing policy uncertainty which is further discussed below.

#### U.S.–China Tariff Rates

(Percent)



Source: U.S.–China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart | PIIE.

#### Exports to the United States and China

(Percent of Total Exports)



Source: UN Comtrade.

<sup>1</sup> IMF April 2019 WEO estimates that a 25 percent increase in tariffs affecting all China–U.S. trade would reduce the bilateral trade between the two countries by 20 to 30 percent in the short-term and possibly up to 70 percent in the long-term depending on the model and the direction of trade.


#### Box 4. Trade and Essential Goods—Food and Medical Products

**In times of domestic or international emergencies, trade in food and medical products becomes a critical lifeline to meet acute needs and replace disrupted supplies.** Cushioning the impact of shocks affecting essential goods is not only macro-critical through its impact on economic growth, but also vital for societies' most vulnerable.

**The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine underscore the risks from beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies in food and medical products.**

- As COVID-19 began to spread in March 2020, new export bans and licensing requirements on food and agricultural commodities are estimated to have affected 9.78 percent of traded calories worldwide. This was further surpassed when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, with countries imposing restrictions amounting to 18.26 percent of traded calories worldwide (Laborde and Mamun, 2022).
- In the case of medical products, countries' initial reactions included a mix of import liberalizing and export restricting measures on trade in supplies critical to fight COVID-19 such as PPEs and ventilators (Global Trade Alert, 2022). These measures led to substantial increases in trade costs for these critical goods in 2020 and 2021 (Egger and others, 2022) and caused significant, although temporary current account implications for several countries in this period (IMF, 2021 ESR; IMF, 2021 Malaysia Article IV Staff Report).

#### Many Countries Introduced Export Taxes or Restrictions on Medical Goods (e.g., Masks, Respirators, Medicines, or Chemicals Used to Produce Medicines) During the Pandemic



Source: IMF COVID-19 Policy Survey Database (Last Update: March 2021).

**But these events also illustrate the value of multilateral trade rules.**

- The WTO contributes to medical goods trade in several ways. Negotiated binding tariff commitments have lowered trade costs and reduced uncertainty; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) balances incentives to develop new medicines with flexibilities for governments to address public health needs; the plurilateral 2015 Expansion of the Information Technology Agreement eliminated tariffs on certain modern technology-intensive medical equipment; and the plurilateral Agreement on Pharmaceutical Products eliminated tariffs and other charges on a large set of medicines and their inputs. Trade in health-related services, such as telemedicine, professional education and training, e-commerce, health insurance, health tourism, and temporary movement of healthcare workers abroad, directly impacts the supply of healthcare, and is governed by the GATS.

#### Box 4. Trade and Essential Goods—Food and Medical Products (concluded)


- Multilateral rules on agricultural goods and services, in particular regarding tariffs and subsidies (see Chapter 2), are relatively lax and form part of the unfinished WTO reform agenda. They allow for temporary export restrictions to prevent or relieve critical shortages. Nevertheless, they stipulate notification requirements and due consideration of the impacts of such restrictions on trading partners' food security. The Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity (WT/MIN(22)/28) issued at MC-12 stressed the need to avoid export restrictions, and called for emergency measures to minimize trade distortions, in particular on vulnerable countries, and to be temporary, targeted, and transparent.

**Supplying the world with COVID-19 vaccines relies on highly complex global value chains, underscoring the need for policy coordination.** The rollout of vaccines in record time was made possible by the free flow of trade in vaccine inputs, although production itself is concentrated among a small group of countries (Evenett and others, 2022). This success story was nevertheless marred by the unequal access of LDCs to vaccines. The WTO–IMF COVID-19 Vaccine Trade Tracker (WTO and IMF, 2022) was created to facilitate monitoring of global vaccine access with the aim of ending the pandemic. To this end, some emerging market economies have requested a waiver from certain obligations under the WTO TRIPS Agreement for COVID-19 drugs and vaccines in order to jumpstart their own production, which ultimately resulted in an agreement on the issue by trade ministers at the June 2022 WTO Ministerial Conference (WT/MIN(22)/30).

#### 18. Policy barriers to services trade have remained steady over the review period, and are much higher than goods trade barriers (OECD, 2021).

The average trading partner faced services trade barriers of around 80 percent in tariff-equivalent units in AEs and 172 percent in EMs, where variability was significantly greater (Figure 11).<sup>5</sup> Trade in business services faced the lowest barriers while construction faced the highest barriers. Services sectors facing lower trade costs tend to be both more productive and experience higher productivity growth (Miroudot, Sauvage, and Shepherd, 2013). Domestic regulation, which often serves legitimate policy objectives, plays a key role as a barrier, although harmonization, standards, and best practices can help lower trade costs. Deeper liberalization has the potential to unlock substantial welfare gains but has been elusive both at the multilateral and regional level.

Figure 11. Tariff-Equivalent Services Trade Restrictions (Percent)




Sources: OECD, IMF staff calculations.

<sup>5</sup> Based on the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. Regulatory barriers to services trade do not generate customs revenues but their negative impact on imports can be expressed in tariff-equivalent terms.


**19. These relatively high trade barriers faced by services compared to goods are an increasing drag on growth.** Since structural change implies growing expenditure on services relative to goods, services trade barriers become increasingly important (Lewis and others, 2022). This also has a bearing on current account imbalances by depressing the trade balances of countries with a comparative advantage in services, although estimates of the magnitude vary (Barattieri, 2014; Joy and others, 2018; Boz, Li, and Zhang, 2019). A WTO plurilateral Joint Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation and services provisions in recent RTAs such as CPTPP help lock in existing gains and prevent backsliding.

**20. Moreover, there is an increasing risk of proliferation of restrictions to the provision of cross-border services in new areas.** The WTO moratorium on the application of customs duties to electronic transmissions has discouraged such restrictions but will lapse in early 2024 unless extended by WTO members. The recent proliferation of digital services taxes (DSTs) motivated by tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) and other fiscal concerns is meant to be addressed under the G-20/OECD Inclusive Framework negotiations to reform international tax rules. Pillar 1 of the agreement would reallocate some taxing rights of digital MNEs to the countries in which they operate and remove unilateral DSTs, and failure to implement it would therefore pose additional risks to trade, including retaliatory measures to DSTs. Pillar 2 would introduce a global minimum tax that helpfully reduces the scope to use tax incentives for industrial policy purposes, particularly important for digital MNEs (“scale without mass”), but could encourage the use of other forms of subsidies. This underscores the need for greater transparency and clearer international norms on the appropriate use of subsidies more generally (IMF, OECD, WBG, and WTO, 2022).

**21. Trade distorting industrial policies, including subsidies, have gained momentum.** Subsidies can take a variety of forms (e.g., direct grants, below-market finance, tax advantages) and are difficult to quantify, but their use has risen as countries seek to respond to a range of challenges encompassing health, food, and the climate crisis (the latter prompting a debate over the appropriate design of green industrial subsidies) or try to gain a competitive edge in certain strategic sectors such as high-tech products (Figure 12). These measures are sometimes explicitly or implicitly justified on the grounds of national security. EMs have steadily increased agricultural producer subsidies over the last decades, overtaking AEs in recent years (Figure 13). Even when necessary from a public policy perspective, subsidies are costly to sustain, and can have unintended consequences such as weighing down productivity by misallocating resources (Jurzyk and Ruane, 2021) and disadvantaging foreign competitors. Sharp differences over subsidies have brought significant discord to the trading system, which makes additional work to fill data gaps and economic analysis even more of a priority (IMF, OECD, WBG, and WTO, 2022).



**22. Trade policy uncertainty has surged to unprecedented levels in recent years.** The withdrawal of the UK from the EU, the trade tensions between the United States and China, the pandemic, and Russia’s war in Ukraine have contributed to the sharp rise in trade policy uncertainty (Figure 14). While aggregate trade volumes are still growing, the current geopolitical environment and security concerns have given rise to a surge in trade distortive measures (documented below) that further feed uncertainty and negatively affect trade growth going forward. A less certain environment curtails global economic activity by suppressing firms’ investment incentives (Handley and Limão, 2022) and lowering consumers’ confidence and spending, in particular on durable goods where consumption can more easily be delayed (Altig and others, 2020). A one standard deviation hike in trade policy uncertainty (e.g., March to June 2018, when the United States introduced tariffs and trading partners retaliated) is estimated to reduce investment by 2.5 percent and GDP by 0.4 percent within three years (IMF 2022 REO: Asia and Pacific). The weakening of the dispute settlement mechanism at the WTO makes it more likely that trade tensions erupt into trade protectionist measures—a point further discussed below.



## WTO and Trade Agreements

**23. The multilateral trade agenda has been sluggish; relaunching it requires updating the WTO system to address new and emerging issues.** The slow pace of multilateral reforms has left in place major obstacles and trade distortions, and the failure to address these issues has contributed to recent trade tensions. In response, at the 2018 Buenos Aires Summit, G-20 Leaders called for the “necessary reform of the WTO”—a call that continues to be reaffirmed by Leaders. The reform agenda has focused on four areas. First, strengthening WTO rules, such as those on subsidies, investment disciplines, intellectual property rights protection and enforcement, and flexibilities for developing countries. Second, improving transparency, including through notification requirements and independent monitoring—an area where practice has fallen short.<sup>6</sup> The third area is restoring effective dispute settlement by resolving the current impasse over Appellate Body vacancies. The final area is reaching new market-opening agreements in areas relevant to the modern economy (such as e-commerce, services, and investment facilitation).


**24. The June 2022 WTO Ministerial (MC-12) included several positive developments, but broader liberalization and WTO reform will require further progress, including a pragmatic approach in which subsets of WTO members move ahead.** In December 2021, 67 WTO members concluded negotiations on a Joint Initiative (JI) on Services Domestic Regulation (SDR), making it the first WTO services deliverable since the 1997 agreement on financial services, and the first JI to reach conclusion. At MC-12, members reached an agreement on fisheries subsidies, an extension to the long-standing moratorium on electronic transmissions duties, and a partial five-year waiver from WTO intellectual property rules for COVID vaccines. Trade Ministers also agreed at MC-12 to work toward a roadmap on WTO reform and to conduct discussions with ‘the view’ to having a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system by 2024.<sup>7</sup> Negotiations toward agreements on e-commerce and investment facilitation continue. Where possible, this should involve the whole membership, but experience also shows that it can be valuable, where necessary and legally feasible, to proceed within the WTO on a plurilateral basis, among sub-sets of the membership.

**25. While progress on the multilateral agenda stalled, RTAs mushroomed globally and increased their depth.** The number of RTAs such as the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) rose from below 50 in 1990 to over 350 today. Many of these agreements have “deepened” (Figure 15), extending their reach beyond tariffs and precisely in those behind-the-border areas where the WTO has been unable to deliver such as subsidies and state-owned enterprises, services, and investment (Mattoo, Rocha, and Ruta, 2020). More recently, RTA activity appears to have slowed down and, in some cases,

<sup>6</sup> According to the [WTO Secretariat](#), and as of May 2022, 94 members had still not submitted their 2021 subsidy notifications, 78 members had not submitted their 2019 subsidy notifications, and 67 had yet to submit their 2017 notifications.

<sup>7</sup> WTO, [MC-12 Outcome Document](#), June 22, 2022.

countries have turned to novel approaches such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) which primarily aim at regulatory cooperation rather than market-opening.



**26. RTAs contribute to reduce trade costs and can be useful laboratories for regulatory innovation but need to move in complement with multilateral integration to avoid fragmentation.** The WTO and the multilateral system's unique strengths cannot be duplicated in RTAs and countries need the institutional framework of the WTO to ensure that RTAs can co-exist with an open multilateral trade system. The WTO's global reach, inclusiveness, and institutional, legal, and enforcement characteristics cannot be matched, and are particularly important to smaller countries and LICs, who rely on stable rules and open access to larger markets. Crucially, the WTO provides governments and policymakers with a set of consistent rules that support informed decision making and efficient markets.

**27. Negotiations of WTO-based plurilateral agreements have gained momentum and can be another way to advance the trade agenda.** Several plurilateral initiatives are moving forward at the WTO, including those on e-commerce and investment facilitation, while negotiations for a plurilateral agreement on Services Domestic Regulation concluded in December 2021. Innovations in the 2017 Trade Facilitation Agreement, which allows for variable speeds and depths of integration, may also help to point a way forward. While WTO-based plurilateral agreements may be a helpful way to rekindle trade integration, some members have argued that this approach may not be legally consistent with the WTO rules and principles.

## MODALITIES OF FUND WORK ON TRADE

*A three-pillared evaluation shows the Fund's strengths of responding to shocks and key trade events with high quality coverage in surveillance and analytical outputs, but also a decline in attention to trade policy overall. Further investment is needed to keep up with policy areas of growing importance, anticipating headwinds to globalization and better translating multilateral surveillance into bilateral policy advice.*

### A. Methodology

**28. The analysis is based on three complementary evaluation approaches aimed at the systematic review of bilateral and multilateral work between 2014 and 2022.** The first approach involves textual analysis to assess the coverage of trade developments and trade policies in multilateral surveillance, bilateral surveillance, and program reviews. The textual analysis uses a search software to calculate the number of trade-related words and phrases, covering 2002–2022 to help establish a longer-term perspective on the Fund trade work. The second approach is a survey of IMF country teams regarding their Article IV and program staff reports.<sup>8</sup> The third approach relies on a review of multilateral surveillance and research work in consultation with external experts (Professors Douglas Irwin and Nina Pavcnik at Dartmouth College and Professor Amit Khandelwal at Yale University) who assessed the coverage of key themes in the overall output and examined in greater depth the quality and relevance of a subset of outputs. The methodology is further detailed in Section 3 of the Background Paper.

### B. Review of Multilateral Surveillance and Research

*The review of multilateral surveillance showed timely coverage of key issues such as supply chain resilience, state-owned enterprises, and the importance of rules-based trade to the global economy, but also identified areas for further investment (e.g., policies underlying trade tensions, services and digital trade, development issues, climate change).*

**29. The textual analysis of the IMF flagship products<sup>9</sup> suggests that the coverage of trade issues has increased in the past two decades while attention to trade policy topics has been marginal.** The result of the textual analysis reveals that coverage of trade developments grew in multilateral surveillance (Figure 16).<sup>10</sup>

- Multilateral surveillance in some cases showed timely reaction to shocks that affected trade and trade policy. For example, following the outset of the China–U.S. trade war, more attention was


<sup>8</sup> Over 120 responses, representing all regions and income levels.

<sup>9</sup> The textual analysis was done on World Economic Outlooks (WEOs), External Sector Reports (ESRs), Global Financial Stability Reports (GFSRs), Fiscal Monitors (FMs), and Regional Economic Outlooks (REOs).

<sup>10</sup> The textual analysis exercise is performed on three disjoint sets named BOP, trade, and trade policy. Each set includes multiple topics, and each topic contains several keywords. For a detailed list of words and topics, please see Section 3 of the Background Paper.


dedicated to trade integration and trade tensions. More recently, with the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the Fund flagships studied the resilience of GVCs and the trade effects of geopolitical tensions.

- With the exception of the China–U.S. trade war, the attention to trade policy topics has been marginal. For example, the textual analysis does not detect the launch of the WTO Doha Round in late 2001 nor the breakdown in negotiations in 2007 and 2008.



**30. In line with the aggregate trend, the Fund has been responsive to selected trade policy developments but was not consistent in its coverage.** Figure 17 shows that flagship products increased their coverage of tariffs and NTMs after the outset of the China–U.S. trade war. Similarly, there is an increase in focus on RTAs in correspondence to the approval of large RTAs such as the African Continental Free Trade Area.<sup>11</sup> The search for keywords related to multilateral trade agreements confirms that the coverage of MTAs in IMF flagship documents has declined over time and has been unresponsive to key developments in WTO negotiations such as the launch of the Doha Round and the breakdown of its negotiations.

<sup>11</sup>April 2019 WEO–Chapter 4, April 2019 Sub-Saharan Africa REO–Chapter 3, and October 2019 Sub-Saharan Africa REO–Chapter 1.




**31. The report by the external experts stressed the quality and policy relevance of the Fund's output on trade (see Figure 18 and Box 5).<sup>12</sup>** The strengths of the Fund were the ability to respond rapidly to shocks affecting trade with high-quality analysis, including the China–U.S. trade war, pandemic, and Russia's war in Ukraine, and to cover a wide array of trade topics, spanning GVCs, spillovers, currency pass-through and invoicing, aggregate gains from trade, knowledge flows, and commodity prices. The consistently high quality and policy relevance of WEOs drew special praise.

<sup>12</sup> Quality and policy relevance are rated 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Here 10 denotes the frontier or state-of-the-art research methodology for quality, or utmost policy relevance as assessed by the external experts.

### 32. External experts made three sets of recommendations, which are in line with staff views:

- The core trade areas deserve continued attention but would benefit from more granular analysis.** These core issues include the analysis of spillovers through GVCs, the uneven impacts of trade on workers, complementarities with development policies and institutions, and interactions with climate policies. Regionally, more attention could be devoted to Africa, given its persistent trade-related challenges and potential for growth and reforms (and the role of IMF-supported programs).
- The Fund needs to further analyze “modern” trade areas that have increasing macroeconomic ramifications.** The coverage of services trade should be improved to meet their growing economic significance. A more extensive treatment of areas where globalization continues to advance rapidly (digitalization, e-commerce, cross-border data flows, regulatory harmonization) in multilateral surveillance would be highly impactful in the global policy debates.



- The Fund should not fall behind in its use of new data and tools.** Trade work requires investment in more granular data (including firm-level data and trade policy data) and specific expertise, including through training. In most cases, new data can best be developed in collaboration with other IOs. Internal workshops could be held on state-of-the-art empirical, modeling, and forecasting methods (e.g., gravity models and quantitative trade models), which better account for country-specific frictions and market distortions, and thus allow for more targeted policy advice.

**Box 5. Select Management Engagements and Research on Trade**


*This box provides a snapshot of select IMF Management engagements on trade, including speeches and conferences, as well as trade-related research outputs during the review period (2014–2022). A more complete list of activities and publications in this area are included in the online appendix.*

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Flagship and G-20 Reports</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 2022, Chapter 4: "<a href="#">Global Trade and Value Chains in the Pandemic</a>".</li> <li>• April 2020, Fiscal Monitor Chapter 3: "<a href="#">State-Owned Enterprises: The Other Government</a>".</li> <li>• April 2019, Chapter 3: "<a href="#">The Price of Capital Goods: A Driver of Investment under Threat?</a>"</li> <li>• April 2019, Chapter 4: "<a href="#">The Drivers of Bilateral Trade and the Spillovers from Tariffs</a>".</li> <li>• October 2018, <a href="#">Chapter 1</a>, Section: "Risks" and Scenario Box 1: "Global Trade Tensions".</li> <li>• July 2018, G-20 Surveillance Note Annex: "<a href="#">The Global Impact of Escalating Trade Actions</a>".</li> <li>• October 2016, Chapter 2: "<a href="#">Global Trade: What's behind the Slowdown?</a>".</li> <li>• July 2016, "<a href="#">Group of Twenty – Reinventing Trade to Support Growth: A Path Forward</a>".</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Joint Papers and Statements with other International Organizations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 2022, "<a href="#">Subsidies, Trade, and International Cooperation</a>". (IMF-OECD-WB-WTO)</li> <li>• April 2020, "<a href="#">Joint Statement on Trade and the COVID-19 Response</a>". (IMF and WTO)</li> <li>• September 2018, "<a href="#">Reinvigorating Trade and Inclusive Growth</a>". (IMF-WBG-WTO)</li> <li>• April 2017, "<a href="#">Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment</a>". (IMF-WBG-WTO)</li> <li>• October 2016, "<a href="#">How to Make Trade Work for Everyone</a>," op-ed by Christine Lagarde, Jim Yong Kim, and Roberto Azevedo.</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>High-level Events and Speeches</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 2022, "<a href="#">Preserving Open Trade: Subsidies, Geopolitics, and International Cooperation</a>" – Joint IMF-World Bank-WTO-OECD Panel.</li> <li>• October 2019, "Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policy-Making: The Case of WTO Accession" – Joint IMF-World Bank-WTO Conference.</li> <li>• December 2018, "<a href="#">Why a New Multilateralism Now?</a>" – Remarks by First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton at the Bloomberg Global Regulatory Forum.</li> <li>• October 2018, "<a href="#">How Global Trade Can Promote Growth</a>" – Joint IMF-OECD-World Bank-WTO conference for the 2018 Annual Meetings.</li> <li>• November 2017, "<a href="#">Sixth IMF-WB-WTO Trade Conference</a>".</li> <li>• October 2016, "<a href="#">Making Trade an Engine for Growth for All</a>" – Annual Meetings Seminar.</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Other Research Outputs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• September 2021, "<a href="#">Carbon Pricing: What Role for Border Carbon Adjustments?</a>".</li> <li>• May 2020, "<a href="#">The African Continental Free Trade Area: Potential Economic Impact and Challenges</a>".</li> </ul>

## C. Review of Country Coverage

The textual analysis and the country team survey show consistent attention to trade issues, in line with the continued relevance of trade for IMF member countries. In contrast, the analysis shows a significant decline in the coverage of trade policy despite the surge in the number and complexity of trade measures.

**33. The textual analysis of Article IV surveillance and program review documents shows most of the focus has been on balance of payments (BOP) assessments.** This is consistent with the findings of the 2015 review.<sup>13</sup> Keywords and phrases used in the textual analysis for BOP assessment—imports, exports, trade, trade balance, and the WTO BOP committee—occur with high frequency and are more than three times higher than word counts for other trade and trade policy issues (Figure 19).<sup>14</sup> Separating these words and phrases allows for a more complete picture of coverage of “trade issues” beyond BOP assessments, including topics ranging from trade in goods and services to spillovers, trade and technology, and fragmentation, to “trade policy issues,” which include topics such as tariffs, non-tariff measures, trade war, RTAs, and MTAs.




**34. The coverage of trade issues in IMF reports kept up with the long-term trend of trade becoming a more prominent part of IMF members’ economies.** For the median IMF member (goods plus services) trade as a share of GDP surged over time from 69 percent in 2002 to 86 percent in 2022. Moreover, trade issues came to the forefront under the period covered by this review, especially since 2018 with the growing trade tensions between China and the United States

<sup>13</sup> The higher coverage of BOP-related topics is expected given that Article IV documents include an External Sector Assessment and program documents include a discussion of recent external sector developments.


<sup>14</sup> A “weighted” textual analysis exercise, where weights are defined as the share of GDP of countries in the world GDP, shows that the coverage of BOP and trade topics remains the same, but the coverage of trade policy issues nearly doubles to 0.1 percent. This reflects the higher attention in staff reports to trade policy developments in large economies such as China and the United States, as further discussed below.

and also since the beginning of the pandemic with the severe disruptions to GVCs and trade in essential goods as documented in Chapter 2. This is most visible in the chart for LICs—the coverage of trade topics was relatively flat prior to the pandemic and picked up after 2020 driven by key words related to disruptions to GVCs and trade in food and medical products (Figure 20).




**35. Over time, the coverage of trade policy in Article IV surveillance and program review documents has notably declined, even as the importance of trade policy issues increased.** This declining pattern is present across countries with different income levels, apart from the coverage by AEs during Brexit and the trade war (Figure 20). In addition, bilateral surveillance for China and some East Asian economies included higher coverage of trade policy issues during the trade war which offsets the declining attention to trade policy developments in EMs and LICs in other regions during the last decade.<sup>15</sup> The overall decreasing coverage of trade policy issues may reflect a sustained decline in trade policy support for country teams, even as the number of trade measures increased and trade policies themselves grew more complex. It also suggests that there may be persistent difficulties in translating multilateral surveillance into bilateral policy advice—a finding that is consistent with the 2015 Trade Review and requires careful thinking for a forward-looking strategy.

**36. Consistently with the textual analysis, the country team survey also shows a noticeable difference between trade and trade policy coverage.** While the country survey was not able to assess historical trends and focused on the last three years or reports (unlike the textual analysis), trade issues were covered to a greater degree over trade policy issues which, in contrast, were overwhelmingly assessed to be only minimally or somewhat covered both in aggregate and across income levels (Figure 21). In addition to the determinants as described above, country teams cited several reasons for gaps in their overall coverage, including space constraints, need to cover other more pressing issues, and limited relevance.



<sup>15</sup> To provide a benchmark for comparing the ratios depicted in the textual analysis charts, we have counted the number of paragraphs (instead of words) that cover trade and trade policy matters in the United States and China 2015 and 2018 AIVs. For the United States, in 2015, 3 paragraphs mentioned trade issues and 2 paragraphs mentioned trade policy issues, but these numbers increased to 13 and 17 paragraphs in 2018, respectively. For China, 5 paragraphs discussed trade matters and 2 paragraphs covered trade policy issues. The coverage in 2018 increased to 12 and 13 paragraphs for trade and trade policy issues, respectively.


**37. At the same time, textual analysis shows that country coverage has reacted promptly to key events related to trade (Figure 22).** This finding is consistent with the results of textual analysis for multilateral surveillance. For example, attention to fragmentation increased around developments in Crimea in 2014 and with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Trade in essential goods (food and medical products) had higher coverage during the food crises of 2008 and 2012, and at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, coverage of issues related to supply chains surged as bottlenecks emerged starting in the second half of 2020, and attention to issues related to the China–U.S. trade war spiked in 2018 as China–U.S. tensions mounted.<sup>16</sup>



<sup>16</sup> This surge was driven by AIV reports for China and the United States but also from key countries facing significant spillovers (e.g., Vietnam, Mexico).


**38. In contrast to trade issues, the coverage of most trade policy topics has declined in bilateral surveillance and program reviews (Figure 23).** The coverage of tariff-related issues in staff reports has declined as the relative importance of tariff barriers has decreased in the past decades. However, textual analysis shows that this has not been matched by an increase in coverage of non-tariff measures—although some attention was devoted to this around 2016 (Brexit referendum) and 2018 (China–U.S. trade war). In addition, as documented in Chapter 2, many countries prioritized RTAs over multilateral negotiations as the multilateral trading system weakened. Incognizant of these developments, the coverage of all of these topics declined in bilateral surveillance. This is a surprising finding considering that many RTAs include commitments that can have implications across economic policy, including in areas relevant to the Fund (e.g., service sector reforms, investment, worker mobility, tariff reductions).

**Figure 23. Textual Analysis of Trade Policy in Bilateral Surveillance**  
(Percent, Related Words Over Total Number of Words)



Source: Textual analysis exercise of AIV surveillance and program review documents by IMF staff.

**39. In addition to looking at overall trade and trade policy coverage, the country team survey also sought to assess responsiveness to key events.** The survey focused on three specific developments during the review period: (i) the China–U.S. trade war and trade tensions, (ii) trade and the pandemic, and (iii) trade and the war in Ukraine. The results largely showed a responsiveness to these events, with the exception of the China–U.S. trade war and associated trade tensions (Figure 24). A higher proportion of AEs assessed the trade war and trade tensions to be well-covered than EMs and LICs who overwhelmingly responded that coverage was minimal. Trade and the pandemic was generally well-covered, but with more minimal coverage in LICs. The majority of responses indicated that trade and the war in Ukraine was well or very-well covered—a fact that is consistent across income groups. This differences in coverage between the three events could partially be explained by the nature of the shock. For example, the country teams may have assessed the trade war as having a more targeted impact on country groups whereas the pandemic and the war in Ukraine had more global ramifications.<sup>17</sup>



<sup>17</sup> Consistently, the coverage of trade policies in Article IV surveillance was correlated with the underlying trade policy uncertainty in the country. This correlation was strongest during periods of heightened trade tensions (2017–2020) indicating that attention was highest in more critical contexts.

**40. The findings from the textual analysis and the survey are corroborated by a closer look at Article IV reports which suggests uneven trade policy coverage, and little attention to domestic policies to share the gains from trade and technology more widely.** For example, in the largest economies, bilateral surveillance provided policy advice on trade policy issues such as reversing trade restrictions (in the context of the China–U.S. trade war), refraining from using trade measures to address currency concerns, and encouraging state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to act commercially. At the same time, there was little attention to the development impact of large country policies, and few calls to reform domestic trading regimes. Engagement in multilateral trade negotiations received modest attention and was largely focused on G-20 economies. With some important exceptions, there was little attention to domestic policy reforms that would help to share the gains from trade more widely.


## FUTURE AGENDA AND PRIORITIES

### A. Emerging Challenges in Global Trade


*Policymakers face key trade and trade policy challenges related to climate change and technology, the growing use of trade policy to achieve non-trade objectives, and the mounting risks of runaway geo-economic fragmentation.*

#### Challenge 1: Structural Forces Such as Technology and Climate Change are Poised to Reshape Global Trade


**41. Climate change and extreme weather events lead to shifts in comparative advantage.** Climate change affects comparative advantages across all sectors—in particular, agriculture, fisheries, and tourism—by changing the availability and productivity of the different factors of production (i.e., capital, labor, and land). Moreover, recurrent climate-related disasters disrupt trade flows and supply chains, impede capital investment, and impact labor availability through migration. Figure 25 shows that climate change presents significant economic challenges for LICs and especially Small Island Developing States (SIDS) whose exports rely on ‘climate sensitive’ sectors. While these countries are not among the top carbon emitters, they are expected to face the most adverse consequences of global warming.



**42. Widespread adoption of new technologies (e.g., industrial robots, 3D printing, AI, digital money) can impact trade in several ways.** They may decrease both domestic and cross-border trade costs by reducing transaction and transportation costs, while the spread of automation decreases the role labor costs in firms' sourcing decisions.<sup>18</sup> Uneven adoption of these technologies is likely to influence the patterns of comparative advantage among countries. Thus far, however, there is little empirical evidence for new technologies having an aggregate impact comparable to the ICT revolution of the 1990s that catalyzed GVCs. In fact, Figure 26 shows that foreign value-added in domestic final demand in AEs has not changed significantly in the last decade. Contrary to the view that new technologies will reduce trade opportunities, some recent studies show that the utilization of 3D printing has boosted international trade (Freund, Mulabdic, and Ruta, 2022) and the use of robots has been associated with growing exports of intermediates from developing countries (Artuc, Bastos, and Rijkers, 2020).



**43. Digitalization promotes growth of services trade by making some previously non-tradeable services tradable and facilitates goods trade through e-commerce.** For example, nowadays, some services can be provided via “telemigration” where firm and labor are located in two different countries. Beyond easing trade in traditional services, digitalization has given rise to a host of new services such as e-health services (see Background Paper, Section 4.C).



Digitalization also may alleviate structural challenges for trade finance (see Background Paper, Section 4.B). Overall, the emergence of new technologies is expected to intensify the growth of services in global trade in the near future—a trend that is already emerging from current trade data (Figure 27). At the same time, new technologies give rise to various challenges related to regulations, privacy protection, market concentration, and the digital divide across and within countries. Section 4.1 of the Background Paper includes a discussion of similar issues with regard to the rise of digital currencies.

<sup>18</sup> See Section 4.A of the Background Paper for a discussion of the implication of digital money for international trade; Section 4.B of the Background Paper focuses on the broader issue of payment systems and trade.

**44. Governments will need to anticipate these changes and adjust their policy stance so as to recognize that:**

- **These structural forces will create winners and losers within and across countries.** Uneven impacts by country and industry, on workers of different skill levels, and in different geographical regions will necessitate looking beyond the necessary adjustments to macroeconomic policies to prevent adverse effects on inequality. This entails investment in traditional and digital infrastructure, education and skills, and labor market policies that reduce worker dislocations, as described in Box 6.
- **Countries should take advantage of new growth opportunities.** As global factors reshuffle comparative advantages, countries can support their firms and workers to be better positioned to benefit. For example, the growing share of services relative to goods trade shifts the emphasis from tariffs (which have on average remained low) to a need to liberalize and harmonize more complex and often more restrictive behind the border regulatory barriers, data policies, taxation, and competition policies. The rising demand for environmentally friendly goods and services also offers new opportunities along the value chain.

**Box 6. Trade, Worker Dislocation, and Policies to Share the Trade Gains More Widely**

**The impact of import competition on workers is often misunderstood.** On one side, many economists and policy makers long-failed to appreciate how intensified import competition could affect workers in domestic import-competing industries, particularly when those industries are geographically concentrated, and workers find it difficult to change firms, occupations, or locations. On the other side, these effects are often misinterpreted as harming low-income households more generally; this has diverted attention from the main drivers of inequality and amplified calls to restrict trade.

**The bulk of empirical evidence indicates that trade has at most a modest impact on income inequality within countries.** Experience varies from country to country, but the review by Helpman (2016) concludes that trade is not a main factor behind increased inequality overall, as technology has played the key role. In the IMF, an early WEO chapter pointed to technology as the main driver of increased inequality, with financial globalization also contributing, while “trade globalization is associated with a reduction in inequality” (IMF, April 2007 WEO). A decade later, another WEO chapter (IMF, April 2017 WEO) found that technological change is a main driver of the downward trend in the labor share of income, although expansions of global value chains may also be contributing by raising the capital intensity of production.

**While neglected in many studies, there is a strong pro-poor bias in lower prices and consumer choice that comes with trade.** Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) find that in each of the forty advanced and middle-income countries they examine, closing off trade would disproportionately harm the poorest households. In advanced economies, trade is estimated to have reduced by two-thirds (one quarter) the cost of household consumption of a typical low-income (high-income) household. This “pro-poor” bias arises because poor consumers spend relatively more on traded products (e.g., food and beverages) and thus experience larger price drops when trade is opened.

**Trade is also associated with more, better paid and better-quality jobs for women.** Trade exposure in manufacturing sectors reduces the gender wage gap, since firms find it more costly to discriminate (Black and Brainerd, 2004), and because women’s wages are less affected due to their relatively lower switching costs out of manufacturing (Brussevich, 2018). Moreover, exporting firms, where wages and conditions are

### Box 6. Trade, Worker Dislocation, and Policies to Share the Trade Gains More Widely (continued)

generally better, are also found to employ substantially more women than non-exporting firms (WB and WTO, 2020).

**At the same time, trade has left many individuals and communities behind (IMF, WB, and WTO, 2017).** The downside to increased import competition has often been concentrated, harsh, and prolonged. Perhaps most dramatically, in part reflecting the impact of pro-market reforms in China, beginning about 2000 in many advanced economies the manufacturing sectors faced sharply increased import competition. (This occurred even as other sectors benefitted from reduced prices of imported inputs and from increased Chinese demand for their products.) Studies such as Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Pierce and Schott (2016) show that the areas most exposed to competition from Chinese manufacturers (due to their industrial structures) experienced significant losses in jobs and earnings.

**Unless workers are able to move and change jobs easily, these negative local effects can be stubbornly persistent, with prolonged economic and social consequences.** Slow capital adjustment and labor mobility frictions can amplify the initial shock (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015). At the individual level, knock-on effects of the long-term unemployment spells include poorer health outcomes, higher mortality, and lower educational achievements by children (Pierce and Schott, 2016). The persistent socioeconomic effects can also impact the domestic political economy (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a; 2018b).

**This is an avoidable outcome, as suitable domestic reforms can deliver the benefits of open trade policies and help to ensure that those benefits are widely shared.** As discussed in a joint paper for the G-20 by IMF, World Bank, and WTO staff (IMF, World Bank, and WTO, 2017), declining worker mobility (across sectors, regions, and skills) has impeded adjustment and concentrated the negative effects of import competition on particular groups of workers and particular communities. Domestic policies that ease the adjustment to trade can also strengthen overall economic flexibility and performance, helping workers to move more rapidly into expanding sectors. Faced with adjustment pressures, whether from technology, trade, or other forces, improving worker mobility should be a priority.

**IMF, WB, and WTO (2017) examine policy options to aid adjustment in detail.** A stable macroeconomic environment and broadly open trade policies can minimize other labor market disruptions and promote new job opportunities. Adequate social safety nets and other “passive” labor market policies can give displaced workers the opportunity to pursue training and job search on their own and can also help to minimize worker anxiety over import competition. Training programs, job-search assistance, and other “active” labor market programs can facilitate rapid re-employment. By promoting worker mobility and economic flexibility more generally, complementary policies in areas such as housing, credit, and education can facilitate movement from declining sectors, regions, and specific jobs to expanding areas. Finally, although assessments of their effectiveness have been mixed, targeted, trade-specific support programs can complement broader labor market programs. Enabling targeted and place-based policies requires measuring (and anticipating) local trade exposure, the focus of recent work that extends Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) by incorporating export expansion (Feenstra, Ma, and Xu, 2019) and the role of GVCs and input-output linkages (Jakubik and Stolzenburg, 2021).

**Attention to these issues in IMF surveillance has been mixed.** Multilateral surveillance and collaboration with other IOs should now place greater emphasis on adjustment pressures from technological change and increased import competition, including with respect to services trade. Labor market inefficiencies were often highlighted in bilateral surveillance, but only a few Article IV Staff Reports have linked this to technological changes and import competition, for example:


### Box 6. Trade, Worker Dislocation, and Policies to Share the Trade Gains More Widely (concluded)

- The 2016 Report for the United States calls for negative effects of trade on workers to be mitigated through training, temporary income support, and job search assistance, including deployment of the existing trade adjustment assistance program (IMF, 2016).
- The 2017 Report for Korea calls for “flexicurity” to adapt to the demands of technological and structural change, encompassing flexible hiring and firing, active labor market policies, and unemployment insurance (IMF, 2018a).
- The 2017 Report for the UK calls for active labor market policies (ALMP) to help Brexit-affected workers to change sectors, since reductions in trade will likewise generate adjustment pressures (IMF, 2018b).
- Going forward, staff can explore ways to bring out more regularly advice on policies to help share the gains from trade and technological progress more widely, linking this into countries’ wider structural reform agenda.

## Challenge 2: Trade is Increasingly Intertwined with Non-Trade Areas, such as the Environment, Inequality and Inclusion, Food Security, and Public Health

**45. Keeping trade open and predictable remains critical to addressing pressing global challenges from poverty to climate change and food and health security.** Open trade and the rules-based trading system have been an engine of growth, particularly in EMDEs, and allowed millions of people to raise their living standard and exit poverty (see Background Paper, Section 4.C; WB and WTO, 2015). The need to follow through with the unfinished agenda of securing and further liberalizing trade, for instance in medical goods, agriculture, and environmental goods, has become increasingly evident: (i) unimpeded global supply chains were necessary to produce vaccines to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic; (ii) food imports are critical for the livelihood of many, especially in low income and fragile countries; and (iii) global value chains are indispensable in manufacturing the environmental goods necessary for the energy transition, such as solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries.

**46. At the same time, trade policies are increasingly motivated by and harnessed to accomplish non-trade objectives.** This trend is evidenced for instance by the proliferation of environmental and labor standard clauses in RTAs (Figure 28) and the adoption of a border carbon adjustment mechanism in the EU to complement domestic carbon pricing. These measures can address negative externalities associated with open trade, but their design poses challenges to policymakers and requires international cooperation. Moreover, recent export restrictions by some countries have been motivated by food security and national security concerns. Import restrictions also have a long history of being motivated as means of protecting workers in certain industries. Even when these concerns are legitimate, addressing them through trade measures can adversely affect other countries. In other cases, the concerns may mask protectionist intent.



**47. Trade policy actions in response to currency tensions have raised particularly important issues for the Fund (Box 7).** The use of trade agreements to promote public reporting of foreign exchange intervention and other policy information can be constructive, although the threat of punitive trade measure to enforce such provisions could be of concern. Of most concern, however, would be the threat of punitive trade measures in response to currency undervaluation; in its bilateral surveillance, the Fund should continue to speak out against the use of trade measures to address perceived currency issues. The importance of these issues has receded in the past two years, but could rise again in the event of a widening of external imbalances or currency tensions that arise for other reasons.

#### Box 7. Currency Issues in Trade

**Some governments have turned to trade agreements and trade measures in the hope of addressing currency disagreements, including most prominently actions by the United States during 2017–21.**

While pressures have ebbed since early 2021, they may intensify in the event of a widening of external imbalances. Some actions present important risks to trade, monetary policy independence, and to the Fund’s surveillance over members’ exchange rate policies and oversight of the international monetary system (IMS) and can complicate Fund surveillance. Other forms may be benign or even constructive.

- *Using trade agreements to promote transparency and dialogue.* This includes a 2015 Joint Declaration by the macroeconomic policy authorities of TPP countries reaffirming their obligation under the IMF Articles of Agreement to avoid manipulating exchange rates or the IMS for certain purposes, detailing their intention to publicly report foreign exchange intervention and foreign reserves data, and to consult regularly to address macroeconomic issues. The [Joint Declaration](#) was not retained by CPTPP participants following U.S. withdrawal from the TPP. In 2018, Canada, Mexico, and the United States brought similar provisions inside the USMCA, Chapter 33, “Macroeconomic Policies and Exchange Rate Matters” and provided that compliance with transparency and data provision requirements can be challenged through formal USMCA dispute settlement. To the extent that provisions in trade agreements are limited to transparency, and especially when they are alongside (rather than a part of) the trade agreement and clearly under the control of the exchange rate authorities, these provisions can be constructive.

### Box 7. Currency Issues in Trade (concluded)

- *Using countervailing duties (CVDs) to address currency misalignment.* This concerns treating undervaluation of the currency of another country as a foreign subsidy and placing additional tariffs (CVDs) on imports from that country. Many countries allow a domestic firm or industry to seek protection from subsidized imports that have injured the industry, consistent with provisions of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). A 2019 domestic U.S. rule change explicitly allows the U.S. investigating authorities to consider currency undervaluation as a subsidy for these purposes and at least two investigations (concerning China and Vietnam) proceeded. The currency component of CVDs actually applied under the investigations appears to be limited.
- *Other unilateral tools.* In 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) opened a separate investigation into Vietnam’s currency valuation and currency practices under Section 301 of U.S. trade law—the first time Section 301 was used to investigate currency issues. Section 301 authorizes USTR to restrict trade when a foreign action “is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.” USTR found on January 15, 2021, that “Vietnam’s acts, policies, and practices with respect to currency valuation, including excessive foreign exchange market intervention ... are unreasonable and burden U.S. commerce, and are thus actionable under section 301.” This finding authorized USTR to restrict imports of Vietnamese products. Under the new U.S. Administration that took office on January 21, 2021, the Treasury Department reached an agreement with the State Bank of Vietnam; in July 2021, USTR indicated that “no action under the Section 301 investigation is warranted at this time because Vietnam’s agreement with Treasury provides a satisfactory resolution of the matter....”

**The mixing of currency and trade can raise several important issues.** It has not triggered significant trade restrictions, but a renewed period of currency or trade tensions could trigger them and perhaps lead to retaliatory measures. Individual governments could use varied tools and exchange rate assessment methodologies, detracting from a core role of the Fund, politicizing assessments, and weakening the Fund’s oversight of the international monetary system. Independent monetary policymakers could be pressured to adjust monetary policy to avoid having their country’s exporters subject to additional trade restrictions. Moreover, although there may be legitimate issues of currency undervaluation or manipulation, punitive actions by other countries are unlikely to be a constructive way to address them. Such concerns have been expressed by the IMF Executive Board, including when concluding the 2021 Article IV consultation with the United States and in discussing the Fund’s 2021 External Sector Report.

**The use of CVDs or other unilateral actions can also give rise to formal WTO dispute settlement cases, in which the Fund could be requested by the WTO to participate.** These could test, for example, whether currency undervaluation could be considered a “subsidy” that can be countervailed under the WTO ASCM, in which the Fund may be consulted on its exchange rate assessment.

**The issues here require the Fund to exercise its full roles in exercising surveillance over members’ exchange rate policies, overseeing the international monetary system, helping members to maintain economic stability, and promoting the balanced growth of international trade.** Excessive external imbalances can drive currency and trade tensions, and the Fund will need to vigorously identify emerging issues and advise on policies to avoid excessive imbalances. While fact-based analysis, surveillance, and dialogue among macroeconomic policy authorities can be effective, unilateral trade actions seem more likely to prove counterproductive. With this in mind, Fund bilateral surveillance should speak out vocally against the use of trade measures to address perceived currency issues.

**48. The use of trade policy to achieve climate adaptation and mitigation goals illustrates the challenges faced by governments.** Mitigation measures to reduce emissions include carbon pricing. Concerns over carbon leakage may prompt governments to consider complementary trade

measures, such as border carbon adjustments (BCAs) (Parry and others, 2021). Subsidies on environmentally friendly products are another mitigation tool but may require trade policy cooperation to avoid distorting competition and negatively affecting trading partners. Facilitating the adoption of environmental goods and services, for example by lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers through WTO negotiations on an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), would also contribute to mitigation efforts (WTO, 2022). Adaptation measures assist countries to adjust to the impacts of climate change and include diversifying toward sectors less sensitive to climate change. Section 4.D of the Background Paper includes further discussion on the interaction between trade and climate change.

**49. Governments will need to cooperate to keep trade open and carefully assess the impact of their measures on economic and non-economic outcomes, at home and abroad.** A careful examination of the possible costs and benefits of using trade restrictions to achieve non-trade objectives is warranted, particularly when other policy options are available. The Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity (WT/MIN(22)/28) issued at MC-12 was a promising step in this direction, as it stressed the need to limit export restrictions on food, and requiring emergency measures to minimize trade distortions, in particular on vulnerable countries, and be temporary, targeted, and transparent. Greater international cooperation can help to ensure that measures such as “green subsidies” are designed to effectively address climate goals without unduly distorting trade and investment as when they are accompanied by discriminatory requirements (IMF, OECD, WBG, and WTO, 2022).

### **Challenge 3: The Rise of Geopolitical Tensions Threatens the Multilateral Trade System**

**50. The increasing use of trade measures and industrial policies may destabilize the multilateral trade system.** Since 2018, trade uncertainty has risen to unprecedented levels, weighing down investment and growth in affected countries (Figure 14). This uncertainty captures a growing risk of geo-economic fragmentation (GEF) driven by unilateral measures that are increasingly introduced for strategic reasons, such as national strategic objectives, security considerations, strengthening sovereignty, enhancing autonomy by reducing reliance on others, or strategic economic rivalry among nations or groups of nations. Unilateral trade measures such as export restrictions on critical raw materials or technology have negative spillover effects. Subsidies may help to address market failures, but a disorderly subsidy race (among those that can afford it) and discriminatory trade provisions would promote costly countermeasures. Fragmentation and frictions tend to reduce economic efficiency and put upward pressures on prices as they drive a wedge between demand and supply; while some countries may derive strategic advantages in selected sectors, significant economic costs are very likely incurred on aggregate (see Box 8 and Background Paper, Section 4.E).

### Box 8. The Macroeconomic Consequences of Geo-Economic Fragmentation

**The adverse consequences of geo-economic fragmentation (GEF) could transmit through multiple channels to the global economy.** A long period of increasing global integration in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century came with many benefits through multiple channels, not least for EMs and LICs. A reversal of these benefits would entail sizeable costs (Aiyar and others, 2023):

- The unraveling of **trade links** and introduction of new trade barriers would most adversely impact low-income countries and less well-off consumers in advanced economies.
- Restrictions on **cross-border migration** would deprive host economies of valuable skills while reducing remittances in migrant-sending economies.
- Reduced **capital flows** would hinder financial deepening in destination countries, especially through foreign direct investment as a source of **technological diffusion** across national borders.
- A decline in international cooperation would put at risk the provision of vital **global public goods**, such as action on climate change and pandemic preparedness.
- The **uncertainty** associated with fragmentation can itself take a toll on investment and productivity.

**Recent studies provide preliminary quantification exercises of the costs of fragmentation in trade and technology.** Since fragmentation is a recent phenomenon, work on estimating its costs is limited. Four recent studies model domestic and global GDP losses primarily due to trade and technology barriers under a variety of assumptions on restrictions, bloc formation, trade substitution, and countries considered:

- **IMF 2022 REO: Asia and Pacific** examines the cost of eliminating trade in the high-tech manufacturing and energy sectors across rival blocs that form according to the voting pattern on the motion to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in March 2022.
- **Bolhuis, Chen, and Kett (2023)** put a particular emphasis on the role of commodities, comparing a mild scenario of partial trade restrictions between different blocs with a more severe scenario of zero inter-bloc trade, using a new dataset of production and trade in a large number of sectors.
- **Cerdeiro and others (2021)** study the costs of three cumulative layers of fragmentation, including a trade layer, a sectoral misallocation layer, and a layer of reduced foreign knowledge diffusion under a range of fragmentation scenarios featuring looser and stricter ties of countries to specific blocs.
- **Góes and Bekkers (2022)** zoom into the effect of lower knowledge diffusion across countries on productivity and domestic output when the global economy is divided into an Eastern bloc and a Western bloc based on UNGA voting records.

**Estimates from these studies vary widely depending on modeling assumptions but suggest substantial costs under most scenarios.** The cost to global output from trade fragmentation could range from 0.2 percent (in a limited fragmentation/low-cost adjustment scenario) to up to 7 percent of GDP (in a severe fragmentation/high-cost adjustment scenario); adding technological decoupling could push the loss in output to 8 to 12 percent in some countries. These uncertainties aside, the papers collectively suggest:

- The costs are greater the deeper the fragmentation.
- Technological decoupling would significantly amplify losses from trade restrictions.
- Transition costs are likely to be large since it takes time and effort to reconfigure supply chains.
- EMs and LICs are likely to be most at risk when they lose access to knowledge spillovers.
- Existing estimates likely do not represent an upper bound since they abstract from additional GEF transmission channels, including through labor flows, capital flows, global public goods, and uncertainty.


**51. The multilateral trading system is ill-equipped to resist these pressures.** Global rules of conduct on unilateral measures could help reduce the risk of fragmentation, preventing miscalculation and tit-for-tat retaliation. However, negotiations to address emerging and long-standing sources of tensions have all but stalled at the WTO (Chapter 2.B.). Collective action is needed to revive discussions in key areas, such as subsidies disciplines. Moreover, the WTO's potential for generating transparency and predictability is hampered by severe delays in members' notifications. Finally, the WTO dispute settlement system has been reasonably successful at helping members navigate sensitive issues arising from non-trade concerns in the past such as restrictions on biotechnology (GMOs) and hormones. However, at present, without a quorum at the Appellate Body, the system is unlikely to produce durable solutions to the increasing number of disputes, including in controversial areas such as national security.

**52. Governments should collectively aim to preserve an open, transparent, and stable trade system, which is crucial for the effective functioning of the global economy.** Geopolitical realities suggest two important principles for policymaking. First, with respect to measures taken for national security reasons, close involvement of economic policy officials in the design and use of certain national security measures (such as investment screening) seems to play a positive role. Second, any trade restrictions should be applied judiciously and as narrowly as possible to minimize efficiency losses, while reducing the risk of tit-for-tat responses by trading partners and dampening the risk of runaway geo-economic fragmentation.

## B. Reinvigorating Fund Work on Trade to Meet Current Challenges

*This section outlines a Fund strategy on trade that can help governments address key trade-related challenges in coming years. Given the scale of the challenges, the proposed strategy would boost the profile of the Fund's trade work in line with its institutional mandate, while leveraging collaboration with the WTO and other international organizations.*

**53. A reinvigorated trade strategy should bring macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial perspectives to the challenges identified above (Figure 29).** Guided by economic principles and practical experience, the Fund should continue to advocate for and support more open, stable, and transparent trade policies, whether through unilateral, regional, or multilateral means. A strong multilateral trading system is central to these goals and the Fund will bring a more active voice to major global trade policy debates, including on strengthening the WTO. The Fund should also maintain its preference for non-discrimination in trade policies and should emphasize the development impact of trade-related policies of advanced economies and of emerging market and developing economies, including low-income countries.



**54. To best meet the Fund’s broad mandate on trade, the proposed strategy sets out a Fund role that aims to be both selective and effective.** Across multilateral surveillance, bilateral surveillance, capacity building, and the use of fund resources (UFR), this means:

- **Selectivity.** Fund work on trade will focus on trade topics of macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial relevance—and, in turn, bring macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial perspectives to these topics. With considerable high quality analytical and policy research outside the Fund, staff will build on and complement the work of academics, think tanks, and other international organizations wherever possible.
- **Effectiveness.** Fund work on trade will continue to respond with agility to provide timely intellectual leadership on important global, regional, and national trade policy issues. To further bolster bilateral surveillance of trade issues, staff will invest in developing practical guidance for area department country teams and others that will, in turn, underpin timely, consistent, and evenhanded policy advice.

**55. Staff see the need to scale up its internal trade policy expertise.** The decline in Fund resources dedicated to work on trade since the mid-2000s is visible in the decline of trade policy coverage in Article IV discussions and staff reports, identified in Chapter 3. A lack of adequate resources in this area may effectively impede the Fund from properly fulfilling its mandate at a time when the complexity and number of trade policy measures is ramping up, and new trade challenges are emerging (Chapter 4.A). The importance of a critical mass of Fund expertise in this area was also emphasized by the IMF Independent Evaluation Office in 2009 (IEO, 2009) and the 2015 Trade Review (IMF, 2015).

**56. This scale up will be achieved through reprioritization within the existing budget envelope, focusing on providing analytical trade tools to country teams and strengthening the network of trade expertise within the Fund.** The scale up of the Fund’s trade expertise will be attained primarily by increasing the number of staff devoted to trade in the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, achieved via internal reprioritization. The expanded trade team within SPR will enhance support of the country teams by providing the needed tools such as trade policy databases, studies on key trade issues, and notes on policy advice. This will help country teams to provide quality and evenhanded advice when trade policy is a relevant issue. Since the trade work is decentralized across Fund departments, staff will also strengthen the internal mechanisms for channeling tools to country teams and, more broadly, exchanging information on trade with area and other functional departments.

**57. A failure to act could carry important enterprise risks for the Fund.** The Fund could be seen as losing agility and not delivering on its mandate if it does not respond to key emerging challenges relevant to today’s global economy and its membership across all income levels. Not tackling the identified gaps in the coverage of trade policy issues could also raise concerns about the lack of evenhandedness in Fund advice. At the same time, staff recognize that the proposed trade strategy could risk over-reach and duplication with the work of other IOs. This risk, however, can be effectively mitigated by collaborating with other IOs, most notably the WTO, as discussed below.

**58. Fund work on trade should continue to be carried out through three main channels:** (i) multilateral surveillance, analysis, and advocacy; (ii) bilateral surveillance; (iii) and trade-related collaboration with other international organizations.

- **Analysis and multilateral surveillance** will continue identifying major trade-related developments and risks and provide intellectual leadership and the analytical underpinnings for Fund policy positions. These efforts should give particular attention to macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial perspectives of key trade issues. For example, the Fund can contribute data and analysis on fiscal and quasi-fiscal subsidies that would also be useful in informing the important global debate over the trade implications and the design of subsidies to meet legitimate domestic policy goals with minimal impacts on trading partners. Scaled-up *advocacy* will inject Fund analysis and policy positions into global and regional policy debates. This would often concern the WTO and related global policy debates, but it would also extend to major regional issues.
- The Fund should also redouble efforts to **translate analysis and multilateral surveillance into bilateral surveillance** in light of the increasing use of trade measures and new industrial policies (Chapter 2.B). This will involve enhancing support for area department country teams, so that the depth of coverage of trade policy issues is determined primarily by Fund-wide surveillance criteria rather than by constraints on in-house trade policy expertise. Examples of enhanced support could include developing practical trade policy guidance in selected areas, with additional tools; developing databases that could be easily accessed by country teams to obtain relevant information, such as on trade policy developments; and, where needed, assistance for

country teams to support trade policy discussions with national authorities. Where regional initiatives are an important driver of reforms at the national level, such as under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the Fund can help national authorities to adjust their macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial frameworks to get the best results from their implementation of the regional initiative.

- **Trade-related collaboration** will blend the Fund’s core responsibilities on macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial issues with the specific competencies of other IOs and bring these to bear on policy issues that cut across the responsibilities of multiple IOs, including by following through on the built-in agenda presented in the recent paper on subsidies. While respecting institutional mandates, staff will also increase advocacy for the WTO and support the G-20’s call for WTO reform, including by exercising the Fund’s role as a WTO observer organization to build a more vocal and regular presence in WTO discussions (for further discussion of IMF–WTO cooperation see Background Paper, Section 1). Through its collaboration with other IOs, the Fund can also support improved data and information for trade policy analysis. In critical areas, such as on the risks of geo-economic fragmentation, the Fund could partner with the WTO to create a multilateral platform for sharing information on cross-border restrictions motivated by strategic considerations and their rationale, providing analysis of cross-border spillovers, and supporting deliberations among key players on ways to address them.<sup>19</sup> Staff will also work to improve cooperation and coherence in regard to individual countries, including in areas like surveillance, trade policy monitoring, and WTO accessions.

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<sup>19</sup> In some cases, strategic trade policies may be introduced for national or international security reasons. In the case of security motivated policies, the Fund work would be limited to economic considerations and would avoid discussion of the political or military considerations leading to the measures. The Fund had previously acknowledged in other policy areas (in particular with respect to exchange restrictions over which the Fund has a unique mandate), that the Fund does not provide a suitable forum for discussion of the political and military considerations leading to policy actions. A similar approach was recently endorsed by the Executive Board for capital flow management measures (CFM). It was agreed, with respect to CFMs, that while the macroeconomic implications of security-based measures that are CFMs will be discussed in Article IV consultation reports in line with the Integrated Surveillance Decision where macro-critical or if they generate significant outward spillovers, their appropriateness under the Institutional View will not be assessed, and staff will not advise on their removal or recommend alternative policies. The Fund’s engagement on strategic trade policies introduced for security reasons will, similarly, avoid discussion of the political or military considerations that underlie these policies and will focus solely on analysis of the economic impacts and spillovers. The Fund will not recommend alternative policies or opine on the effectiveness of the trade measures to achieve the underlying security objectives.

### Box 9. Cooperation with the WTO and Other International Organizations (IOs)

**Robust cooperation with other IOs is central to fulfilling the Fund’s mandates to facilitate expanding trade and conduct effective surveillance.** In the past few years, staff have stepped up certain aspects of cooperation, with positive results: high-profile joint policy papers have visibly contributed to the global policy debates, and cooperation around WTO accessions has been very constructive. Yet an earlier broad decline in the Fund’s trade work “came at the cost of constructive roles in trade issues central to financial and systemic stability” and the “relationship with the WTO... declined substantially from the mid-2000s” (IEO, 2019). The 2019 IEO report also identified “a generalized concern at the WTO that the Fund’s overall interaction with the institution has decreased, notwithstanding the recent period of intensified cooperation and despite the greater role of trade in the global economy and increased linkages between trade and other policies”.

**Into the 2000s, the IMF engaged very actively in the GATT and (later) the WTO to voice a macroeconomic perspective in global trade debates, to advocate for open trade, and to promote coherence in the policies of the two institutions vis-à-vis their common members.** Before modern communications technologies, the IMF Geneva Office, with several professional staff, represented Fund views and perspectives in formal meetings of WTO members (as an “official observer”), in frequent informal meetings with Geneva-based ambassadors and other national delegates, and with the ILO and other Geneva-based IOs. This was supported by dedicated trade staff in IMF headquarters (with broader trade functions) and by engagement of Washington-based senior staff and Management, particularly during periods of WTO negotiations. Staff regularly prepared Executive Board papers on WTO developments and sought guidance on Fund positions; through this channel, staff also encouraged finance ministries to bring a macroeconomic perspective to their own government’s trade policy positions.

**Reduced cooperation broadly followed contraction in other IMF trade work.** Fund trade positions did not exceed 1 percent of total staff in the early 2000s and are around 0.1 percent today. This trend may have reflected the major trade reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s, and a belief that the WTO and a “built-in” negotiating agenda would deliver new agreements to exploit new opportunities and address new challenges as trade and the global economy evolved. Some believed that the WTO would play a trade policy role like that of the Fund in international finance. In fact, however, WTO members designed the institution with active monitoring and transparency functions but, unlike the IMF surveillance function, with no mandate to provide policy advice. WTO staff and management have a limited ability to initiate proposals and work with members to develop support for them.

**The Fund’s re-engagement in certain areas has been enthusiastically welcomed, but the previous level of overall WTO engagement has been missed, particularly as trade tensions mounted and the multilateral trading system came under threat.** The creation of the WTO has not eliminated the need for an IMF role in trade policy; according to IEO (2009), “without a strong IMF presence on [systemic] issues, the global debate misses a critical player.” Several senior trade diplomats expressed similar sentiment to IMF staff during recent visits to the WTO.

**Recent improvements in some areas of joint work, strong personal relationships, and the formal structure under the IMF–WTO Cooperation Agreement provide the foundation to further strengthen cooperation.**

- With the April 2022 joint paper (with OECD, WB, and WTO) on [Subsidies, Trade, and International Cooperation](#) staff have continued the new tradition of joint work on major issues in global trade, to communicate a joint view on issues that cut across the competences of several IOs. The paper followed a joint paper (with the WB and WTO) for discussion by G-20 Sherpas in 2017, [Making Trade an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment](#), and [Reinvigorating Trade and Inclusive Growth](#), for discussion at the IMF/World Bank 2018 Annual Meetings. Heads of institutions jointly launched these reports.

**Box 9. Cooperation with the WTO and Other International Organizations (IOs) (concluded)**


- IMF and WTO staffs have worked closely together to enhance the role of IMF country teams in facilitating the country's WTO accession. This included a joint IMF, WB, and WTO conference at the 2019 Annual Meetings, chaired by the WTO Deputy Director-General, and intensified information sharing and staff collaboration.
- IMF staff have worked effectively with staffs of other IOs on urgent international priorities, including recent initiatives on vaccines and food security.
- As needed, Fund and WTO staff work to ensure that Fund policy advice is consistent with WTO rules.
- Staff are again making occasional presentations to WTO members, a practice that had fallen off sharply.
- Annual joint trade research conferences (with WB and WTO) build awareness of ongoing analytical work.

**59. These channels will continue to be supported by:**

- **Use of Fund resources.** Fund arrangements include continuous performance criteria that call for members to avoid imposing or intensifying import restrictions for balance of payments reasons. Close operational collaboration with WTO staff and the WTO Balance of Payments Committee, as envisioned in the IMF–WTO Cooperation Agreement, will continue to ensure policy coherence. While trade policy conditionality would remain limited, staff will pay increased attention to avoiding or correcting tariff increases and other trade policy reversals that frustrate balance of payments adjustment and create policy uncertainty.
- **Capacity building.** Fund capacity development related to trade has been focused on customs administration, complementing the assistance by other international organizations on trade facilitation and implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) (see Background Paper, Section 2). Capacity development in this area is critical and will continue to focus on helping customs authorities to improve compliance with the domestic law and import / export regulations. In this context, future work will place greater emphasis on digital transformations of customs operations. In addition, the IMF Legal Department will continue to provide assistance in tax law design and drafting in trade and trade-related areas like corporate income tax (e.g., cross-border incentives), and excise, trade, and value-added taxation.

**60. Trade priorities will reflect the level of development, tailored to country circumstances**

**(Figure 30).** Regardless of their development level, it is important for the economic growth and stability of all countries that trade takes place under an open, stable, and transparent rules-based trading system, including mechanisms for the prompt and effective resolution of trade-related disputes so as to promote policy certainty. Fund policy advice will regularly remind members of the practical importance of their constructive engagement in the WTO and abiding by their WTO obligations.



- **For advanced economies**, a key priority is to reduce the risks of trade fragmentation by avoiding new trade and investment restrictions and other discriminatory policies wherever feasible—these actions can create damaging policy uncertainty and destabilize the rules-based international trading system. In particular, authorities should strike a careful balance between efficiency and national security considerations, including in the context of new industrial policies. The Fund will continue to raise these important issues with national authorities and in public, with an exclusive focus on the economic considerations and without discussing or assessing the political or military considerations leading to such measures. Other priorities include to further reduce barriers to imports of agriculture, textiles and clothing, and other goods and services of export interest to developing economies; and to reduce barriers to digitally enabled and other services trade. Many advanced economies also need improved policies to facilitate adjustment to, and better share the benefits from, technological changes and increased import competition. This can include passive and active labor market policies as well as investments in trade-related infrastructure.
- **Many emerging markets** would benefit greatly from further traditional liberalization of goods and services markets and completing the move away from import-substitution policies. Trade policy should be better integrated into the Fund work on structural reforms, which is especially relevant for emerging markets stuck in the so-called middle-income trap. Where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important in international trade, for example, Fund policy advice should help governments to ensure that these operate on a commercial basis that promotes even-handed competition with private foreign and domestic firms. This is especially important as the increasing role in international trade of SOEs that receive significant public support risks distorting trade and investment patterns and stoking trade tensions.

- **Low-income countries** can least afford the distortions and costs that result from restrictive trade and investment policies, but for them it is especially important to complement this openness by improved trade facilitation (e.g., trade infrastructure and economic institutions), and increased access to regional and global markets. The Fund can help by building and maintaining macroeconomic stability, supporting key successful structural reforms, taking into account a country's implementation capacity, and with related technical assistance, such as promoting more efficient domestic revenue sources and further reducing reliance on trade taxes. The Fund can also advise on the pace of reforms and their sequencing with other aspects of the overall reform packages. The Fund's advocacy for a strong, rules-based trading system is especially important for LICs, whose export development prospects depend on an open, stable, and transparent global trading environment.

**61. Staff see several ways how Fund work on trade could address critical trade challenges in the next several years, often by working across multiple channels (Table 1).** Action to build trade openness and resist trade fragmentation, for example, would cut across multilateral surveillance and advocacy, bilateral surveillance, and inter-institutional cooperation. Another aspect would highlight the domestic economic effects and international spillovers from export restrictions and other critical industrial policy and national security measures to better inform the unintended consequences of many such measures. This, too, cuts across the competencies and mandates of various international organizations where carefully defined cooperation to address gaps, avoid duplication, and promote policy coherence and analytically based dialogue among national governments could help to develop more common perspectives on the appropriate use and design of such measures.

## ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

- In Directors' view, what key factors will shape global trade policy in the coming years?
- Do Directors agree with the three key challenges identified by staff: (i) structural forces reshaping trade; (ii) interplay between trade and non-trade objectives; (iii) and risks and spillovers from geo-economic fragmentation?
- Do Directors support the main elements of the staff's reinvigorated trade agenda? Does the proposed strategy address the identified challenges, and does the strategy meet the specific needs of Fund members across regions and stages of development?

Table 1. Examples of Priorities in a Proposed IMF Trade Strategy

	<b>Multilateral surveillance, analysis, and advocacy</b>	<b>Bilateral surveillance</b>	<b>Collaboration with WTO &amp; other IOs</b>
<b>Structural forces</b>  Examples: digitalization, new technologies, services, climate change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assess impact of structural forces (e.g., digitalization; climate change) on trade, and identify broad policy lessons;</li> <li>Assess benefits and risks (e.g., on labor markets) of greater services trade.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote greater services openness;</li> <li>Provide tailored advice on domestic policies to help share the gains from trade and technology more widely.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Joint policy advocacy on open services trade;</li> <li>Improve data on services trade and policy.</li> </ul>
<b>Non-trade objectives</b>  Examples: climate, labor adjustment, food security, health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop policy positions on key trade-related issues (e.g., border carbon adjustments);</li> <li>Highlight economic costs of food trade restrictions, and the impact of other trade policies with non-trade objectives;</li> <li>Explore effects of trade policies on non-trade outcomes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide tailored policy advice on trade-related climate issues (e.g., tax design)</li> <li>Provide tailored policy advice on alternative paths to food security</li> <li>Highlight impact of other trade policies motivated by non-trade objectives; consider policy alternatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote dialogue and policy coherence on use of trade measures for non-trade objectives;</li> <li>Support development of best practices around use of trade measures for non-trade objectives.</li> </ul>
<b>Risks and spillovers from fragmentation; building openness</b>  Examples: subsidies, new industrial policies, national security measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highlight broad effects of restrictive trade regimes and trade fragmentation, including on development;</li> <li>Assess cross-border spillovers from subsidies and other policies; assess cooperative solutions when appropriate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Actively promote open, stable, and transparent trade policies;</li> <li>Provide policy advice on key new industrial policies; explore alternative designs;</li> <li>Note the macroeconomic effects of trade-related national security measures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring, analysis, and advocacy in key areas;</li> <li>Seek coherence of policy advice across institutions, exploit synergies;</li> <li>Build dialogue on economic spillovers from trade policies;</li> <li>Improve data, analysis, and dialogue on the use of subsidies.</li> </ul>

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